Abstract
Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In a way, this marks the distinction between Gary Watson’s “Two Faces of Responsibility,” in Watson (2004), pp. 260–288. On the one hand there is, according to Watson, the aretaic face of responsibility, in which the relevant responsibility judgments are about moral faults in the agent: his action disclosed something bad about him and his ends, say. On the other hand, there is the accountability face, in which being responsible is a matter of being held responsible, of being subject to demands of goodwill and being susceptible to certain reactive moral emotions.
At least this was Frankfurt’s early take on the matter.
At least this was Watson’s early take on the matter. See his “Free Agency,” in Watson (2004), pp. 13–32.
See, e.g., Taylor (1976); “Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction” and “A Desire of One’s Own,” in Bratman (2007); Stump (1988); Velleman (2002); and Smith (2000). One of our own views is that the right relation consists in one’s will depending on psychic elements that ultimately depend on one’s nexus of cares. See Shoemaker (2003).
See, e.g., Watson (2004), p. 261.
For this sort of criticism, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2003), esp. pp. 371–373.
Wolf mentions the objection again very briefly in Wolf (1990), p. 37.
One might see traces of this objection in Strawson (2003).
Cf., Wolf (2003), pp. 376–379.
The language used here matters. In Wolf’s original scenario, the relevant assessment is that JoJo is not to be regarded as “responsible” for what he does (and of course the title of the article itself declares it as being about “responsibility”). “Moral responsibility” is something of a term of art in philosophy, however, and it’s not at all clear what the folk in general take it to mean. It could, after all, be taken to mean anything from “causally responsible” to “having a moral duty” to “having a role-based duty” to “being open to moral appraisal” to “living up to moral expectations” (according to which JoJo could be thought to be quite irresponsible). We thus decided to test intuitions using the term “blameworthy,” as this is less of a term of art, is likely clearer, and is still in accordance with what Wolf had in mind, it seems.
All were students at Bowling Green State University.
For each survey, N = 30. The overall ANOVA demonstrated a statistically significant difference between average responses for all three JoJo cases (F = 4.318, p = .016). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons between responses for JoJo1 and JoJo2 demonstrated a significant tendency to judge JoJo2 less responsible (p = .023). Comparisons between JoJo1 and JoJo3 demonstrated a trend towards judging JoJo3 less responsible (p = .072). Comparisons between JoJo2 and JoJo3 demonstrated no significant difference in responses (p = 1).
See, for one discussion, Nickerson (1998).
This is closely akin to finding fault with someone for her negligence. Negligence is notoriously difficult for theories of responsibility to handle adequately, in part because there doesn’t seem to be any particular action for which the agent is blameworthy; rather, it’s an absence of an action that garners fault-finding, e.g., someone’s failure to salt the ice off her sidewalks before hosting a big party (where someone falls on the ice), or someone’s being so engrossed in a conversation that he fails to look both ways and plows into another car. (For a brief discussion of the latter example, see Gary Watson, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will,” in Watson (2004), pp. 52–53.) We have no intention of solving this difficult problem here; rather, we hope to show how the scalar dimension of some assessments of responsibility may derive from considerations in this neighborhood.
It is also worth pointing out here that we are not entirely convinced that the lack of difference in assessments of JoJo2 and JoJo3 was not just due to the fact that our sample size was too small. This is, at the very least, a survey worth running again, perhaps to see if there is a difference between responses to a JoJo who has been exposed to expressions of good will and a JoJo whose exposure has actually penetrated his ignorance.
Another way to put this point: we often take basic moral claims (expressions of ill will are wrong) to be self-evident, but we also recognize that their self-evident nature can be obscured by one’s thoroughgoing exposure to bad value systems. Applying this point here helps explain why all three JoJos may be thought responsible while the extra exposure of JoJo3 is redundant.
See Scanlon (1998). See also Derek Parfit’s forthcoming book On What Matters.
The authors would like to extend their deepest thanks to Leisha Colyn for her invaluable help and advice with the experimental aspects of this paper. We would also like to thank two referees for the special issue of the European Journal of Philosophy, one of whom revealed himself to us as Eddy Nahmias. Finally, a special debt of gratitude goes to Joshua Knobe, whose ongoing encouragement and enthusiasm for this project was truly the spark of its ultimate completion.
References
Arpaly, N. 2003. Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arpaly, N., and T. Schroeder. 1999. Praise, blame and the whole self. Philosophical Studies 93: 161–188.
Bratman, M. 2007. Structures of agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy LXVIII: 5–20.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. 2003. Identification and responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6: 349–376.
Nickerson, R.S. 1998. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology 2: 175–220.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 2008. Moral dimensions. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Shoemaker, D.W. 2003. Caring, identification, and agency. Ethics 114: 88–118.
Smith, A. 2000. Identification and responsibility. In Moral responsibility and ontology, ed. T. van den Beld, 233–246. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Smith, A. 2005. Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics 115: 236–271.
Smith, A. 2008. Control, responsibility, and moral assessment. Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392.
Strawson, G. 2003. The impossibility of moral responsibility. In Free will, 2nd ed, ed. G. Watson, 212–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stump, E. 1988. Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt’s concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy LXXXV: 395–420.
Taylor, C. 1976. Responsibility for self. In The identities of persons, ed. A.O. Rorty, 281–299. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Velleman, J.D. 2002. Identification and identity. In Contours of agency, ed. S. Buss and L. Overton, 91–123. Cambridge: MIT.
Wallace, R.J. 1994. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Watson, G. 2004. Agency and answerability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, S. 2003. Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility. In Free will, 2nd ed, ed. G. Watson, 372–387. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Faraci, D., Shoemaker, D. Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Rev.Phil.Psych. 1, 319–332 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z