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# **Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time**

**by**

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**Declaration of Material:**

I declare that the following is all my own work and has not been submitted for another degree at any time.

Keith Wylie Faulkner

**Abstract / Summary:**

The three syntheses of time are Deleuze's response to Kant's belief that time is synthesized by the unity of the "I think." Deleuze believes that there is a prior synthesis of time in the unconscious. He calls this a "passive" synthesis of time. My thesis will seek to clarify Deleuze's theory of the three syntheses of time by providing the background from which he derived his concepts. In chapter one I argue that the system of "signs" presented in *Proust and Signs* is the precursor to Deleuze's three syntheses of time. I conclude that Worldly Signs correspond to synthesis of habit, Signs of Love correspond to the synthesis of memory, and Signs of Art correspond to the synthesis of the future. In chapter two I argue that the system of "series" presented in the second half of *The Logic of Sense* illustrates Deleuze's conceptions of "resonance" and "forced movement" that are critical to understanding the three syntheses of time. I conclude that Deleuze's conception of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series are derived from Freud's reading of libidinal stages in his *Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality*. In chapter three I argue that chapter two of *Difference and Repetition* is based upon concepts derived from Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. I conclude that the concepts of the Id, Ego and Superego each correspond to a synthesis of time and that these agencies are primarily based upon neurological processes. In chapter four I argue that the static repetitions are the means by which the three syntheses of time manifest themselves in our actions. I conclude that the Superego presents and forbids actions that constitute a "pure event" and that the psyche reacts by repetitive behaviors that correspond to the three static dimensions of time: the before, the during, and the after.

**Key to abbreviations used in this thesis:**

For the works of Gilles Deleuze:

[DR] = *Difference and Repetition*

[LS] = *The Logic of Sense*

[PS] = *Proust and Signs The Complete Text*

[NP] = *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

[CC] = *Coldness and Cruelty*

For the works of Sigmund Freud:

[1Freud] = *Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unpublished Drafts.*

[7Freud] = *On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works*

[11Freud] = *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*

For the works of Friedrich Nietzsche:

[WP] = *The Will to Power*

[Z] = *Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a Book for None and All*

For the work of Harold Rosenberg:

[TN] = *The Tradition of the New*

## Introduction:

This thesis is about the three syntheses of time as they are presented in the work of Gilles Deleuze. What are the three syntheses of time? The three syntheses of time are not reducible to our conscious sense of time. It is true that we have a sense of time that is divided into a sense of the past, present, and future. But the problem of the three syntheses of time does not address the *conscious* phenomena of our sense of time; rather, it addresses the unconscious and preconscious conditions that *produce* our sense of time. For example, our sense of duration within the passage of time is dependent upon our biological needs and expectations. Each organ in the body may have its own duration that is determined by its *own* contractions of need and satisfactions. Deleuze calls this a “passive” synthesis of time because we are not directly conscious of these processes that condition our sense of time. Another example of a passive synthesis is to be found in our sense of the past. When Deleuze refers to the “pure” past he is not referring to a process of memory; rather, he is referring to an entire dimension of time that is *prior* to any content. Once again this is a “passive” synthesis because our general sense of the past is determined by a form of libidinal investment as we shall see. The “passive” synthesis of the future is even more problematic: our sense of the future cannot be reduced to a form of expectation. Expectation is a *conscious* and active form of the future. Deleuze investigates the “passive” synthesis of the future that is not reducible to the conscious expectation of an event. This “passive” synthesis of the future can be found in the concept of the “problem.” A problem, as Deleuze uses the term, is a divergent event that centers on a complex image of action. To put it simply, the passive synthesis of the future is the

play of a divergent series of actions that is constantly at work in the unconscious. In the pages that follow all of this will be explained in detail. For now what is important to keep in mind is that the three syntheses of time are not reducible to our conscious sense of time.

It is incumbent upon the writer of this thesis to give the reader a sense of the purpose and style of the work he is about to read. To this end the following warnings and guidelines may be helpful. This is not a work that intends to re-produce or re-present the concepts of the author it intends to study. Instead, this thesis is a meditation upon problems. As such, it need not directly concern itself with what the author of the original text (Gilles Deleuze) actually had in mind when he wrote about the three syntheses of time. But neither does it intend to depart from, or be critical of, Deleuze's position. Because this thesis is not a meditation on any one philosopher or school of thought it will cut across disciplines and divergent types of philosophies. For example, this thesis is just as much about the works of Freud, Proust and Nietzsche as it is about Deleuze. Because I am in pursuit of a philosophical "problem" I am not concerned with what any of these philosophers may have thought about themselves and their own positions. In short, I leave all questions of ideology, background and philosophical persuasion aside for the duration of this thesis. To put it another way, I de-center the philosopher in favor of the *potentialities* of the concepts *themselves* and their ability to take on new meanings when juxtaposed with problems and concepts of another philosopher. This is nothing less than Deleuze does in his own work. As such I am following the precedent laid out in Deleuze's conception of ideas as "problems" rather than the normal conception of philosophical "concepts" as the *intended* expression of a philosopher. Here is the procedure that I will follow in my thesis: Each section will ask a question. This question will lead to



various concepts found in the works of different thinkers. What will unify them into a coherent whole is the persistence of the question being asked. In reading this thesis it is *very important* to keep in mind the question being asked. If the reader fails to do this then there will be no comprehension of the *series* of problems being dealt with. It is also very important that the reader remain focused upon the immediate problem being dealt with and not try to find a *totalizing* thesis that would sum up Deleuze's position. This is always a danger: philosophers often seek to find a formula that would describe the *total* philosophy of a thinker. Deleuze's work is difficult to classify because Deleuze only works upon a multiplicity of small problems and small questions. There is not "one" overriding problem or question that would sum up the three syntheses of time. The three syntheses of time have no "meaning"; therefore it is impossible to state the meaning of something that is not about meaning. Instead, the three syntheses of time are about "functioning." Because of this, this thesis will be about how the three syntheses of time function and not about what they mean. Here is yet another warning to the reader: do not look for "meaning" in this thesis; instead read it as one would read a mechanical instruction booklet; see how it functions. In order to do this when reading this thesis one must keep questions of function in the foremost of one's thoughts such as: "What makes us experience time as duration?" or "What makes us believe that there is a past?" or "How are we aware of the future?" The main function of this thesis is to make the reader aware of these questions and the problems that animate them.

Now let us consider Deleuze's texts themselves. The actual phrase "three syntheses of time" is named for the first time in *Difference and Repetition* and more specifically in chapter two of this book: "Repetition for-itself." But it is my contention that a foreshadowing of this official "three syntheses of time" is to be

found in his work written four years previously, namely *Proust and Signs*. In the first chapter of this thesis I will show how the system of signs in *Proust and Signs* implies three syntheses of time. This is, perhaps, the easiest chapter of my thesis to read because the concepts that are drawn from the work of Proust are straight-forward and easy to understand even if one has not read Proust's work. This first chapter will focus upon three types of signs: worldly signs, signs of love and signs of art. I will show how each of these types of signs helps to illuminate a relation to time. Worldly signs relate to our sense of time passing. Signs of love refer to our sense of the past or lost time, and signs of art relate to the future or time regained. This first chapter is intended to give the reader a general sense of the three syntheses of time and their various modes of operation. The second chapter, however, is more difficult: it begins to delve into the details of synthesis. This second chapter of my thesis deals with the second half of Deleuze's book *The Logic of Sense*. The important secondary referent for this chapter is Freud, and more specifically, his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in which he puts forward his theory of libidinal stages or series: pre-genital, oedipal, and post-oedipal. The connection and disconnection between these stages will be extremely important to our *passive* syntheses of time. By this time we will have seen that Deleuze discovers the three syntheses of time in the work of Proust. Now in this second chapter we will discover how Deleuze deepens this understanding of the three syntheses using the work of Freud. Essentially this second chapter will deal with the "disguises" and "displacements" that take place through time and in the unconscious. Again, I must warn the reader that the transition from the first chapter to the second chapter of this thesis is abrupt and requires a shift in thinking. What must be kept in mind when reading the second chapter of this thesis is the conception of a "stage" or a "series" and *how* one stage in our libidinal evolution

interacts with and transforms itself into another stage. We must ask ourselves: “what effect does this overlapping and resonance of stages have on our sense of time?” This is the overriding question of the second chapter. The third chapter of my thesis is even more difficult. It deals with chapter two of *Difference and Repetition* in connection with Freud’s book *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. The theme of this third chapter is “energetics” or the neurological transformation in the brain and the organism that constitutes the “passive” nature of synthesis. The importance of this chapter is to give the reader the sense that the three syntheses of time has nothing to do with the purely “spiritual” or conscious sense of time, but rather, it has more to do with the physical and neurological transformations in the brain. Deleuze, himself, refers to Freud’s *Project for a Scientific Psychology* in his book *Difference and Repetition*. It is my belief that the concepts of “larval selves” and “passive synthesis” are partially derived from this important work by Freud. This third chapter is the most difficult chapter because it begins on the edge of philosophy and neurology. However, it is one of the most important aspects of my thesis because it shows that the concepts that Deleuze uses are not abstract metaphysical entities; but rather, they are concrete physical activities in the brain. Deleuze sometimes tells us that the unconscious is mechanical. We must take this literally: the third chapter of my thesis opens up the possibility of this reading of the unconscious as a machine. In order to understand this third chapter it is necessary that the reader think in terms of causality: “A causes B that leads to C” or “if A happens then B must result.” The chapter begins with simple organisms and traces a growing series of complexities that lead from one passive synthesis of time to another. This third chapter will show the “genesis” of the synthesis of time rather than a static and pre-given matrix of time inherent in consciousness. When the reader reaches chapter four he will notice another shift in

style and form. Chapter four is not arranged in the format of the previous chapters in which there are three sections, each section devoted to a synthesis of time. Chapter four is about the “static” genesis of time as it is presented in chapter two of *Difference and Repetition*. The static genesis of time is deeply involved in Deleuze’s theory of the “pure event.” This last chapter is also divided into three parts. The first part deals with Freud and the concept of the event. Two things are of particular importance in this section: first, Freud’s conception of the unconscious archetype (phylogenesis) and the three modes of repetition (before, during and after). Each of these repetitions is the manner in which the unconscious repeats in relation to a problematic “event.” It is very important that the reader does not confuse these three “repetitions” with the three syntheses of time. If these three repetitions must be placed in a synthesis of time, then they belong to the third synthesis of time that “comprehends” the previous two. The second section of chapter four deals with the cyclic conceptions of time. The three cyclic conceptions of history also demonstrate the three modes of repetition of before, during and after. The first: expiation of faults by karmic repetition. The second: dramatic repetition of roles in history from the point of view of analogy. The third: the repetition of chance itself. This exposition on cyclic history is immediately followed by a close reading of a chapter from Harold Rosenberg’s book *The Tradition of the New* of which Deleuze makes extensive use of in *Difference and Repetition*. It is in this reading of Rosenberg that the example of character change of Hamlet in the play by Shakespeare illustrates the passage through the three stages of repetition: before, during and after. The third section of chapter four turns to Nietzsche’s *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in order to illustrate the three repetitions again in relation to the “pure event” of the eternal return. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze states that two of the three repetitions that he spoke of are

present in this work by Nietzsche. In this section I will show how Zarathustra passes from denial of the eternal return to acceptance and also examine Deleuze's premise that there is an unfinished third part to the eternal return. This is immediately followed by another exposition of the eternal return as it is presented in Deleuze's book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. It is in this last part that I will examine the eternal return as an "ethical" and "selective" doctrine. I will also explain why Deleuze calls the eternal return a return of "difference." None of this fourth chapter is incidental to my thesis. The "static" synthesis of time is still part of the three syntheses of time. It is the manner in which the three syntheses are "comprehended" or how they make themselves felt in our repetitive activities. This last chapter allows us to question the manifestations of the syntheses of time in our fears, our vices, and in our hopes. In this way, the last chapter is a "practical" application of the syntheses of time. The danger the reader must avoid, however, is to reduce the three repetitions to the three syntheses *or* to completely disconnect them so that they appear incidental to the whole thesis of three syntheses of time. One must, therefore, think of the three "repetitions" as the *other face* of the three syntheses of time. This is the other face that is manifested in action. To repeat the warning to the reader given above: it is very important that each chapter be read as a new approach to the three synthesis of time. Imagine this thesis as a story told from multiple perspectives. The first "story" is about signs, the second is about series, and the third is about energetics. If the reader expects one chapter to expand upon another then he may be disappointed. Each chapter must be a new start. However, this does not mean that each "story" or chapter may not resonate with another. In fact there will be repetitions of themes, and each chapter will approach a theme from a different perspective. On the whole, the

use of different strategies or perspective is intended to give a more complete picture of Deleuze's theory of the three syntheses of time.

Before we can begin to examine the details of the three syntheses of time we must first ask ourselves: what is its importance? Why should we spend our time thinking about the three syntheses of time? What does it do? What is the problem it addresses? The thesis itself will deal with the details and the workings of the three syntheses, but before we delve into them I will set aside part of my introduction to address the question of the "importance" of the three syntheses of time.

What tradition of philosophy is Deleuze attacking or working against when he postulates the three syntheses of time? Although there are many examples of "abstract" synthesis in traditional philosophy, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze names Kant as his adversary: "It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation. Here synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis." [DR 87] Kant believed that the syntheses of time *depended wholly* on the active syntheses of the abstract logical subject of thought. For every representation we could have, there is an "I think" that can accompany it and relate it to *one and the same subject*. By doing this Kant made the synthesis of time wholly dependent on the activity of the subject. He even went so far as to say that if the subject disappears then time and space will disappear too: "... if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us."<sup>1</sup> This means, in short, that only those subjects that are capable of *active* representation of the "I think" are able

to synthesize the manifold appearances of time into a whole. Does the ameba say “I think” or have any power of synthesis? If we think of all the various species of life and reserve the power of synthesis of time only to those who are capable of abstract representation, we then encounter an absurdity. For Deleuze this Kantian synthesis of time is an abstract synthesis of time. He does not deny that Kant has discovered a valid synthesis of time. However, Deleuze does not rest content with making *active synthesis* the only basis of the synthesis of time. Instead he seeks out the possibility of a *passive synthesis* that takes place both on an organic level and an unconscious level. In this way he will free synthesis from “representation” and the subject.

Deleuze does not deny that there is an active synthesis. He only believes that it comes *afterwards*. In *Proust and Signs* Deleuze demarcates two distinct ideas about the order of intelligence. A traditional view of the faculty of intelligence states that it comes *before*: “There is one aspect... of logos, by means of which the Intelligence always *comes before*, by which the whole is already present, the law already known before what it applies to: this is the dialectical trick by which we discover only what we already have given ourselves, by which we derive from things only what we have already put there.” [PS 105-106] This is what Deleuze calls the “totalizing impulse” [PS 105] by which we try to represent to ourselves all of our knowledge *as if* it formed a pre-given unity. Kant is guilty of this when he tells us that space and time is already given as a whole: “Different times are merely parts of one and the same time.”<sup>2</sup> For Kant time is a “necessary representation”<sup>3</sup> and this is undoubtedly valid according to his argument, but we must ask ourselves: is time *only* a representation? As “representation” time is given as a whole, but in its synthesis time is not given as a whole. This leads to Deleuze’s second conception of the faculty of intelligence; he says of Proust: “He counters the logical or conjoined use of all our

faculties--preceded by the intelligence that brings them all together in the fiction of a 'total soul'--by a nonlogical and disjunct use, which shows that we never command all our faculties at once and their intelligence always *comes after*." [PS 106] Given this second vision of the use of the intelligence, the possibility of a *passive synthesis* becomes evident. In short, every "representation" of time or space that we have must be *produced* by a prior passive synthesis of time and space. Therefore, even though we conceive time as a whole in our representational consciousness, this does not mean that time is a "whole" outside of representation. In fact, the "power of sickness, age, and forgetting, affirm the fragments as disjunct" [PS 129] according to Deleuze. It is in those states that the powers of "representation" fall apart and time appears as fragmented and disjointed. This testifies to the necessity of a passive synthesis *prior* to the activity of the intellect. For this reason Deleuze's three syntheses of time are an attempt to construct a new "Trancendental Aesthetic" that, according to Deleuze, "appears more profound to us than that of Kant." [DR 98] Deleuze names two reasons for reconfiguring the transcendental aesthetic: Kant rules out "the possibility of composing space step by step" [DR 98], and he deprives "this passive self of all power of synthesis (synthesis being reserved for activity)." [DR 98] Therefore, the focus of Deleuze's three syntheses of time will be to restore the power of synthesis to the passive or unconscious selves and to restore the possibility of composing time step by step. It is because of this that Deleuze's new transcendental aesthetic must pass into the unconscious.

If Kant began the era of "representational" or active synthesis then Freud began the era of passive or unconscious synthesis. After Freud it becomes possible to speak of the unconscious as an autonomous faculty that was unavailable to Kant. Because of this Deleuze makes extensive use of Freud in his construction of a new



transcendental aesthetic of passive synthesis. Although Freud himself was not primarily concerned with the philosophical problem of time, there are aspects of his work that lend themselves to an analysis of time. Deleuze selects three main aspects that form the basis of his three syntheses. First there is the theory of displacement and disguise in Freud. Freud discovered that memories or fantasies masked one another and displaced certain elements across time. Concepts like “deferred action” fall into this category of displacement and disguise. For Deleuze this forms the basis for his theory of the *second synthesis* of time. The remarkable aspect of this theory of disguise and displacement is that it accounts for memory but treats memory as an effect of a preconscious or unconscious process and not the voluntary exercise of an active faculty. As such, the passive synthesis of memory is prior to the active or conscious activity of remembering. Second, in Freud we find a complex theory of neurology. In *The Project for a Scientific Psychology* Freud lays out a systematic account of how quantities of excitation pass through neurons and are synthesized into perceptions. It is this aspect of Freud that Deleuze relies upon to formulate the *first synthesis* of time. In the work of Deleuze such concepts as the “larval subject” and the contraction of habits are also to be found in the work of Freud. All of these neurological syntheses are unconscious or non-conscious activities in the brain. As such they are to be considered a *passive synthesis* of the present or the means by which “duration” is synthesized by the organism. Third, in Freud we discover the theory of phylogenesis. Although Deleuze does not agree with Freud about the origin of these unconscious archetypes he does see them as essential to his own theory of the “pure event.” For Deleuze these archetypal events are “problematic” insofar as they have no clear subject or object. Being ambiguous, these problematic events are the means by which the future is synthesized. To put it simply, the synthesis of the

future is the simultaneous affirmation of all possible outcomes. The pure event, being an expression of all possible divergent series of outcomes, brings the dimension of the future under the realm of unconscious “problems.” Because these events are unconscious or preconscious they too must be considered a *third passive synthesis* of time. It is from this third passive synthesis of time, as a relation of the ego to a problematic event, that our preconscious sense of time arises. It is at this point that Deleuze talks about the “three repetitions” [DR 91] of a pure static order of time. The “static order of time” is different from the three syntheses of time. This static order only concerns the presentation of the third synthesis of time in the preconscious. Consider an archetypal event that we find in the work of Freud: “to kill the father.” The ego is placed *in time*, not by the order of real events, but by its relation to these pure “timeless” archetypal events. In the case of the tragedy of Oedipus, there is a point in the play *before* the realization of the act of “killing the father,” a point of realization of the act or the *during*, and a point of self-destruction *after* the act. Deleuze extends the third synthesis of time into the static repetition of time to show that our concept of before, during and after in time are products of passive synthesis and *not a priori* forms of the understanding. The passive nature of these three static repetitions can be found in the work of Freud. In chapter four of this thesis I extract from the work of Freud the three repetitions of before, during and after. These are: the repetition of the neurotic, the repetition of the child who plays destructive games, and the repetition of the superego that seeks to negate object-cathexis. These forces of repetition are what Freud referred to as “demonic” forces because they fall outside the will or volition of the subject. As such, they expose the priority of passive or involuntary synthesis over the active syntheses of the faculties of representation. For

all the reasons above Freud is an important part of this thesis on the three syntheses of time.

Proust is also an important point of reference in this thesis. In chapter one I deal with Deleuze's *Proust and Signs*. It is in this work that the three syntheses of time are discovered although the terminology "three syntheses of time" does not appear in this book. Instead, in this book, Deleuze deals with "signs" and their temporal character. There are three basic types of signs that each correspond to a synthesis of time: worldly signs, signs of love, and signs of art. Each type of sign has a temporal characteristic: time wasted, time lost, and time regained. What does this have to do with passive synthesis? A sign is not a symbol or a sign that has intelligible meaning. The intellect does not interpret these "signs" of which Deleuze speaks. Signs are primarily the involuntary emissions of signals. Their interpretation is involuntary and unconscious. In the work of Proust a pain is the "result" of an unconscious interpretation of signs. The episode of the boot in the work of Proust is the result of an emission of signs that awaken the memory of the hero's dead grandmother. *At no point is the hero of the novel consciously aware of these signs.* He is only aware of their *effect* by sensations of pleasure and pain. The synthesis of time in Proust's great novel is a wholly *passive* and *involuntary* activity of the faculties. Proust testifies to the priority of the involuntary syntheses of time over the activity of the intellect: their "truth" is signified by their involuntary nature. Proust provides an important element to Deleuze's quest to construct a new transcendental aesthetic. His work testifies to the function of "signs" in the synthesis of our temporal existence. Proust investigates, in a literary form, the nature of duration, the pure past and the process of death reaching into the future. The introduction of Proust into this thesis, I hope, will give the reader a general sense of the three syntheses of time

presented in a non-technical manner. This is why the first chapter is devoted to Proust. It is necessary to recognize the effect of the three syntheses of time in practical situations before we delve into the unconscious mechanics of Freud. It is my hope that the first chapter will provide a concrete example of temporal synthesis so that the later discussion of unconscious processes will have a proper context.

No presentation of the three syntheses of time would be complete without mention of Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. I end my thesis with this important concept because it is the summation and ethical end of Deleuze's three syntheses of time. This "ethical" doctrine of eternal return is essential to Deleuze's reading of the Event. Deleuze conceives of three possible relations to the event: experiencing it as "too much for me" *or* becoming-equal *or* becoming equal to the unequal. In his analysis of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Deleuze documents these three approaches to the "event" of the eternal return. The last chapter of this thesis ends with an examination of the extreme consequences of "becoming equal to the unequal." Implicated in this last "extreme" affirmation of the eternal return are the concept of the "overman" and the disappearance of the subject. Why is this important? Because, the total affirmation of the eternal return would imply the total distraction of the "active" faculties of judgment and the affirmation of the passive syntheses of time in-themselves. This is Deleuze's final condemnation of "representational" philosophy. The destruction of the active faculties of judgment would imply an extreme sensitivity to signs as Deleuze describes in *Proust and Signs*: "Though endowed with an extreme sensibility and a prodigious memory, the narrator has no organs insofar as he is deprived of any voluntary and organized use of such faculties." [PS 182] The active faculties of judgment and voluntary control are essentially organized by "resentment" according to Deleuze. This is because they

cannot affirm “chaos” as the fundamental law of the universe. They seek to impose order and “justice” upon every passive and involuntary activity of the organism. In short, they organize the body and the world according to a transcendent principle of the unity of the self. This is the completion of Deleuze’s alternative “transcendental aesthetic” that sought to establish two things: to return the power of synthesis to the passive self and to give “time” itself the power of synthesis. The doctrine of the eternal return does these two things. This is why it deserves a special place in this thesis.

What does this thesis attempt to do? The primary aim is to show how the three syntheses of time actually work. This has not been done before. All of the secondary literature on Deleuze devotes very little attention to the three syntheses of time. None of them give a *systematic* account of the workings and interconnections of the three syntheses. At best they paraphrase Deleuze’s own words without adding anything new to his account. This thesis seeks to add something *new* to the account of the three syntheses. The difficulty in understanding Deleuze’s conception of the three syntheses is that he *assumes* a great deal of background information is *already* understood by the reader. There is a pressing need for a sense of *context* to be applied to Deleuze’s own presentation. What this thesis seeks to do is to return to the main sources that inspired Deleuze’s conception of synthesis and to link it up with Deleuze’s own words so that the reader may see the whole picture. Also, this thesis attempts to be as systematic as possible when dealing with a subject matter of this complexity. For this reason the thesis is divided into parts that do not repeat *one main* thesis; but rather, progress from one aspect of the three syntheses to another. In this way I hope to cover all the main components of a complex theory. In the end, I hope that the reader will get a sense of the workings of the three *passive* syntheses of time

and their viability as an alternative to the “transcendental aesthetic” of Kant. However, at no point in my thesis do I argue directly against Kant’s aesthetic. This thesis is meant to provide a positive alternative and not to refute any other philosophy. The argument will seek to demonstrate the conceptual rigor of the three syntheses of time so that it may be adopted as a doctrine and applied to practical ends. Its value as a doctrine is to be decided by its applicability and not some abstract logical proof. As such, all conceptual refutation of Deleuze’s doctrine is placed to one side for the moment so that the readers may get an *adequate* sense of the components of the doctrine and may then decide for themselves. My task will be successful only if this thesis leaves the readers with a better understanding of the three syntheses of time than they had before they read it. Of course this short work is unable to draw out all of the consequences of this doctrine. There are still many questions that are raised by this thesis that will remain unsolved. However, it is my hope that it will be the most complete text available on this important subject.

## Chapter 1: The Syntheses of Signs

At first sight Deleuze’s discussion of signs in his book *Proust and Signs* would seem to have little to do with the three syntheses of time that he explicates in *Difference and Repetition*. However, there is a secret link between these two books. This link becomes evident when we take seriously Deleuze’s statement: “To each kind of sign there doubtless corresponds a privileged line of time.” [PS 24] There are three types of signs and three types of time. Although not explicitly stated, it seems as though these are prototypes for the three syntheses of time. In what follows I will show the correspondences between these two works. This will show that the three

syntheses of time are drawn from the work of Proust and that it is the main source of inspiration for Deleuze's analysis of time.

a) Worldly signs

1.1 What is a sign? A sign is not something that refers to an object or a meaning. When Deleuze refers to signs he is not speaking of the artificial signs of language but rather of natural signs. This becomes evident when we consider Deleuze's example of signs: "One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease." [PS 4] Above all a sign is a form sensation that acts as a signal to the organism. Because Deleuze is concerned with the *passive* synthesis of sensations he treats signs as a part of a nervous system that acts independently of reflective thought. For example, if the organism has a need, the only way it can know if that need is satisfied is if the organism receives a signal telling it that certain conditions have been met. After a meal one receives a *sign* that one is full. A sign is the means by which the organism "interprets" its environment. When we read Deleuze we must keep in mind that when he speaks of interpretation of signs he is using this term to designate the *passive* synthesis of sensations and not the active synthesis of intelligence. In order to think in terms of passive synthesis we must put to the side our assumptions about the faculty of intelligence as being the center of interpretation and focus instead upon the means by which the nervous system itself interprets. First, consider Deleuze's explanation of need: "Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic form of expectation." [DR 73] Need on this level is not unlike the mouth that *expects* food, or the beloved's body that anticipates a caress. At this level "need" is the means by

which the organism reaches out to its environment and *questions* its surroundings. The *sign*, put simply, is the answer to the question that the organism puts to its surroundings. Either there is a signal of satisfaction or there is a negative response of dissatisfaction. By negotiating with the environment the organism learns, by means of signs, to anticipate and predict responses. In short, it builds up perceptual habits. These habits, in turn, inform our faculty of intelligence. But because this faculty of forming habits comes first, it is more primary than the faculty of intelligence. When the intelligence comes into play the *passive synthesis* has already conditioned the sign and filtered it through the guise of habit. This is why Deleuze says: “Each contraction, each passive synthesis, constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active syntheses.” [DR 73] In short, signs are caught up in the activity of expectation and habit in the nervous system before they even reach the intelligence. By the time they have reached the intelligence all the activity of learning has already been set down in the neural pathways. The intelligence is just the pale reflection of an unconscious process of interpretation of signs.

1.2 For Deleuze duration is not a simple given. Duration is the product of a passive synthesis of time. This synthesis is built upon organic need. It is from the very rhythm of our bodies that we become aware of the duration of existence. This is what Deleuze calls the fundamental form of repetition:

The *repetition of need*, and of everything which depends upon it, expresses the time which belongs to the synthesis of time, the intratemporal character of that synthesis. Repetition is essentially inscribed in need, since need rests upon an instance which essentially involves repetition: which forms the for-itself of repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration. [DR 77]



Duration is not an effect of the active synthesis of intelligence; but rather, it is the passive longings and needs of an organism. Our conscious desires are the reflection of a more fundamental dimension of organic need. Our longings and anticipations that make time seem to pass much slower than it does are the result of the delay involved in the transmission of signs. Once again, Deleuze draws this lesson about duration partially from the work of Proust. Proust sees duration as essentially problematic. This is because, at the moments in which we are most aware of duration, we are also most aware of our unsatisfied needs. When he speaks of the succession of moments that form the hours of his waiting, Proust's hero experiences them as painful:

Those inaccessible and excruciating hours during which she was about to enjoy unknown pleasures – now, through an unhoped-for breach, we are entering them; now, one of the moments which, in succession, would have composed those hours, a moment as real as the others, perhaps even more important to us, because our mistress is more involved in it, we can picture to ourselves, we possess it, we are taking part in it, we have created it almost: the moment in which he will tell her we are here, downstairs.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that Proust says that *we have composed those hours* and that we have created the moment. This is why Deleuze tells us that signs are a *temporal apprenticeship*, because the expectation of signs teaches us to wait and to contract moments together. Whereas it has become almost a phenomenological cliché to say that the present and the past and the future are all extended into one another, this

account leaves out the important role of signs in the production of duration. No one has a “natural” disposition to experience time as a foundational experience; some pathological conditions prevent some people from living within a normal duration. It is the ability to form habits in the organism that makes this possible. There are as many durations as there are organic needs. One part may have a different degree of contraction than another. By the time that the various durations and rhythms of the organism make themselves felt in consciousness we confuse them with the duration of the changing of the external world. This, however, is not a mistake. Signs are not in the body. They are in the world; however, it is the various contractions of the organism that interpret these signs. The *active* faculty of intelligence is only aware of the signs and not the process by which they become synthesized in the unconscious.

1.3 When Deleuze speaks of “worldly signs” in *Proust and Signs* he is referring to the habitual use of responses and clichéd remarks that fill up the conversations in everyday life. Deleuze remarks upon this habitual use of mimicry: “Nothing funny is said at the Verdurins’, and Mme Verdurin does not laugh; but Cottard makes a sign that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign that she is laughing, and her sign is so perfectly emitted that M. Verdurin, not to be outdone, seeks in his turn for an appropriate mimicry.” [PS 6] At first sight this seems strange because the characters are not really communicating with one another. But if we critically appraise the majority of our conversations we will find that most of the time we are not really conveying information. This form of social politeness that masks the vacuity of conversation is not incidental. It is an essential part of signaling that is endemic to expressions of friendship. However vacuous these scenes of mimicry seem, they take up a great deal of the space in Proust’s novel. According to Deleuze they represent the apprenticeship into “wasted time” or, in other terms, duration.

However, there is a certain pleasure associated with wasting time in this way. Proust describes this idle chatter: "...idle chatter, which would have absorbed nothing of the nervous pleasure, the fleeting emotion of the experience, and which would have been reminiscent in this respect of the impression of lassitude and regret that follow the first warm days of spring."<sup>5</sup> These society people seek each other out in order to be "elegant" and charming. It is the lightness of conversations in which nothing is communicated, in which roles are played and expectations instantly met. But not communicating is not an objection to worldly signs. Signs are not meant to convey information. Their role is to have a direct, pleasurable or unpleasant, effect upon the nervous system itself. In an interview Deleuze stated that he liked this aspect of Proust: "This is why he has always liked and still likes Proust so much, for the society life [mondanité], the social relations [rapports mondains]. This is the fantastic emission of signs, for example, what's known as a 'gaffe.' This is a non-comprehension of a sign, signs that people don't understand. Society life exists as a milieu of the proliferation of empty signs, but it's also the speed of their emission, the nature of their emission."<sup>6</sup> This form of elegant conversation is pleasant because it contracts the present into a simple lassitude. Nothing unexpected enters into the exchange of signs, the responses are predictable, and therefore the anxiety about the future is laid to rest. This use of signs is meant to negate the unpleasant aspects of duration by *speeding* along the transitions of signs so that the present can be reduced to its minimum. This is why we form habits of speaking: to minimize the uncertainty of signs and the tension of organic expectation.

1.4 Our habits of thinking are a direct result of our habits of speaking. Deleuze discovers in the work of Proust both a critique of friendship and a critique of philosophy: "According to Proust, friends are like well-disposed minds that are

explicitly in agreement as to the signification of things, words, and ideas; but the philosopher too is a thinker who presupposes in himself the benevolence of thought, who attributes to thought the natural love of truth and to truth the explicit determination of what is naturally worked out by thought.” [PS 30] Philosophy is, then, the natural extension of friendship: one goes from the agreement between two people to the presupposition of a universal agreement signified by “truth.” The values derived from this idea of a universal friendship, however, only attain a *possible* value and not a necessary one. This is because it presupposes the identity of reason to be a universal attribute and the benevolence of all people who engage in discourse. “In all its forms, intelligence attains by itself, and makes us attain, only those abstract and conventional truths that have merely a *possible* value.” [PS 30] They are only *possible* because there is always the possibility of the malevolent thinker who says that  $2+2=5$ . Like polite conversation, an unexpected sign that brings displeasure to the harmonious accord of like-minded people can always disrupt agreement. We shall see that this form of “truth” is not endorsed by Deleuze or Proust. In the section on “signs of love” we will see that there is another form of truth that is generated by discord. For now it is enough to oppose it to this placid form of truth.

