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To be or not to be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights

Charles R. Beitz: The Idea of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 256 pp.

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Notes

  1. See: Beitz (1979/1991).

  2. For prominent examples of naturalistic theories, see: Griffin (2008), Buchanan (2004), Nussbaum (1997).

  3. The unequivocal proponent of agreement theory about human rights is Michael Walzer (1994). The other proponents of agreement theories listed by Beitz, such as Joshua Cohen (2008) and Charles Taylor (1999) are less obvious candidates, but I leave that question aside.

  4. See, for instance: Griffin (2008: 207–208), where the human right to work is dismissed as non-genuine.

  5. See: Rawls (1999: 78–82).

  6. See: Tasioulas (2007) and Nickel (2001).

  7. These considerations make up Beitz’s recommended ‘schema’ for justifying claims about the content of human rights (111–112, 137–138). That Beitz understands human rights violations to serve as a pro tanto justification for a host of international remedial actions, including aid, assistance, advocacy, and punitive sanction, differentiates him from other theorists who endorse a solely intervention-based practical conception of human rights, i.e. Raz (2010) and Rawls (1999).

  8. Griffin (2008: 37–39).

  9. Article One, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

References

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Acknowledgments

My thanks to John Tasioulas, Roger Crisp, Kimberley Brownlee, and S. Matthew Liao, who read and provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this review article.

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Correspondence to Adam Daniel Etinson.

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Etinson, A.D. To be or not to be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights. Res Publica 16, 441–448 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9121-3

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