Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

Faraci, David; Shoemaker, David

doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z

Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

Faraci, David; Shoemaker, David

Authors

Dr David Faraci david.n.faraci@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

David Shoemaker

Abstract

Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.

Citation

Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 319-332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Mar 19, 2010
Publication Date	Mar 19, 2010
Deposit Date	Aug 31, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Sep 4, 2018
Journal	Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Print ISSN	1878-5158
Electronic ISSN	1878-5166
Publisher	Springer
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	1
Issue	3
Pages	319-332
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
Related Public URLs	https://davidfaraci.com/pubs/jojo.pdf

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Copyright Statement
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of philosophy and psychology. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z