1.5 For Deleuze a sign is always a sign of the present. The organism only knows the presence or absence of sensation. The *active* faculty of the intelligence can conceive of a future and a past, but the *passive synthesis* in the unconscious can only experience signs that indicate a present fact. However, this present fact may indicate a past state enduring in the present. For example, the scar: “A scar is the sign not of a past wound but of ‘the present fact of having been wounded’: we can say that it is the contemplation of the wound, that it contracts all the instants which separate us from it into the living present.” [DR 77] In short, the *passive synthesis* only deals with

sensations that are signs of the present. The scar may hurt, and all that the passive syntheses register is the present fact. The active synthesis carried out in the faculty of the intellect may attribute a past and a future to this sign. In the example of the scar, the scar carries the past into the present by the physical persistence of the wound. However, the sign knows nothing of the history of the scar, only its duration extending into the present. Deleuze derives this theory of the sign from the stoics. The stoic argument is as follows: A sign is always a sign of a thing; if the thing is not present then the sign is not present. A past thing is not present; therefore it cannot be indicated by a sign; the same with a future thing. Sextus Empiricus makes the following argument: "For some people make a mistake and want a present thing to be a sign of a past thing, as for instance, 'If this man has a scar, this man has had a wound.' For 'He has a scar' is something present, since it is evident, but his having had a wound is past, since there is no longer a wound. [...] the wound has already happened and is past, but 'This man has a wound', which is a proposition, is present, though it is said about something which has happened."<sup>7</sup> The stoics were forced into this logical position because their propositional "truth" requires that some state of affairs subsists in the present. This is necessary because a truth cannot be verified directly in the present unless there is a present fact. The organism only knows the present facts that it can sense directly. Therefore, at the level of passive synthesis, only the most immediate states of affairs are registered. Further, this means that within the first synthesis of time every *trace* of previous events is subsumed within the present state of affairs. Therefore, traces of events that are long past will have an effect on the present *without* there being any memory of that past event. Further, there is no passage of time at this level; it is as if there is a total amnesia at every

instant. The first synthesis of time is a machine that registers the present state of affairs without any retention of previous events.

1.6 Deleuze calls the work of Proust an “apprenticeship to signs.” [PS 4] By this he means that we *learn* by an encounter with signs. But what kind of learning are we talking about here? In the case of learning through signs, the outcome is not necessarily knowledge. We must conceive of learning with signs as something that takes place on an unconscious level. To illustrate this Deleuze gives us this example:

A well known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposed to find food in boxes of one particular colour amidst others of various colours: there comes a paradoxical period during which the number of ‘errors’ diminishes even though the monkey does not yet possess the ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ of a solution in each case: propitious moment in which the philosopher-monkey opens up to truth, himself producing the true, but only to the extent that he begins to penetrate the coloured thickness of a problem. [DR 164-165]

It is this paradoxical moment in which we are learning without having explicit knowledge that fascinates Deleuze. The colors and the appearance of food in this example act as signs that, through an act of repetition, form a paradoxical form of learning. The signs are subliminal insofar as they are not objects of knowledge; but rather, problems that require repetition of trial and error to sort out. Signs have a temporal character *because they are not given in a single instance*. They require the repetition of learning in order to form habits. Proust’s great novel has the structure of a long series of repetitions of signs that form the basis of a “research” into time. The hero of the novel contemplates these strange recurrences in his life in order to

discover their message, or meaning. He learns by drawing off a theme or archetype that is repeated in each era of his life. The exploration of time is also the exploration of the unconscious. “As a result, ‘learning’ always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind.” [DR 165] Unlike the theory of learning in which “knowledge” is the correspondence between an image in the mind and an object in nature, Deleuze’s theory of learning places signs at the frontier between the mind and nature, so that one engenders the other. The mind is just a sensitivity to signs that are neither inside nor outside but within the transversal space in-between. Deleuze calls this *space* the problematic field: “To learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field.” [DR 165] The problematic field, in this case, is the inertia of the water, the resistance of the waves and the attempt to coordinate the movements of the body to fit these elements. A feedback loop is formed and the signs of the waves are learned by the response of the body. Given this theory of signs we see why these signs must always be in the *present*: one never swims in a past or future wave. If this model of learning fits well with the works of Proust it is because his novels follow the logic of learning through a sensitivity to signs. The signs in Proust are the encounters with society people, the trials of love, the question of the work of art that he wished to create. There is a gradual unfolding of problems and solutions that follow the logic of apprenticeship. This is why it is a work of signs.

1.1 Signs are the interpretations of organic needs.	1.3 Worldly signs are habits of speaking that reduce the present to a minimum.	1.5 Signs only register the present state of affairs without any retention of past events.
1.2 Duration is an <i>effect</i> of the delay in the transmission of signs.	1.4 These signs give rise to the illusion of universal truth based upon friendship.	1.6 Learning is the encounter with signs through the unconscious.

## b) Signs of Love

2.1 With the introduction of signs of love we encounter a transition from the first synthesis of time to the second synthesis of time. This transition takes place because of the nature of these signs. That is, the signs of love are deceptive: “They are deceptive signs that can be addressed to us only by concealing what they express: the origin of unknown worlds, of unknown actions and thoughts that give them a meaning.” [PS 9] This new form of sign does not invalidate the rule that “all signs are signs of the present.” This is because the signs of love are encountered in the present, and yet, they activate the mind in such a way that it seeks their meaning in the past. The example that illustrates this in the work of Proust is that of *jealousy*. Consider this quote from Proust that describes the action of jealousy:

And whatever point in it he tried to touch in his memories, it was the whole of that season, during which the Verdurins had dined so often on the island in the Bois, that hurt him. Hurt him so badly that gradually the curiosity which his jealousy kept provoking in him was neutralized by his fear of the new torments he would inflict on himself by satisfying it.<sup>8</sup>



Jealousy is a form of involuntary memory that is provoked by signs that are deceptive.<sup>9</sup> They are deceptive because there is a contradiction between them. In order to be deceptive signs must contain a mixture of truth and falsehood in such a way that the two do not logically cohere. A perfect lie would not excite the intelligence. These signs are *simulacra* insofar as they *resemble* the truth while at the same time they hide it:

Swann immediately recognized this statement as one of those fragments of true facts which liars, when caught unprepared, console themselves by introducing into the composition of the falsehood they are inventing, believing they can accommodate it there and steal away its resemblance to the Truth.<sup>10</sup>

Because the passive synthesis is unable to reconcile the contradiction in signs, the active synthesis of the intelligence is activated. This is the faculty for determining the truth of signs. This is where the contradiction that we saw above plays its part: there is a pleasure associated with the search for truth that directly contradicts the pleasures of love. The pleasures of love depend upon the complete presence of the beloved, whereas the pleasures of the search for truth place the beloved in a possible world that excludes us. What is hidden is the *past* of the beloved. Here we have reached the essence of signs of love: they are *traces* of past events subsisting in the present. These traces refer to a dimension of time that is wholly distinct from the present: the *a priori* past. That is, not a past that we could ever have lived through, but a past that the beloved *may have had* before we met her. As such, it is an imaginary dimension

of the past and not a factual dimension of past-presents. This is what Deleuze refers to as the “pure past.” This is the essential element in the second synthesis of time.

2.2 The second synthesis of time is activated by the disappointment in the objective nature of signs. Deleuze tells us that the present as an objective plurality of signs is often tinged with this fundamental disappointment: “Disappointment is a fundamental moment of the search or of apprenticeship: in each realm of signs, we are disappointed when the object does not give us the secret we were expecting.” [PS 34] We have seen that on the level of organic need the nervous system *learns* by expecting certain outcomes. But because of the chaotic nature of the environment the needs of the organism cannot be immediately met. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the example of the nursing child given in *Difference and Repetition*:

On the one hand, the child goes beyond the bound excitations towards the supposition or the intentionality of an object, such as the mother, as the goal of an effort, the end to be actively reached ‘in reality’ and in relation to which success and failure may be measured. But *on the other hand and at the same time*, the child constructs for itself another object, a quite different kind of object which is a *virtual* object or centre and which then governs and compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity: it puts several fingers in its mouth, wraps the other arm around this virtual centre, and appraises the whole situation from the point of view of this virtual mother.

[DR 99]

The virtual object compensates the child for the disappointment of real action. It provides a buffer against the shocks and discords of reality. But more than that, it

also provides the child with a *point of view* that is not *in* the immediate present. The child is able to revive *past situations of satisfaction* and transpose them upon the present dissatisfying failure. This is a radical temporal shift in the psyche of the child: from the present of the first synthesis to a different synthesis of the past. This transposition of the virtual dimension of the past upon the present also provides memory with the ability to embellish events with an aura or a significance that they did not have at the time. Deleuze notices a pattern in the work of Proust of a disappointment in the hero of the novel when he is undergoing an experience for the first time: “There are few things that are not disappointing the first time they are seen. For the first time is the time of inexperience; we are not yet capable of distinguishing the sign from the object, and the object interposes and confuses the signs. Disappointment on the first hearing Vinteuil, on first meeting Bergotte, on first seeing the Balbec church.” [PS 34] The first encounter only presents us with a *problem* of confused signs that do not yet have a coherence. This is why the *virtual* dimension is so important: it gives order to the present by the imposition of fragments of memory (and fantasy) onto the chaos of first encounters. However, there is a paradox: there is a delay in this superimposition of the virtual dimension; that is, it only comes after the event. This effect of delayed reaction can best be seen in the example of the trip to the theatre to see the actress Berma: “A touch of genius in the acting of La Berma is revealed to us by the reviews a week after we have seen her on stage, or by the cheers from the back stalls.”<sup>11</sup> The difficulty that Proust’s hero has in perceiving the genius of the actress was caused by the misplaced notion that genius and beauty can be found in the objects themselves. As Deleuze points out:

Those signs we had not been able to relish or to interpret so long as we linked them to Berma's person – perhaps their meaning was to be sought elsewhere: in associations that were neither in Phèdre nor in Berma. Thus Bergotte teaches the hero that a certain gesture of Berma's evokes that of an archaic statuette the actress could never have seen, but which Racine himself had never certainly thought of either. [PS 35]

The compensations for the disappointing nature of objects can be found in the *subjective* compensation of the association of ideas. This is why the hero only gains insight into the event *after* it is over: “My interest in La Berma's acting, being no longer subject to the compression and constraints of reality, had gone on growing since the end of the performance.”<sup>12</sup> Normally, the chain of associations is blocked by our attention to the signs that we are perceiving in the present. It is necessary to wait for the moment to pass before that now former moment can gain significance. That now former moment then takes on a reality that it *did not have* at the time of our first encountering it. This is why Deleuze believes that the past is more than an accumulation of past moments. *Memory transforms the past* more than it conserves it. This is why the past is more virtual than actual: the aura of memory is *different in kind* from perception in the present. This is why Proust discovers the contradiction of trying to find in reality what is virtual: “...what a contradiction it is to search in reality for memory's pictures, which would never have the charm that comes to them from memory itself and from not being perceived by the senses.”<sup>13</sup> This means that memory contains elements that were *never perceived* in the past, purely virtual elements that cannot be reduced to past perceptions. As we shall see, the *effect* of the

pure past (that was never present) is produced by the mechanism of the association of ideas.

2.3 In the first synthesis of signs (the worldly signs) we encountered signs that were bathed in the sensibility of encounters. But Deleuze tells us that signs are more profound than the objects we encounter them in: “It is because the sign is doubtless more profound than the object emitting it, but it is still attached to that object, it is still half sheathed in it.” [PS 36] The first synthesis only gave us half of the nature of the sign (as an encounter) the other half is the subjective series of associations. The sign is both in the mind and in nature and in neither of them. The sign has an actual side and a virtual side: the first is the *encounter* with the sign in perception, the second is the *association* of *that* sign with other signs in the mind. As Deleuze says: “We proceed from one to the other; we leap from one to the other; we overcome the disappointment of the object by a compensation of the subject.” [PS 36] This movement is essential to the *signs of love*: love is directed, not to the actual woman before us, but rather to the virtual woman of subjective association. Proust illustrates this fact of love in his narrative of Swann’s love for Odette in which Swann associates Odette with a painting by Botticelli:

He looked at her; a fragment of the fresco appeared in her face and in her body and from then on he would always try to find it in her again, whether he was with Odette, or was only thinking of her, and even though he probably valued the Florentine masterpiece only because he found it again in her, nevertheless that resemblance conferred a certain beauty on her too, made her more precious.<sup>14</sup>

We cannot say that the beauty is in the painting or in Odette; rather, we say that it is *in-between* them, in the *effect of resonance* that is produced by their association. Therefore we can conclude that the *virtual* element is not in the objective recall of a memory but in the *effect* of signs that are associated across time. The intellect can find objective resemblances between objects but this intellectual act lacks the resonant effect of love. The association of ideas that Deleuze is working with in his work on Proust is that of the heart and not of the head. This is why we must distinguish love from jealousy: love follows the passive synthesis that makes the past resonate with the present, while jealousy follows the active and constrained use of the intellect that makes the past disjointed with the present. The jealous lover associates the beloved with various *imagined* past scenarios and is unable to make a connection between them. The other lover associates the beloved with images in the past and makes a transversal connection between them. These two modes of love represent two different approaches to the virtual past: one of accord the other of discord. The first forms associations of ideas and the second breaks them.

2.4 In the work of Proust we encounter only a narcissistic form of love. Deleuze defines this form of love by the following: “*to love without being loved*, because love implicates the seizure of the possible worlds in the beloved, worlds that expel me as much as they draw me in and that culminate in the unknowable homosexual world...” [PS 142] The great secret of this form of narcissistic love is the existence of “possible worlds” that draw us in and expel us. In order to understand this strange form of love we must turn to Freud’s description of narcissism:

For it seems very evident that another person’s narcissism has a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are

in search of object-love. [...] The great charm of narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover's dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman's love, or his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its roots in this incongruity between the types of object-choice. [1 | Freud 82-83]

The heroes of Proust's novel only fall in love with narcissistic women because of the sense of mystery that they envelop. The women they fall in love with are vain, stupid and self-serving. And yet, they are the perfect vehicles of the fantasies of the lover. Only in them is it possible to dream of other possible worlds that are not reducible to the here and now. The problem of *possible worlds* is the key to understanding of the *motive* for the association of ideas. It is also the key to understanding why we seek resonances within the past. The key that Freud provides to this puzzle is to be found in instinctual renunciation. In the theory of narcissism our first love as infants is always *ourselves*. However, later we learn to give up this self-love and direct our love towards others. But there is always a core longing to return to this narcissistic state. So, we project this longing into our object-choice or our beloved. This longing is called Eros. This is why Deleuze gives it the role as a motivator of memory: "It is always Eros, the noumenon, who allows us to penetrate this pure past in itself, this virginal repetition which is Mnemosyne." [DR 85] The narcissistic woman takes the place of the narcissistically invested object: the phallus. This happens according to Deleuze because "it has the paradoxical property of changing its place, not being possessed by those who have a 'penis', yet being *possessed* by those who do not have one, as the theme of castration shows." [DR 103] In short, this means that men who have renounced their narcissism (castration) substitute narcissistic women for their loss. Now, what is interesting is what Deleuze does with this psychoanalytical

insight. He applies it to the second synthesis of time and discovers the link between the castration complex and the constitution of a pure past. He links sexual drives to memory, thereby making the force that *drives* the association of ideas erotic: “The symbolic phallus signifies no less the erotic mode of the pure past than the immemorial of sexuality. The symbol is the always-displaced fragment, standing for a past which was never present: the object = *x*.” [DR 103] To put it simply, we follow the chain of associations in search of the missing phallus or the lost sense of wholeness to be found in narcissism. This “always-displaced fragment” is the *possible world* that the beloved expresses. What links the associations of ideas in the work of Proust is a sublimated sexuality that drives the imagination. Proust tells us that: “Our curiosity about the woman we love, the roots of which lie far beyond our reasoning mind, reaches far beyond her character.”<sup>15</sup> It extends into worlds that we can never be a part of because of our renunciation of our own narcissism. This inspires the ambivalent attitude that Proust’s hero has towards his beloved. Deleuze speaks of an original Hermaphrodite: “The original Hermaphrodite continuously produces the two divergent series.” [PS 80] For Freud narcissistic love is essentially homosexual. The lover of narcissistic woman loves “what he himself was” [11 Freud 84] in the women he chooses and is therefore displacing his own homosexuality onto the beloved. This is the motivation for jealousy in Proust’s novel: the lover suspects the beloved is committing the “original sin” [PS 140] that he himself is repressing. “Homosexuality is the truth of love.” [PS 81] The whole dynamic of the *possible worlds* of the beloved conceals this essential secret.

2.5 It would be too easy to conceive of the “possible world” as an origin of the series. This mistake is tempting because it presents itself as an originary dimension of the pure past. But this illusion of an original term in the series is the *effect* of the



series itself. Deleuze calls this necessary illusion the originary phantasm: “the phantasm returns easily to its own origin and, as an ‘originary phantasm,’ it integrates effortlessly the origin of the phantasm (that is, a question, the origin of birth, of sexuality, of the difference of the sexes, or of death...). This is because it is inseparable from the displacement, an unfolding, and a development within which it carries along its own origin.” [LS 217] We could take any one of the phantasms that haunt repetition, the mother, the phallus, and the castration complex... but we would not be unmasking an original term in the series. These phantasms are the result of the resonance between multiple terms in the series. If the phantasm carries its origin along with it, this is because it acts as a lure that draws us into an infinite temporal regression. According to Deleuze not even our mothers are our first loves because the temporal series is not limited to our personal history: “by loving his mother the hero of *In Search of Lost Time* repeats Swann’s love for Odette. The parental characters are not the ultimate terms of the individual subject but middle terms of an intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to another for different subjects...” [DR 105-106] In psychoanalysis there is a tendency to treat the love of the mother as the original archetype for all later loves. This is because psychoanalysis conceives of time as an objectively distributed series of events on a line of time. However, for Deleuze, the unconscious has no conception of a linear form of time; instead the unconscious has *no first event that acts as an origin*. Fantasies, myths, stories that one has read or heard have as much reality as the events one has experienced. It is for this reason that Proust inserts the narrative of Swann into the largely first person narrative of the hero of the novel. He treats this memory of another person as if it were a personal memory: “I had learned, about a love affair Swann had had before I was born, with that precision of detail which is sometimes

easier to obtain for the lives of people who died centuries ago than for the lives of our best friends...”<sup>16</sup> The theme of Swann’s love appears again and again in the novel. Each time disguised in a different jealousy: the jealousy of the hero, the jealousy of Saint-Loup, the jealousy of Charlus for Morel, etc. Each repetition forms a complex theme that acts as the law of the disguise. It is as if all these people shared the same memories, or as Proust says: “All these memories added to one another now formed a single mass... and then those that were only memories belonging to another person from whom I had learned them...”<sup>17</sup> When we make the effort to remember we untangle this “mass” of memory and deploy it on a line of time, but we should not confuse the means by which we conceive time with the manner in which it is stored in the unconscious. The notion of “origins” is a secondary revision of memory by the conscious mind and not a deep structure of the unconscious.

2.6 We have seen how the subjective association of ideas determines a series of memories. However, this is not the end of the story of the second synthesis. There is a further objective foundation for this subjective chain of associations: the Idea or the Theme. From a series of associative links it is possible to extract a generality or a repetitive theme that runs through all of them. We do not choose this theme; but rather, it chooses us. Our desires and actions follow a pattern that is laid out by themes of which we are unconscious. Even Freud’s method of free-association discovered that free associations are not always completely free. The subject of the conjunction of images and ideas is determined by archetypes that act as a superior viewpoint upon our repetitions. It is within this unconscious locus that Deleuze places the essence of love:

But, in love, the difference has passed into the unconscious: it becomes in a sense generic or specific and determines a repetition whose terms are no longer to be distinguished except by infinitesimal differences and subtle contrasts. In short, essence has assumed the generality of a Theme or an Idea, which serves as a law for the series of our loves. [PS 75]

The repetitions of the loves in Proust's work testify to the sorrows of jealousy and betrayal. During the moments when the hero is undergoing the trials and tribulations of love he is saddened by the painful *duration* of time. However, when he is free of the constraints of love he is able to look back and discover the "idea" that is incarnated in that repetition and in it he discovers a newfound joy. This is the objective element that coordinates the series. This is also, according to Proust, the means by which time can be redeemed:

Ideas are substitutes for sorrows; the moment they change into ideas they lose a part of their power to hurt our hearts and, for a brief moment, the transformation even releases some joy. Substitutes only in the order of time, though, because it seems that the primary element is actually the idea, and the sorrow merely the mode in which certain ideas first enter our minds.<sup>18</sup>

It is a mistake, on the part of Freud, to believe in the universal theme of the Oedipus complex. The theme is not a pre-given nucleus of our psychological states. It is *selected* by our choice of associations. According to Deleuze the subjective chain of associations *selects* the objective theme that will govern it: "It is indeed the Idea that determines the series of our subjective states, but also it is the accidents of our

subjective relations that determine the choice of the Idea.” [PS 76] In Proust’s novel the initiator of the series of loves is not the relationship to the mother (although the novel begins with this), but rather, it is the story of Swann’s love that is *activated* by the associative chain. Deleuze compares this “choice” of the Idea to Leibnizian possibilities that lay dormant until they were selected to be actualized:

Swann is the great unconscious initiator, the point of departure for the series; but how can we help regretting the themes sacrificed, the essences eliminated, like the Leibnizian possibilities that do not pass into existence and would have given rise to other series in other circumstances and other conditions?  
[PS 75-76]

This *selection* of themes from the accidental combinations in the series of loves shows that the theme *does not determine our choice of loves*. The series of choices are not disguises of some fundamental theme that is being repeated; rather, it is the repetition that determines the phantasms that haunt the preconscious mind. Deleuze recognizes that repetition is full of contingency and that if Albertine had not been selected then the theme of the novel would have been modified: “Albertine therefore enters the series of loves but only because she is selected from a group, with all the contingency that corresponds to this selection.” [PS 77] If repetition follows a theme then this theme is projected onto the series *afterwards*. However, this does not make the theme any less real. It is *real without being present, ideal without being abstract*. It is not reducible to the subjective chain of association because it breaks with the subjective chain. This is why the pure past that is conserved in itself is not reducible

to the subjective. Deleuze distinguishes between the objective and subjective conditions for resonance:

But if the resonance has both objective and subjective conditions, what it produces is of an altogether different nature: the Essence, the spiritual Equivalent, the Combray that was never seen and that breaks with the subjective chain. This is why producing is different from discovering and creating and why the entire Search turns successively from the observation of things and from the subjective imagination. [PS 154]

This shows that the pure past as a *virtual* dimension of time is not reducible to the subjective imagination. The psychological association of two moments in time is *produced* by the imagination, but the pure past that mediates these two moments is *discovered* as an impersonal reality.

2.1 The signs of love are deceptive and activate the mind to seek their meaning in the past.	2.3 The <i>effect</i> of resonance is produced by the association of images that is driven by Eros and broken by Thanatos.	2.5 The phantasm is not an original memory but a complex theme that links memories.
2.2 The <i>virtual</i> past compensates for the chaos of the present. This past gives meaning to the present <i>only</i> afterwards.	2.4 The <i>effect</i> of possible worlds is caused by projected narcissism. Homosexuality is the secret of lost worlds.	2.6 The “theme” that determines the series of loves is selected by chance. The theme is the <i>objective</i> element of association.

### c) Signs of Art

3.1 We have discovered the beginning of the signs of art in the resonant effect of memory. The idea of an objective “theme” of our repetitions is the beginning of art. In the work of Proust these themes are discovered through the series of loves that all repeat the narrative of Swann’s love with minor variations. Proust made the great discovery that these themes can become the essence of a work of art. As Deleuze tells us: “The real theme of a work is therefore not the subject the words designate, but the unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the words, but also the colors and sounds, assume their meaning and their life.” [PS 47] Proust discovers in the last volume of his work the essential element of the work of art in a form of idealism of themes. From the apprenticeship of observing patterns of behavior the hero of the novel is able to extract a general idea from the various substitutions of his past loves:

These substitutions add something disinterested, something more general, to the work, something which at the same time is an austere lesson that it is not to individuals that we must attach ourselves, that it is not individuals who really exist and are capable of being expressed, but ideas.<sup>19</sup>

The subject matter for the *Search for Lost Time* is not the people, places or things in it, but rather, the themes that are repeated in each section and the ideas they express.

3.2 However, this vision of the work of art as expressing ‘ideas’ comes dangerously close to the form of Platonism of which many readers have accused Proust. Deleuze is very careful to distinguish Proustian ideas from Platonic ones.

Deleuze tells us that the ideas are the *effect* of difference and repetition and not their *cause*: “a One and a Whole that would not be the principle but, on the contrary, ‘the effect’ of the multiplicity and of its disconnected parts.” [PS 163] The key difference between Platonic ideas and Proustian ideas is that the Proustian ideas *come after* the series of repetitions that they explicate. Deleuze gives the example of Balzac’s great work that unfolds in a series that explores the unity of its fragments. It is a mistake to think that this unity was preordained in the mind of Balzac: “For it is the same mistake, the same incomprehension of Balzac’s genius, that makes us suppose he had a vague logical idea of the unity of the *Human Comedy* beforehand or even that this unity is organically constituted as the work advances. Actually, the unity results and is discovered by Balzac as an *effect* of his books.” [PS 164] Proust himself is very clear about this; works that have a transcendent design that is envisioned by the artist before or during the writing of the work are weaker and less enduring than those that take upon themselves a vital unity that the author did not foresee:

This unity was an afterthought, but not artificial. Otherwise it would have crumbled into dust, like so many systematic constructions by mediocre writers who, by lavish use of titles and subtitles, try to make it look as if they have followed a single, transcendent design. Not artificial, perhaps all the more real for being an afterthought, born in a moment of enthusiasm when it is discovered between parts which only need to come together, a unity which was unaware of itself, and which therefore is vital and not born of logic, which has not ruled out variety or put a damper on execution.<sup>20</sup>

Two things make this unity strikingly different from Platonic unity: first, the unity is not born of logic because the unity is to be found in the “style” of the work that is grasped by an aesthetic sense and not a logical one; and second, the unity that results does not *reduce* the variety of differences within the work to one overriding concept. Above all the unity is *more real* for being an afterthought; that is, the unity is *discovered* and not created in the mind of the reader. This is the decisive point at which the third synthesis of time differs from the second synthesis of time that we discovered in the resonance of series. The subjective associations that the hero of the novel made between the present event and past events were wholly contingent and needed to be *created* by him. The themes that are repeated are *not* the subjective creations of the imagination: they are the fully objective means by which repetition explicates itself. We may choose the content of our daydreams but we are chosen by the themes that map out our destiny. Deleuze recognizes that the repetitions that make up our life are not the mere creations of the imagination but rather an objective force that individualizes our fate: “We shall not ask *who* chooses. Certainly no self, because we ourselves are chosen, because a certain self is chosen each time that ‘we’ choose a person to love, a suffering to experience, and each time this self is no less surprised to live or to relive, and to answer the call, whatever the delay.” [PS 127-128] It is this *objectivity* of the theme or unifying idea that is controversial. Most people would say that when we notice a “style” in an author or a repetition of occurrences in a series we are merely extracting a generality from the series of singularities. It seems as if we are using our intelligence to *analyze* a work of art and inventing the theme in our individual imaginations. But Deleuze denies this. He compares a work of art to a Leibnizian monad: “As Leibniz says, they have neither doors nor windows: the viewpoint being the difference itself, viewpoints towards a



world supposedly the same are as different as the most remote worlds. [...] Essence does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressed as the essence not of the subject but of Being, or the region of Being that is revealed to the subject.” [PS 41-42 & 43] Therefore the illusion that “style” is an illusion in the imagination is false for Deleuze. Style is a point of view upon the world the same way that the monad is a “point of view on the world”; that is, by expressing a clear and distinct *region* of difference that is explicated through the work of art. This point of view is not identical to the point of view of the author; rather, it is the point of view that the author tries to attain, his ideal and not his reality.

3.3 If signs of art can be distinguished from signs of love and worldly signs it is because these signs of art can communicate something to the reader that the others cannot. The worldly signs were steeped in habitual patterns of conversation, and the signs of love were silent and divorced from the beloved as one world is from another. But if the signs of art can bridge this gap between people it is because of its violent effect on our habitual manner of seeing the world. Proust shows us that the use of the work of art is not to give the reader something immediately recognizable, but something different:

This labour of the artist, this attempt to see something different beneath the material, beneath experience, beneath words, is the exact inverse of what is accomplished within us from minute to minute, as we live our lives heedless of ourselves, by vanity, passion, intellect and habit, when they overlay our true impressions, so as to hide them from us completely, with the repertoire of words, and the practical aims, which we wrongly call life.<sup>21</sup>

The signs of art are essentially violent; that is, they do violence to our habitual manner of perceiving the world. After viewing a Monet or a Turner we then leave the museum only to encounter the landscape and the sky again but this time in a different way than we have ever viewed it before. This is because something *new* has been added to our perception and our manner of perceiving is forever altered by our confrontation with *signs of art*. When Proust speaks of the fictional painter Elstir in his novel he gives him the genius of being able to transform the world. Here are his words on the subject:

If one tries to define what it is that the art lovers mean by the adjective, it can generally be seen to apply to some unfamiliar image of a familiar thing, an image that is different from the ones we are in the habit of noticing, unusual yet true, and which for that reason seems doubly striking, since it surprises us and shakes us out of our habits, while at the same time it turns us in on ourselves by recalling an impression.<sup>22</sup>

What is even more important than the ability of art to communicate this *difference* in perception is its ability to act as a mediator between worlds. This is why Deleuze says, “there is no intersubjectivity except an artistic one.” [PS 42] Of course we cannot see into the mind of another person. This is not what art is about. Art is not identical with the point of view of the artist. If it were it would be uninteresting; rather, it is a world unto itself. According to Proust great artists like Rembrandt or Vermeer are names for “styles” or modes of perceiving the world more than they are subjective reports about the “feelings” or “ideas” of the artist. As such they are eternal and completely independent of the artist that created them. *The most*

*important effect of art* is that it allows the present to *pass into the future* by modifying our perception. In short, we pass from the present world to a new world that is modified by the signs of art. The present passes away because there are always *new* and *multiple* worlds for us to pass into. Proust best expresses the objectivity and eternal nature of art in the following passage:

Thanks to art, instead of seeing only a single world, our own, we see it multiplied, and have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists, all the more different one from another than those which revolve in infinity and which, centuries after the fire from which their rays emanated has gone out, whether it was called Rembrandt or Vermeer, still send us their special light.<sup>23</sup>

We can now see why the signs of art belong to the third synthesis of time. It satisfies three criteria that Deleuze attributes to the third synthesis:

- 1) It constitutes the autonomy of the product, the independence of the work. [DR 90]
- 2) It is itself the new, complete novelty. [DR 90]
- 3) It is by itself the third time in the series, the future as such. [DR 90]

In short, the signs of art are independent from the artist who creates them. They express a completely novel viewpoint upon the world, and they open up the future by creating possible worlds for us to enter.

3.4 Signs of art cannot be “eternal” if they are mere creations of an artist. Deleuze employs a whole ontology of art to explain why signs of art relate to Being and not to the imagination. He tells us “it is expressed as the essence not of the subject but of

Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject.” [PS 43] Deleuze uses a Neoplatonic word to describe this ontology of art and time: complication. In order to understand this form of “complicated” time it is necessary that we put to the side our notions of time as a series of events that follow one another on a line of time. Instead we must imagine *all possible events* taking place at *one unique moment outside of chronology*. A complicated state of time is the unity of all time in an *undeveloped state*. Deleuze says of this state: “it does not yet have the distinct dimensions according to which it can unfold, nor even the separate series in which it is distributed according to different rhythms.” [PS 45] Deleuze also uses the word “explication” to describe the means by which this complicated state differentiated and unfolded to generate the series of time we can experience. The complicated state is “eternal” insofar as it subsists adjacent to chronological time. It is not changeless, but rather the source of all change. For Deleuze time is organized “according to degrees of immanent complications and following an order of descending explications.” [PS 45] Signs of art “explicate” time by developing a perpetual recreation of the primordial elements of nature. But it also “implicates” time by producing accords between divergent events and things. In fact, art explicates the world by implicating divergent elements. To put it simply, the work of art does the same thing that dreams do: it creates new combinations by combining disparate images and thereby expands perception. This process of combining and expanding is what Deleuze calls pure thought: “But, like sleep, art is beyond memory; it appeals to pure thought as a faculty of essences.” [PS 46] Whereas memory is ruled by the subjective associations of ideas, art appeals to this ontological base of complication. Because of this, art is not the creation of the subject but the *discovery* of a region of Being by the artist. The signs of art synthesize time, not by recomposing past

instances of life, but by drawing upon an original complicated state of time. This is why art has nothing to do with the resonances of involuntary memory. Art unfolds time *itself* by recreating the world at each moment.

