Abstract
The Duhem–Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by appealing to a cluster of virtues called ‘good sense’, and it has recently been argued by Stump (Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 18(1):149–159, 2007) that good sense is a form of virtue epistemology. This paper considers whether Quine, who’s philosophy is heavily influenced by the very thesis that led Duhem to the virtues, is also led to a virtue epistemology in the face of underdetermination. Various sources of Quinian epistemic normativity are considered, and it is argued that, in conjunction with other normative commitments, Quine’s sectarian solution to underdetermination amounts to a skills based virtue epistemology. The paper also sketches formal features of the novel form of virtue epistemology common to Duhem and Quine that challenges the adequacy of epistemic value truth-monism and blocks any imperialist naturalization of virtue epistemology, as the epistemic virtues are essential to the success of the sciences themselves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Battaly H. (2001) Thin concepts to the rescue: Thinning the concepts of epistemic and intellectual virtue. In: Fairweather A., Zagzebski L. (eds) Virtue epistemology: Essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 98–116
Battaly, H. (2006). What is virtue epistemology? World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy of values. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuBatt.htm
Bergstrom L. (1993) Quine, underdetermination and skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 60(7): 331–358
Bloomfield P. (2000) Virtue epistemology and the epistemology of virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 23–43
Bonk, D. (2008). Underdetermination: An essay on evidence and the limits of natural knowledge. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 261. New York: Springer.
Brady M., Pritchard D. (2006) “Epistemic virtues and virtue epistemology” with Pritchard, D. Philosophical Studies 130: 1–8
Code, L. (1987). Epistemic responsibility. University Press of New England for Brown University.
Duhem, P. M. M. (1954). The aim and structure of physical theory (P. P. Wiener, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fairweather, A., & Zagzebski, L. (Eds.), (2001). In Virtue epistemology: Essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibson R. (1987) Quine on naturalism and epistemology. Erkenntis 27(1): 57–78
Greco J. (1993) Virtues and vices of virtue epistemology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23: 413–432
Greco, J. (2004). Virtue epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
Greco J. (2009) The value problem. In: Haddock A., Millar A., Pritchard D. (eds) Epistemic value. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 313–321
Haack S. (1993) The two faces of Quine’s naturalism. Synthese 94(3): 335–336
Houkes E. (2002) Normativity in Quine’s naturalism: The technology of truth seeking. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33(2): 251–267
Hylton P. (2007) Quine. Routledge, London
Ivanova M. (2010) Duhem’s good sense as a guide to theory choice. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(1): 58–64
Kim J. (1988) What is epistemology naturalized?. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 381–405
Laudan, L. (1990). Demystifying underdetermination. In W. Savage (Ed.), Scientific theories (pp. 267–297). Series: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Montmarquet J. (1993) Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham
Neta R. (2008) How to naturalize epistemology. In: Pritchard D., Hendricks V. (eds) New waves in epistemology. Palgrave, New York, pp 324–353
Nozick R. (1997) Socratic puzzles. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Pritchard D. (2007) Recent work on epistemic value. American Philosophical Quarterly 44: 85–110
Quine W. V. (1953) From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Harvard
Quine W. V. (1960) Word and object. MIT Press, Cambridge
Quine W. V. (1966) The ways of paradox. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Quine W.V. (1969) Epistemology naturalized. In: Quine W.V. (ed.), Ontological relativity and other essays. Columbia University Press, New York
Quine W.V. (1975) On empirically equivalent theories of the world. Erkenntnis 9: 313–328
Quine W. V. (1981) Theories and things. Harvard University Press, Harvard
Quine, W. V. (1986). Reply to white. In H. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court.
Quine W. V. (1992) The pursuit of truth. Harvard University Press, Harvard
Royce J. (1908) The philosophy of loyalty. Macmillan, New York
Searle J. (1987) Indeterminacy, empiricism and the first person. Journal of Philosophy 81: 123–146
Sher G. (1999) Is there a place for philosophy in Quine’s theory?. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 91–524
Sosa D. (1991) Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Sosa E. (2007) Apt belief and reflective knowledge, Volume 1: A virtue epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Stanford K. (2001) Refusing the devil’s bargain: What kind of underdetermination should we take seriously?. Philosophy of Science 68: S1–S12
Stroud, B. (1984). The significance of philosophical skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Stump D. (2007) Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 18(1): 149–159
Zagzebski L. T. (1996) Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fairweather, A. Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology. Synthese 187, 673–692 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9868-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9868-2