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Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference

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Abstract

We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of some information to maintain consistency, instead of being withdrawn it will be kept and introduced in a different layer with lower value. Throughout this development we will follow the principle of minimal change, being one of the important principles proposed in belief change theory, particularly emphasized in the AGM model. Regarding the reasoning part from the stratified belief base, the agent will obtain the inferences using an argumentative formalism. Thus, the argumentation framework will decide which information prevails when sentences of different layers are used for entailing conflicting beliefs. We will also illustrate how inferences are changed and how the status of arguments can be modified after a revision process.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Universidad Nacional del Sur, (8000) Bahia Blanca, Buenos Aires, Argentina

    Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García & Guillermo Ricardo Simari

  2. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina

    Marcelo Alejandro Falappa & Alejandro Javier García

  3. Technische Universitaet Dortmund, Department of Computer Science, University of Dortmund, 44221, Dortmund, Germany

    Gabriele Kern-Isberner

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  1. Marcelo Alejandro Falappa
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  2. Alejandro Javier García
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  3. Gabriele Kern-Isberner
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  4. Guillermo Ricardo Simari
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Correspondence to Marcelo Alejandro Falappa.

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Falappa, M.A., García, A.J., Kern-Isberner, G. et al. Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. J Philos Logic 42, 161–193 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9217-z

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