3.5 Style is essentially metaphor. But what Deleuze and Proust mean by metaphor is different from its normal interpretation: “metaphor is essentially metamorphosis and indicates how two objects exchange their determinations, exchange even the names that designate them, in the new medium that confers the common quality upon them.” [PS 48] Proust gives the example of the paintings by Elstir: “One of the metaphors which recurred most often in the sea-pictures which surrounded him then was one which compares the land to the sea, blurring all distinction between them.”<sup>24</sup> What Proust calls metaphor Deleuze also calls “implication”. He gives the following definition of this term: “‘*Implication*’ is what we called the state of intensive series in so far as these communicate through their differences and resonate in forming fields of individuation.” [DR 280-281] In the example from Proust above we see that in the painting the land and the sea communicate *through their difference*, thereby forming a new individual that is neither land nor sea. The key function of implication is to make differences *problematic* once again so that an “unstable opposition” between the two will disturb our habits of perceiving either the land or the sea. In turn this enfolding of contraries reproduces the complicated state of *original time*. When Deleuze speaks of essence he is referring to this complicated form of time, and style or metaphor is the means by which the explicated objects in time lose their individuality and make the return journey to their intrinsic beginnings. “This is because style, in order to spiritualize substance and render it adequate to essence, reproduces the unstable opposition, the original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial elements that

constitute essence itself.” [PS 48] What the artist does, to put it simply, is to introduce the quality of dreams into the waking world of things. We notice that in dreams time seems to stop and when dream effects are introduced into art they produce a similar effect upon us. According to Proust this procedure protects the metaphor from the contingencies of time: “Indeed, just as in life, it begins at the moment when, by bringing together a quality shared by two sensations, he draws out their common essence by uniting them with each other, in order to protect them from the contingencies of time, in a metaphor.”<sup>25</sup> This effect is important for the following reason: the implication of elements returns them to a problematic state, and it is from this unstable opposition that time is forced to explicate itself again. In a paradoxical twist, the movement of time depends on these *centers of envelopment* to conserve the problem and continues the temporal series: “The *centres of envelopment* still testify to the persistence of the values of implication in the movement which explicates and solves them.” [DR 281] In short, the present passes because of the ambiguities that always haunt the present; i.e., those paradoxes of *becoming* that we found in the painting of the land becoming sea.

3.6 Where do the powers of difference and repetition come from? The artist spends his whole life perfecting his craft, repeating themes and striving towards an ideal that is never met. Like “Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others” [DR 1] the only thing the artist can do is to repeat, while differing in infinitesimal ways, his life’s work. “About the work of a great artist, we say: it’s the same thing, on a different level.” [PS 49] Proust speaks of artistic creation as a kind of worship, a quest of perfection:

I realized that, in a certain ideal pattern, the few outlines and arabesques of which could be seen to recur in his work over and over again, in a certain model of beauty, he had once seen something almost divine, since all of his time, the whole intellectual effort of which he was capable, in short the whole of his life, was devoted to the task of seeing those outlines more clearly and reproducing them more accurately. This ideal had become a form of worship, of such solemnity, and so demanding, that he could never be content...<sup>26</sup>

This is the progressive power of difference and repetition that Deleuze finds so important to the synthesis of time. But this power would never begin without the sublimation that the ideal inspires in the artist. Once again Freud's theory of narcissism plays an important role in inspiring repetition. Freud describes this ideal as a displaced narcissism: "The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value." [11Freud 88] This obsessional form of thought that the artist expresses is at the very heart of repetition. This obsession is described by Deleuze as a fatal affection:

It is all in this same movement that there is a reflux of Eros on to the ego, that the ego takes upon itself the disguises and displacements which characterize the objects in order to construct its own fatal affection, that the libido loses all mnemonic content and Time loses its circular shape in order to assume a merciless and straight form, and that the death instinct appears, indistinguishable from that pure form, the desexualized energy *of* that narcissistic libido. [DR 113]

By the “death instinct” Deleuze is referring to the repetition compulsion that inspires the obsessional repetitions of an artist. Sublimation *is* desexualized libido that has turned the sexual energy of the libido back onto the ego itself, thus making the ego follow a line of repetitions without end. In short, the death instinct splits the ego between itself and its ideal towards which it forever strives. This guarantees a continual production of differences from out of that split in the ego. It is within this continual repetition that the artist lives his life until he exhausts himself in his old age. In old age, and the exhaustion of his powers, the artist loses the ability to find continual novelty in repetition; he ends by lapsing into the comfort of ready-made images. Or as Proust says there is a point “when his creative genius would begin to dissipate, gradually giving way to idolatry, mere worship of the forms which had once nourished it and to the beguiling temptations of inertia.”<sup>27</sup> It is only at this point that the repetitions fail to be productive and instead become mechanical. Or as Deleuze puts it: “repetitions that have become mechanical because they are external, frozen differences that revert to a substance that they can no longer make light and spiritual.” [PS 49-50] It is the Idea that fuels productive repetition.

3.1 The subject matter of the work of art is “themes” and not people.	3.3 The signs of art communicate “violently” by changing perceptions. This allows us to pass into the future.	3.5 The artist reproduces “complication” by implicating diverse elements. This <i>envelopment</i> animates “becoming.”
3.2 Proustian ideas are different from Platonic ideas because they come <i>afterwards</i> . They are “points of view” produced by style.	3.4 Art appeals to the ontological base of “complication.” It explicates a region of Being.	3.6 The progressive force of repetition is motivated by the “ideal” of the artist. This “death instinct” brings difference to repetition.



## Chapter 2: The Syntheses of Series

In this chapter we will be investigating what Deleuze calls “series.” The main sources for the argument of this section can be found in Deleuze’s *The Logic of Sense*, in particular series 32 and 34. It is in these chapters that Deleuze lays out his theory of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series. It is also here that he distinguishes between depth, physical surfaces, sexual surfaces and metaphysical surfaces. But more important he gives a coherent theory of resonance and forced movement that takes place *between these surfaces*. It will be made clear that these three series and the effects they have on each other will be essential to a deeper understanding of what Deleuze means by the three syntheses of time. It is also in this section that we will investigate the important role the theories of Freud will play in Deleuze’s construction of series and syntheses. The series and their interaction directly mirror the processes of sublimation and fixation that can be found in the work of Freud. All in all, it will become clear that time is an *effect* of a dynamic process of resonance and forced movement operating between different series of psychical structures.

### a) The connective series

1.1 The story of connective series begins with the birth of the child. In its primitive state of development the infant is almost completely disorganized. Neural connections are still forming in the brain; the infant is still trying to coordinate its movements. About the only thing that is completely developed at birth is the ability to feed and to excrete. Freud calls these basic functions the drives of self-

preservation. In the beginning the mouth and the anus function to preserve the life of the infant. However, because of the complete dependence of the infant upon external sources of nourishment, needs will not always be satisfied in a timely fashion. When this happens an excess of intensity builds up in these zones. Here is where the emergence of another sort of relationship with reality emerges. We have all noticed the phenomenon of thumb sucking in small children. It is at the moment that the small child finds satisfaction in the thumb rather than the breast that the organism has switched from dependence on external stimuli to an “auto-erotic” relationship. Freud tells us that this is the birth of the erotogenic zone:

The child does not make use of an extraneous body for his sucking, but prefers a part of his own skin because it is more convenient, because it makes him independent of the external world, which he is not yet able to control, and because in that way he provides himself, as it were, with a second erotogenic zone, though one of an inferior kind. [7Freud 98]

For Deleuze this is an important step. The child has gone beyond the immediate real objects in order to activate a *virtual* object: “the child constructs for himself another object, a quite different kind of object which is a *virtual* object or centre and which then governs and compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity...” [DR 99] The virtual object is also the partial object discovered by Klein. There has been a lot of confusion about the nature of partial objects. For our purposes we will define it in the following way: it is an image of an *action* that will satisfy a drive in an auto-erotic manner. The child who sucks his thumb is not just sucking *that* thumb; he is also providing the drive with an image of a satisfying breastfeeding that took

place in the past and transposing it upon the present situation. The virtual/partial object allows the child to evade the present by conflating the present situation with a past one that was more satisfying. On a micro level this is the very beginning of sexuality. An important shift has taken place: the drives of self-preservation have been co-opted by the sexual drives. Drives of self-preservation depend upon real objects of satisfaction, whereas sexual drives only depend upon virtual objects. A zone of the body moves from one drive to the other when it acquires a memory for itself and begins to replay satisfying scenarios rather than waiting for real satisfaction.

1.2 It may seem strange at first to say that a zone of the body has a “memory.” But this is easily rectified if we consider what form this memory takes. Each zone has a degree of intensity. Normally the zone only needs enough intensity or energy to keep it functioning. However, as we have seen, the continual dissatisfaction of needs caused the zone to become invested with more intensity that it could use for normal purposes. This is important to Deleuze’s theory of the zone: “Consider, for example, objects of sucking or images of the oral zone. Each one becomes coextensive to the entire range of the partial surface and traverses it, as it explores its orifice and field of intensity, from the maximum to the minimum and vice versa.” [LS 225] The drives of self-preservation have a narrow *range* of intensity. These drives follow the range between the need of hunger to the satisfaction of feeding. On the other hand, the sexual drives exceed this narrow range: the repetition of satisfaction becomes detached from any actual need of the organism and instead *repeats its activity because of a drive to attain pleasure itself*. When repetition becomes detached from need it instead focuses on the *reduction* of the excess tension in the system.

Therefore the difference between the drives of self-preservation and the drives of sexuality is one of a difference in amplitude according to Freud:

But apart from these sources there are present in the organism contrivances which brings it about that in the case of a great number of internal processes sexual excitation arises as a concomitant effect, as soon as the intensity of those processes passes beyond certain quantitative limits. [7Freud 124]

Another great difference between the repetition of need in the drives of self-preservation and the repetition of pleasure in the sexual drives is that the sexual drives leave a trace whereas the drives of preservation do not. The newly developed partial sexual drives do two things: they seek to mitigate the unpleasure of expectation by an imaginary compensation and they register a habitual pattern in the neural-system in the form of a habit-memory. For Freud, every intensity has a *source* and an *aim*. The source of intensity in the erotogenic zone is the tension created by the expectation of a satisfaction that comes always too late. The *difference* between the self-preservative drive and the sexual ones is the difference in *aim*. The aim of the preservative drive is to satisfy an organic need. The aim of the sexual drive is to satisfy a pleasure. An object can only satisfy the first while the second can be satisfied with an *image*. According to Freud this is how a zone is produced: “At its origin it *attaches* itself to one of the vital somatic functions; it has as yet no sexual object, and is thus *auto-erotic*; and its sexual aim is dominated by an *erotogenetic zone*.” [7Freud 99] This attachment of an auto-erotic drive to a somatic function is so important to Deleuze because it marks the *first* transition from the *depth* of the organic to the *surface* of images: “It is with sexuality, that is to say, with the release

of the sexual drives, that the series begins—because the serial form is a surface organization.” [LS 224] Deleuze derives his terms “surface” and “depth” from a Stoic distinction between things that have bodies and things that do not. The drives of self-preservation belong to the “depths” because they *depend* upon an incorporation of *objects* for their satisfaction. The drives of sexuality belong to the “surface” because they *repeat* a series of *images* that provide a substitutive satisfaction.

1.3 The sexual surfaces and the images that populate them *should not* be confused with the faculty of the imagination and the images that are encountered in consciousness. The images in the conscious imagination *reproduce* images that were perceived by the senses. At this primitive level, the partial zones do not have any *perceptual* conception of complete objects that act as an aim of desire. It has often been thought that the infant *imagines* a picture of the mother’s breast when sucking its thumb. This conception of imagination treats the partial object *as if it were a whole object*. A partial object is radically different than a real object. For whole objects there are *parts* that are subtractable from the whole and act as wholes *of a part*. However, according to Deleuze a partial object is not part of a whole: “Whatever the reality in which the virtual object is incorporated, it does not become integrated: it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real continues to lack.” [DR 101] If we are to gain a better understanding of what kinds of images partial or virtual objects represent, then it would be better to think of them as movement-images or movement-memories. The partial objects refer to *actions* and not forms and outlines that make up visual images. The best example of this can be found in an early work of Freud concerning the perceptions of other human beings:

Then the perceptual complexes proceeding from this fellow human-being will in part be new and non-comparable—his *features*, for instance, in the visual sphere; but other visual perceptions—e.g. those of the movements of his hands—will coincide in the subject with memories of quite similar visual impressions of his own, of his own body, memories which are associated with memories of movements experienced by himself. [1Freud 331]

It must be kept in mind that, at this stage, the infant has no conception of a whole *other person*. The locus of the other person is, instead, made up of memories of *actions* such as feeding, or bathing, or cleaning, or stroking, any of the actions that the infant undergoes *without understanding* their source. The source of misunderstanding about partial objects is our own retrospective projection of our current mode of perception back upon the infant. When we, as adults, think of satisfying objects we think of body parts that act in the erotic imagination. The infant, however, has little understanding of objects and a *far greater* intuition of actions. When he sucks his thumb, it is not the breast as an *object* he recalls; but rather, the *action* that brought satisfaction in the past. It is quite natural that the first form of memory that the infant develops is a habit-memory. The survival of the child depends *more* on being able to repeat *actions* than it does on recognizing objects. This also follows from the scientific discovery that the first year of life is mostly devoted to coordinating movements and forming habits.

1.4 Habits give birth to a *series* of pleasures each connected to a partial zone that is homogeneous with itself. Of the three major zones (anal, oral, urethral) each has its own rhythm of succession and contraction. That is, each has an image of action that conditions its synthesis of pleasures. And because each zone pursues its own

synthesis there is no global sense of duration. If we are to conceptualize the *time* specific to partial objects and their synthesis we must look for it in dreams. Deleuze tells us that in dreams we return to that state of fragmentary consciousness:

The persons we dream of lose their total character and are treated as partial objects, either because a part of them is isolated by our dream or because they function altogether as such objects. Now this was precisely what the worldly raw material offered us: the possibility of isolating, as in a frivolous dream, a movement of the shoulders in one person and a movement of the neck in another, not in order to totalize them, but to partition them one from another.

[PS 150-151]

In dreams we are no longer confronted with whole-persons but only those fragmentary *movements* that are combined in them. This is because dreaming is a *regression* to a primitive state of sexuality in which each zone partitions the person of whom we dream into its zones of interest. What does this have to do with the series? In dreams our sense of duration is distorted. It is not completely eliminated, but rather it does not extend into the past and future: it remains fragmented. This is because each zone determines its *own duration* based on its own rhythm of contraction. What we encounter in dreams is a chaos of conflicting durations, and rhythms that do not add up to a coherent passage of time. It is not that there is an absence of presence in dreams, but rather a confused sense of order. This confused sense of passage is due to the absence of the whole object known as the Other. Deleuze gives the function of *transition* of object and ideas to the Other:

The first effect of Others is that around each object that I perceive or each idea that I think there is an organization of a marginal world, a mantle or background, where other objects and other ideas may come forth in accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passage from one to another. [LS 305]

In dreams we experience the synthesis of time that we call the *present* but without the sense of transition of passage from one moment to the next that we experience in waking. The difference between these two experiences of the present can be found in the integrations of the partial zones. In dreams we experience only the *local integrations* of larval egos or partial zones that determine a living present. According to Deleuze this is the form of time that we find in the Id: “The Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out.” [DR 97] In the Id there is an eternal present without passage from one present to the next; instead, they all subsist in a *complicated* state of co-presence. It is only with the *global* integration of sexuality that whole persons can be recognized and the present takes on a sense of succession from one moment to the next. According to Deleuze this *global* integration is carried out by the *active* and unified ego: “The passive egos were already integrations, but only local integrations, as mathematicians say; whereas the active self is an attempt at global integration.” [DR 98] The difference between the passive egos and the active one is that the passive egos are wholly auto-erotic and have no aim outside themselves, whereas the active ego takes the Other as the aim of its desires.



1.5 The final stage of the pre-genital series and the first stage of the following series comes with the coordination activity of the phallus. The function of the phallus at this stage is to bring all the competing instincts and the images they form into one coordinated surface. Deleuze calls this integration the line of the surface: “This line, emanating from the genital zone, is the line which ties together all the erogenous zones, thus ensuring their connection or ‘interfacing’ (*doublure*), and bringing all the partial surfaces together into one and the same surface on the body of the child.” [LS 201] The phallus, in this case, is not just another partial object among others; rather, it is the unity of the whole series of virtual objects. The question now arises: how does the phallus unify the series of virtual objects? Deleuze gives the following answer: “He is able to give this extension to the concept of the phallus (such that it subsumes all the virtual objects) because the concept effectively comprises the preceding characteristics: testifying to its own absence and to itself as past, being essentially displaced in relation to itself, being found only as lost, being possessed of an always fragmentary identity which loses its identity in the double...” [DR 103] The short answer to this question is that the “lost” character of the phallus is explained by repression. Genital sexuality *represses* pre-genital sexuality and the narcissism of auto-eroticism is suppressed by the sexuality of “object-choice.” Freud summarizes this process:

The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly auto-erotic; it now finds a sexual object. Its activity has hitherto been derived from a number of separate instincts and erotogenic zones, which, independently of one another, have pursued a certain sort of pleasure as their sole sexual aim. Now, however, a new sexual aim appears, and all the component instincts combine to attain it,

while the erotogenic zones become subordinated to the primacy of the genital zone. [7Freud 127]

If the phallus is split into two parts, as Deleuze claims, is it because the new found genital sexuality does two things: a) it determines a choice of a real object as a new aim of sexuality and b) it represses the narcissistic auto-erotic drives. The auto-erotic drives, from the side of post-pubescent sexuality, appear as a “paradise lost” of complete unity before the repression of the phallus. Of course this is a retrospective *effect* of the phallus: there is no real primordial unity, only the appearance of one from the side of separation. Deleuze compares this illusion of lost unity to the unity of Platonism: “...the Good is reached only as the object of a reminiscence, uncovered as essentially veiled; the One gives only what it does not have, since it is superior to what it gives, withdrawn into its heights; and as Plato said of the idea, ‘it flees or it perishes’...” [LS 191-192] Thus, the unity of the past is determined by a *transcendent* unity of withdrawal and repression. The consequence this has for the synthesis of time is dramatic: *at the same time* we are given a present that *passes* we are also given a *pure past* that never was past. That is, the new found genital sexuality allows the “global ego” to be activated and the libido becomes attached to a series of objects in the “real” world; however, at the same time the repressed pre-genital series takes on the appearance of a past unity that was lost.

1.6 Deleuze says of the pure past, “It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passage of time.” [DR 82] We have just seen how the phallus causes the *effect* of a pure past that never was present. Now we will see how this same phallus causes the present to pass. The phallus, as we have seen, activates the “active ego” that invests in real objects in the world. This ego in turn “samples” the external world in a series

of cathexes according to Freud: “The ego periodically sends out small amounts of cathexes into the perceptual system, by means of which it samples the external stimuli; and then after every such tentative advance it draws back again.” [11Freud 441] However, the ego is never a complete agency unto itself. It operates in a field of *tension* between the Id and the super-ego. The passage of time is dependent upon a passage of cycles of judgment. This “judgment” should not be thought of as the conscious judgments we make through language. These judgments operate on the level of desire between Eros and Thanatos. In Freud’s paper on negation he describes this polarity of judgment: “The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation – as a substitute for uniting – belongs to Eros; negation – the successor to expulsion – belongs to the instinct of destruction.” [11Freud 441] The Id acts as an attractor of objects; it was separated from the ego by the repression of the pre-genital sexuality and now acts as the source of Eros. The Super-ego acts as a repulser of objects; it is the agency of repression that separated the ego from the id. In each encounter the “active ego” has with the objects of its investment it either reacts with the desire to draw that object in or it reacts by repulsing that object away. In either case the repressed series (of the pure past) forms a preconscious judgment as to the desirability of that object. In this way the *passing present* slides across the repressed series of the *pure past*. When an object is recognized, as we say in our everyday language, there is a *resonance* between the repressed series of the past and the passing series of objects in perception. This is the effect of Eros. As Freud says, it is a positive judgment, and time seems to stop for a brief moment. However, the superego will always reassert itself and withdraw the libidinal investment in that object allowing the present to pass. Several phenomena are indicative of this

veritable speed of time's passage: lovers experience the seeming slowness of time as it actually passes quickly in romantic situations, and those who are bored experience the drawing out of duration that seems to prolong in waiting for something to happen. We will take up this distinction between resonance and *forced movement* later in another section.

1.1 The virtual object is attached to the self-preservative drive by "auto-eroticism." This replaces an imaginary satisfaction for a "real" satisfaction.	1.3 The "partial" objects are movement-images that have no form. This is the basis of habit-memory.	1.5 The "repressed" pre-genital series becomes the pure past <i>at the same time</i> that the phallus causes the ego to relate to whole objects that make the present pass.
1.2 When a "zone" exceeds a certain <i>intensity</i> it becomes "auto-erotic." This splits the <i>aim</i> of the zone between surface images and objects of the depths.	1.4 Each zone has its own duration. We experience this in dreams. The coherence of passage is due to the "whole" object.	1.6 The "active" ego now <i>samples</i> the external world. Attraction and repulsion are determined by the pre-genital drives. The speed of passage is thus determined.

b) The conjunctive series.

2.1 Freud tells us that object-choice takes place in two waves or two series:

It may be regarded as typical of the choice of an object that the process is diphasic, that is, that it occurs in two waves. The first of these begins between the ages of two and five, and is brought to a halt or to a retreat by the latency period; it is characterized by the infantile nature of the sexual aims. The

second wave sets in with puberty and determines the final outcome of sexual life. [7Freud 119]

These two series are separated by a period of time called “latency” which is a period of extreme repression. The repressed period allows the first series to be pushed back into time; in fact, into a time before memory. The first series is subject to what Freud calls infantile amnesia. The effect of this is that the first series, of pre-genital sexuality, is completely wiped out of memory at the same time it becomes the basis for memory. However, we should not think that the first series is completely destroyed: instead it is partially sublimated. According to Freud: “The resultants of infantile object-choice are carried over into the later period. They either persist as such or are revived at the actual time of puberty. But as a consequence of the repression which has developed between the two phases they prove unutilizable.” [7Freud 119] Under the influence of the phallus the pre-genital series is carried over into the second series in puberty and transformed into an Oedipal phantasy. This is why Deleuze tells us that the Oedipal series is based upon a repressed series from which it extracts its images: “Moreover, this or these Oedipal series enter into relation with the pregenital series, with the images which correspond to them, and even with groups and persons wherefrom these images were extracted.” [LS 226] This process, whereby one series resonates with another, is called fixation. The choice of the mother as an external object-choice is predetermined by a previous *internal* object-choice that predates the formation of the ego. We should not confuse the relationship between the “internal” object-choice with a resemblance to an “external” object-choice. The internal object is not an image in the sense that an

external object is an image. Rather, according to Freud, the pre-genital series is an *intensity* that becomes attached to the caregiver:

A child's intercourse with anyone responsible for his care affords him an unending source of sexual excitation and satisfaction from his erotogenic zones. [...] A mother would probably be horrified if she were made aware that her marks of affection were rousing her child's sexual instinct and preparing for its later intensity. [7Freud 145-146]

Of course no one remembers the pre-genital excitation that took place during caregiving but the intensity of that first series becomes the basis for the resonant effect that appears in the second series. The attachment to the mother in the Oedipal series is foreshadowed by the intensity experienced in the pre-genital series.

2.2 The conjunctive synthesis is different from the previous connective synthesis insofar as the conjunctive synthesis is the connection between divergent series that are separated by infantile amnesia. Freud makes a strong connection between hysterical amnesia that is associated with trauma and infantile amnesia that effects us all:

Hysterical amnesia, which occurs at the bidding of repression, is only explicable by the fact that the subject is already in possession of a store of memory-traces which have been withdrawn from conscious disposal, and which are now, by an associative link, attracting to themselves the material which the forces of repression are engaged in repelling from consciousness. It

may be said that without infantile amnesia there would be no hysterical amnesia. [7Freud 91]

Here we see Freud approaching the repressed memories as a store of traces in the unconscious that both *attract* the present series of conscious ideas and *repel* them by the forces of repression. The trauma of hysterical amnesia is not a special case of infantile amnesia but only a case where the tension between the intensity of attraction is stronger than the counter-force of repression. Hysterical amnesia gives the appearance of some “event” that happened in the past that cannot be made present through recall. However, as we have discovered, the previous series of excitations do not have the structure that can be called an “event.” The pre-genital series only contains excitations of zones. Freud tells us that the excitations in one of these pre-genital zones is responsible for the *effect* of deferred action: “Deferred action of this kind occurs as well in connection with memories of excitations of the *abandoned* sexual zones.” [1Freud 269] He stresses the word “abandoned” because these excitations cannot be translated into post-genital sexuality and are therefore repressed. Instead of a memory of a previous “event” the hysterical person is faced with a “screen memory.” Freud defines screen-memory as follows:

One is thus forced by various considerations to suspect that in the so-called earliest childhood memories we possess not the genuine memory-trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces.<sup>28</sup>

There has been a lot of confusion about the notion of deferred action in Freud. This is because Freud held two different views on this phenomenon. The first was that hysterical amnesia was caused by an actual scene of seduction in childhood. However, he later gave up this idea of actual traumatic events for the theory of the psychological reality of traumatic fantasies. In the following passage from a letter Freud explains why he gave up the theory of actual traumatic seductions:

Then came surprise at the fact that in every case the father, not excluding my own, had to be blamed as a pervert—the realization of the unexpected frequency of hysteria, in which the same determinant is invariably established, though such a widespread extent of perversity towards children is, after all, not very probable. [1Freud 259]

This admission makes the proposition that the “cure” for hysterical amnesia is to remember the repressed event. If there is no first event then the “event” itself must not be either in the first series or in the second series; but rather, it must take place between them.

2.3 For Deleuze the comprehension of the event is the effect of resonance itself: “In our terminology, it is therefore not a question of events properly speaking, but rather of two series of independent images, whereby the Event is disengaged only through resonance of the series in the phantasm.” [LS 226] It is the difference in kind between these two types of images that determines the resonance between the series. Freud tells us that memories are stored differently for the infant than for the adult mind: “Visual memory accordingly preserves the type of infantile memory.”<sup>29</sup> Not only are “visual” memories stored, but also the memories of sensation and



intensities. As such, these images must remain unconscious because they lack the criteria that would allow them to become conscious. According to Deleuze, “sexuality does not have the conditions which would render possible its being maintained in consciousness (namely, the possibility of being denoted, manifested, and signified by linguistic elements corresponding to it).” [LS 244] In short, the infant’s mind stores only qualitative memories, and because it does not have a language, these memories do not carry over to the second series. The difference is one of organization of memory. Deleuze tells us that verbal representations belong to the incorporeal surface effects, and object representations belong to the sexual depths of bodies: “Verbal representation must be carefully distinguished from ‘object representation,’ because it concerns an incorporeal event and not a body, an action, a passion, or a quality of bodies.” [LS 245] If there is a repression of infantile images it is because it is incompatible with the linguistic structures of consciousness. But this difference is also the means by which the two series resonate. If recollection of memory in the adult series is determined by designation, signification, and manifestation, then the repressed infantile series must act as a generalized “sense” that pervades language as an allusion. The attempt of the conscious mind is to neutralize “sense” as much as possible so that language can maintain its pragmatic (rather than poetic) uses. Deleuze indicates this in the following quote:

This is why when another surface is developed with different effects which at last found denotations, manifestations, and significations as ordered linguistic units, elements like phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes seem to turn up on this new plane, but seem to lose their sexual resonance. This sexual resonance is repressed or neutralized, while the basic series are swept aside

by the new series of amplitude. Sexuality exists only as an allusion, as vapor or dust, showing a path along which language has passed, but which it continues to jolt and to erase like so many extremely disturbing childhood memories. [LS 242]

With regard to the last part of the above quote, the disturbing childhood memories, Freud has mapped out disturbances of language in his book *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. This work exposes the resonance of pre-genital sexuality in the everyday slips of the tongue. The fact is that these phenomena are not accidental; rather, they reveal the strange “emotions” that some people feel when uttering a phrase that is not explainable by the content of the sentence. Deleuze’s book, *The Logic of Sense*, is primarily about the *effect* of language known as sense that is not reducible to the meaning of words. “Sense” is the effect of resonance of the repressed depths of pre-genital sexuality upon the surface effect of language. In an extreme form of this phenomena, known as “hysteria”, the person in question undergoes a revival of a “memory” that is supposed to date back to early childhood. In this case the “memory” in question is activated by a linguistic and propositional structure that attempts to translate qualitative “object representations” into a narrative structure of an event. *The “event” in question is a product of the translation between the two forms of representation.* What the hysterical person understands is not a distorted form of an original event, but the linguistic and narrative reconstruction of a qualitative object-memory. This is what Freud calls a screen-memory. An example of a screen-memory can be found in the work of Proust in the episode of the madeleine: “Undoubtedly what is fluttering this way deep inside me must be the image, the visual memory which is attached to this taste and is trying to follow me.”<sup>30</sup> Even

Proust recognizes that “visual memory” or the qualitative essence of things is stored deep in the unconscious and repressed regions of the psyche. This is why reactivation of involuntary memory always follows from an association of “qualitative” images rather than associations of linguistic units that appeal to the faculty of the intellect. The qualitative image only becomes a screen-memory when it becomes attached to a name: Combray. It is this screen-memory of Combray that Deleuze calls the pure past:

*Combray as it is in itself*, as a fragment of the pure past, in its double irreducibility to the present that it has been (perception) and to the present present in which it might reappear or be reconstituted (voluntary memory). This Combray in itself is defined by its own essential difference, that ‘qualitative difference’ which, according to Proust, does not exist ‘on the surface of the earth’, but only at a particular depth. [DR 122]

It is here that Deleuze makes it clear that the form of screen-memory which we have been examining is not the recollection of a real event (a past perception or a recalled event) but rather, it is a qualitative difference (the pre-genital “object-representation”) that subsists only in the depth constituted by the repressed series of infantile memories.

2.4 Of the screen-memories, or phantasms as Deleuze calls them, none are more evident in the life of the psyche than the Oedipal series. In the second half of *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze makes great use of the Oedipus complex as a series that is typical of the phantasm. He draws a comparison between the first series of pre-genital sexuality and the pubescent series of the Oedipus complex: “...these Oedipal

series enter into relation with the pregenital series, with the images which correspond to them, and even with groups and persons wherefrom these images are extracted.”

[LS 226] The question arises: how are the pre-genital series converted into the phantasms of the Oedipal series? We have seen that the pre-genital series comes under repression by the institution of language, but what is the source of this language? For Deleuze, language is inspired by the “voice from above.” To put it simply, the infant experiences the voices around him as a *voice from above* that is pre-signifying. Deleuze equates the voice with the formation of the superego in the following quote:

Freud himself stressed the acoustic origin of the superego. For the child, the first approach to language consists in grasping it as the model of that which preexists, as referring to the entire domain of what is already there, and to the familial voice which conveys tradition, it affects the child as a bearer of a name and demands his insertion even before the child begins to understand.

[LS 193]

The child does not understand the significance of the voices of adults that it hears but it understands the scolding nature and rewarding nature of the voice. It is this opposition of loving and hating voice that leaves a mark on the infant. It is this “mark” that inspires the repression of “object representations” in favor of verbal representations. But more than this, the voice that is experienced in the infantile series is *translated* into the adult series as the phantasms of the “mother” and the “father” in the Oedipal series. In this case the “father” image *resonates* with the scolding voice from above, and the “mother” image with the loving voice from

above. The two images form the component parts of the superego: the part that one identifies with as an “ego-ideal” and the part that forbids that constitutes the proper form of the superego. The ego-ideal attracts the drives of the depths by prompting the image of a healed and unified surface in which the destructive drives of the depths are neutralized. However, in order to bring about this unification the superego must repress the pre-genital zones that fragment the surface. It is at this point that the illusion of narcissism that we examined above comes into play. The “phallus” becomes the privileged object that the phantasms of the Oedipal series revolve around. The phallus becomes the ideal of re-unification: it seeks to make the transcendent unity of the ego-ideal immanent and the fragmented series of pre-genital zones unified. Deleuze addresses this problem of the phallus:

And when it determines parental images, it is again by dissociating its own aspects, by distributing them as alternatives which supply the alternating terms of the Oedipal series, and by arranging them around the image of the mother (wounded and to be healed), and the image of the father (withdrawn and to be made present). Only the phallus would then be left as the agent of convergence and coordination; the problem is that it itself gets involved in Oedipal dissociations. [LS 227]

The phantasms of the Oedipus complex are already involved in an ongoing Castration complex. In the pre-genital series this phantasm is represented by the withdrawal of the breast or the excretion of feces. This is where the phallus gets its qualities of being both a presence and a lack, being both present and absent and going from one series to the other without shifting its place. It can do this because, as

a representative of the primary narcissism of the child it subsists in the pure *past* that has its unity by its transcendent and withdrawn nature, and as a problem in the *present* Oedipal series it can represent the lack the child feels in relation to the parental images.

