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CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES

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Abstract

Games associated with congestion situations à la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Second, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Giovanni Facchini, Freek van Megen, Peter Borm & Stef Tijs

Authors
  1. Giovanni Facchini
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  2. Freek van Megen
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  3. Peter Borm
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  4. Stef Tijs
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Facchini, G., van Megen, F., Borm, P. et al. CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES. Theory and Decision 42, 193–206 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004991825894

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004991825894

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