Abstract
The paper argues against systematic overdetermination being an acceptable solution to the problem of mental causation within a Humean counterfactual theory of causation. The truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical to physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental to physical counterfactuals.
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Esfeld, M. Causal Overdetermination for Humeans?. Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 99–104 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0061-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0061-3