2.5 The whole problem with the second series of *resonance* is that it is an incomplete sublimation of the pre-genital drives. It creates a traumatism in the phantasm because the “comprehension” of the series remains incomplete. There are two things dangerously wrong with the second synthesis of time: a) it sets up a feeling of nostalgia for a lost unity that never existed and b) it seals off the psyche in a repeating loop that prevents any progress being made (a repetition of the same). According to Deleuze the whole “intermediary” surface of sexuality is complicated with symptoms and failures of comprehension:

Melanie Klein remarks that between symptoms and sublimations there must be an intermediary series corresponding to cases of *less successful sublimation*. But the whole of sexuality, in its own right, is a ‘less successful’ sublimation: it is intermediary between the symptoms of corporeal depth and the sublimations of the incorporeal surface; and in this intermediary state it is organized in series on its own intermediary surface. [LS 224]

This is why Deleuze disparages sexuality in his work. Eros as the force of resonance in the second synthesis of time is beset by failures typified in the Oedipus complex. For Deleuze the phantasm of the sexual surface is a failed vision of the event. The “pure event” belongs to the third synthesis of time that we will examine later. This third synthesis of time brings about a repetition that is a repetition “of difference”

and is progressive and creative in its productions. This must be contrasted with the repetition of Eros and sexuality that repeats the “same” and entraps the thinker in repetitive games of guilt and castration. Deleuze’s contempt for this form of thought about sexuality can be seen in the following passage:

The risk is obviously that the phantasm falls back on the poorest thought, on a puerile and redundant diurnal reverie ‘about’ sexuality, each time that it misses its mark and falls short, that is, each time it falls back in the ‘in-between’ of the two surfaces. [LS 220]

It is true that Deleuze is already anti-Oedipal in *The Logic of Sense*. However, he does affirm the Oedipal and the second synthesis of time of which it is a part to be a stage in transition to the third synthesis of time. The remarkable accomplishment in this work is that Deleuze has succeeded in overturning the common assumptions about Freudianism: that is, the idea that the Oedipus complex is a “nuclear complex” that lies at the heart of each person. Instead Deleuze shows how it is an *effect* of the resonance of the divergent series of the pre-genital and pubescent sexualities. Further, he shows how the cure for this “neurosis” does not consist in remembering some original event; but rather, progressing to a new synthesis of the radical sublimation of “desexualization” that we will discover in the third synthesis of time. Whereas the Freudian project was to stop repetition through remembering, the Deleuzian project is to extend repetition *beyond* remembering:

We are not, therefore, healed by simple anamnesis, any more than we are made ill by amnesia. Here as elsewhere, becoming conscious counts for little.

[...] If repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also frees us, testifying in both cases to its 'demonic' power. All cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetition. [DR 19]

In essence, Deleuze departs from Freud in his re-evaluation of the Death instinct as a repetition compulsion. Whereas Freud only saw it as a problematic condition attached to neurosis, Deleuze sees it as a possible means of escape from the regressive repetitions of neurotic and erotic fixations.

2.6 Deleuze names transference as the mechanism by which one is set free from the Oedipus complex: "The more theatrical and dramatic operation by which healing takes place – or does not take place – has a name: transference. Now transference is still repetition: above all repetition." [DR 19] In a note to this sentence Deleuze recommends the work of Ferenczi and Rank: "Those who are interested most profoundly upon the therapeutic and libidinal aspect of repetition as it appears in transference were Ferenczi and Rank..." [DR 307] In their short work, *The Development of Psychoanalysis*, they set out to explain the technique of psychoanalysis, not as an education of the patient, but of a weaning of the patient away from his or her libidinal attachments. In their own words:

The essential thing in the analytical intervention, however, does not consist either in the verification of the 'Oedipus Complex', or in the simple repetition of the Oedipus situation in the relation to the analyst, but rather in setting free and detachment of the infantile libido from its fixation on its first objects.<sup>31</sup>



Essentially, in the analytic practice the patient becomes attached to the analyst. This process is called “positive transference.” In this phase the neurotic will repeat his Oedipal fantasies in the therapeutic session. In these sessions the psychoanalyst will have, projected onto him, all the libidinal and erotic attachments that the neurotic patient has not resolved. Here is the crucial role of the analyst: *not to interpret or confirm the neurotic’s fantasies, but to disappoint them.* There comes a point in every analysis when the love the patient feels for the analyst turns to hate: this is “negative transference.” The difference between positive and negative transference is the difference between Eros and the Death Instinct. One seeks resonances between the analyst and libidinal attachments in the pre-genital series. The other breaks with libidinal attachments, and the result is that, for the first time, the patient comprehends the “truth” of his attachment to the analyst. He was just replaying a pattern of a demand for love from his own internal Other, his own superego, that could never be satisfied in reality. Ferenczi and Rank explain this in the following quote:

For this phase the problem is to get the patient, with the help of the love for the analyst, to give up this love. [...] After the patient has become convinced that he cannot obtain the love of the analyst in reality—and that such is the case he only admits in the very last phase of the cure—he recognizes, consciously as well as emotionally, the impossibility of fulfilling the demands of his infantile libido and contents himself with the other things which life offers. It is remarkable with what haste the libido, as it frees itself from the cure, seeks out new interests in life. We see the process of sublimation which in ordinary life requires years of education, take place before our eyes towards the end of the cure in the shortest space of time...<sup>32</sup>

Before one can give up one's Oedipus complex one must first regress to the first series; that is, to set up a resonance between the pre-genital series and the present series of transference. This is why the second series of time, the pure past, is an important step in the path to progressive repetition. In the work of Proust, the hero must fall in love with Albertine, re-play all the games of deception and separations, and then resolve himself to finally break with Albertine. In Proust's work we see the whole series of positive and negative transference at work in the opposition of love and jealousy. It is only at the moment that the Oedipal series of resonance is broken in *The Search* that the hero finds his libidinal energies free to create the work of art. But before the final break, the hero must pass into the *pure past*, and examine the resonances that it produces and experience the pain of unfulfilled wishes. Deleuze reinterprets Freud's theory of "remembering" as a voyage to the bottom of repetition, and of bringing the erotic connection to the past to a crisis point. For Deleuze it is necessary to *install oneself directly into the pure past* to make a living connection and to experience the full range of frustration and disappointment that this resonance causes:

Freud noted from the beginning that in order to stop repeating it was not enough to remember in the abstract (without affect), nor to form a concept in general, nor even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity: it was necessary to seek out the memory there where it was, to install oneself directly in the past in order to accomplish a living connection between the knowledge and the resistance, the representation and the blockage. [DR 18-19]

This *installing oneself directly in the past* that Deleuze recommends is identical to what Proust called involuntary memory and Ferenczi and Rank called positive transference. Deleuze tells us that this movement into the past *in itself* is only the initial movement of a pendular structure: “It has a pendular structure: the basic series traversed by the movement of the object = x, the resonance, and the forced movement of an amplitude greater than the initial movement.” [LS 239] In short, the second synthesis of time and the resonance of its initial movement, is only the precursor to the forced movement of the third synthesis of time.

<p>2.1 The <i>intensities</i> of the repressed pre-genital series <i>resonate</i> with the post-genital series. This is how two divergent series are conjoined.</p>	<p>2.3 The “comprehension” of the event is an <i>effect</i> of qualitative excitations from one series being “translated” into verbal representations in another series. The qualitative series is the “sense” of language.</p>	<p>2.5 The Oedipus complex is a “less successful sublimation” that is only an <i>effect</i> of resonance and not a “nucleus.” The way beyond Oedipus is not remembering but “desexualization.”</p>
<p>2.2 “Traumatic” events are not <i>real</i> events but rather a result of the <i>translation</i> of repressed excitations into a fantasy called “screen memory.”</p>	<p>2.4 The parental images in the Oedipus complex are extracted from the “voice from above.” These two images form the two functions of the phallus: presence and lack.</p>	<p>2.6 The way beyond Oedipus is an “erotic” regression into the pure past followed by a “crisis” that breaks with the erotic synthesis of the past. This is called “transference.”</p>

## c) The disjunctive series.

3.1 Whereas the series of *resonance* between the partial zones and the sexual surface was a less successful sublimation, the *forced movement* between the original depths and the metaphysical surface is described by Deleuze as being more extreme: “But the forced movement which represents desexualization is Thanatos and ‘compulsion’; it operates between the two extremes of the original depth and the metaphysical surface, the destructive cannibalistic drives of depth and the speculative death instinct.” [LS 239] Both Freud and Deleuze call this new amplitude or range between series “sublimation.” The first major difference between sublimation and the Oedipus complex is that the Oedipus complex *represses* unutilizable pre-genital zones, and this repression results in the amnesia and resonance of that series. According to Freud, in sublimation the pre-genital zones are no longer repressed, or at least no longer useless:

We know of a far more expedient process of development, called ‘*sublimation*’, in which the energy of the infantile wishful impulses is not cut off but remains ready for use—the unserviceable aim of the various impulses being replaced by one that is higher, and perhaps no longer sexual.<sup>33</sup>

Resonance was *caused* by the screen-memories that were invested with the energy of the pre-genital zone. Now those zones are *desexualized* and turned into energy that can be used for creative thought. Deleuze describes this new movement as greater than that of resonance because the series of Oedipal wishes *directly impeded*

intellectual capacity. According to Freud, this impediment to thought is brought about by the great libidinal energy that is absorbed in maintaining a fixation:

A certain psychical inertia, a sluggishness of the libido, which is unwilling to abandon its fixations, cannot be welcome to us; the patient's capacity for sublimating his instincts plays a large part and so does his capacity for rising above the crude life of the instincts; so, too, does the relative power of his intellectual functions.<sup>34</sup>

But what are these intellectual functions that Freud is speaking of? When Freud is speaking of sublimation and its intellectual functions he seems to be referring to particularly creative endeavors of the mind and not to the mundane tasks of thought. It is in the creative aspect of thought that we see the functional necessity for a transition from *fixation* to creation. Because the fixations of the Oedipus complex eventually expose the psyche to great conflicts, the imaginative capacity of the mind must be expanded in order to solve these conflicts in a *creative way*. Because the psyche cannot solve the conflict in "reality" it seeks to recreate, or counter-actualize, the real world in an image of an intellectual one. According to Freud, it is the attempt to avoid the frustrations of psychical conflicts that leads the psyche to sublimate:

The task here is that of shifting the instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration from the external world. In this, sublimation of the instincts lends its assistance. One gains the most if one can sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure from the sources of psychical and

intellectual work. When that is so, fate can do little against one. A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist's joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a scientist's in solving problems or discovering truths...<sup>35</sup>

What the artist essentially does is to take the conflicting drives that we discovered in the pre-genital series and re-organize them so that they can be *translated* into linguistic or expressive phenomena in literature or art. Because of this *translation* of pre-genital sexuality, the aims that were incompatible with consciousness now enter consciousness in a desexualized form. In this way, the polymorphous-perverse phenomena of repressed sexuality finds expression, although disguised by the mask of language, in the artistic format. If these works of sublimation appear to express *new truths*, according to Freud, it is because they translate phantasies into new realities:

An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play in the life of phantasy. He finds his way back to reality, however, from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to mould his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by men as precious reflections of reality.

[11Freud 41-42]

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze calls this process "counter-actualization." In this process the actions in the depths of the body – what Deleuze describes as the destructive and cannibalistic instincts that manifest themselves in life as self-

destructive behavior – is given a literary or artistic form, in which the person who undergoes the destructive events is *depersonalized*, as if it was being acted out on a stage as a representation of the event. According to Deleuze, action takes place on two stages; one in which it is undergone in reality, and the other where it is *mimed* by the sublimated and artistic representation of the event: “...to be the mime of *what effectively occurs*, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the identification with distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization.” [LS 161] We can see in this quote from Deleuze the same process that Freud talked about when he spoke of turning “phantasies into truths of a new kind” through the activity of sublimation.

3.2 Does sublimation go far enough? In the work of Freud it seems as if sublimation *only goes as far as making the end of the Oedipus complex possible*. Freud’s ideal for the termination of treatment is to turn the conflicts of sexual investment in an Oedipal complex into a sort of “affection” for the parents that is *only partially* sublimated:

The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated (a thing which happens with every transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and changed into impulses of affection. [7Freud 319]

Freud’s plan for the dissolution of the Oedipus complex involves a transformation from the child’s fear of castration to an *identification* with the parental figure that carries out the threat. This is what is known as *identification with the aggressor*. It is

also the internalization of the prohibition; this means that repression is partially released from direct suppression of the instincts and the prohibition is internalized in the form of a superego. This is a compromise. The aggression that was turned *against* the child in the form of a threat can now, because of identification with the aggressor, be turned outwards towards an *instinct of mastery*. The child who has undergone this form of sublimation now feels compelled to turn the repressive aggression *outwards* into constructive projects. While it is true that the libidinal energy that was used to repress the child is now turned towards productive ends, it still “compromises” with the Oedipus complex and carries it out in another form. The ideal for dissolution of the Oedipus complex is the drive to become a father of one’s own children and repeat the cycle of repression on a new generation. So, the conflict with the father is turned into an affection and identification with the father so that the *same* pattern can be repeated in a new cycle. Freud favors sublimation because it is socially useful: it guarantees the continuation of *culture* through the drive to create new structures and to pass down values to new generations. It represents the *value* that the superego has for the maintenance of culture over the hedonistic impulses of the pre-genital instincts. But there is a problem with Freud’s argument. The structures of the superego are built upon the perversions of the pre-genital series and are a continuation of them. In short, our virtues are built upon a foundation of vice according to Freud: “The multifariously perverse sexual disposition of childhood can accordingly be regarded as the source of a number of our virtues, in so far as through reaction-formation it stimulates their virtues.” [7Freud 164] Freud arbitrarily divides sublimations from perversions by their social usefulness. For example, he shows the sublimated vices from which ambition and thrift are derived: “Thus, obstinacy, thrift and orderliness arise from an exploitation of anal eroticism, while ambition is



determined by strong urethral-erotic disposition.” [7Freud 164] Further, Freud tells us that sublimation is, “employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses which have been recognized as being unutilizable.” [7Freud 164] The only difference between perversion and sublimation is the social usefulness of the outcome. Perhaps perversion is the truth of sublimation and not its opposite. For Deleuze perversion is the natural extension of sublimation. All thought is based on a prior perversion that motivates it.

3.3 In place of simple sublimation Deleuze proposes the more radical desexualization of perversion. Deleuze tells us that the desexualization that sublimations inspire provide the ego with only two alternatives:

Desexualization has two possible effects on the workings of the pleasure principle: either it introduces functional disturbances which affect the application of the principle, or else it promotes a sublimation of the instincts whereby pleasure is transcended in favor of gratifications of a different kind.

[CC 116]

In Freud’s paper “On Narcissism” he explains why some people indulge in their desires without any shame while others take the same activities as shameful: “We can say that the one man has set up an *ideal* in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal.” [11Freud 88] The person who has such an *ideal* can either submit to it and “better himself” through sublimation, or he can suffer self-disgust and depression. The person who sublimates projects an ideal onto the “metaphysical surface,” as Deleuze calls it, and each of his actions is measured by this counter-actualized ideal. But here is the problem that makes

Deleuze dissatisfied with this solution: the ego ideal that the superego sets up is completely subordinated to the repressive forces of society. This is why he asks the following question:

Is there no other solution besides the functional disturbance of neurosis and the spiritual outlet of sublimation? Could there not be a third alternative which would be related not to the functional interdependence of the ego and the superego, but to the structural split between them? [CC 117]

This alternative that Deleuze seeks would disengage the ego from a subordination to the ego ideal that enslaves it and forces it into conformity. If we are to truly break with the Oedipal cycle and not repeat the mistakes of our fathers it is necessary to delve into perversion. Perversion is defined by “the splitting of the ego” as it is described by Freud and the same process that is called “the fracture in the I” by Deleuze. In order to understand why there is a splitting of the ego it is first necessary to replay the drama that initiated the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Freud describes the choice that the child has to make between following the Oedipus complex or facing castration in the following quote:

So far he had had no occasion to doubt that women possessed a penis. But now his acceptance of the possibility of castration, his recognition that women were castrated, made an end of both possible ways of obtaining satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them entailed the loss of his penis – the masculine one as a resulting punishment and the feminine one as a precondition. If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus

complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis of his parental objects. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the child's ego turns away from the Oedipus complex. [7Freud 318]

The child that is enthralled in this drama is forced to choose between an instinctual demand and a threat that is perceived in reality. The choice is love or death: the child who sublimates chooses life at the expense of love (the instinctual demand). But the perverse individual changes the rules of this drama. Freud presents us with a case where *the child takes both options*:

It must now decide either to recognize the real danger, give way to it and renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or to disavow reality and make itself believe that there is no reason for fear, so that it may be able to retain the satisfaction. Thus there is a conflict between the demand of the instinct and the prohibition by reality. But in fact the child takes neither course, or rather he takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing. [11Freud 461]

It is within this drama that the ego splits: one side is orientated towards reality and the other is orientated towards the instinct. Freud has divided the options that the psyche can take in this dilemma of castration: neurosis, psychosis, or perversion. Freud explains the distinction between neurosis and psychosis: "I arrived at the proposition that the essential difference between neurosis and psychosis was that in the former the ego, in the service of reality, suppresses a piece of the id, whereas in a psychosis it lets itself be induced by the id to detach itself from a piece of reality."

[7Freud 355] The neurotic follows the path of “reality” in which the ego is turned outwards towards the series of real events that fail to satisfy him. The psychotic, on the other hand, finds only hallucinations that arise from the instincts and blocks out reality. The pervert does both at the same time: he operates on two planes, one directed towards reality and the other towards the instincts. Freud makes this clear in the following quote:

On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects reality and refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath he recognizes the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear.

[11Freud 461-462]

It is in perversion that Deleuze finds the ideal solution to his theory of the two surfaces. What the pervert does is simple: half of the ego sets up an ideal plane of thought where castration is *disavowed* and another half of the ego recognizes the reality of castration. The disavowed half constitutes the metaphysical surface of thought and the other half constitutes the actions and passions of bodies. The pervert moves from one to the other by the process of disavowal. According to Deleuze: “The famous mechanism of ‘denegation’ (that’s not what I wanted...), with all its importance with respect to the formation of *thought*, must be interpreted as expressing the passage from one surface to another.” [LS 208] On the metaphysical surface the *action* of castration is denied by making it “neutral” and not willed by any person. The ego ideal is replaced by the ideal ego, “in which the mother-image serves as a mirror to reflect and even produce the ‘ideal ego’ as a narcissistic ideal of

omnipotence...” [CC 129] In this *idealization* the traumatic drama of the castration complex is denied reality. At the same time the other half of the ego recognizes this same reality that is denied in the other. Deleuze tells us that this is possible because all action is divided in two by disavowal:

...it takes the totality of every possible action and divides it into two, projects it on to two screens, as it determines each side according to the necessary exigencies of each screen. On one hand, the entire image of action is projected on a physical surface, where the action itself appears as willed and is found determined in the forms of restoration and evocation; on the other, the entire result of the action is projected on a metaphysical surface, where the action itself appears as produced and not willed, determined by the forms of murder and castration. [LS 207-208]

The split in the ego becomes the split between the superego and the ego. Whereas before the ego was subordinated to the superego as a determining factor, with the split in the ego the superego becomes the representative of the internal world that is in direct contact with the archetypes in the Id. Freud recognizes this dual relationship in the split between the ego and superego: “Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id.” [11Freud 376] We shall see that this split is extremely important for Deleuze’s theory of the “pure event.” The world of the Id contains archetypes for all real events that pass in time.

3.4 Why does Deleuze associate the “fractured I” with the empty form of time?  
As we have just seen, the ego is split into two halves: one that is directed towards

reality and the other towards the metaphysical surface of pure thought. Or, to put it in Freudian terms, one part of the ego has become “narcissistic” and the other is directed towards investment in objects. According to Deleuze the first becomes the locus of the passive ego and the second as an activity of thought: “For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be *thought*. This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissistic ego passively *experiences* on its own account.” [DR 110] Let us be clear about our terminology. The “narcissistic” ego withdraws its attention away from objects in “reality” in order to replace them by presentations from the Id. The narcissistic part of the ego concerns itself only with what Deleuze calls “pure thought,” or the archetypical presentations of the instincts. Let us be clear, the “narcissistic” aspect of the ego is only the attempt of the ego to *take itself as a loved object*. Whereas objects in the “real” world are subject to time, the ego-as-loved-object is not subject to time; rather it takes itself as a pure and empty form. According to Deleuze: “The narcissistic ego indeed appears in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: the narcissistic libido, the reflux of the libido into the ego, abstracts from all content.” [DR 110] As we saw above, when the ego splits there is a desexualization of the libido; or, it ignores the reality of castration to set up, inside itself, a compensatory phantasy. If the ego is normally used to direct libido into the external world of objects, according to Freud, then the contrary movement represents a reversal of instinctual impulses:

By this getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as the sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the

service of the opposing instinctual impulses. It has to acquiesce in some of the other object-cathexes of the id; it has, so to speak, to participate in them.

[11Freud 386-387]

When Deleuze refers to the “death instinct” he is primarily referring to this process by which the ego replaces object-cathexes for a cathexis of instinctual objects in the Id. When the ego turns away from external objects it focuses its attention towards pure events. These are not events that have happened to the ego in question but timeless events that seem to predate the ego. Consider the following statement by Deleuze:

*Totem and Taboo* is the great theory of the event, and psychoanalysis in general is the science of events, on the condition that the event should not be treated as something whose sense is to be sought and disentangled. The event is sense itself, insofar as it is disengaged or distinguished from the states of affairs which produce it and in which it is actualized. [LS 211]

The great theory of the totem meal, in which the children kill the father and eat him, is a pure event that was never actualized in states of affairs. However, Freud mistakenly continues to seek a foundation for the archetypes in the id by an appeal to phylogenesis:

The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations they transform themselves, so to say,

into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity.

[11Freud 378]

For Deleuze, for the “event” to be a pure event it must be completely free of any form of memory, even a phylogenetic one. The Freudian theory of the events in the id is too reminiscent of Plato’s idea of reminiscences, in which, forms that have been forgotten in a previous life are recovered in this life and recognized as true. In order to evade this platonic trap that Freud fell into, Deleuze provides another explanation for these events.

3.5 Deleuze distinguishes the *actions* and *passions* that subsist in the id from the “result” that is projected on the metaphysical surface. But what is this distinction and where does it come from? In the pre-genital phase of sexuality the organism was divided into separate aims and instincts. Each instinct is designated by an action that it undertakes. We saw that in the oral zone the mouth had as its auto-erotic image the *action* and *passion* of sucking (breast feeding). Other zones have their own actions and instincts. However, in the Oedipal phase, none of these passions of the partial zones could be translated into post-genital sexuality. There was, therefore, a repression of the pre-genital zones. These zones in turn returned in the form of screen-memories in the Oedipal phase. But now with the dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the rise of the narcissistic ego the pre-genital zones are put into use once more. The reason that these zones were repressed in the Oedipal phase was that there was no means to translate them into language. Language is the means by which “object-representations” in the unconscious are linked to the “verbal-representations” in consciousness. But because the Oedipal phase was only concerned with objects its translations focused upon *nouns*, or more correctly “phonemes, morphemes, and



semantemes” [LS 247-248] that correspond to the partial objects. However, language is impossible without a means to connect the various partial fragments and provide them with a *sense*. This is where the metaphysical surface of pure thought becomes important. At this stage the *actions* and *passions* of the component instincts become the basis for the “infinitive verb.” What is unique about the infinitive form of the verb is that it cannot be designated as an object or signified by any concept. Instead, the infinitive form of the verb provides the partial fragments (nouns, etc.) with a means to connect with one another in a meaningful way. However, the infinitive form of the verb always remains silent as Deleuze explains: “The verb, however, is silent; and we must take literally the idea that Eros is sonorous and the death instinct is silence. In the verb, the secondary organization is brought about, and from this organization the entire ordering of language proceeds.” [LS 241] The infinitive verb is the means by which the pre-genital drives can express themselves in language by “translating” action into *sense* on the other surface. But let us be careful: the infinitive verb is *not* in consciousness. It is pre-conscious, or the pure surface of *meaning* that cannot be designated or signified by objects or words. Certainly we can say the infinitive verb “to eat” but the meaning of this infinitive form of the verb is not to be found in the objects we eat, nor in a concept of eating, nor by the act of demonstration of eating. The meaning of the “infinitive” cannot be exhausted by any of these limited or thinkable examples. Instead, the *sense* of the infinitive verb is *only* to be found in the archetypes of pure events that come from the id. The infinitive verb forms the core of these events. According to Deleuze it is this aspect of the verb that makes it *unique* and symbolic for all possible actions or events:

In this case, the verb is inscribed on this surface—that is, the glorious event enters a symbolic relation with a state of affairs, rather than merging with it; the shining, noematic attribute, rather than being confused with a quality, sublimates it; the proud Result, rather than being confused with an action or passion, extracts an eternal truth from them. [LS 240]

Instead of Freud's theory of phylogenesis, Deleuze explains pure events by sublimation; that is, by linking the partial drives with the verbal-representation on the metaphysical surface: "This is the verb which, in its univocity, conjugates devouring and thinking: it projects eating on the metaphysical surface and sketches out thinking on it. [...] The verb is the 'verbal representation' in its entirety, as well as the highest affirmative power of disjunction (univocity, with respect to that which diverges)." [LS240 & 241] To put it simply, the impulse to action in the body is translated into a thought *about* action in the mind. For example: if we see a horse carrying a heavy weight and a man carrying a heavy weight, we can *sense* that heaviness and the power of lifting in our own bodies (any child knows this sympathy response), but this sense of sympathy in the body is *translated* into a power of thinking *about* this action by the thing that unites them for thought, namely the infinitive verb. Everybody has a sympathy response by which bodies *affect* one another. The infinitive verb allows this universal commonality of affects to be expressed by a single verb: for example, to-carry (in the case of the horse and the man). The event allows us to express the commonality of every action by one verb. This is the univocity of Being.

3.6 How does the pure event express the unity of divergent series? In order to answer this question we must first clarify what divergent series are. Deleuze takes the following quote from Borges to illustrate divergent series:

In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he chooses one at the expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable Ts'ui Pên, he chooses – simultaneously – all of them. He thus *creates* various futures, various times which start others that will in their turn branch out and bifurcate in other times. This is the cause of the contradictions in the novel. 'Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at his door. Fang makes up his mind to kill him. Naturally there are various possible outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die and so on and so on. In Ts'ui Pên's work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations. [DR 116]

Each of these possible events has one thing in common: the verb to-kill. The subjects and objects in this story are incidental. There is a reversal at work here: the true subject of events are not the subjects or objects that undergo the transformation, but the transformation itself that is represented by the infinitive verb. A divergent series is, then, the contradictory outcomes that circulate around each verb. In the work of Leibniz we learn of the impossible worlds that *cannot* communicate with each other because God has chosen to make only a completely logical world where there is *no chance* of two contradictory events happening at the same time. Deleuze reverses this: it is not God who chooses the event; it is the pure event that chooses itself. This truth is rediscovered with the advent of Freud's theory of the unconscious. The unconscious does not contain coherent events but divergent events that crystallize around a verb that expresses them. The fascinating thing about the

infinitive form of the verb is that it is completely *neutral*. Deleuze explains this neutrality of the phantasm:

This neutrality, that is to say, this movement by which singularities are emitted... belongs essentially to the phantasm. This is the case in *A Child Is Being Beaten* (or better, “A Father Is Seducing His Daughter,” following the example invoked by Laplanche and Pontalis). Thus, the individuality of the ego merges with the event of the phantasm itself, even if that which the event represents in the phantasm is understood as another individual, or rather as a series of other individuals through which the dissolved ego passes. [LS 213-214]

Laplanche and Pontalis note that in original fantasy, or the phantasm, the subject is not always the object of the action or even one of the components of the event: “But the original fantasy, on the other hand, is characterized by the absence of subjectivization, and the subject is present *in* the scene: the child, for instance, is one character amongst many in the fantasy ‘a child is beaten’.”<sup>36</sup> In the phantasy the subject is dissolved because the *action itself* is the only constant feature of the phantasy. In it, sometimes the father is beating a friend, sometimes the father is being beaten, sometimes he is beating a brother or a sister, and sometimes it is the mother who is beating someone. This should not be interpreted as a mask for the “subject” being beaten. The subject is unimportant; only the action is essential to the phantasy. Laplanche and Pontalis recognize the structure of phantasy as having multiple entries:

‘A father seduces a daughter’ might perhaps be the summarized version of the seduction fantasy. The indication here of the primary process is not the absence of organization, as is sometimes suggested, but the peculiar character of the structure, in that it is a scenario with multiple entries, in which nothing shows whether the subject will immediately be located as *daughter*; it can as well be fixed as *father*, or even in the term *seduces*.<sup>37</sup>

This scenario shows remarkable similarity to the story by Borges in which multiple possibilities are simultaneously affirmed. This is because the pure event is not a singular event, but an event that can be expressed in *divergent outcomes*. This is why Deleuze can claim that the pure event is difference itself. The pure event, Deleuze tells us, unifies all contraries: “Nothing other than the Events subsist, the Event alone, *Eventum tantum* for all contraries, which communicates with itself through its own distance and resonates across all of its disjuncts.” [LS 176] The event is the symbol for the whole of time because it does not take place at any determined moment; rather, it haunts all moments and times. This is also why Deleuze tells us that, “between the verb as it appears in language and the verb as it subsists in Being, we must conceive of an infinitive which is not yet caught up in the play of grammatical determinations—an infinitive independent not only of all persons but of all time, of every mood and every voice (active, passive, or reflective).” [LS 214] The third synthesis of time excludes all persons and all moments of time. It acts, instead, as a pure form of time that is not reducible to any ordered chronology. This is the truth of the “fractured I.” Between the passive and narcissistic ego and the superego that presents us with the infinitive verb, there subsists, in-between them, the intuition of time: “It is as though the *I* were fractured from one end to the other:

fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self that appears in time.” [DR 86] Put simply, the intuition of pure and empty time is generated in the tension between contraries found in the phantasm. Chronological time is perceived as a succession of chance actualizations that *do not contradict each other*. The pure intuition of time involves the phantasm in an essential way: it involves the affirmation of all divergent possibilities in the same event. Deleuze calls this the system of the future: “The system of the future, by contrast, must be called the divine game, since there is no pre-existing rule... Not restrictive or limiting affirmations, but affirmations coextensive with the questions posed and with the decisions from which they emanate...” [DR 116] To simplify this, there are two modes of the future: one in which *we* anticipate the wished for outcome of events, and the other in which there is no *we*, no *I*, and no anticipated event but only the phantasy that involves all the possible outcomes *at once*. It is impossible for the *subject* to make such an affirmation because our will always seeks out its preference. Instead, in the phantasy, the future is not considered to be a present-to-come, but as an unlimited becoming of the future. Deleuze tells us that there is also a future that is not a state-of-affairs to come, but an event that represents everything that *can happen* without any limitation: “But on the other hand, there is the future and the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular, *eventum tantum*...” [LS 151] We have seen the reality of this “pure event” that Deleuze speaks of in the form of the phantasm that was discovered by Freud.

3.1 “Forced movement,” instead of repressing pre-genital zones, sublimates them and uses their energies for creative endeavors.	3.3 Perversion sets up a “metaphysical surface” by <i>splitting the ego</i> , one side turned to external reality, the other turned to internal reality. “Disavowal” suspends the “pure event” that is extracted from the Id by the superego.	3.5 Instead of “phylogenesis” the “infinitive verb” becomes the nucleus for verbal representation of pre-genital excitations from the Id. It provides a “sense” for all actions in a “univocal” manner.
3.2 “Sublimation” does not go far enough in destroying the “values” of Oedipus. “Perversion” goes further in destroying these values and creating new ones.	3.4 The “narcissistic ego” takes itself as a loved object and thereby eliminates its temporal content. It turns to timeless “events” extracted from the Id.	3.6 The infinitive verb is <i>neutral</i> , therefore it can express divergent events. It is also the symbol for the whole of time, simultaneously affirming all possible outcomes.

### Chapter 3: The Syntheses of Energetics

In the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze introduces Freud’s celebrated work called *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. It is in reference to this work that Deleuze says, “biophysical life is presented in the form of such an intensive field in which differences determinable as excitations, and differences of differences determinable as cleared paths, are distributed.” [DR 118] It is reference to this work by Freud that haunts the whole section of *Difference and Repetition* starting at page 96 where Deleuze says: “Biopsychical life implies a field of individuation...” [DR 96] The field of individuation that Deleuze speaks of is nothing other than the system of neurology that Freud presents in his *Project*. This chapter will examine the “field of individuation” in Freud’s *Project* and will relate it to Deleuze’s own project of passive synthesis. This will take three forms. First, the

field of individuation known as the Id will constitute the passive synthesis of habit or duration. Second, the synthesis of the Ego will constitute the passive synthesis of memory. Third and last, the phantasms of the Superego will constitute the passive synthesis of the future. This entire chapter will be about the *process* of individuation. Therefore, it will start with the most basic functions of the nervous system and show how they *go beyond* themselves towards the constitution of the objects of perception. This will be a journey from organic basis of the unconscious to the genesis of time for consciousness. It will end in a discussion of the transcendental basis for consciousness: the object = x.

