

# THEORIA

Edited by  
Sven Ove Hansson

with Ingar Brinck,  
Kristen Bykvist, Bengt Hansson,  
Patricia Mindus, and Wlodek Rabinowicz

## CONTENTS

### EDITORIAL

Gender issues in philosophy publishing  
*Sven Ove Hansson* 3

### ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle  
*Stefan Rinner* 8

On a body-switching argument in defence of the immateriality of  
human nature  
*Pirooz Fatoorchi* 17

A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language  
*Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi and Antonio Benítez-Burraco* 30

Reductivism versus perspectivism versus holism: A key theme in  
philosophy of science, and its application to modern linguistics  
*Finn Collin and Per Durst-Andersen* 56

A developmental logic: Habermas's theory of social evolution  
*Keunchang Oh* 81

Metaphysical explanations: The case of singleton sets revisited  
*Kai Michael Büttner* 98

What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledge  
*Peter Baumann* 109

Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality  
*Hamid Vahid* 122

Acting and pretending  
*Yuchen Guo* 134

# THEORIA

A Swedish journal of philosophy

**Editor-in-Chief:** Sven Ove Hansson

## Editorial Board

Ingar Brinck  
Krister Bykvist  
Bengt Hansson  
Patricia Mindus  
Wlodek Rabinowicz

**Editorial Assistant:** Henok Girma Abebe

## Consulting Editors

Joseph Almog	Julia Driver	Penelope Maddy	Matti Sintonen
Carla Bagnoli	Jacques Dubucs	Genoveva Martí	Brian Skyrms
Cristina Bicchieri	Catherine Z. Elgin	Anna-Sofia Maurin	Sonja Smets
Emma Borg	Marc Fleurbaey	Sara Negri	Michael Smith
Luc Bovens	Tamar Gendler	Calvin Normore	Wolfgang Spohn
João Branquinho	Susan Haack	Erik J. Olsson	Katie Steele
Michael Bratman	Sophie Horowitz	Elisabeth Pacherie	Isidora Stojanovic
Philip Brey	David Kaplan	Peter Pagin	Johanna Thoma
John Broome	Juliette Kennedy	Carlo Penco	Amie Thomasson
Jeremy Butterfield	Simo Knuuttila	Angela Potochnik	Laura Valentini
John Cantwell	Henrik Lagerlund	Joelie Proust	Johan Van Benthem
Erik Carlsson	Hannes Leitgeb	François Recanati	Rinique Verbrugge
David Chalmers	Mary Leng	Pauliina Remes	Barbara Vetter
Ruth Chang	Judith Lichtenberg	Hans Rott	Heinrich Wansing
Giovanna Corsi	Andrew Light	Gabriel Sandu	Timothy Williamson
Stephen Darwall	Fenrong Liu	Elisabeth Schellenkens	Jan Wolenski
Neelke Doorn	Cynthia Macdonald	Dammann	Dan Zahavi

**Disclaimer:** The Publisher, Stiftelsen Theoria and Editors cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal; the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher, Stiftelsen Theoria and Editors, neither does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement by the Publisher, Stiftelsen Theoria and Editors of the products advertised.

For submission instructions, subscription, and all the latest information, visit <http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/theo>.

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE**

# On a body-switching argument in defence of the immateriality of human nature

**Piروز Fatoorchi** 

Independent Scholar, Tehran, Iran

**Correspondence**Piروز Fatoorchi, Independent Scholar,  
Tehran, Iran.Email: [piروز.fatoorchi@gmail.com](mailto:piروز.fatoorchi@gmail.com)**Abstract**

In an earlier paper in *Theoria*, I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul-switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body-switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul-switching argument” and “the body-switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of the latter argument. Section 3 considers some philosophical discussions in the ancient, modern, and contemporary eras in which the idea of body-switching (or some similar conception) plays a major role. In the following section 4, some criticisms of the argument are discussed and a general response that is meant to cover a broad range of objections is considered. This paper shows that the body-switching argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of several contemporary arguments in defence of substance dualism.

**KEYWORDS**

body-switching, human nature, immaterialism, materialism, personal identity, Razi, soul, soul-switching

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

It is not easy to find an uncontroversial example of a medieval Latin thinker who conceives of the human person in *purely* material terms without any immaterial element or aspect.<sup>1</sup> Because they were nearly all Aristotelians, they did not believe that humans consist of matter alone. Their Christian faith in resurrection of the dead also gave significant motivation for believing in the immateriality of at least the intellectual soul (although they did disagree about whether this

<sup>1</sup>There were indeed a number of Christian thinkers in the patristic period (through the sixth century AD) who held that the human soul is material. As Marcia Colish points out, “they did so influenced by the Stoic principle that everything that acts is a body (which includes God as well as the human soul); among these early Christian thinkers are: Tertullian, Lactantius, Cassian, Hilary of Poitiers, Faustus of Riez, and Cassiodorus” (personal communication, October 22, 2012); cf. also her discussion of this topic in Colish (1985, pp. 24, 43, 121–124, 128–129, 249–252).