Abstract
In this paper, we develop a neo-Humean response to the problem of moral inclusion by bringing Humean moral philosophy into deep and serious dialogue with Latin American philosophy. Our argument for achieving this two-fold aim unfolds as follows. In section one, we elucidate Mia Sosa-Provencio’s conception of a mestiza ethics of care. We begin by highlighting its fundamental elements, especially its concern with what we refer to as the cultural embeddedness both of moral agents and of moral patients. We then explain how this aspect of the mestiza ethic poses a distinctive challenge for Humean moral philosophy. In section two, we develop a neo-Humean response to this challenge. We begin by highlighting the strengths and limits of trying to develop a response by appealing to Hume’s conceptions of sympathy and humanity. We then present what we take to be the most plausible way for a neo-Humean conception of moral philosophy to offer a satisfactory reply to the challenge posed by the mestiza ethics of care, by appealing to two key concepts from outside the system of Hume’s moral philosophy: namely, sympathetic understanding and relational humility.
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Notes
By “neo-Humean” all we mean is an account of moral philosophy that remains essentially Humean while incorporating insights that go beyond and might even be at odds with Hume’s own moral philosophy—as, e.g., Philippa Foot’s neo-Aristotelian account of virtue ethics does with Aristotle’s philosophy and contemporary natural science.
On this point, Sosa-Provencio’s critique of a white feminist ethics of care is similar to Sandel’s critique of the Kantian conception of “unencumbered agents”—see, e.g., Sandel 1984: 90–1; cp. 1996: 7–11.
E.g., concerning the role of the family in a patient’s deliberations.
We say “certain forms” since Hume acknowledges morally vicious forms of partiality—see, e.g., T 2.2.4.2; 3.2.2.8.
Cp. T 2.2.5.14-5; 2.2.6.4; see also Vitz 2002.
For a helpful discussion of Hume’s conception of “social power” and of the role of “general rules” in contributing to “the phenomenon of social distance,” see Taylor 2015: 70–98.
For a helpful discussion of this topic as it relates to Hume’s views on slavery, see, e.g., Watkins 2019: 75–79. See also Hume’s comments on weak sympathy leading to contempt (T 2.2.9.15).
For a helpful presentation of the essential details of Hume’s conception of a cultivated sense of humanity, see, e.g., Taylor 2015: 175–184.
For helpful discussions of Hume’s conception of gallantry as it relates to humanity, see Taylor 2015: 187–8.
In a similar vein, see, e.g., Hume’s description of the process of moral assessment of people in relation to the narrow circle in which they move (T 3.3.3.2). For a related discussion of the role of reason as it relates to sympathy and civic friendship, see Kekes 1984.
Cp. T 1.3.8.2; 2.3.10.6; see also T 3.3.3.5.
For a helpful discussion of related implications concerning the “delicacy of taste,” see Watkins 2019: 193–199.
Perhaps the most egregious example is his treatment of “negroes” in “Of National Characters.” For recent commentaries on Hume’s treatment of race, see, e.g., Willis 2016; Watkins 2019. For recent commentaries on his treatment of sex and gender, see, e.g., Falkenstein 2015; Taylor 2015; and Watkins 2019. For related concerns regarding Hume’s treatment of sexuality, see Watkins 2019: 185, 209–211.
See, e.g., Schmidt 2020.
The neo-Humean approach we propose relies on a person’s attentively seeking to understand another with an openness to being vulnerably affected by his or her condition. This differs from the approach taken by Dalmiya, which emphasizes the significance of seeking understanding for the purpose of cultivating empathy by means of perspective-taking. In this way, our neo-Humean proposal is more in line with a view like that of Iris Young (see, e.g., 1997: 52–53), which Dalmiya rejects (2016: 247–248).
Cp. Sandel 1996: 11–17.
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Espinoza, M., Vitz, R. Cultural Embeddedness and the Mestiza Ethics of Care: a Neo-Humean Response to the Problem of Moral Inclusion. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 24, 1091–1107 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10256-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10256-7