#### a) The Energetics of the Id.

1.1 In Deleuze's book on Bergson he lists five aspects of subjectivity. He identifies the first two as belonging to the "objective" aspect of the subject: "Of the five aspects of subjectivity, the first two obviously belong to the objective line, since the first confines itself to abstracting from the object, and the second confines itself to establishing a zone of indetermination."<sup>38</sup> These first two aspects are objective because they concern only the *passive synthesis of time*. That is, they do not enter consciousness, nor do they rely on the will and intentionality of a subject. Let us consider what they do rely on:

(1) *need-subjectivity*, the moment of negation (need makes a hole in the continuity of things and holds back everything that interests it about the object, letting the rest go by); (2) *brain-subjectivity*, the moment of interval or of indetermination (the brain gives us the means of "choosing" that which



corresponds to our needs in the object; introducing an interval between received and executed movement...<sup>39</sup>

Let us consider the proposition that we evolved from simple organisms. If this is so then those simple functions are the first and primary functions of the organism. A simple organism reaches out into the world in order to discover an object that will nourish it. In order to do this it must be able to (1) distinguish what is food from what is not and (2) maintain the perception of the *presence* of that object long enough to assimilate it. If the various stimuli coming from the sensory organs are discontinuous, it is because the external world is changing from moment to moment. On the side of the organism, in order to identify and confirm the *presence* of the needed object, the data from the senses *must be synthesized into a durational schema* in which the object that is needed can be confirmed to be still there. This is the first developmental stage of our nervous system and therefore its most basic function. The passive synthesis of time that Deleuze speaks of is a very real process in the organism.

1.2 While rocks just passively sit and erode with time, organisms actively maintain their unity by their contractions and their contemplations. Consider a simple organ like the eye. It is not *designed* to gather light and pass it on as information to the brain. Rather, in the theories of evolution it *gains* that function by a series of repetitions. These repetitions are determined by the needs of the organism to maintain itself. The “urgency of life” [DR 78] determines the habits the eye will form in forming itself and not an *intention* to make sight possible. Once again, the difference between the rock and the organism is that the organism maintains its unity as a growing and evolving thing by contractions of external elements into itself and

the concomitant faculty of contemplating those elements that the organism needs. Deleuze asks the question: “What organism is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby intertwining all the habits of which it is composed?” [DR 75] Some might accuse Deleuze of anthropomorphizing simple organisms by saying that they contemplate and contract habits. This is not at all the case. *Passive synthesis* is as old as Aristotle who noticed that all living things maintain a sense of purpose in their will to survive. Deleuze is not saying that living things have a will or an aim. He is merely pointing out that the *mechanical* repetitions of organisms, in a sense “choose” the way they will respond to stimuli. Unlike a rock that is tossed a number of times and always falls the same, an organism can adapt to situations and create a *difference* in the way it will respond. The eye developed as a “seeing” organism because of its adaptation to stimuli and the repetition of need of its greater organism. In order to hold itself together as a functioning organism it needs to “contemplate” the elements in the external world that it needs in order to maintain itself. Again, rocks do not need to draw in substances to maintain themselves; therefore they do not contemplate. Only the organism that has needs to maintain its structure “needs” to absorb (and therefore contemplate) the elements its lacks.

1.3 Freud tells us that pleasure is a state of reduction of tensions in which stimulus is reduced as far as possible: “This discharge represents the primary function of the nervous system. Here is room for the development of a secondary function. For among the paths of discharge those are preferred and retained which involve a cessation of the stimulus: *flight from the stimulus*.” [1Freud 296] Let us be clear as to what this means: the organism develops a tension (a contraction) in expectation of a need, and only when this need is met can the tension be

“discharged” and the organism can lapse into a sense of pleasure. Therefore, according to Freud, the organism learns strategies to deal with excess stimulus and “learns” to react to the external world by finding the best way to interact with it that will, at the same time, limit the tension that it demands on the organism. In this way the organism learns to meet its organic needs with the minimum of effort or strain. This is an ingenious plan that is motivated by *the pleasure principle*. But Deleuze does not agree with this: “Whether pleasure is itself a contraction or a tension, or whether it is always tied to a process of relaxation, is not a well-formed question... Pleasure is a principle in so far as it is the emotion of a fulfilling contemplation which contracts in itself cases of relaxation *and* contraction.” [DR 74] In essence, Deleuze argues that pleasure is the principle that guides organic needs *insofar as it maintains the organism* by fulfilling its unity through time. Deleuze’s argument is that “habits” of contracting come *before* the principle of pleasure that is supposed to motivate them. In short, this is a “chicken and the egg” question: how could the organism form itself in the first place if it did not *already* have an idea of the reduction of tensions *in the beginning*? Or: if pleasure is the reduction of tensions, why did the tension of the unity of the organism form in the first place? If the organism seeks “death” why was it ever born? Deleuze’s answer is that there is an “Eros” of passive synthesis that finds pleasure in its *own* activity and not in the outcome of satisfaction. In short, the organism finds pleasure in *whatever* maintains its existence and, only *secondarily*, in what satisfies it. Why is this important? The search for pleasure concerns the future (in seeking reduction) and the past (in *returning* to a state of relaxation) but not the present. However, if Deleuze is correct, then the future and past of the organism is only a secondary *effect* of its immediate concern with maintaining its *present* unity. Therefore, according to Deleuze, the need

to “bind” the organism is pleasurable in itself and not as an “intention” to master excitations: “Binding synthesis cannot be explained by the intention or the effort to *master* an excitation, even though it may have that effect.” [DR 97] In short, pleasure is whatever allows the organism to maintain its larval unities, and unpleasure is that which disrupts this unity. An excess of excitation can disrupt and even destroy the organism; therefore (as a secondary effect) the organism must work to stave off excitations.

1.4 Freud, in his work *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, makes a remarkable study of the nervous system. In it he postulates the existence of a group of neurons that he symbolizes by the figure  $\psi$ . The  $\psi$  neurons are those neurons that act as a sieve: that is, they have “doors” or barriers that can only transmit their signal to the next neuron *if a degree of quantity of neural energy ( $Q\dot{n}$ ) is exceeded*. In this way they can leave behind “traces” of past perceptions. Freud uses the word “facilitation” [*Bahnung*] to signify the traces left behind in the neural pathways. Now, the important thing about these pathways is that they do *not* maintain an *identity* of the previous perception that passed through. Rather, the *effect* of retention of past perceptions is caused by the pure *differences* in degrees of permeability *between* a multiplicity of neurons. In Freud’s own words:

If we were to suppose that all the  $\psi$  contact-barriers were equally well facilitated, or (what is the same thing) offered equal resistance, then the characteristics of memory would evidently not emerge. For, in relation to the passage of an excitation, memory is evidently one of the powers which determine and direct its pathway, and, if facilitation were everywhere equal, it would not be possible to see why one pathway should be preferred. We can

therefore say still more correctly that *memory is represented by the differences in the facilitations between the  $\psi$  neurones*. [1Freud 300]

The “facilitations” preserve past excitations in the form of a chain or a code that is the *effect* of the pure differences between the neurons in the same way that words are the *effect* of differences between letters. If all the “letters” or neurons were the “same” then there would be no retention or message to be retained. This difference is not ingrained into the neurons in *one* instant of excitation; but rather, across a whole multiplicity of instances: “Facilitation depends on the  $Q\acute{h}$  which passes through the neuron in the excitatory process on the number of repetitions of the process.” [1Freud 300] The differences become more pronounced and fixated after a great number of repetitions of similar excitations. When these “habits” or *differences* become fixated then there is a process called “binding” [Bindung] in which the charge of excitation passing through the neurons is *trapped* in the complex of  $\psi$  nerves. Freud tells us that the nervous system stores this energy in these pathways:

Under the compulsion of the exigencies of life, the nervous system was obliged to lay up a store of  $Q\acute{h}$ . This necessitated an increase in the number of its neurones and these had to be impermeable. It now avoids, partly at least, being *filled* with  $Q\acute{h}$  (cathexis), by setting up *facilitations*. [1Freud 301]

In short, the neurons *themselves* “decide” when to discharge their energy by the difference between facilitated neurons and un-facilitated neurons. For example: suppose the organism is seeking nourishment. In the past it encountered elements that lead to the “excitation” of satisfaction of the organic need. These experiences left a

trace on the neurons. Now when the organism encounters a similar set of circumstances it will “discharge” its energy only when the perception *matches* the pattern laid down in the neurons. It acquires this “habit” by repeating the excitation that fits the pattern, and the pattern is reinforced by each repetition. In this way it *contracts* each of the past instances into the present, one thereby forming an extended duration. The *delay* in recognition forms the *tension* of the organism in its expectation, and the facilitation forms the past of the organism by retention. This is why Deleuze says: “Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic form of expectation. The retained past appears in the form of cellular heredity.” [DR 73] Because all this takes place on a *passive* level of the organism none of these processes are conscious. For example: when we hear the “tick-tock” of a clock we do not actively try to remember past instances when we heard a clock; instead, we involuntarily hear the two instances of “tick” and “tock” as a *case* or a set that we *intuitively expect* to follow one another. This is because “facilitations” in the brain laid down pathways that contract these two *instances* into one-another automatically. In this way our whole life is a contraction of habits: each of our habits of movement and action act upon the present by contracting chains of *cases* into an extended duration. When Hume tells us that we expect that the sun will rise tomorrow even though we have no knowledge of the future, we necessarily expect this by our “expectation” that the present pattern of existence will continue. We have seen that “facilitations” force us to expect the continuation of patterns by extending the past into the future around a continuous present. As Deleuze says of passive synthesis, “it constitutes our habit of living, our expectation that ‘it’ will continue, that one of the two elements will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetuation of our *case*.” [DR 74] This “habit” of forming *cases* gives the present a sense of urgency or

tension centered around the always present question: might things not turn out differently? The delay that we feel in the present is the persistent “problem” of existence: chance. We feel pleasure when our expectations are fulfilled and a duration of tension or “waiting” that opens up the possibility that facilitations might not be met. In this way, our conscious experience of duration is based upon a prior *passive* contraction of facilitations in the nervous system.

1.5 There is a common phenomenon that is encountered by most people when reading: one will be reading a phrase and, in the process, *misread* one of the words in the phrase because it was unexpected. This phenomenon can be explained by the theory of facilitation. We expect a certain pattern to reality, so that, when an unexpected combination arises, our expectation is so strong we will hallucinate the expected “case.” This may seem to be an exception, but in fact most of the time we hallucinate reality. When we walk into a room that we know well, the arrangement of things is hallucinated as being the same as it always was unless there is some immediate indication to the contrary. This leads us to the second effect of “facilitation”: it structures perception into habitual patterns, or, it makes order and regularity out of chaos. This is explained as follows: In the  $\psi$  neurons excessive amounts of energy are stored up (in the blocked pathways) thereby generating a sense of tension. The tension cannot immediately find a means to “discharge” itself in a perception, so instead it hallucinates. It does this by sending the accumulated energy along the facilitated pathway *without* a perception. Freud explains this by appealing to the sense of urgency that is so strong that it activates a memory *as if* it were a perception:

Thus, as a result of the experience of satisfaction, a facilitation comes about between two mnemic and the nuclear neurons which are cathected in the state of urgency. No doubt, along with the discharge of satisfaction the  $Q\dot{\eta}$  flows out of the mnemic images as well. Now, when the state of *urgency* or *wishing* re-appears, the cathexis will also pass over onto the two memories and will activate them. [1Freud 319]

Freud calls this a “wishful activation” [1Freud 319] of a mnemic image. It is this wishful activation that Freud will also call the “primary process.” The primary process, instead of waiting for an *actual* object to satisfy its need, will instead hallucinate that object. Freud tells us that these hallucinations are what cause us to dream: “It is an important fact the  $\psi$  *primary processes*, such as have been biologically suppressed in the course of  $\psi$  development, are daily presented to us during sleep.” [1Freud 336] However, they are not limited to dreams. In waking life these hallucinations fill-out the outlines of reality by supplementing what is perceived with what is remembered. For example: when we see the face of someone we know, we do not have to re-notice all the details of her face; instead, most of the details are hallucinated by the primary processes. This is why we don’t always notice that someone we know has aged until it becomes too apparent. The fact that our perceptions are half reality and half dream show us that there is an interaction between real objects and what Deleuze calls “virtual objects.” Deleuze tells us that the virtual objects are not integrated into the real object but rather, “it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real continues to lack.” [DR 101] However, if the virtual object goes too far and tries to replace the real object



then a real hallucination is present. Like a man who reaches for a hallucinated sandwich, it will lead to the shock of disappointment. Freud tells us as much: “I do not doubt that in the first instance this wishful activation will produce the same thing as a perception—namely a *hallucination*. If reflex action is thereupon introduced, disappointment cannot fail to occur.” [1Freud 319] At the level of the  $\psi$  neurons all the objects of satisfaction are hallucinated. Deleuze tells us that, in the Id, the larval egos that form in the neurons of facilitation do not have real objects as their aim. Instead, they tell the brain *what would count as a satisfying object*. Every “binding” of neurons centers around a hallucinatory object: “This is why the satisfaction which flows from binding is necessarily a ‘hallucinatory’ satisfaction of the ego itself, even though hallucination here in no way contradicts the effectivity of the binding.” [DR 97] In short, the binding process in the Id constitutes a “drive” that centers around a wished-for object: “Drives are nothing more than bound excitations.” [DR 97] These wished for objects are creations of passive synthesis that will later drive the *active* synthesis of the Ego in its search for an equivalent object in reality.

1.6 Heretofore we have only dealt with external stimuli. However, there is another source of stimuli that is processed by the nervous system in a radically different way than external stimuli. Freud explains:

With an increasing complexity of the interior of the organism, the nervous system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself—endogenous stimuli—which have equally to be discharged. These have their origin in the cells of the body and give rise to the major needs: hunger, respiration, sexuality. From these the organism cannot withdraw as it does from external stimuli; it cannot employ their  $Q$  for flight from the stimulus. They only cease

subject to particular conditions, which must be realized in the external world.

[1Freud 297]

Whereas external stimuli are intermittent, the source of endogenous excitation is constant and unavoidable. This raises several important questions for Freud. First, if the source of excitation is constant then why is it felt only intermittently in moments of hunger, lust, or anxiety? Here is the problem:

We cannot avoid the idea that there is an accumulation; and the intermittent character of their psychical effect necessitates the view that on their path of conduction to  $\psi$  they come up against resistances which are overcome only when there is an increase in quantity. [1Freud 316]

The cells of the body may lack substances that it needs, but we do not become immediately aware of this because most of our internal needs remain unnoticeable until they reach a certain threshold. It is this threshold that interests Freud. Freud borrows a concept from Fechner: that an intensity will not become perceptible unless it reaches a certain threshold, and when it does, it will emerge in a state of confusion called "complication." Here is the quote from Freud: "Thus quantity in  $\phi$  is expressed by *complication* in  $\psi$ . By this means the  $Q$  is held back from  $\psi$ , within certain limits at least. This is very reminiscent of conditions of *Fechner's* law, which might in this way be localized." [1Freud 315] In philosophy this concept of *complication* has a long history, which I will not go into here, except to point out the Leibnizian idea of the sound of a wave. According to Leibniz the sound of the wave is made up of all the little sounds of each drop of water. According to Deleuze, this is the admission

from Freud that the unconscious is differential: “The unconscious is differential, involving little perceptions, and as such it is different in kind from consciousness.” [DR 108] Freud pays “homage to the Leibnizian Fechner” [DR 108] because the somatic sources of drives are pulsations from all the little cells of the body that are summed up in the pathways of the nervous system. Here is how: excitation builds up in the nervous system, thereby flooding all the pathways of the  $\psi$  neurons until one of the contact-barriers is permeated and the excitation is discharged. To put it simply, endogenous excitation looks for the point of least resistance in the nervous system. Freud tell us this in the following quote:

Above a certain  $Q$ , however, they (the endogenous excitations) act as a stimulus continuously, and every increase of  $Q$  is perceived as an increase of the  $\psi$  stimulus. It follows, therefore, that there is a state in which the path of conduction has become permeable. Experience shows, further, that, after the  $\psi$  stimulus has been discharged, the path of conduction resumes its resistance once more. [1Freud 316]

Like a balloon bursting, all of the previous buildup of energy is released through the pathway that is most permeable, and therefore, the mnemonic image that is invested in that pathway is activated. If a virtual or partial object is activated by this discharge of energy it is because the mnemonic image is the summation of the excitations that make up the image. This is why Deleuze tells us: “Partial objects are the elements of little perceptions.” [DR 108] When the mnemonic pathway is permeated the instinctual energy becomes *invested* in that image. This process is called *summation*: “A process of this kind is termed *summation*.” [1Freud 316] This summation of excitation and its

investment in an image gives the psyche an aim or a *will*. Freud recognizes that this is the impulsion that drives the psyche to act: “Here  $\psi$  is at the mercy of  $Q$ , and it is thus that in the interior of the system there arises the impulsion which sustains all psychological activity. We know this power as the *will*—the derivative of the *instincts*.” [1Freud 317] Let us set up a simple example of this process: The cells of an infant’s body send signals to the brain. These signals are summed up and *invested* in the mnemonic image of the breast. Then the sensation of hunger becomes associated with the *partial object*, and the infant experiences the *instinct* to breast-feed. This instinct will haunt the psyche until a *specific action* is carried out in reality that will satisfy the organism and bring the levels of endogenous excitation down to a level where it will no longer permeate the mnemonic pathways. Freud sees this as the natural conclusion or *aim* of the instinct:

The removal of the stimulus is only made possible here by an intervention which for the time being gets rid of the release of  $Q\dot{\eta}$  in the interior of the body; and this intervention calls for an alteration in the external world (supply of nourishment, proximity of the sexual object) which, as a *specific action*, can only be brought about in definite ways. [1Freud 317-318]

Here we see the life-instincts (Eros) in action. The organism maintains its unity by incorporating those elements that it needs by the process of summation and instinctual drives. However, there is a problem with this. With the life instincts there is also a *death instinct* that operates by the same process. We have seen that, in summation, the endogenous excitations seek out the pathway that is most permeable and that it invests that mnemonic image with its excitation. But what if the “most

permeable" pathway is connected with a painful mnemonic image? Freud recognizes that the irruption of pain can cause permanent facilitations in the  $\psi$  neurons:

We see in this a manifestation of the primary trend against a rising of  $Q\dot{\eta}$  tension, and we infer that pain consists in *the irruption of large  $Qs$  into  $\psi$* . The two trends are in that case a single one. Pain sets the  $\phi$  as well as the  $\psi$  system in motion, there is no obstacle to its conduction, it is the most imperative of all processes. Thus the  $\psi$  neurons seem permeable to it; it therefore consists in the action of  $Qs$  of a comparatively high order. [1Freud 307]

Let us consider the kind of pain that we are talking about. The excitations coming from the external world through  $\phi$  neurons have a shield that prevents the over excitation of the  $\psi$  neurons. However, the pain coming from the inside of the body, namely emotional pain, does not have this mechanism. This is why when Freud speaks of *trauma* it is usually associated with an excessive sexual excitation. Even the trauma of war that he investigated is invested with the endogenous excitations of the libido and not the external excitations of the real world. This means that all traumas are libidinal events and not events in the real world. As we have seen above, the instinct invests an image that is then enacted in the external world. This is no different for the death instinct than it is for the life instincts. The *repetition compulsion* is the means by which the internal excitation is relieved by taking a *specific action* in the real world. Painful actions are repeated because the mnemonic image is only satisfied by a return of the same action. This raises the following question: If painful facilitations are stronger (more permeable) than pleasurable

facilitations, then why are not all our instincts death instincts? This question can only be answered by the mechanism of repression. Freud sums up the basic function of repression as follows: “The wishful state results in a positive *attraction* towards the object wished-for, or, more precisely, towards its mnemonic image; the experience of pain leads to a repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemonic image cathected.” [1Freud 322] In order to keep all of the repetitions inspired by instincts from being painful ones it is necessary that the pathways that are painful be drained of their excitation. In the next section we will see that it is the function of the Ego to affect this repression.

<p>1.1 There are completely <i>passive</i> or involuntary processes that select objects and maintain their presence in attention.</p>	<p>1.3 The “habit” of maintaining unity in the <i>present</i> comes before the pleasure principle that concerns the <i>immediate</i> past and future.</p>	<p>1.5 “Facilitations” that spontaneously activate invade perception and fill-out the outlines. Virtual objects seek to manifest themselves in perception in this way.</p>
<p>1.2 Unlike inorganic matter, organisms can develop creative responses to stimuli. <i>Difference</i> is drawn from repetitions called “contemplation.”</p>	<p>1.4 Retention of habit is due to coded <i>differences</i> in permeable neurons. Duration is “contracted” between organic need and cellular coding.</p>	<p>1.6 Endogenous excitations exert a constant pressure on the psyche that is only felt at a “threshold.” This summation of excitation is called “instinct.” Painful facilitations (death instinct) are repressed by the Ego.</p>

## b) The Energetics of the Ego.

2.1 First, it is important that the Ego be distinguished from consciousness. The ego is not the self. The Ego, as we speak of it here, is a bundle of neurons that effects a change in the direction of investment in the psyche. Therefore it is better to think of the Ego in terms of Freud's other name for it: side-cathexis. Freud tells us that the function of side-cathexis is to *inhibit* the flow of endogenous excitation in the neural system: "A *side-cathexis* thus acts as *an inhibition of the course of  $Q\dot{\eta}$* ." [1Freud 323]

Why is this inhibition so important? We have seen that, in *primary processes*, energy naturally flows from one mnemonic image to another without impediment. In dreams we experience the hyper-associational connection of mnemonic images. It is also in dreams that we are most likely to encounter a traumatic repetition of painful images. This is because the *freely flowing energy* of the instinct naturally invests itself in the most permeable pathways. Those pathways are always the most painful. In waking life these pathways are avoided because of the *side-cathexis* of the Ego that prevents these images from being activated. Freud tells us how the side-cathexis can inhibit these hostile mnemonic images:

Inhibition of this kind is, however, a decided advantage to  $\psi$ . Let us suppose that  $a$  is a hostile mnemonic image and  $b$  a key-neuron to unpleasure. Then, if  $a$  is awakened, primary unpleasure would be released, which would then perhaps be pointless and is so in any case if released to its full amount. With an inhibitory action from  $\alpha$  the release of unpleasure will turn out very slight and the nervous system will be spared the development and discharge of  $Q$  without any damage. [1Freud 324]

The following illustration of this process may be helpful in visualizing this: suppose that  $Q$  energy flows from point  $a$  to point  $b$  where “ $b$ ” is a hostile mnemonic image. Now, if *between* point  $a$  and point  $b$  another pathway is interjected that will “draw off” the energy flowing from one point to the other, then the energy reaching point  $b$  will be far less than it would have been if there was no side-pathway between them. The energy that is drawn off from the circuit of neurons is stored in the side-cathexis in the same way as a transistor “traps” energy into an endless loop. It is as if the newly cathected Ego acts as a battery that takes up energy that would be used by *primary processes* and redirects its aim. Freud describes this:

This organization is called the ‘*ego*’. It can easily be depicted if we consider the regularly repeated reception of endogenous  $Q\dot{\eta}$  in certain neurons (of the nucleus) and the facilitating effect proceeding thence will produce a group of neurons which is constantly cathected and thus corresponds to the *vehicle of the store* required by the secondary function. [1Freud 323]

What is highly significant about this storage of energy is that it, in turn, powers the neural system to send out signals to the muscular system to effect “real” actions upon the environment. It is this re-direction of instinctual aims towards the real world that Freud calls *secondary processes*. This enacts the dynamic between the two mutually exclusive functions of the nervous system: primary and secondary processes. The Ego is that mechanism that inhibits the first in favor of the second as Freud clearly states: “Therefore, if an ego exists, it must *inhibit* psychological primary processes.”



[1Freud 324] The Ego is, as we shall see, not consciousness but that which makes consciousness possible.

2.2 The second step in this process is the “test of reality.” Before we can say what the test of reality is we must first say what it is not. First, Deleuze tells us: “It would be completely wrong to consider the positing of reality to be an effect induced by the external world...” [DR 98] This would assume that there is an object *already* in the world that has a stable identity and that the psyche merely has to take cognizance of this thing. To assume this would be to neglect the dictum that the external world is nothing to the psyche other than sensation and energy. Many psychologists have postulated the “mother” as the first whole-object for the infant. However, they assume the pre-establishment of a “reality” of the mother in the actual body of the mother. If this were the case the test of reality would not “create” the reality of the object but only discover it. Second, Deleuze tells us that it is wrong to see the positing of reality as, “the result of failures encountered by passive syntheses.” [DR 98] Freud tells us that primary process (passive synthesis) introduces *hallucinations* in response to organic needs but when these hallucinations fail to satisfy the organic need, “disappointment cannot fail to occur.” [1Freud 319] For example, if I dream that I am eating a sandwich this dream cannot satisfy my hunger; therefore I will realize that I am dreaming, I will wake up and then I will actually eat a sandwich. This is a powerful argument. However, the unity of the object of satisfaction cannot be wholly explained by biological need. The failure of primary process determines the need for *specific action* but not for the nature of the *thing* acted upon. Third, Deleuze tells us that the test of reality does not take the form of “a negative judgement” [DR 98] or an existential judgment. Freud says of this form of judgment: “It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it

asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality.” [11Freud 439] Judgment only applies to the empirical existence of the thing. However, as we will see later, the Freudian *thing* is not identical to the empirical object that we find in perception. In short, negation only applies to *attributes*, and the Freudian *thing* is not an attribute but a substantive. Fourth, Deleuze tells us: “It would be wrong to suppose that the reality principle is opposed to the pleasure principle, limiting it and imposing renunciations upon it.” [DR 98] In the above example of the dream of the sandwich, there was not so much a renunciation of the pleasure of dreaming the sandwich as a *delay* in the pleasure until *specific action* could be taken to eat a sandwich in reality. In primary process (dreams) the satisfaction or pleasure is “immediate” whereas in the active synthesis of reality the pleasure is delayed or anticipated in the future. The pleasure-principle is not “renounced” but extended according to Deleuze: “The renunciations of immediate pleasure are already implicit in the role of principle which pleasure assumes, in the role that the idea of pleasure assumes in relation to a past and a future.” [DR 98-99] Pleasure is delayed so that it can be resolved in a *systematic manner* or global manner rather than a partial and fragmentary manner. This leads us to the positive definition of reality-testing for Deleuze. Deleuze tells us that, “the test of reality mobilises, drives and inspires all the activity of the ego... in moving beyond the binding in the direction of a ‘substantive’ which serves as a support for the connection.” [DR 98] By reading Freud carefully we find out that the test of reality is *not a perception* of the empirical object but rather the indication that a *specific action has taken place*. Freud calls this indication a *discharge*:

It is probably the  $\omega$  neurons which furnish this indication: the *indication of reality*. In the case of every external perception a qualitative excitation occurs in  $\omega$ , which in the first instance, however, has no significance for  $\psi$ . It must be added that the  $\omega$  excitation leads to  $\omega$  discharge, and the information of this, as of every discharge, reaches  $\psi$ . *The information of the discharge from  $\omega$  is thus the indication of quality of reality for  $\psi$ .* [1Freud 325]

This corresponds to what Deleuze has to say about recognized objects: “An object is recognized, however, when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object.” [DR 133] This means that there is *no pre-existing identity in the object* and that the unity of the object is produced by an indication of “discharge” coming from each of the faculties. For example: if I see an apple and reach out to grab it and eat it, but when I touch the image there is no indication of pressure on the hands, then there is no indication of reality in the psyche, and the object is a hallucination. However, if I feel the apple and taste it, and the organism registers the satisfaction of hunger then there is a discharge. In short, we are conscious of the “object-like” nature of the thing by neural-feedback from the senses that follows a coherent pattern that can be logically comprehended by consciousness. However, the “intentionality” that we have towards the object is *within* the psyche itself; that is, both the “object” and its thing-like nature are products of an indication of “discharge” and not a pre-established unity in the “real” object itself.

2.3 We have just seen what an indication of reality is. Now we must carefully consider what the Freudian *thing* is. Deleuze makes an ingenious connection between the Freudian *thing* and Kant’s conception of the object-in-general (or object = x).

First, let us consider how Freud uses the term “thing.” In the following quote Freud exposes his conception of a thing by using the example of a fellow human being:

Thus the complex of the fellow human-being falls into two components, of which one makes an impression by its constant structure and stays together as a *thing*, while the other can be *understood* by the activity of memory—that is, can be traced back to information from the subject’s own body. [1Freud 331]

What we can derive from this quote is as follows: the *thing* is the structure of a substantive that is *without attributes*, while the attributes are the means by which we understand the object through mnemonic traces in the psyche. For example, the attribute of “screaming” is determined in the fellow human being by memories of one’s own screaming: “Other perceptions of the object too—if, for instance, he screams—will awaken the memory of his (the subject’s) own screaming and at the same time of his own experiences of pain.” [1Freud 331] The attributes of the object are based upon the *sympathy value* they have with our own body. However, the *thing* like nature of the object is not immediately reducible to our own memories. Rather, it is the *locus* or structure that brings these attributes together in one-and-the-same external object. Here is the most important aspect of the Freudian *thing*: whereas we encounter only the attributes of things in consciousness we never encounter the *thing in itself* as a structure in our perceptions. Therefore, the Freudian *thing* has a “transcendental” relation to consciousness. Here is where the similarity to Kant’s conception of the transcendental idea becomes evident. First, let us consider what Deleuze has to say about this object = x:

The double series of the conditioned, that is, of the empirical consciousness and its objects, must therefore be founded on an originary instance which retains the pure form of objectivity (object = x) and the pure form of consciousness, and that which constitutes the former on the basis of the latter.

[LS 105]

This “double series” is divided into an empirical half, that is the collection of attributes that we perceive, and a transcendental half, that is the structure of the object that stays together as a thing through all the changes in attributes. But what is this structure of the thing itself? It is completely indeterminate insofar as consciousness is concerned because it has no means to *judge* the thing itself. Freud tells us that judgment “affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute...” [11 Freud 439] If a thing-in-itself cannot be judged in consciousness it is because it is completely positive. According to Deleuze: “Kant shows how the idea of a sum total of all possibility excludes all but ‘originary’ predicates and in this way constitutes the completely determined concept of an individual Being...” [LS 345] This means that the thing in-itself or object = x contains all possible attributes because the activity of judgment has not yet deducted anything from it. And because it contains all the divergent and contradictory attributes it cannot be brought into consciousness. Like pure light that contains, intermixed, all the colors of the rainbow, it cannot be distinguished. This strange proposition about the content of perceptions comes directly from the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a *thing in itself*, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an *ens realissimum*

is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to *being*. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal* which forms the basis of the complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest material condition of its possibility—a condition on which must rest the cognition of all objects with respect to their content.<sup>40</sup>

This means that the basis of the “content” of perception is radically different from the “attributes” of the perceived thing. So, when Deleuze uses the term “object = x” he is referring to this transcendental *idea* of a thing in-itself. It is imperative that we maintain the *radical* difference between the transcendental *thing* and its empirical counterpart. According to Deleuze: “The error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground.” [LS 105] This can easily be done if we pay heed to Kant’s dictum that the faculty of reason provides the unity of a “thing” to perception:

Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience... but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to collect into an *absolute whole* all the acts of the understanding.<sup>41</sup>

The result of this remarkable discovery is that, for Kant, the external world is the product of a function of reason and not a natural unity of objects themselves. If we

refer back to Freud we will also see this insight at work. He tells us that the indication of quality (which is actually an indication of unity) makes us distinguish between memory and perception:

For the difference is that the *indication of quality* follows, if it comes from the outside, whatever the intensity of the cathexis, if it comes from  $\psi$ , it does so only when there are large intensities. It is accordingly *inhibition by the ego which makes possible a criterion for distinguishing between perception and memory*. [1Freud 326]

Along the lines of a primary and a secondary process there is also a split between the subjective world of mnemic images and perceptions. In short, there is a distinction between the internal world of thought (memory) and the external world of perceptions. This contrast has a remarkable effect on the psyche: at the same time that the external world becomes unified, so too does the internal world. Kant makes this distinction clear:

I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me—among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for *other* things are exactly those which I think as different or *distinguished* from myself.<sup>42</sup>

We have seen that, in the work of Freud, the Ego becomes unified by suppressing the primary process and directing its “attention” towards the *real* object. Because of this the Ego is not identical to consciousness; rather, the psyche becomes conscious

*because the Ego affects a split between the internal and external world.* In short, the “I think” of consciousness becomes possible because of the transcendental unity conferred upon the “external” object by the faculty of reason. Whereas thoughts are “predicates” of perceptions, the objects are the means by which these predicates are unified for the ego by being connected by the *structure* of objectivity. The “effect” of unity in the external object has a reflective “effect” upon consciousness: that of imposing unity upon the “I” that thinks: “By this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception.”<sup>43</sup> Next we will see that these two poles of “unity” produce a reciprocal effect upon each other.

2.4 Along with the split between the “I” that does nothing but think and the “object” that does nothing but maintain a unity for predicates, there is, in the work of Freud, a corresponding split in the Ego itself. In the following quote Freud describes this split:

Just as the pleasure-ego can do nothing but *wish*, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is *useful* and guard itself against damage. [11Freud 40-41]

One Ego strives to unify the object of *wishes* and the other Ego strives to unify the object of *perceptions*. Once again Deleuze finds a correspondence between Freud and Kant in the split between these two Egos:



Drives, which are defined only as bound excitation, now appear in differentiated form: as self-preservative drives following the active line of reality, as sexual drives in this new passive extension. If the first passive synthesis constitutes an ‘aesthetic’, the second may properly be defined as the equivalent of an ‘analytic’. [DR 109]

The extended passive synthesis concerns only the present; as such, it involves the synthesis of sensations that Kant referred to as “aesthetic.” However, the second extension of passive synthesis concerns the past and, in Deleuze’s sense of the term, these fragments of the “pure past” must be equivalent to an *a priori* conception similar to what Kant called the “transcendental analytic.” This will become clear when we examine the relationship between what Freud calls “perceptual-identity” and “thought-identity.” In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud makes a distinction of two types or *aims* of thought: one that seeks to build up an *image of a satisfying object in memory* and the other that seeks to link this first image with an *image that will satisfy this first image in perception*. The first (perceptual-identity) is what Deleuze calls a “synthesis of reproduction” [DR 98] and the second (thought-identity) he calls a “synthesis of recognition.” [DR 98] The first synthesis is called “reproduction” because it reproduces an image of a satisfying object in memory. For example, the child who sucks its thumb *reproduces* a memory of a past satisfaction and attaches it to the present autoerotic activity of the imagination. This “perceptual-identity” becomes the *a priori* image that constitutes a region of the transcendental analytic. The virtual object is like a pure conception of the understanding in Kant insofar as they are predicates of possible judgments. Kant tells us that these *a priori* conceptions *relate* to undetermined objects: “But conceptions, as predicates of

possible judgments, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object.”<sup>44</sup> For Deleuze these *a priori* conceptions belong to the past; not a past of “past perceptions” because then the conceptions would not be “analytic,” but rather, an auto-erotic “virtual” past. The second synthesis is called “recognition” because it links the *a priori* conception of a “perceptual-identity” or virtual object to an object in the present. If we were to examine this relationship in Freudian economic terms we could say the “binding” stabilizes the virtual object (perceptual-identity) and relates it to an external aim in reality by the inhibition of the Ego. Freud describes this transition from perceptual-identity to thought identity:

The primary process endeavors to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus accumulated, it may establish a ‘perceptual identity’ with the experience of satisfaction. The secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its place – the establishment of a ‘*thought* identity’ with that experience. All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an identical cathexis of the same memory which it is hoped to attain once more through an intermediate stage of motor experiences.<sup>45</sup>

The connection between the two is best expressed by the phrase: “when dreams come true.” Essentially the synthesis of recognition is the correspondence between an actual event and those of our dreams (primary processes). How is this accomplished? Freud tells us that the essential difference between the identity of primary process and secondary process is the difference in intensity of those ideas. When a wished-

for idea in perceptual-identity has some of its intensity “discharged” then its image becomes a thought-identity. Freud tells us: “Thinking must concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the *intensities* of those ideas.”<sup>46</sup> The virtual objects in primary process are so closely interlinked with other virtual objects that they are not distinguishable. However, when an image is *selected* from the series of virtual objects it becomes attached to an actual object and clearly distinguished from all the other images. According to Freud this is the main difference between primary and secondary process:

But it is obvious that condensation of ideas, as well as intermediate and compromise structures, must obstruct the attainment of identity aimed at. Since they substitute one idea for another, they cause a deviation from the path which would have led on from the first idea. Processes of this kind are therefore scrupulously avoided in secondary thinking.<sup>47</sup>

When an idea is extracted from “the condensation of ideas” it appears in a less *intense* form of an *actualized* or recognized idea in perception. In short, the idea passes from the attributes that circulate in pleasure-ego to a definite attribute conferred onto a “substantive” object by the reality-ego. Or, to put it simply, an attribute that previously appeared only in thought is now found in a real perception. When this happens something remarkable occurs: the reality-ego is able to “think” attributes in terms of their connection in things rather than just in fragmentary part objects. This means that memory gains a second power that it did not have before: it can now recognize objects as persisting through time. This function fulfills the aim of reality-testing. Freud tell us that the aim of this reality-testing is to establish an object

that can persist in time: “The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to *find* an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to *re-find* such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.” [11Freud 440] This form of memory is radically different than the habit-memory that we found in the first synthesis of time. For the first time memory is extended to objects *themselves* rather than just to their attributes (or partial objects) as they were in the first passive synthesis. For the first time the reflective memory recognizes objects as the *same* through time because of the “object = x” that mediates between them. As we saw above, the *object = x* has no determinate predicates (or all predicates), therefore it has no discernable place in time. If I may use an analogy: it is like the word “it” that has no predicates and can take on all possible predicates. As such, this “it” can both exist in the past as an “it was” and in the present as an “it is.” As such, it can both be present and past *at the same time*. Deleuze tells us that this object = x is that which constantly circulates between the past and the present and makes recognition between two series possible:

Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (object = x). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines transformations of terms and modifications of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents. [DR 105]

Both the real object and the virtual object are the support for connection. It is this “object = x” that is both the real object and the virtual object at the same time. Not a

“perceived” real object or a “remembered” virtual object, but a transcendental unity of the present and a transcendental unity of the past. For example: in the work of Proust the name of the place “Combray” is not the real place that it names, nor is it a place that one can remember; rather, it is the transcendental unity of a pure past. To put it simply, Combray is the pure “it” that can refer both to a totality of perception in the present and a totality of memory in the past. This is why Deleuze says of Combray: “And if the two series succeed one another, they nevertheless coexist in relation to Combray in itself as an object =  $x$  that causes them to resonate.” [DR 122] My analogy of the word “it” is confirmed by Deleuze in his use of the “there is” that remains indeterminate: “There is no doubt that *there is* an identity belonging to the precursor, and a resemblance between the series which it causes to communicate. This ‘there is’, however, remains perfectly indeterminate.” [DR 119] The object =  $x$  is a “floating signifier” that is, “in itself void of sense and thus susceptible of taking on any sense...” [LS 50] and thus it can appear both in the series of real objects in the present and in the series of virtual objects in the past without contradiction. In short, the Kantian *transcendental idea* provides the link between memory and perception and supports the synthesis of recognition.

2.5 In philosophy the phenomenon of “intentionality” is often taken for granted. It is assumed that the subject, self, or ego “naturally” projects itself towards objects in the world as its aim. To the merit of Freud he does not *simply* state that the Ego seeks out object-cathexis. He also explains the process by which this happens. Freud begins his investigation into the nature of judgment (intentionality) from the standpoint of the difference between dream states and waking states. In dream states (primary process) images are chaotic; that is, many contradictory predicates connect that could not co-exist in a waking state. Further, there is no set place or time in

dreams: one moment is not clearly distinguishable from another. One place is confused with another. What dream phenomena shows is that there is a lack of *judgment* in dreams. Judgment belongs to the waking state that Freud calls “secondary process.” Freud explains the difference between these two states in economic terms:

Thus *judging* is a  $\psi$  process which is only made possible by inhibition by the ego and is evoked by the dissimilarity between the *wishful cathexis* of a memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to it. It can be inferred from this that coincidence between the two cathexes becomes the biological signal for ending the act of thought and for allowing discharge to begin. [1Freud 328]

We have seen that in the neural system, according to Freud, mnemonic traces in the form of “pathways” are activated by freely flowing energy that activates a multiplicity of contradictory images. What the Ego (side-cathexis) does is to “bind” this freely flowing energy so that a *perceptual* signal can be distinguished from a *wishful* signal. In effect, this form of judgment is derived from “negation.” Now, let us examine what Freud has to say about negation. First, negation is not the “will” of a subject but the effect of two types of instinct:

The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the opposition of two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation – as a substitute for uniting – belongs to Eros; negation – the successor to expulsion – belongs to the instinct of destruction. [11Freud 441]

Second, negation frees the psyche from the pressure of repression and from a strict compulsion from the pleasure principle:

But the performance of the function of judgment is not made possible until the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with the first measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and with it, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle. [11Freud 441]

Repression, as we have seen, is the effect of side-cathexis: the energy flowing between memory neurons is inhibited so that painful memories are not activated. Painful memories, according to Freud, leave behind permanent “facilitations” (a crack) and if left unimpeded, this crack in the neural system will cause a repetition compulsion that Freud associates with the death instinct. Now, the process of “binding” is the solution to this problem: how to avoid the devastating effects of destructive quantities of energy from destroying the nervous system? Freud’s answer is what he calls the “fusion” of the instincts: “The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards... towards objects in the external world.” [11Freud 418] This is the beginning of “intentionality” or object-cathexis. The nervous system “binds” the excess energy from traumatic mnemic pathways and this energy is then diverted towards objects. In fact, as Freud explains, the strength of the ego to bind excitations comes from the unpleasant amplitude of neural energy (Thanatos):

Indeed, if we suppose that the original *Qñ* release of unpleasure is taken up by the ego itself, we shall have in it itself the source of the expenditure which is required by the inhibiting side-cathexis from the ego. In that case, the stronger the unpleasure, the stronger the primary defense. [1Freud 324]

In this way the destructive potential of excessive excitations in the neural system is diverted to help in the *unification* of side-cathexis. In short, the destructive instinct is placed at the service of the constructive instinct (Eros). Now, we have seen that pure Eros at work in the primary process that seeks to bring together all the contradictory mnemonic images *at once*. The *difference* that side-cathexis makes to this process is as follows: the ego makes use of “destructive energy” to *negate* some of the contradictory images so that a stable and coherent image is produced. This “image” is then tested against “reality” and if the feedback loop of signals in the muscular system confirm this image it becomes the “intended” object. This would not be possible without two things happening first: the “destructive energy” must be used *against* the system’s natural tendency to move towards immediate satisfaction in a hallucinated image, thereby delaying the effect of the pleasure principle *and* the “destructive energy” must be turned towards the part of the nervous system that controls muscular discharge so that this energy is diverted towards the *instinct for mastery*. Instead of repressing the destructive instincts, they are *sublimated* and *fused* with the life instincts (Eros). “Intentionality” is the *effect* of this fusion of instincts and their sublimation. Now that we have determined the nature of intentionality we can return to Deleuze’s conceptions of the *object = x* and the transcendental field with a greater sense of clarity. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze criticizes Sartre’s notion of the transcendental field because it stops at consciousness:



This field can not be determined as that of a consciousness. Despite Sartre's attempt, we cannot retain consciousness as a milieu while at the same time we object to the form of the person and the point of view of individuation. [LS 102]

The argument that Sartre puts forth, reproduced here in an extremely simplified manner, is as follows: when we are engaged in action in the world, such as chasing a tram, we are not reflecting on the "I" that is engaged in this action. Only the pure field of intentionality appears *without* the self-consciousness of the person engaged in the action. Deleuze's criticism of this is that, while it eliminates the "I" from the field of consciousness, it still maintains consciousness as a *ground* of individuation of the world. Deleuze objects that, "even if we define this impersonal consciousness by means of pure intentionalities and retentions, [they] still presuppose centers of individuation." [LS105] There is still the problem of the *object = x* or the undetermined object-in-general that cannot be grounded by consciousness itself because an object *without predicates* never appears in consciousness. To understand the nature of the *object = x* Deleuze turns to Leibniz's theory of impossible worlds. Leibniz has a strange theory about impossible worlds in which the *same* person in one world would exist in another world with different predicates. This means that there must be a "vague" object that is the *same* in each world despite some or all of the predicates that define him may be different. According to Deleuze: "There is thus a 'vague Adam,' that is, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam = x common to several worlds, just as there is a Sextus = x or a Fang = x. In the end, there is something = x common to all worlds." [LS 114-115] The striking thing about these

“vague” objects is that they are indeterminate. They possess all possible predicates across all the possible worlds *and yet remain the same object in each world*. When this indeterminate object becomes individualized in *only one world* it becomes fixed to a set of predicates that define it for consciousness. This use of Leibniz is not so strange as it might seem. Of course the theory of possible worlds is metaphysical speculation, but if we return to Freud’s theory of the unconscious we encounter something that is based upon observation. In dreams the object =  $x$  can take on impossible predicates! I can dream of a man that is also a woman at the *same time* or someone who is *both dead and alive* at the same time. It is the test-of-reality that determines the object =  $x$  with fixated predicates *only upon awakening*. Individualization takes place only in conscious states but the object =  $x$  transcends consciousness. In dreams we encounter what Deleuze calls “singularities” that are not attached to any individuated whole-object. Instead of consciousness being the ground for individuation, the unconscious primary processes, *as emissions of singularities*, are the pre-conditions for individuation. According to Deleuze: “What is neither individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a *nomadic distribution*, radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the synthesis of consciousness.” [LS 102]

The synthesis of consciousness that Deleuze speaks of here is due to the side-cathexis of the Ego that *negates* impossible predicates from the *object =  $x$*  and stabilizes the perception of the object. Therefore, the objects that we perceive are individuated by negations, not of the reflective understanding, but by the unconscious process of inhibition of libidinal energy.

2.6 At the heart of “primary-process” is something that Deleuze calls “essence.” At the heart of “secondary-process” is what Deleuze calls the “object = x.” To prove this first point we need go no further than to look at the revealing comment that Deleuze makes in *Proust and Signs*: “Nonetheless, if we look for something in life that corresponds to the situation of the original essences, we shall not find it in this or that character, but rather in a certain profound state. This state of sleep.” [PS 45] In the state of sleep we find the free play of “predicates” or “singularities” without definite objects. They subsist in a “complicated” state that Freud calls “condensation.” According to Freud: “The construction of collective and composite figures is one of the chief methods by which condensation operates in dreams.”<sup>48</sup> In short, in dreams there is no respect of person, place or thing. Qualities that would, in waking consciousness, be separated into different people or things, are in dreams confused in such a way that they do not cohere to an object. It is this state of affairs that both Deleuze and Proust call a “qualitative difference.” [PS 41] Because qualities belong to this state of *complication* in the psyche they are not objective, and yet they are not reducible to the subject. As Deleuze tells us: “It is not reducible to a psychological state, nor to a psychological subjectivity, nor even to some form of higher subjectivity.” [PS 43] These “qualities” are signs that operate *between* the psyche and the world. This can be seen in the work of Freud when he speaks of the effects that primary processes have on the mnemonic images and the “sympathy-value” and “imitation-value” that they provoke:

While one is perceiving the perception, one copies the movement oneself—that is, one innervates so strongly the motor image of one’s own which is aroused towards coinciding with the perception, that the movement is carried

out. Hence one can speak of a perception having an *imitation-value*. Or the perception may arouse the mnemonic image of a sensation of pain of one's own, so that one feels the corresponding unpleasure and repeats the appropriate defensive movement. Here we have the *sympathy-value* of a perception. In these two cases we must no doubt see the *primary process* in respect of judging, and we may assume that all secondary judging has come about through a mitigation of these purely associative processes. [1Freud 333-334]

For example: if we see someone cut by a knife in the arm we may feel a cringe of pain and may spontaneously grab our own arm. This is because we *feel* the quality as a sign that operates between the psyche and the perception in the world. However, in dreams we encounter these signs detached from any external object and we *react* to them as if they were real. These signs are “predicates” or “singularities”. In Deleuze's sense of the term a quality like “to be cut” is like a “motor image” insofar as it is neither in the object nor in the subject but describes the manner in which the *world is individuated at that moment*. We have just seen how qualities subsist in a *complicated* state in primary processes. Now we must determine how these qualities are *explicated* in objects. In secondary-processes the psyche turns its attention outwards and posits an object that is both real and the aim of its actions. As we have seen, it then *selects* predicates for this object based upon images found in wishful-cathexis (perceptual-identity). It is in this *process* that we find the object = x that serves as an *objective* support for the connection of qualities or singularities. To put it simply, the psyche looks for those attributes in the object that will fulfill its needs. First, this means that the psyche will seek to *recognize* attributes in the object that will link it to mnemonic images. In short, what we perceive in the object is only the

*signs* or attributes that fulfill the expectations of wishful-cathexis. Freud distinguishes between the transcendental *thing* and the perceptual *qualities* in the object:

As a consequence, the perceptual complexes are divided into a constant, non-understood, part—the *thing*—and a changing, understandable, one—the attribute or movement of the thing. Since the thing-complex recurs linked with a number of attribute-complexes, and these recur linked with a number of thing-complexes, a possibility arises of working out the pathways of thought leading from these two kinds of complex to the wished-for state of the thing... [1Freud 383-384]

What is crucial in this passage is that the *thing* is not an object for judgment; only the signs or attributes make up the perceptual qualities of the world before us. This is because the attributes or signs *are the individuating factors of the object*. The primary processes have no conception of “objects,” and our memory *cannot* store “objects” or “identities” but only qualitative differences. When we perceive something, the qualitative differences that are stored in memory are linked with the perceptual signs. *The memory does not store images of objects but only the qualities that individuate objects*. According to Freud: “What we call *things* are residues which evade being judged.” [1Freud 334] This is the object = x that Deleuze finds so important. This is the undetermined *thing* that is beyond perception and memory. It cannot be thought because thought requires individuation and determination. Kant calls it an Idea of reason. Deleuze calls it “the being of the sensible.” On what basis can we say that there is a transcendental *thing* that is the locus for individuation and

yet remains undetermined in itself? In order to justify this *thing* Deleuze relies on concepts taken from the work of Leibniz. In particular: the Monad. Deleuze is fascinated with the idea of a monad as a “viewpoint” upon the world. In *Proust and Signs* he makes it the center of *envelopment* in which qualities can converge in one object:

What is essential occurs when the sentence achieves a Viewpoint proper to each of the two objects, but precisely a viewpoint that we must call proper to the object because the object is already dislocated by it, as if the viewpoint were divided into a thousand various noncommunicating viewpoints, so that, the same operation being performed for the other object, the viewpoints can be set within each other, setting up resonance among themselves... [PS 166-167]

For example: the taste of tea in a past moment and the taste of tea in the present moment are two non-communicating qualities in the work of Proust. That is, until they are combined in a “viewpoint” upon the world called “Combray” that is like a *monad* insofar as it expresses a unique “region” of the world that is not reducible to either a subjective *memory* or to a *perception* of a subject. The “viewpoint” is the object = x that envelops two divergent moments in time. Moreover, these two moments neither converge in the *present* perceptions of the hero of Proust’s novel, nor in a remembered *past* that actually happened, but in a phantasm of a Combray that never existed. If we return to the work of Leibniz for a moment we can see that the “Combray” example is an example of a “compossible” world. This will be made clear if we turn to Deleuze’s comments in his book on Leibniz. In this work Deleuze

reproduces an example from Leibniz of “Adam.” He lists the singularities that individuate this monad called Adam: “Here, for example, are three singularities: to be the first man, to live in a garden of paradise, to have a wife created from one’s own rib. And then a fourth: sinning.”<sup>49</sup> All of these singularities or attributes *resonate* because they cohere in a single “viewpoint” upon the world. But what if a singularity appears that does not cohere? Deleuze describes this:

But then a fifth singularity appears: resistance to temptation. It is not simply that it contradicts the fourth, ‘sinning,’ such that a choice has to be made between the two. It is that the lines of prolongation that go from this fifth to the three others are not convergent, in other words, they *do not pass through common values*.<sup>50</sup>

This is a “divergence” in viewpoints because the attributes “sinning” and “resistance to temptation” cannot cohere in one monad. But still there is this Adam = x that can take on *both* the qualities of “sinning” and “resistance to temptation.” This is the undetermined object = x that transcends all possible worlds and all possible viewpoints. It is Deleuze’s contention that there are divergences of viewpoints *in one and the same world* meaning that we pass from one monad or viewpoint to another within time:

Only when something is identified between divergent series or between impossible worlds, an object = x appears transcending individuated worlds, and the Ego which thinks it transcends worldly individuals, giving

thereby to the world a new value in view of the new value of the subject which is being established. [LS 113]

*Resonance* is defined by the convergence of attributes in one viewpoint and *forced movement* is defined by the divergence between two viewpoints. “*This convergence defines ‘compossibility’ as the rule of a world synthesis.* Where the series diverge, another world begins, impossible with the first.” [LS 111] If we are to speak of a second “synthesis” of time it must be in terms of this “resonance” of qualities into one and the same object = x. It is this synthesis that is responsible for the progressive determinations of objects by *constructing a viewpoint that is common to “compossible” singularities.* As the object = x becomes determined as a viewpoint that envelops qualities that would normally be found in two different objects, one loses sight of the problematic nature of the object = x. The question arises: if we only *perceive* the qualities of objects, then how do we ever conceive of the *thing* itself? Along with the *progressive determination* of compossible worlds there is also a counter-movement of Thanatos that breaks the resonant effect and exposes problems. As we saw above in the example of Adam who both sinned *and* resisted temptation, there are *points of indecision* in the progressive determination of worlds. These points of indecision center around Ideal Events that are expressible by the infinitive verb: in this case “to sin.” The neutrality of the verb is the locus of indecision in the Ideal Event. When two fragments or singularities fail to cohere this “verb” or Event remains problematic. It is at this moment that we become aware of the *thing* apart from its predicates as an “indeterminate” element. Deleuze describes this as the two faces of the Idea:



It is as though every Idea has two faces, which are like love and anger: love in the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities which, by dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of a 'revolutionary situation' that causes the Idea to explode into the actual. [DR 190]

The first movement of Eros (love) links the fragments (qualities) into a convergent series that determines the object = x. The second movement of the death instinct (anger) counter-actualizes the object = x and causes the psyche to turn back upon itself and question the order of events. Deleuze gives the example of the modern work of art that uses divergence and decentering to create an *effect*: "Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacements and disguises, their divergences and decenterings..." [DR 293] Deleuze gives an example of a remarkable movie: "*Last Year at Marienbad*, which shows the particular techniques of repetition which cinema can deploy or invent." [DR 294] In this movie divergent series are played out, the order of events are questioned and the overall effect is to fracture the viewpoint so that impossibilities *appear in one and the same world*. The movie, as a modern work of art, is no longer about viewpoints or stories with characters; but rather, it is about thought and the ideal events that the divergences provoke. In short, it moves us from a focus on enveloped qualities and the singularities that *resonate* to the insistence of problems and the Ideas they expose. While the envelopment of qualities into convergent series belongs to the second synthesis of time, the divergence of singularities and the problems they actualize

belong to the third synthesis of time. It is this third synthesis of time that we will turn to next.

<p>2.1 Side-cathexis inhibits the connection of ideas by inhibiting the excitation that passes between neurons. It stores this energy to later signal motor discharge.</p>	<p>2.3 The Freudian “thing” is like Kant’s object = x, it is the undetermined locus for the connection of predicates or qualities. The structure of objectivity is the basis for reflective subjectivity.</p>	<p>2.5 “Intentionality” is the directing of destructive energy outwards by the process of “fusion.” It constitutes the object = x as an indeterminate unity that envelops singularities.</p>
<p>2.2 Reality-testing delays pleasure in order to integrate it into a “substantial” object. The reality of this object is confirmed by feedback from all the senses.</p>	<p>2.4 The ego is divided between “perceptual-identity” and “thought-identity.” The object = x enables the object in memory to link with the object in perception.</p>	<p>2.6 <i>Complication</i> of qualities and indeterminate object = x. The second is a viewpoint or monad. The modern work of art explores divergent possible worlds.</p>

### c) The Energetics of the Superego

3.1 In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze tells us: “Repetition is thus in essence symbolic, spiritual, and intersubjective or monadological.” [DR 106] What is of particular importance to us at this point are the first and last terms: the symbolic and the monad. First let us ask the question: what is a monad? The monad is a strange concept because it has no *place*. We cannot identify it with a body or an embodied subject because monads have no body: it is a soul. Deleuze tells us that according to Leibniz: “the soul is not in a body in a point, but is itself a higher point and of another nature, which corresponds with the point of view.”<sup>51</sup> At first sight this does not seem so strange; after all we all have a point-of-view. However, to reduce the

monad down to the point-of-view of a soul or subject would be a terrible oversimplification of the monad. There is a double ambiguity as to what *subject* has the *predicates* that constitute the point-of-view. Consider the following example that Deleuze draws from the work of Leibniz: “On the one hand, the world in which Adam committed sin exists only in Adam the sinner (and in all other subjects who make up this world). On the other hand, God creates not only Adam the sinner but also the world in which Adam has committed sin. In other words, if the world is in the subject, the subject is no less *for the world*.”<sup>52</sup> Since Leibniz clearly states that God produces the world *before* creating the souls that populate this world it seems that the “subject” is a secondary effect of the monad. Above all, the monad is a point-of-view on the world in which the “subject” is only one element *in* that point-of-view. We will come back to this “point of view” in a moment after we have illustrated it in the following story. Deleuze takes a special interest in Lacan’s seminar on *The Purloined Letter* in which a story by Poe is recounted. This story consists of two series: “first series: ‘king-queen-minister’, second series: ‘police-minister-Dupin’” [DR 316] or, to put it simply, each of the three characters in one series mirrors the three in the other series. However, they do not have fixed characters: each of the characters is caught up in a drama in which the “letter” that was purloined in the first series structures the intersubjective relation of the characters in a different way than in the second series. Or as Lacan says: “In so far as they have entered into the necessity, into the movement peculiar to the letter, they each become, in the course of successive scenes, functionally different in relation to the essential reality which it constitutes. [...] ...that is to say that at each point in the symbolic circuit, each of them becomes someone else.”<sup>53</sup> In this story where is the point-of-view? In the first series the minister notices a letter that the queen has

written and has kept from the king by hiding it in the open. The minister notices this and takes the letter. In the second series Dupin notices the letter that the minister has stolen and is hiding from the police by hiding it in the open and Dupin takes the letter. There is a transposition of viewpoints: the police replace the king (letter hidden from  $x$ ), the minister replaces the queen ( $y$  who hides the letter in the open) and Dupin replaces the minister ( $z$  who steals the letter). Let us suppose that each of the two series is a monad and  $x$ ,  $y$  and  $z$  are predicates that inhere in the three subjects in each monad. In each case the characters are individualized by their predicates  $x$ ,  $y$  and  $z$ . But in the two monads each of the characters participate in a different point-of-view depending on their relationship to the letter. In fact, *their point-of-view is determined by their symbolic relations with the letter*. This means that subjects are distributed in “monads” by their symbolic relationship that *is a point-of-view*. The only object that transcends the two monads is the letter (object =  $x$ ) that has no “predication” and thus no individuation that would bind it to only one monad. In fact, the letter as object =  $x$  is the point of divergence between the two possible worlds. And the *displacement* of the letter from one series to the other (or from one monad to another) is what causes the actors to exchange their masks or disguises. This is why Deleuze says:

It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines transformations of terms and modifications of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents. [DR 105]

In describing divergent series and the symbolic communications between series Deleuze is making a radical departure from Leibniz. Whereas Leibniz postulated only one *actual* world upon which all the monads converge. Deleuze postulates a multiplicity of monads that resonate across a divergent series of “worlds.” Deleuze derives this conclusion from the work of Proust in which time is fragmented into closed-off vessels that occasionally communicate with one another. For Proust the “One and Whole... would function as effect, effect of machines, instead of principles.” [PS 163] We will see next how the symbolic relation produces the effects of *resonance* and *forced movement*.

3.2 Freud tells us that a symbol takes the place of a thing. But what does this mean? A *thing*, in this case, is not an object. If we pay close attention to the mechanism of “displacement” that symbols affect we will see that “the thing” is not something in the consciousness of the reflective mind. First, let us consider the passage where Freud distinguishes between *hysterical* symbol-formation and normal symbol-formation:

But a hysterical *symbol* behaves differently. The knight who fights for his lady’s glove *knows*, in the first place, that the glove owes its importance to the lady; and, secondly, he is in no way prevented by his adoration of the glove from thinking of the lady and serving her in other respects. The *hysteric*, who weeps at *A*, is quite unaware that he is doing so on account of the association *A—B*, and *B* itself plays no part at all in his psychical life. The symbol has in this case taken the place of the *thing* entirely. [1Freud 349]

The particular importance of the last phrase becomes immediately apparent: there is a radical difference between a “thing” and a “symbol.” The “glove,” in the above example, is the symbol for the “lady.” But the “lady” is also a symbol for the object-cathexis of the man. In short, there is a displacement from one *signifier* to another *signifier*, but not a displacement from a “thing” to a “symbol.” In the case of *hysterical* symbol-formation we come closer to the “thing” that is symbolized: the *thing* is not an object but an “affect” that is repressed. The “thing” that is repressed is an *excessively intense* idea that has been repressed. Freud gives this excessively intense “affect” the ability to detach itself from one idea and *displace* that energy on to another idea:

The term ‘excessively intense’ points to quantitative characteristics. [...] If so, only the distribution has changed. Something has been added to *A* which has been subtracted from *B*. The pathological process is one of *displacement*, such as we have come to know in dreams—a primary process therefore.  
[1Freud 350]

In short, displacement allows one signifier to replace another signifier. However, the first signifier is not the repressed “thing” but becomes repressed because it is associated with the unpleasant *affect*. The hysteric will make a fetish out of an object because it has become the “symbol” that replaces the repressed or forgotten signifier that has been “de-cathected” (has had the “affect” uncoupled from the idea). Therefore the *thing* that is signified by the symbol is not an object but the displaced “affect” that has floated from one signifier to the other. This excessive “affect” *causes* the displacement-effect of the symbol (object = *x*). This energy that causes

displacement is called “forced movement” by Deleuze. Freud calls this “forced movement” a *repetition compulsion*. Freud tells us that every repetition compulsion is accompanied by a repressed or forgotten idea-affect: “Analysis has led to the surprising conclusion: that for every compulsion there is a corresponding *repression*, that for every excessive intrusion into consciousness there is a corresponding amnesia.” [1Freud 350] It is on the nature of this “amnesia” that Deleuze and Freud disagree. Freud believes (at first) that the disguise of repression refers to a “real” event in the hysteric’s past. If this is the case then a simple “remembering” of the repressed idea would bring about a cure. However, in Freud’s text of the case of Emma there is an ambiguity that could lead to another interpretation. Without recounting the whole case history it is enough to point out the major terms of the repression in the case of Emma. In summary there are two series in this case history: a) the sexual assault by the shopkeeper in the first series, b) the *fright* at the laughter of the shop assistants in the second series. First, Freud says of the second series that Emma experienced *fright* at the laughter about her clothes by the two shop assistants: “She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants (one of whom she can remember) laughing together, and ran away in some kind of *affect of fright*.” [1Freud 353] The two terms here are “laughter” and “clothes.” According to Freud the laughter resonated with the repressed idea of the shopkeeper in the first series: “In the shop the two assistants were *laughing*; this laughing aroused (unconsciously) the memory of the shopkeeper.” [1Freud 354] Now, what is strange about hysterical displacement is that the *affect* of fright should be attached to “clothes” which is a perfectly neutral idea. According to Freud this irrational fright is caused because “clothes” has become the *symbol* for the fright experienced during the assault: “In our example, however, it is noticeable precisely that the element which enters

consciousness is not the one that arouses interest (assault) but another one, as a symbol (clothes).” [1Freud 356] Now the question arises: is it the *fright* that is the repressed “thing” or the idea of *assault* that is repressed? They are not identical because the assault is an excitation coming from external sources, whereas the *fright* is an endogenous excitation that is linked with timeless unconscious processes. This means that the *fright* at the assault can also be a *fright* from an earlier period. This has led some psychoanalysts such as Otto Rank to observe that all trauma refers back to “birth-trauma.” This means that all the displacements of “affect” across all traumatic ideas refer to *one and the same event*. However, neither Freud nor Deleuze agrees with this idea of a primal trauma. Whereas Freud continues to humor notions of traumatic events to some degree, Deleuze rejects placing the “origin” of forced movement or repressed affect to any actual occurrence in the real world. Deleuze completely rethinks the situation of displacement and repression. What was for Freud a repression of one *real* series by another *real* series becomes, for Deleuze, a relationship between a real series in the present and a *virtual* series in the past. Why? Because when the *affect* is displaced from one idea in the past to another idea in the present, the idea in the past becomes the mirror image of the present event. In short, the idea that is repressed is integrated into the present scene as a kind of ghostly presence even though it is absent. Freud describes this as the uncanny impression that the past facilitations of memory have on our *actions* in the present. This only happens, according to Freud, when we are under the influence of affects or emotions that disturb our sense of the present. Freud gives the following explanation for this:

The recent pathway succumbed in the affective state: *facilitation*—that is, what was *old-established*—gained the upper hand. This forgetting involves



the disappearance of the power of selection, of efficiency and of logic in the passage of thought, very much as happens in dreams. Secondly, affect inhibits thought in that without forgetting, pathways are followed which are ordinarily avoided: in particular, pathways leading to discharge, such as actions performed in the affective state. [1Freud 357]

Freud discovered this effect because of a personal experience of forgetting: “Thus, for instance, it happened to me during the agitation caused by a great anxiety that I forgot to make use of the telephone, which had been introduced into my house a short time before.” [1Freud 357] This forgetting is actually what Proust described as “involuntary memory.” It is as if we were transported back into a past, and we began to react to the present reality *as if* it were a past reality. This means that an “affect” is responsible for the process of involuntary memory just as this same “affect” is responsible for our repetition compulsions. The difference between these two “affects” is not a difference in *kind* but a difference in *degree*. The effect of *forced-movement* comes from an “image” or virtual object that is repressed along with the affect. In this case the affect has been de-cathected or de-invested from the virtual series and has been re-cathected or invested in an actual series. The result is that patterns of activity are repeated *without conscious knowledge*. In the case of *resonance*, or involuntary memory, the “affect” is displaced on the virtual series and the cathexis (or investment) in the actual series is neglected in favor of a past or virtual series. The result is that patterns of activity are repeated *with conscious knowledge*.

3.3 Strong emotions can have one of two effects: they can strengthen the pleasure-principle or they can strengthen the reality-principle. If they strengthen the

pleasure principle then memory is enhanced. If they strengthen the reality principle then action is enhanced. This distinction is based upon a single principle: “‘Reflecting’ is a time-consuming activity of the ego’s, which cannot occur when there are strong *Qñs* in the level of affect.” [1Freud 358] As we have seen, the activity of side-cathexis binds excess excitation so that the psyche has *time* to reflect on what action to take in reality. However, if the side-cathexis of the ego fails to do its job then the psyche will regress into the virtual series of mnemic-images. According to Freud, a sudden rush of excitation can suspend the attention to reality or reality principle:

By that means the release of unpleasure was quantitatively restricted, and its start was precisely a signal for the ego to set normal defense in action; this guarded against fresh experiences of pain, with their facilitations, developing so easily. Nevertheless, the stronger the release of unpleasure, the harder was the task for the ego, which, with its side-cathexes, can after all only provide a counterweight to the *Qñs* up to a certain limit, and is thus bound to permit a *primary passage* of quantity to occur. [1Freud 358]

If there is not enough side-cathexis then the passage of mnemic-images erupts into consciousness along with the “affect” that was repressed. However, if the side-cathexis is stronger, the “affect” will be repressed along with the mnemic-image and the *repressed* instance will find its expression in *action*. If we recall the case presented in the last section, where the hysteric *replaces* the thing with a symbol, we will discover the positive aspect of the death instinct. The difference between normal symbol-formation and hysterical symbol-formation is that the “normal” formation

involves a firm grasp of the “thing” being symbolized. However, in the repetition compulsion there is no “thing” that the psyche can remember. In this case the psyche is faced with a problematic symbol that *cannot be reduced to a signifier* in some virtual series of memories. If the symbol is not directed to a memory then it must take as its object the “actual series” that follows the reality principle. But as we have seen, the reality-principle normally relates the psyche to external objects in the world. How then can it relate to a symbol that is not real? In order to relate to the symbol the reality principle must constitute *another* reality: the reality of thought. This *second* reality is that of language. We have seen, previously, that the *indication of reality* is accompanied by a psychical discharge. In the case of “eating,” the *discharge* that signaled the *reality* of the food was the action of the mouth and the stomach. In the case of “speaking,” however, there is a physical discharge in the mouth of words being spoken. This is the basis of the *reality* of thoughts. This process of symbol-formation resembles the hysterical process of symbol-formation because, in both cases, the symbol completely replaces the *thing*. Words are not things and things are not words, but the principle of reality applies to them both as if words are *as real as* things. To sum up: if the excessive excitations of “affect” reinforce the reality-principle (side-cathexis) then this excessive attention to reality can either a) find an outlet in compulsive behavior or b) find an outlet in symbolization and language. Deleuze confirms this alternative in the death instinct of compulsive repetition or selection and thought:

It seems that the idea of a death instinct must be understood in terms of the three paradoxical and complementary requirements: to give repetition an original, positive principle, but also an autonomous disguising power; and

finally, to give it an immanent meaning in which terror is closely mingled with the movement of selection and freedom. [DR 19]

Deleuze explains the compulsive repetition as a symptom of the destructive drives to be found in the un-binding movement of the psyche. These drives are turned outwards by the reality principle and seek to be symbolized in *either* action *or* thought. The death instinct inspires the formation of thought which *gives an immanent meaning to the terror of endogenous excitations*. In short, the “therapeutic” effect of the “talking-cure” discovered by Freud is to translate emotions into words and, ultimately, into a narrative structure that creates a *meaning* for them. In short, *verbalization* creates a “metaphysical” surface upon which the “affects” of the body are turned into thoughts in the mind. Deleuze takes this process of “verb”-alization seriously by making the verb the center for thought: “Speaking, in the complete sense of the word, presupposes the verb and passes through the verb, which projects the mouth onto the metaphysical surface, filling it with the ideal events of this surface.”

[LS 241] If we were to describe the transformation from repetition compulsion to thought then we must see it in the *translation* of actions into pure “verbs.” Next we will see how these pure “verbs” function as the locus for thought in the unconscious.

3.4 Freud defines repression as a failure in translation: “A failure of translation—this is what is known clinically as ‘repression’.” [1Freud 235] But what is *translation*? Translation is a process whereby unconscious thing-presentations are linked with preconscious word-presentations. According to Freud, preconsciousness “is the third transcription, attached to word-presentations and corresponding to our official ego.” [1Freud 234-235] Why is this important? Because in the work of Deleuze the difference between “thought” (Thanatos) and involuntary “memory”

(Eros) is the difference between the second and third syntheses of time. In involuntary memory we discover the *effect of resonance* in the Freudian concept of the screen-memory. The screen-memory is an effect of repression that seeks a symbol of the past “in general” and substitutes mnemonic-images for perception. However, with verbalization a new relationship to the unconscious is achieved: rather than activate mnemonic-images the psyche creates word-images of the repressed drives. This is why “translation” is so important: rather than producing an “erotic” mask of memory, translation moves beyond the sexual resonance of memory and produces a desexualized thought-image. Deleuze establishes the difference between forced movement and resonance in *The Logic or Sense*:

At any rate, the forced movement is not established between the basic sexual series, but rather between the two new infinitely larger series—eating, on the one hand, and thinking, on the other... [LS 240]

The difference between the second synthesis and the third synthesis of time is to be found in the *difference in degree of sublimation or translation of the drives*. Deleuze describes the synthesis of Eros as a “less successful sublimation.” [LS 224] This is because involuntary memory, at best, gives us a fleeting image of object-images that cannot be maintained. On the other hand, thought can *translate* these object-images into *word-images* and maintain them in consciousness. In the work of Proust we find the episode of the “tea and madeleine” in which highly charged images pass into consciousness for only a brief moment. This process involves the mechanisms of regression, displacement and screen-memory that do not fully overcome the forces of repression. If Deleuze suggests that Eros “allows us to penetrate this pure past in

itself” [DR 85] he is not speaking metaphorically. He actually means that the mechanisms of repression and sexuality account for the movement of memory. But Deleuze also tells us that the “status of sexuality accounts for repression.” [LS 243] When Deleuze is speaking of memory we must distinguish it from the simple recalling of mundane facts as “I have a doctors appointment.” These are former presents that “may be represented beyond forgetting by active synthesis, in so far as forgetting is overcome.” [DR 85] Deleuze is referring, instead, to a passive synthesis of memory that is bound up with sexuality and repression. This is why Deleuze says, “it is *within* Forgetting, as though immemorial, that Combray reappears in the form of a past which was never present: the in-itself of Combray.” [DR 85] However, we must still consider this “forgetting” as a failed sublimation or a failed translation. The translation into word-images represents a triumph of the third synthesis of time over the second synthesis of time. It is in this synthesis that the pre-conscious can reach down *directly* into the unconscious and extract pure Events. It is at this point that Freud’s theory of phylogenesis makes an important distinction between memory and thought. Freud discovered certain events or fantasies that were common amongst many people and yet could not be traced back to any historical fact in their personal memory. For example, the Oedipus complex is derived from the mythical occurrence of the “Totem” meal in which the children kill their father and eat him. Freud tells us that these pure “events” that cannot be traced back to any occurrence form the basis of the superego: “The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually originated from the experience that led to totemism.” [11Freud 378] He reasons that this occurrence cannot have come from the external world because the *ego* mediates between the world and the id: “Reflection at once shows us that no external vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the id, except by way of the *ego*,

which is the representative of the external world to the id.” [11Freud 378] If the “events” represented in the preconscious did not originate from the external world then they must have been preserved in the id itself. However, as we have seen, the impulses in the id remain unconscious as long as they remain as object-images. Deleuze’s important contribution to the theory of sublimation is his introduction of the *verb* into the superego. Of the verb Deleuze says: “It represents the event as expressed, brings it to exist in the elements of language, and, conversely, confers on these elements an expressive value and function as ‘representatives’ which they did not have themselves.” [LS 245] Again, he tells us that the “event” is expressed by a synthesis of elements in language that would not be possible without the infinitive form of the verb that gives “sense” to language. In short, it represents *action* in language that, in turn, makes fantasies such as the “totem meal” possible: to eat/to be eaten or to kill/to be killed. The verb represents the nucleus of the primal fantasies transmitted to the superego from the id. Again, the superego presents us with a pure *image of action* that never occurred in actual events. Deleuze calls this image of action a symbol for *the whole of time*: “The whole of time is gathered in the image of the formidable action as this is simultaneously presented, forbidden and predicted by the superego: the action = *x*.” [DR 110] Why is this important? The importance of Deleuze’s theory of the verb is that it provides an alternative explanation to Freud’s theory of phylogenesis. Whereas Freud believed that the id stores the experiences of our ancestors, Deleuze believes that the “events” expressed in the superego are actually the expressions of the destructive drives *translated* into word-presentations. This interpretation is supported by the following passage in Freud: “The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now continued in a higher region...”

[11Freud 379] Are not then the struggles that are waged in the unconscious now the objects of thought on some metaphysical surface? And is not the “verb” the representative of all actions and passions in the depths of bodies? Deleuze thinks so: “...it is the necessary result of actions and passions, although of an entirely different nature, and itself neither action nor passion: event, pure event, *Eventum tantum* (to kill the father and castrate the mother, to be castrated and to die).” [LS 207] To sum up: the effect of language is to put the inner life of the id on the same level as perception, so that, speech-discharge manifests our inner desires in the form of pure “events.”

3.5 We should not think of the “pure” events of thought as analogous to the occurrences that we encounter in actual life. Events are logical entities. Because of this we must investigate the root of logic which is reason. Freud finds the roots of reason in the superego: “Reason and Necessity... arouse a suspicion that they still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as a parental couple, in a mythological sense, and believe themselves linked to them by libidinal ties.” [11Freud 423] It is not by chance that Deleuze also links the superego to reason: “...from the negative as a partial process of destruction endlessly reiterated, to negation as an absolute idea of reason. It is indeed the vicissitudes of the superego in sadism which account for this progression.” [CC 126] This raises the question: is reason a “natural” faculty of thought or is it the product of “identification” with parental figures, as Freud thinks, and the force of negation, as Deleuze thinks? There is certainly a history to this conception of reason. First, Deleuze’s idea that reason as a pure negation can be found in Kant’s conception of the “constraint” of reason. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant describes his constraint as *both* a pain *and* something elevating:



As *submission* to the law, therefore, that is, as a command (announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the legislation of our *own* reason, it also contains something *elevating*, and this subjective effect on feeling... may be called in this respect *self-approbation*...<sup>54</sup>

There is, then, a negative constraint of reason that seems to come from within. Second, this process of the internalization of prohibition is caused by identification and introjection of aspects of authority figures. According to Freud: “The super-ego retained essential features of the introjected persons – their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and punish.” [11Freud 422] This process of internalization of prohibitions can be seen in the development of children. At first a child will not restrain his natural desire to satisfy his needs despite their consequences. However, through the process of education the child is given a sense of “logical” consequences of his actions; in short, he learns the logic of causality. He also learns that he will be rewarded if he restrains the desire for immediate satisfaction and considers alternatives. The child thereby delays the pleasure of satisfaction in favor of the intellectual pleasures of reason and constraint. However, reason would not have developed without the “no” of the father upon which the superego is based. This is why Freud claims: “Kant’s Categorical Imperative is thus the direct heir of the Oedipus complex.” [11Freud 422] The Oedipus complex is dissolved, according to Freud, when the child internalizes the prohibition of the father. This prohibition is the source of the “negative” function in logic. The categorical imperative is a logical deduction of what “events” would be logically

consistent. Deleuze gives the example of “lying” in his book on Kant: “For example, if everyone told lies, promises would destroy themselves since it would be contradictory for anyone to believe them.”<sup>55</sup> This is a great example of a “pure” event: it is not reducible to an actual event; rather, it is an ideal event that is suspended by the activity of logic. Further, it is derived by a double negation: a lie would negate itself because it would *contradict* itself (this is a lie: “I am lying.”). Critical reason is based upon the “sense” of the coherence of events, and as such its object is *not* the objects or subjects that predicate events; rather, it is the copula of the subject and object. To demonstrate the total reversibility of the subject and the predicate around the verb (or pure event) Deleuze cites the following examples from the work of Lewis Carroll:

Hence the innumerable examples dotting Carroll’s work, where one finds that “cats eat bats” and “bats eat cats,” “I say what I mean” and “I mean what I say,” “I like what I get” and “I get what I like,” and “I breathe when I sleep” and “I sleep when I breathe,” have one and the same sense. [LS 33]

In each case the verbs “to-eat,” “to-say,” “to-get,” and “to-breathe” remain the *same* despite the change in the order of subject and predicate. Deleuze even tells us that “‘God is’ and ‘God is not’ must have the same sense” [LS 33] because negation does not change the meaning of the verb “is” in each of the two propositions. Therefore we can say that negation only effects the predicates of events and not the events themselves. However, in actual occurrences events do not exist outside of their subjects and predicates (for example: a cat sits on a mat, the mat and the cat determine the “sitting”). It is only in the domain of “reason” that the *verb* becomes

the nucleus for all logical events. Now let us return to the aspect of “constraint” in reason. The fact is that “constraint” or negation tries to limit propositions to a coherent order; that is, so that they only travel in one direction. Deleuze calls this constraint of reason “good sense.” Deleuze says of good sense: “It first determines the principle of a unique sense or direction in general, ready to show that this principle, once given, forces us to choose one direction over the other.” [LS 76-77] In other words, when we encounter paradoxes like the kind we examined above (I breathe when I sleep *and* I sleep when I breathe, or, God is *and* God is not) we are faced with a sense of uneasiness. We react with laughter or confusion; we are not able to take both senses *at the same time*. Freud explains this reaction as a *biological rule* that reason must follow in order to bring thought to an end *as soon as possible*:

Stated briefly, in the non-observance of the *biological rules* for the passage of thought. These rules lay down where it is that the cathexis of attention is to be directed each time and when the thought-process is to come to a stop. They are protected by threats of unpleasure, they are derived from experience, and they can be transposed directly into the rules of logic—which will have to be proved in detail. Thus the intellectual unpleasure of contradiction, at which the passage of testing thought comes to a stop, is nothing other than the unpleasure accumulated for the protection of the biological rules, which is stirred up by an incorrect thought-process. [1Freud 386]

The activity of critical reason, according to Freud, is an evolutionary development that allows the organism to suspend judgment long enough to consider alternatives.

However, it cannot do this without a certain amount of unpleasure or constraint. In fact, unpleasure and constraint are the same for Freud: the organism will seek to bring *critical reflective* thought to an end as soon as possible so that *action* can take the place of contemplation. If it is unpleasant to think then why do we do it? Freud's answer is the same as Descartes: suspension of judgment is necessary to confirm the reality of perceptions. Once the perception (or order of events) is confirmed to be real then critical thought should naturally come to an end. However, this is not always the case. Next we will examine the reasons for this.

3.6 Along with the logical force of negation there is another force of negation that counteracts the effects of reason. This second form of negation is called "Verleugnung" in German and is in the English translation of the work of Freud as "disavowal." This is also an important concept for Deleuze. Here is Deleuze's interpretation of this term:

For if *Verleugnung* is a question of maintaining the image of the phallus in spite of the absence of a penis, in the case of women, this operation presupposes a desexualization as the consequence of castration, but also a reinvestment of the sexual object insofar as it is sexual by means of desexualized energy: *Verleugnung* is not an hallucination, but rather an esoteric knowledge. [LS 243]

This operation whereby the psyche maintains the presence of an image that it, nevertheless, knows to be absent in perception brings about a *contradiction* that cannot be resolved by logic. The fact of the *painful* contradiction between the *presence* and *absence* of the penis leads the ego to split into two parts. One part

maintains the perception of absence, and the other part maintains the imagination of presence. This split maintains two agencies of the psyche in complete isolation from each other: the superego and the ideal ego. Deleuze tells us that disavowal is a reaction to the negation of intellect and maintains its independence from the superego by constituting an “imagination” that suspends judgment: “Disavowal is a reaction of the imagination, as negation is an operation of the intellect or of thought. Disavowal challenges the superego and entrusts the mother with the power to give birth to an ‘ideal ego’ which is pure, autonomous and independent of the superego.” [CC 127]

Much of Deleuze’s book *Coldness and Cruelty* is devoted to the idea of an imagination that suspends judgment as to the reality of its objects. This “imagination” has its roots in Freud. In his essay “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense” Freud explains that, “there is a conflict between the demand by the instinct and the prohibition by reality.” [11Freud 461] In short, the heavily invested organ of sexuality (the phallus) comes across the question: is it possible to *lack* the phallus? This leads to a paradox within critical reason: either there *is* or there *is not* a lack. This contradiction leads to the unpleasure that we saw above in the “biological rule” of critical reflection. The solution to this “unpleasure” of logical contradiction is the creation of a *new faculty* that is completely independent from reason: the imagination. Reason can still turn towards the objects of “reality” while the imagination can maintain the mental reality of objects of “phantasy.” The result is that the imagination maintains pure “presentations” that are not subject to the laws of logic: negation, reversibility or location. It is within these pure “presentations” that the “pure event” can be maintained apart from any actualization. Ideal events such as the totem meal, the castration complex, incest, the phallus, etc. can be maintained without any critical judgment or repression from the superego. However, when

Deleuze uses the term “imagination” in this sense, he is not referring to the conscious imagination that we encounter in everyday life. Rather, he is referring to what Freud would call the pre-conscious. The imagination, in the ordinary sense of the term, presents us with representations. On the other hand, the preconscious imagination presents us with only pure “presentations.” These presentations give “sense” or meaning to rational propositions, but at the same time (because they are split-off from the ego) they cannot enter rational thought. This is why Deleuze tells us that they are not reducible to any mental state: “If there is, sense, or that which is expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular image, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts.” [LS 19] To put it simply, in every use of language what is expressed by our “propositions” is a *desire* or a *demand* of something that cannot be found amongst real and representable objects. The suspended “presentations” of the transcendental imagination acts as a locus for this desire. However, this requires a closer examination. The key to this form of “presentation” can be found in *Difference and Repetition*. It is in this work that Deleuze poses the complex nature of *problems*. These are not problems that have real solutions like  $2 + 2 = 4$ , but problems for which no “representation” in thought could answer. Deleuze names these problems:

It would be naïve to think that the problems of life and death, love and the difference between the sexes are amenable to their scientific solutions and positings, even though such positings and solutions necessarily arise without warning, even though they must necessarily emerge at a certain moment in the unfolding process of the development of these problems. [DR 107]

If we remember that the “splitting of the ego” caused the transcendental imagination to become a “metaphysical surface” upon which pure events would be *present*, then it becomes clear that the “problems” that the faculty of reason poses about them are *not solvable* by logic. This is why they remain “problematic” and un-presentable in logical propositions, while, at the same time, they give “sense” to these propositions. The answer to this paradox can be found in the work of Lacan. In his essay “The Signification of the Phallus” Lacan defines the nature of “demand” as being different from any empirical “need” that could actually be satisfied:

For the unconditional element of demand, desire substitutes the ‘absolute’ condition: this condition unties the knot of that element in the proof of love that is resistant to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (*Spaltung*).<sup>56</sup>

A “demand” of this sort is not a demand to *someone* for *something* that they can give us. The *demand* is what the proposition expresses; however, it does not express it to anyone. Demand is addressed to the “metaphysical surface” or the transcendental imagination that is *split off* from the ego and acts upon the ego as an a priori *Other*. Our desires are not addressed directly towards other people, but to our “ideal ego” that takes the place of others. The disavowed object becomes “sublimated” and gains a transcendental *objectivity* in the imagination. It is this suspended object that becomes the ideal to which all demand is addressed: “Disavowal and suspense are thus the very essence of the imagination, and determine its specific object: the ideal.”

[CC 128] To put this simply, despite our “intentions” of what we would like to express to another person, the very fact of our speaking is a demand towards an ideal. The meaning of what we are saying (the denotation, signification and manifestation) may be understood as the “intention” of our speech by another, but the “sense” of what *causes* us to talk is the attempt to make the pure event present. For example: in poetic language, one can read the words as intending a specific meaning, but this is not the “sense” of the poem; rather, the sense is *in* what cannot be said in words. In short, the poem attempts to evoke pure “presentations” in the preconscious mind. Now, if we return to the original point of this discussion we can see why disavowal creates “problems” that cannot be resolved by critical reason. We have seen that Freud shares Descartes theory that “doubt” serves to suspend judgment until perceptions can be confirmed. But this form of critical reason is only a temporary posing of questions that immediately receive concrete answers (Descartes and his clear and distinct ideas). There is, however, another form of doubt that is not intended to be closed down by clear and distinct ideas. According to Deleuze neurotics keep questions and problems *open* at the price of their suffering: “Neuropaths and psychopaths perhaps explore this original ultimate ground, at the cost of their suffering, the former asking *how to shift the problem*, the latter *where to pose the question*.” [DR 107] Freud, in the case of the Rat Man, also expresses this need that neurotics have of keeping doubt and questioning open at all costs:

Another mental need... is the need for *uncertainty* in their life, or for *doubt*.  
 [...] The creation of uncertainty is one of the methods employed by the neurosis for drawing the patient away from *reality* and isolating him from the world—which is among the objects of every psychoneurotic disorder.<sup>57</sup>



There is obvious displeasure in doubt, but there is also a pleasure to be gained from this suspension of reality. Suspension of reality is not identical to “fantasy” because fantasy belongs to the series of imaginary objects. According to Deleuze: “The masochist experiences the symbolic order as an intermaternal order...” [CC 63] Or, in other words, the suspension of reality is not “daydreaming” but an esoteric knowledge (one knows and is not conscious of knowing). As such, there is no sense of “lack” in the phantasm of the phallic-mother. The whole point of disavowal was to maintain the *presence* of the phallus despite the apparent lack in reality. With this in mind we are in a better position to understand the “intellectual” pleasures that are to be gained by keeping “problems” and “questions” open. It is clear that Deleuze believes that one is led to think by an “obsessional” path: “There is nothing comical (or sad) in the obsessional paths by which a thinker passes.” [LS 220] But is there not also another dimension to thought than the psychological? Is it not the “obsessional path” that leads to ontological difference? Deleuze seems to think so. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze questions what it means to keep problems and questions “open”:

Being is also non-being, *but non-being is not the being of the negative*; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. [...]  
 ...contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to that question... [DR 64]

As we have seen the “being of the problematic” is maintained by the process of disavowal that forces the question to remain “open” and doubtful. The non-being is the being of the pure event that remains neutral and un-representable in the preconscious psyche because the metaphysical surface “is not at all identical to a consciousness.” [LS 244] To sum up: we are led to philosophical “wonder,” in spite of the displeasure of doubt, by another pleasure of a “suspension” of reality and the affirmation of pure and neutral “events” that are entities of logic and not actual occurrences. The third synthesis of time *is* the pure event that is able to represent everything that can happen without being reducible to anything that has happened.

3.1 The symbolic is Monadological. The object = x determines the connection between series because it is common to two monads.	3.3 The “affect” (object = x) is either “acted out” or represented in language by the production of sense. (The talking cure.)	3.5 Events are logical entities. Negation by reason tries to give direction to events. The pre- logical nature of pure events suspends judgment.
3.2 A repressed “affect” that is displaced from one idea to another is resonance or forced movement.	3.4 “Translation” carried out by the verb completes sublimation and forms the basis of pure events.	3.6 Disavowal forms the ideal ego and is the preconscious imagination that gives meaning to speech and desire.

#### Chapter 4: The Static Genesis of Time

In this last chapter we will shift our attention away from the three syntheses of time towards what Deleuze calls the “static genesis” of time. Deleuze’s discussion of this can be found in chapter two of *Difference and Repetition* and particularly in the section called “Note on the Three Repetitions.” [DR 91] In short, the static repetition concerns the manner in which the psyche reacts to “pure events” that are

presented and forbidden by the superego. The first part of this chapter deals with the manner in which the psyche reacts to the prohibition of these “pure events.” Freud discovers three types of repetition that correspond to three static dimensions of time or the *before*, *during* and *after*. In the second part we turn to Harold Rosenberg’s book *The Tradition of the New* of which Deleuze makes use in his *Difference and Repetition*. Rosenberg discusses the principles of character change, dramatic mimesis and the unintended results of action. Each of these three things will correspond to the three static dimensions of time. In this section we will also briefly cover Deleuze’s objections to cyclic history and his claim that the “eternal return” is not reducible to traditional conceptions of cycles in time. The last section of this chapter will cover the doctrine of the “eternal return.” This part will show the three static dimensions of time at work in Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It will also conclude with a discussion of the eternal return as an ethical and selective doctrine.

#### a) Static Repetition in Freud

1.1 For Deleuze the transition from a dynamic synthesis of time to a static synthesis is determined by the “narcissistic ego.” On one hand, there are the empirical objects that pass in time (one displacing another), but on the side of static synthesis there are no objects that pass in time. Deleuze explains: “When the narcissistic ego takes the place of the virtual and real objects, when it assumes the displacement of the former and the disguise of the latter, it does not replace one content of time with another.” [DR 111] By eliminating all empirical content, the narcissistic ego presents us with what Deleuze calls the “empty form of time.” Postponing the question of the empty form of time for a moment we first must ask:

what causes the ego to become narcissistic? The answer lies in the Freudian concept of “Verarbeitung” or, as it is translated, “working over.” The purpose of working-over is to integrate excitations into the psyche by establishing associative links between them. In essence, its job is to displace cathexis (investment) from one idea to another so that one idea is disguised by another. However, if this strategy for dealing with excitation fails, then the ego employs another: it replaces itself for the lost object or the virtual object. To put it simply, the ego says to itself “I am like the loved object,” it thereby internalizes the loved object and also preserves it from the contingencies of presence and absence. Freud describes the failure of working-over and its replacement by megalomania:

We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are incapable of discharge outwards, or for which such a discharge is for the moment undesirable. In the first instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects. The difference does not appear till later – if the turning of the libido on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal working-over of the libido which has returned to the ego... [11Freud 79]

This is a dense passage; however it can be worked out in several steps: a) distressing affects cause the mind to repress one idea and replace it with another (displacement),

b) because one cannot *act upon* the traumatic idea, one instead discharges the cathexis from that idea to another (disguise), c) real objects are replaced by imaginary objects so that the psyche reacts to them both alike (interiorizing the difference between the two), d) the ego takes the place of both the real and imagined objects, thereby forcing libido to return to the ego itself (narcissism), e) the ego undergoes delusions of grandeur believing itself to be everything (megalomania). In short, because the ego cannot find satisfaction in the virtual object, because it is *always* absent, it takes its place as an *always-present* object. According to Deleuze, this is the “powerful” motivation for narcissism:

The essentially lost character of virtual objects and the essentially disguised character of real objects are powerful motivations of narcissism. However, it is by interiorising the difference between the two lines and by experiencing itself as perpetually displaced in the one, perpetually disguised in the other, that the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passive ego becomes entirely narcissistic. [DR 110]

However this is not the end of the story. The question now becomes: what caused the displacement of the virtual object in the first place? According to Deleuze they come from the narcissistic wound: “The narcissistic ego is inseparable not only from a constitutive wound but from the disguises and displacements which are woven from one side to the other, and constitute its modification.” [DR 110] The “wound” that Deleuze speaks of here is the threat of castration. That is, the direct threat to the narcissistically invested organ. Freud describes this as the *original* disturbance to the child’s primary narcissism:

The disturbances to which a child's original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so... The most significant portion of it, however, can be singled out in the shape of the 'castration complex'... and treated in connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. [11Freud 86]

It is because of this threat, according to Freud, that one *compensates* for the perceived threat (the girls' lack) by producing a fetish object that will *displace* the anxiety. As Freud says: "He created a substitute for the penis which he missed in females – that is to say, a fetish. In so doing, it is true that he had disavowed reality, but he had saved his own penis." [11Freud 463] Ultimately, as we have just seen, the fetish object is replaced by the narcissistic ego. In short, it takes itself as a fetish so that the risk of foreclosure is evacuated. This does not mean that the fetish is overcome. Instead it means that the fetish has become internalized and is no longer projected onto real objects: it is projected onto the "metaphysical surface" as we have seen above.

1.2 When the ego becomes narcissistic the libidinal energy that would have been invested in objects is instead returned to the ego itself. It is this reversal of libido away from objects and towards the ego that Freud calls desexualization: "The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization – a kind of sublimation, therefore." [11Freud 369] Concomitant to this reflux of libido there is also a sublimation, or a conversion of sexual energy into thought-energy. The major

difference between thought-libido and sexual-libido is that the latter binds the destructive nature of libido while the former does not. This “defusion” of the instinct causes thought to take on an aggressive nature in the form of a superego. Freud explains how this superego is formed:

The super-ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father taken as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place, an instinctual defusion occurs at the same time. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructiveness that was combined with it, and this is released in the form of an inclination to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal – its dictatorial ‘Thou shalt’. [11Freud 396]

Therefore, at the same time that the ego becomes narcissistic, the energy that is desexualized becomes the basis of the superego that operates upon the narcissistic ego as an Other. It is the very harshness and cruelty of the superego that forces the ego to “sublimate” or to turn its energy towards creative activities. Freud tells us that the superego “prompts” the ego into sublimation, however; “sublimation remains a special process which may be prompted by the ideal but the execution of which is entirely independent of any such promptings.” [11Freud 89] To put it simply, the superego prompts the ego to creative action: one *only becomes capable of acting “heroically” because of the ideal of the superego*. Again, the narcissistic ego may be *passive* but the thought provoking superego is *active*. This is why Deleuze tells us:

“For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be *thought*. This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissistic ego passively *experiences* on its own account.” [DR 110] As we shall soon see, this modification will be the *a priori* form of the present, i.e. the moment of action. However, for now our question is: what does it mean for a superego to think? This form of “thought” is a special form of unconscious or preconscious thought that is particular to the superego. The superego, according to Freud, is able to revive thoughts of former “egos” of its predecessors. Freud says, “when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection.” [11Freud 378] To put it simply, the superego thinks according to mythical archetypes of quasi-historical past. For example: the “totem meal” would be one of the archetypes that are not reducible to a historical event. Why is this thought? Because when the narcissistic ego is faced with this pure “event” it is forced to react to it in one of three ways: forbidden, presented and predicted. The passive narcissistic ego “repeats” in three different ways depending on its relation to this pure event.

1.3 Deleuze tells us that the “I” is fractured. What does this mean? It is directly related to Freud’s essay “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense.” We have already covered the meaning of this essay in a previous chapter. Now we are ready to define the two halves of the ego. We have already defined the narcissistic ego. Now we ask the question: what is the ideal? The “ideal” (ego ideal *or* ideal ego) is the form of identity that is given to the person. The word “ideal” can be used in the everyday sense of having a model of someone you would like to be like. In imitating the ideal one naturally repeats the actions of the model. There are two ways of having an ideal: one, as a model for action, and two, as an idolization (as in the way some



men idolize a woman). In the first case there is an *identification* with the ideal, and in the second case there is an *idealization* of that model. The first is what one imitates; the second is what one contemplates. In *Coldness and Cruelty* Deleuze associates these two ideals with sadism and masochism:

Either the ego undertakes a mythical operation of *idealization*, in which the mother-image serves as a mirror to reflect and even produce the “ideal ego” as a narcissistic ideal of omnipotence, or else it launches into speculative *identification* and uses the father-image to produce a superego which in turn appoints an “ego-ideal” as an ideal of authority which brings into play forces from outside the subject’s narcissistic ego. [CC 130]

Either way the narcissistic ego tends to approach its ideal, the main function of the idea remains the same to give a coherence to the ego. In itself the narcissistic ego is indeterminate. It is the form of the “I” that is the ideal (or *a priori* Other) that gives determination of that ego. For example: the question “am I a man or a woman?” can be only answered by the “ideal” that is chosen; in itself the narcissistic ego is indeterminate as to this difference. The two manners of relating to the “ideal” above are not mutually exclusive. According to Deleuze they form a structural whole in most psyches:

Of course, the polarity of ego and superego, ideal ego and ego ideal and the types of desexualization corresponding to them may occur together in a structural whole, where they give rise not only to a great variety of forms of

sublimation, but equally to the most serious functional disturbances... [CC  
130]

This means that we can *both* identify with one part of the ideal *and* idealize the other. However, at some time one or the other gains the upper hand depending upon our state of mind. “Action” tends towards identification and “contemplation” tends towards idealization. The first uses the defusion of the death instinct and turns it outwards into a form-giving drive to mastery. The second uses the defused death instinct against the ego itself and reduces it to a state of ideal emptiness. Either way *the defusion of the death instinct is the basis of the “I” or ideal that operates upon the narcissistic ego as an Other.*

1.4 Deleuze asks the question: “What does this mean: the empty form of time or third synthesis?” [DR 88] We too must ask this question. Traditionally time is the “number of movement” [DR 88] and Deleuze plays with the meaning of number. He uses the word “*cardo*” [DR 88] from which is derived *cardinal* and is also the Latin root for a “joint” or “hinge” around which things turn. Hence, according to Deleuze, there are cardinal points through which things in motion pass that make a measurement of time. For example: “ten miles per hour” means that one will pass through ten mile points in that time. This vision of time presupposes that there are “things” that are “passed” in time. Now let us consider what the empty form of time would be. When the ego becomes narcissistic the object of its libido is itself (and the archetypes explored by the superego). As such, these objects *do not pass in time.* Deleuze tells us that the narcissistic ego empties time of all content:

We saw above that the fracture of the I was no more than the pure and empty form of time, separated from its content. The narcissistic ego indeed appears in time, but does not constitute a temporal content: the narcissistic libido, the reflux of the libido into the ego, abstracts from all content. The narcissistic ego is, rather, the phenomenon which corresponds to the empty form of time without filling it... [DR 110]

This is because the unconscious is *timeless* and nothing passes away in it. Therefore the time of the narcissistic ego *cannot be measured by the passing of moments*. Further, our intuition into the *a priori* form of empty time must be given to the narcissistic ego. As Deleuze tells us: “The synthesis is necessarily static, since time is no longer subordinated to movement...” [DR 89] Someone might object that this is *eternity* that Deleuze is describing and not time. However here is an answer to this: there are still “events” in this empty form of time but they do not correspond to events that happen and are then passed by. Instead, the narcissistic ego relates to pure events in a mode of time determined by the “caesura.” We will examine this pure division of time next.

1.5 In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze has high praise for Freud’s book *Totem and Taboo*: “*Totem and Taboo* is the great theory of the event...” [LS 211] The theory of the event that this book refers to is the “event” that marks the division in the *static* division of time into Before, During and After. Deleuze makes this clear in *Difference and Repetition*:

The form of time in the I determines an order, a whole and a series. The formal static order of before, during and after marks the division of the

narcissistic ego in time, or the conditions of its contemplation. The whole of time is gathered in the image of the formidable action as this is simultaneously presented, forbidden and predicted by the superego: the action =  $x$ . The temporal series designates the confrontation of the divided narcissistic ego with the whole of time or the image of action. [DR 110]

In order to make sense of this we must first ask ourselves: what the “formidable action” or “image of action” is and what effect it has on the ego? Freud provides an interesting answer in his book *Totem and Taboo*. In short, he tells us that the “event” that is forbidden is *also* desired:

Since taboos are mainly expressed in prohibitions, the underlying presence of a *positive* current of desire may occur to us as something quite obvious... For, after all, there is no need to prohibit something that no one desires to do, and a thing that is forbidden with the greatest emphasis must be a thing that is desired.<sup>58</sup>

Again we see that the “event” is both desired and feared. This conflict expresses itself in two forms: repression and the return of the repressed. Because it is contradictory the “event” in question remains unconscious. But, according to Freud, we know the effects of this “event” because we see its *effects* in the dreams of normal people:

Suppose...that we were to take into account the findings arrived at by psycho-analysis from dreams of normal people, to the effect that we ourselves

are subject, more strongly and more often than we suspect, to a temptation to kill someone and that temptation produces psychological effects even though it remains out of sight of our consciousness.<sup>59</sup>

This means the *effect* of the pure event is often felt in the lives of normal people and yet we are not consciously aware of it. For example: we may take an instant dislike to someone and immediately have hostile feelings for him for no apparent reason. However, the reason for this reaction can be found in the similarity they bear to some repressed desire. Perhaps that person reminds us of a persecuting father figure encountered only in our dreams. This would be an *effect* of the unconscious event that both presents us with a desire and a prohibition. It is this *effect* that Deleuze calls the “Before” or the act that “is too big for me.” The static genesis of the “Before” is nothing more than our indecisions and self-defeating behavior. This static form of time makes itself felt in what Freud described as “failure neurosis” or “fate neurosis.” Freud describes this neurosis as events that recur in our lifetimes and that appear to be the same:

Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the same outcome: such as a benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time by each of his *protégés*, however much they may otherwise differ from one another, and who thus seems doomed to taste all the bitterness of ingratitude; or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; or the man who time after time in the course of his life raises someone else into a position of great private or public authority and then, after a certain interval, himself upsets that authority and replaces him by a new one; or, again, the lover each

of whose love affairs with a woman passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion. [11Freud 292]

This is the mode of *repetition* that Deleuze describes as the repetition of the static genesis of the “Before.” In this repetition one *unique event* in the unconscious plays itself out in actuality again and again without the person undergoing the repetition knowing its source. Deleuze describes this as a comic repetition because of the twin themes of “misrecognition” and “disguise” (a comedy of errors). Like king Oedipus who questions “Who killed the king?” or Hamlet’s question, “Should I kill the king?”, both of them are struggling with an unconscious event that *they do not feel equal to*. Because of the contradiction between desire and prohibition the pure event *effects* the fate of the person even if there is no consciousness of this event. The unconscious event is played out in action, according to Freud: “Suppose, again, that we were to recognize the compulsive observances of certain neurotics as being guarantees against an intensified impulse to murder or as being self-punishments on account of it.”<sup>60</sup> In short, a repetition compulsion is the result of the “image of action” being “too big for me.” Deleuze makes this the first of the three repetitions in the static genesis of time:

The narcissistic ego repeats once in the form of the before or lack, in the form of the *Id* (this action is too big for me); a second time in the form of an infinite becoming-equal appropriate to the *ego ideal*; a third time in the form of the after which realizes the prediction of the *superego* (the id and the ego, the condition and the agent, will themselves be annihilated)! [DR110-111]

We have examined the first “repetition” of the Before; now let us examine the repetition of *becoming-equal*. Becoming-equal is simply a matter of “identification” with the ego ideal. In *Totem and Taboo* Freud identifies “identification” with the totem meal: “The violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of his strength.”<sup>61</sup> What is clear from this passage is that one only gains the strength to carry out *action* by identifying with the aggressive and prohibiting father. This process is known in psychoanalytic terms as “identification with the aggressor.” Freud briefly talks about this phenomenon in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*:

If the doctor looks down a child’s throat or carries out some small operation on him, we may be quite sure that these frightening experiences will be the subject of the next game; but we must not in that connection overlook the fact that there is a yield of pleasure from another source. As the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the game, he hands on the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute. [11 Freud 286]

In this example we see the *repetition* of the “During,” as Deleuze calls it. The difference between this repetition and the previous repetition of the “Before” is that this new repetition is both active and conscious. The pure event is no longer “repressed,” but rather, *realized* in action. The mechanism of “play” suspends the prohibition by setting up a *dramatic* mimesis that allows the child to express forbidden and painful events in a neutral environment. Notice that people will gladly

accept all sorts of violent and repulsive acts as “entertainment” that they would not accept in reality. This is because *mimesis* allows for the suspension of all “reality” of the situation by placing the action within the frame of “drama.” This is why Deleuze tells us we must become the actor of our own events:

Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one’s own events—a *counter-actualization*. [LS 150]

This is also why Deleuze is so fascinated with sadism and masochism: because they take the unconscious events that are prohibited and *repeat* them in a *dramatic* setting of the masochistic contract or the sadistic suspension of scenes of cruelty. In short, they suspend the prohibition of the superego by placing them in an amoral framework of *mimesis*. This is possible because of the fracture of the “I,” in which, the *identity* of the agent is the *ego ideal* and not the ego itself. The ego takes on the role of the Other, or the identity of the ideal (the father or mother, king Oedipus, Hamlet, etc.). By suspending action in the *repetition of a role* the action takes on a timeless character. For example: Hamlet is a *timeless* character that is manifested each time the play is produced, and yet the action is superficial and ideal insofar as each performance refers to the archetype “Hamlet.” The actor feels no remorse in *playing* the part of a murderer because he is detached (as a person) from the role. However, as we will see next, there is a third repetition of the future that eliminates the previous two.

1.6 In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze makes the remarkable statement: “For the practical law itself signifies nothing other than that empty form of time.” [DR



111] Our task is now to make sense of this. Deleuze conceives of the *repetition* of the future as being one of “annihilation.” This annihilation is carried out by the death instinct but not in the way that Freud thought it did. Our desire is not to *die* because this is contradictory to the death instinct’s purpose as a drive of self-preservation. Instead Deleuze identifies the function of the death instinct and the superego (the moral law) as eliminating introjection or projection. In short, they seek to make us a “body without organs.” Deleuze explains that the purpose of the body without organs is to be complete by eliminating all introjection or projection: “What is opposed is rather an organism without parts, a body without organs, with neither mouth nor anus, having given up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this price.” [LS 188] This is not a completely unfounded proposition. The psychoanalyst André Green makes a similar observation in his book *Life Narcissism Death Narcissism*:

This is the quest of non-desire for the Other, of non-existence, non-being; another way of acceding to immortality. The ego is never more immortal than when it claims that it no longer has any organs or body. Such is the case of the anorexic who refuses to be dependent on his (or her) bodily needs and reduces these appetites by means of a drastic inhibition, letting himself die, as one says so aptly.<sup>62</sup>

Green’s observations about the anorexic are not incidental. They are essential (although exaggerated) aims of the superego: namely, to reduce our desire for objects to zero. In effect, the superego does not seek the *physical* death of the organism but

only the *psychical* death of the desiring subject. André Green explains this *negative* narcissism as a desire to make oneself free from sexual desires:

Instead of sustaining the aim of unifying the ego through the activity of the sexual drives, negative narcissism, under the influence of the Nirvana principle, representing the death drives, tends towards lowering all libido to the level zero, aspiring for psychical death.<sup>63</sup>

In short, if the organism eliminates tension it will not have to seek out objects to satisfy it. It will be wholly independent from sensual needs. It will neither project its sexual desires into others nor feel the need to introject the object of desire (such as food) into itself. In part, Freud recognizes this *effect* of the superego as a *pure culture of the death instinct*: “What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego into death...” [11Freud 394] The repetition of the “future” seeks to eliminate any need of an ego and any impulses from the id. Thus Deleuze can say: “(the id and the ego, the condition and the agent, will themselves be annihilated)!” [DR 110-111] What does this have to do with the practical or moral law? In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant describes one of the *effects* of the moral law as being a desire for moral perfection. This quest for moral perfection – or a desire to free oneself from sensible inclinations so that one can adhere to the demands of the categorical imperative – requires an endless duration that extends even *beyond* our life. In Kant’s own words:

All that can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the consciousness of his tried character, by which, from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however long his existence may last, even beyond this life, and thus he may hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will...<sup>64</sup>

This “endless duration” is the straight line of time according to Deleuze. Commenting on this text by Kant, Deleuze explains how this infinite quest for moral perfection is an “infinite debt” that one owes to the superego:

...from the viewpoint of a progress that continues to infinity in its ever increasing conformity with the law (sanctification as the consciousness of perseverance in moral progress). This path, which exceeds the limits of our life and requires the soul’s immortality, follows the straight line of time, inexorable and incessant, upon which we remain in constant contact with the law. [...] When time is out of joint, we have to renounce the ancient cycle of faults and expiations in order to follow the infinite route of slow death, the deferred judgment, or the infinite debt.<sup>65</sup>

As we will see, the cycles of time in traditional cultures acted as a payment for “sins,” in which, a sacrifice could be made and the gods would be appeased and grant

reprieve. But with the vision of an infinite straight line of time there is only the *ideal* of total death of the ego, that end of the line that never arrives. As such, it is the pure “event” of the future. The repetitions of self-denial and continued adherence to rational “law” have the pure event of death as its goal. Notice, that this is not physical death as Freud believed, but an “impersonal death” that never happens to anyone. Deleuze distinguishes between two types of “events” called death in *Difference and Repetition*:

One is personal, concerned with I or the ego, something which I can confront in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which causes everything to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, with no relation to ‘me’, neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question... [DR 112]

I can think of my physical death as a disappearance of my animated body from the world. I can have anxiety about it, or I can think of a world in which others will see me dead. But what is *not* thinkable is the *radical* absence of the *psychical* desires and impulses that make up the ego. This radical impossibility led Kant to postulate an infinite progress beyond life in which this “impersonal” death of non-desire can forever be postponed. Like the “false” ending of *The Trial* by Kafka, that Deleuze and Guattari protest, does not do justice to “indefinite postponement” because it tries to make impersonal death coincide with personal death.<sup>66</sup> We must imagine Joseph K. as continuing the trial even after his death. The infinite straight line of time *demand*s that there be an “ideal” event of death that motivates the repetition of death in the unconscious. This “death” that is *repeated* in life is recognized by Freud as

forming the basis of the reality principle. He explains that the *repetition* of our renunciation of pleasure in the present is centered around a mythical future event:

A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time. But the endopsychic impression made by this substitution has been so powerful that it is reflected in a special religious myth. The doctrine of reward in the after-life for the – voluntary or enforced – renunciation of earthly pleasures is nothing other than a mythical projection of this revolution in the mind. [11 Freud 41]

What is heaven if not the extinction of all desire and the concomitant sense of completeness that comes with it? *Psychical death* is the impersonal death as a pure event that inspires the *repetition* of renunciation in the present. More astonishingly, it is “the source of problems and questions” [DR 112] because the reality principle allows us to postpone the immediate satisfaction of immediate solutions and *allows us to keep questions and problems open*. If there were no ideal death (heaven), then we would not think! Myth and religion are also forms of *repetition* the “repetition of faith.” Deleuze is quite humorous about this in *Difference and Repetition*. There he will allow “faith” only on the condition that it does not limit the *infinite* straight line of time by placing a *redeeming* end to time that would give all of existence a “meaning.” Instead, he proposes the eternal return as “the truth of faith” [DR 95] because it maintains the idea of indefinite postponement *without* setting limits on the line of time. He tells us that the idea of “grace” still motivates the atheist *and* the believer who still has the atheist’s pessimism about the possibility of grace ever arriving:

We have too often been invited to judge the atheist from the viewpoint of the belief or faith that we suppose still drives him – in short, from the viewpoint of grace; not to be tempted by the inverse operation – to judge the believer by the violent atheist by which he is inhabited, the Antichrist eternally given ‘once and for all’ within grace. [DR 96]

If we are to call the *repetition* of the future a “faith in the future” it must be on account of the pure *event* of “grace” (non-desire) that will never arrive in the “present.” Instead, this pure event of the future inspires the *repetition* of our questioning, that is, of leaving questions *eternally* open. (Not even in our physical death will the question be closed.)

1.1 The ego becomes narcissistic when it takes itself for a fetish that compensates for castration anxieties.	1.3 The “ideal” comes from the defusion of the instincts. Two forms: identification (sadism) or idealization (masochism).	1.5 The repetition of the “before” (failure neurosis) in an image of prohibited action. The repetition of the “during” (sadism) in identification with the aggressor.
1.2 When the ego becomes narcissistic the desexualized libido defuses and becomes the superego. This motivates sublimation and thought.	1.4 Two types of time: empirical time in which events pass and unconscious time in which events are static.	1.6 The body without organs is non-desire not death. This requires an infinite time to achieve the moral law. This is the third repetition of self-annihilation.

## b) Static Repetition in Rosenberg and Cyclic History

2.1 We must keep in mind that in the “static” genesis of time the “before” is *not the past*. The “before” is defined by the ego’s relation to the *event* and not its place in time. In short, if one has *not yet* acted, then – even though we always empirically live in the present – we are living *in the a priori* past. Deleuze makes this clear:

In effect, there is always a time at which the imagined act is supposed ‘too big for me’. This defines *a priori* the past or the before. It matters little whether or not the event itself occurs, or whether the act has been performed or not: past, present and future are not distributed according to this empirical criterion. Oedipus has already carried out the act, Hamlet has not yet done so, but in either case the first part of the symbol is lived in the past, they are in the past and live themselves as such so long as they experience the image of the act as too big for them. [DR 89]

He uses the examples of Hamlet and Oedipus in an astute way: Hamlet has not yet had the nerve to kill the king in the first part of the play so he is living in the “before” moment, *and* even though Oedipus *had* already killed his father, he *had not yet* realized it. So the distinguishing factor of the “before” is not just accomplishing the action; it is also being equal to it or being able to realize it. In order to understand *why* Hamlet was not able to act we must turn to the book by Harold Rosenberg *The Tradition of the New* just as Deleuze did. In the chapter “Character change and the drama” Harold Rosenberg considers the process by which a “character” changes his “identity” in a drama, not by a slow progress towards enlightenment, but all at once.

To investigate how this happens Rosenberg turns to the example of the law and how it recognizes individuals:

The law is not a recognizer of persons; its judgments are applied at the end of a series of acts. With regard to individuals the law thus creates a fiction, that of a person who is identified by the coherence of his acts with a fact in which they have terminated (the crime or the contract) and by nothing else. [TN 136]

An “individual” is not a “person” but rather, the individual is a drama or series of actions that leads to a *judgment of character*. In short, the law converts persons into “symbols” that represent the *whole* of their lifetime and the coherence of the actions within that life. Rosenberg tells us that the difference between the person and the individual is the difference between action and being:

So that dealing with identities rather than with personalities, the law is enabled to do so only by willfully converting persons with histories into emblems of unified actions of a given order. In other words, the law, like its victims, suffers from the discrepancy between being and action, the failure of the individual to conform in every respect to his role. [TN 138]

The “person” is a concrete thing full of contradictory impulses that is not at all unified. The “individual” is an abstraction that has an *ideal* “unity” before the judgment of the law. These two aspects of person and individual *are the same as the fracture in the “I.”* On the one side is the ego with its contradictory impulses; on the



other side is the ego-ideal with its idealized image of unity. Now, if we consider how a character in a drama can undergo identity change, it is clear that the “person” does not change but only the “ego-ideal” or the means by which judgment identifies the character. Rosenberg gives the example of a criminal who is suddenly found innocent:

To begin with the legal instance: the fact of the crime organized... the acts of the criminal and interpreted them. For the law he lived by that fact alone. Were it suddenly discovered that no crime had been committed, the coherence of his actions would collapse and the prisoner, having been converted in an instant into the hypothetical and undefined figure of an innocent man, would no longer exist under the eye of the court. [TN 143]

The criminal is now *divided into before and after*. The change is a “caesura” or sudden reversal that divides time by changing the identity of the character *in one blow*. We have seen how identities change according to a *static order of time*; now let us apply this to the character of Hamlet. The play “Hamlet” is divided into two distinct sections: before the sea voyage (a Hamlet in self doubt) and after the sea voyage (a Hamlet who is capable of acting). What happens to make him capable of action? The Hamlet of the “before” is self-doubting because he lacks an identity structure: he is not equal to the “event” that he is called upon to accomplish. Rosenberg argues that Hamlet does not think because he is an intellectual, rather he thinks too much because he lacks an identity:

The argumentative, self-analytical Hamlet of “non-action,” describing himself in every speech, and using speech as a substitute for deed, is very much the figure of a personality, of a being insufficient for, *because irrelevant to*, the dramatic role offered to him. Hamlet has all the qualities required for action; what he lacks is the identity structure which would fit him to be a character in a drama, a one-ness with his role originating in and responding to the laws of his dramatic world. [TN 146-147]

Hamlet, in short, is incapable of saying “I am...” or he is not able to see himself as having an identity. His persistent question is “am I?” or “to be or not to be?” Because he does not know his “role” in the order of things he questions why he was born. This is a typical neurotic reaction: “who am I?” All the person who is not defined by an identity structure knows is that he is filled with conflicting impulses such as “I desire this and yet I fear it.” Moral clarity only comes to Hamlet when he forsakes the conflicting impulses of his personality and fully gives himself over to his role. Hamlet’s hesitation can be described as a *repetition* because he replays the act over and over in his speech because he cannot repeat it in action. Deleuze describes this kind of repetition as the repetition of the “Before”:

At a first level, the repetition of the Before is defined by default or in a negative manner: *one* repeats because one does not know, because one does not remember, etc: or because one is not capable of performing the action (whether this action remains to be performed or is already performed). [DR 295]

But where is this repetition coming from? It is not Hamlet's will that repeats because his repetition is involuntary or *obsessive*. According to Deleuze it is the Id that repeats: "'One' therefore signifies here the unconscious of the Id as the first power of repetition." [DR 295] This *obsession* of the Id causes the whole scene of the play to become "haunted" with the image of action to be accomplished. The theme of death and murder keep appearing *because Hamlet is unable to make the "event" conscious*. As Deleuze tells us: "this unknown knowledge must be represented as bathing the whole scene, impregnating all the elements of the play... at the same time the hero cannot represent it to *himself* – on the contrary, he must enact it, play it and repeat it until the acute moment that Aristotle called 'recognition'." [DR 15] The whole play is full of disguises and false starts. For example, the murder of Polonius is mistaken for the murder of the king. This is described as a "comic" repetition by Deleuze because repetition *with a lack of knowledge* can only result in mistaken identity: "At another level, the hero repeats the first, that of the Before, as though in a dream and in a bare, mechanical and stereotypical manner which constitutes the comic..." [DR 296] When he murders the wrong person Hamlet is in a "dream" state, totally unaware of what he is doing: he is under the influence of a repetition compulsion (or a fate neurosis). His identity is too weak to overcome the repetition compulsions from the Id. Therefore he is not yet equal to the event.

2.2 To become equal to the event means to engage in a dramatic mimesis. As we saw above, Hamlet is unequal to the act *because* he lacks an identity. In order to become equal to the action he must succumb to a sudden change of identity. Deleuze calls this sudden change of identity that takes place in the present of "metamorphosis" the caesura:

The second time, which relates to the caesura itself, is thus the present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act (this is marked by Hamlet's sea voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus's enquiry: the hero becomes 'capable' of the act). [DR 89]

In the play Hamlet becomes equal to the event by facing death at sea. It is realizing his own mortality that makes him aware of himself as an identity. Deleuze uses this quote from Henry Miller: "I realized that I was free, that the death I had gone through had liberated me." [DR 19] This "caesura" also has its roots in religious rituals. Rosenberg talks about religious rituals like "baptism and eucharist" [TN 144] that involve a symbolic death and rebirth with a different identity. These rituals are rather mundane today but their original meaning of death and sacrifice were very real. Rosenberg also finds these themes operating in character change in drama:

To present identity-replacement in a credible manner the dramatist must imitate the experience of religion and subject his character to the ordeal of death. [...] In a word, dramatic death and regeneration need not be involved in faith; there is the death-laden incident; then occurs a transfer of identities within the single figure, a change of faces behind the mask. [TN 145]

In the play, Hamlet is invested with "this 'dangerous' new ability to act" [TN 148] that is signified by his words: "Yet have I in me something dangerous, which let thy wisdom fear." [Act 5, scene 1] In short, Hamlet is no longer acting according to his *own* desires; instead he has exchanged his will for a dramatic role. Next we will

investigate this “something dangerous” that Hamlet spoke of. To understand “becoming capable of action” in Deleuze’s sense of the term it is necessary to turn to the chapter in Harold Rosenberg’s Book entitled “The Resurrected Romans.” In this chapter he examines the nature of the French Revolution, particularly the manner in which the bourgeoisie used the myths of the Roman Revolution to carry out their own revolution. The question that Rosenberg’s theory answers: why do revolutions break out when they do? Often the social conditions for revolution are there long before the moment of its outbreak. What are the essential conditions that make people *capable* of heroic actions? Rosenberg’s answer is that, whether they know it or not, the historical actors are replaying themes of history. Rosenberg says of the actors in the French revolution:

They imagined they were performing the part set down for them by events of their own lives—their action became a spontaneous repetition of an old rôle. They imagined they were playing themselves—they were but mimicking the engraving of a hero on one of history’s old playbills. [TN 155]

This is the repetition of the “During” according to Deleuze:

The repetition of the During is defined by a becoming-similar or a becoming-equal: *one* becomes capable of performing the action, one becomes equal to the image of the action, the ‘one’ now signifying the unconscious of the Ego, its metamorphosis, its projection in an I or ego ideal in the form of the second power of repetition. [DR 295]

For the bourgeois in the French revolution the “ego ideal” that they preconsciously were identifying with was the “heroic” ideal of the Romans. They saw the Romans as embodying strength and courage in a timeless fashion. Neither Rosenberg nor Deleuze is suggesting that the bourgeois were consciously planning to imitate the Romans; rather the imitation was “spontaneous” and not planned. Deleuze even says that, “*Repetition is a condition for action before it is a concept of reflection.*” [DR 90] This means that historians may *afterwards* draw comparisons with the French and the Romans, *but at the time* of the revolution there was *no intended imitation*. The Roman revolution was an unconscious archetype for those who imitated it. It provided an image of action that would give *meaning to their actions in the present*. However there is a problem with this: it appears as if “identification” with the past is Platonic in inspiration. Mimesis is the means by which “identity” is imposed on historical actions. Rosenberg’s theory is similar to Platonic reminiscence in this respect. Deleuze makes the following criticism of the nature of this identification with the *originary identity*:

However, since to become similar or equal is always to become similar or equal to something that is supposed to be identical in itself, or is supposed to enjoy the privilege of an originary identity, it appears that the image of the action to which one becomes similar or equal stands here only for the identity of the concept in general, or of the I. [DR 295-296]

Rosenberg is not adverse to this interpretation of mimesis as imposing identity upon persons and actions. In fact, what makes action possible is the certainty and curtailment of ambiguity that the imposition of identity provides the historical actors.

According to Rosenberg the “hero” is dead even before he mounts the historical stage. His actions appear as *already accomplished* in the eternal ideal:

That the hero is “dead” means that he moves entirely in the completed, that the contingencies of his existence were ended before he mounted the stage. Hence he is totally defined and at one with his deed—unlike the living with their vacillations of desire and their dilemmas. Men recognize in him not themselves but the embodiment of a part which they shall have to play as if they were wholly given to it. [TN 157]

The whole point of mimesis is to stop “becoming” and to freeze action in an eternal instant that becomes the *symbol for the whole of time*. Deleuze uses these words (equal to the whole of time) to signify that the historical actor is not just repeating something in his own personal memory, but rather something that he *never personally lived through*. The actor is in touch with a “cosmic” memory that purports to gather all of time together in a single heroic act. When he does this he is forsaking his own will for a historical will, or what he believes to be a destiny. This is why Deleuze says that the repetition of the “during” is a repetition of the whole of history in a single act:

This second repetition of the During is one in which the hero himself embraces disguise and assumes the metamorphosis which re-places him on a tragic plane, with his own identity, the inner depths of his memory and that of the whole world, in order that, having become capable of action, he purports to be equal to the whole of time. [DR 296]

This means that when the historical actor is actually undergoing the action he is not aware of anything actually happening. He is aware of the eternal drama that he is participating in only in an abstract manner. We must consider this state as the kind of state the Mircea Eliade described as a reenactment of mythical archetypes:

For traditional man, the imitation of an archetypical model is a reactualization of the mythical moment when the archetype was revealed for the first time. Consequently, these ceremonies too... suspend the flow of profane time, of duration, and project the celebrant into a mythical time, *in illo tempore*.<sup>67</sup>

If we consider the historical actor caught up in the enthusiasm of mimesis as a celebrant in a ritual, we can then easily understand Deleuze's insistence that this "event" is a symbol of the whole of time. Even Rosenberg recognized that the revolutionaries appealed to an "absolute" in order to throw themselves outside of time:

Action required the absolute ("ideals and art forms") and passion, and these came from the past. To make their revolution the bourgeoisie had to throw themselves out of their actual historical situation. This they did through spontaneous repetition that caused two segments of time to coalesce and the present to vanish in the eternal. [TN 165-166]



Indeed this mimesis is a “repetition,” but it is a repetition of a model. Because of this, it cannot for Deleuze be the ultimate form of repetition. Next we will see how this repetition of the “identical” has an unexpected result.

2.3 In the third “repetition of the future” Deleuze tells us that the self and its identity are swept away by a resurgence of multiplicity. In the tragic or heroic mimesis the ego found an image of itself (its equal) but in the course of undergoing metamorphosis the ego loses the very identity that it sought. Deleuze explains:

As for the third time in which the future appears, this signifies that the act possesses a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself. In this manner, the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series corresponding and finds a common descent in the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the ‘plebeian’ guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image. [DR 89-90]

What is significant in this passage is that Deleuze tells us that it is as if the ego, that is “the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth.” In short, it is as if the hero who went through tragic metamorphosis is confronted with a result that is *not identical* to the one that he intended. The whole point of mimesis is to “reverse” the order of time so that an

“original” state of things can be brought about. This is true of traditional cultures that perform rituals to “renew time” and to bring about the return to a perfect beginning. They have a cyclical conception of time and see the ritual as the means to bring about a reversal of misfortune. However, the “tragic” metamorphosis is now confronted with a “straight line of time” in which nothing can be reversed. Harold Rosenberg recognizes that something has changed from the ancient Greek notion of “static” dialectics and that, from the attempt to “reverse” time, springs an entirely new *event*:

Operating through the tragic mechanics of mistake and recognition, the historical drama of “the resurrected Romans” does not break down into a Reversal but results in the creation of “something entirely new,” bourgeois society. Into the static dialectics of Greek tragedy has entered the principle of evolution with its “leap” of the emergent event. [TN 160]

Along with the caesura between the non-action of the first repetition and the mimesis of the second repetition, we must recognize the existence of that which is repeated: the absolutely “new” emergent event. Deleuze tells us that the “new” is the product of all repetition:

We produce something new only on condition that we repeat – once in the mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis. Moreover, what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition: the third repetition, this time by excess, the repetition of the future as eternal return. [DR 90]

The third repetition is the excessive or the unintended result of repetition. In this case it is no longer the “subject” or the ego that repeats; rather, it is now time *itself* that repeats. Rosenberg argues that there is no *true* repetition in time itself, that repetition only appears in the imagination of the hero that thinks he is repeating a past event:

Through the effect of time, represented in action by the continuity of class struggle, upon the historical plot, the hero’s repetition of the past becomes a repetition in appearance only; the permanent operation of change permits no true repetition, as it permits no Reversal. [TN 160-161]

However, Deleuze’s sense of the term “repetition” necessarily *includes* difference. For Deleuze the so-called repetition of an archetype in platonic mimesis is only repetition in appearance only because “identity” does not allow for repetition. For example: if something is *exactly identical* how can we say that it can reoccur a second time? Archetypes take place “once and for all” or one time only, and all apparent repetition is false because something “identical” can never leave itself to be repeated. Another example: if everyday we awoke and all the events of the previous day and the day before were repeated identically, how would we know that we were experiencing it a second or third time? We would have no basis to say that there was a “second” time because there is no difference that would allow us to make that judgment. Therefore repetition *necessarily* implies difference. This is why the mimesis *only exists in the mind of the actor*. The historical actor *intends* the identical object, but *enacts* the repetition of difference. This is *necessary* because of the nature of time. According to Rosenberg:

While the heroes keep repeating the past as if they were acting out an eternal plot, time has entered into their drama in the form of a continual modification of the situation. And this subterranean change in the historical situation... determines what the outcome of the action and its meaning shall be. [TN 160]

This means that the intention of the historical actor does not determine the form or meaning of the resulting action. It is this irruption of multiplicity of becoming, which is inherent in time *itself*, which shatters the image of the action that the ego identified itself with. Deleuze notices this same phenomenon in *The Logic of Sense* in the series “Good Intentions are Inevitably Punished.” It is here that he describes the Oedipus impulse or complex as a well-intentioned action that has unexpected results. It is in this series that Deleuze marks the split between the becoming of the depth and the “intention” as being a surface projection: “It is in this sense that Oedipus can be understood as the tragedy of Semblance... Far from being an agency of the depths, intention is the phenomenon of the entire surface, or the phenomenon which adequately corresponds to the coordination of the physical surfaces.” [LS 207] So, action takes place on two screens: one on the surface where the ego of the depths identifies with an “ideal” action that will unify its fragmentary existence *and* the becoming of actions that have unexpected results in the depths. From this we must conclude that the “third” repetition of static genesis must destroy the surface of “good” intentions. Deleuze has told us that this third repetition implies “the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I,” [DR 90] and the surface of the ego-ideal must give way to the force of the unintended result. What replaces the denial of reality in the ego-ideal is the pure event in its final form: “the result of actions and passions, the surface effect or the event.” [LS 213] Between the

second and third static genesis of time there is always a tension between the intention and the result. The result opens up the world without subjects, where actions appear to produce themselves *despite our intentions*. Deleuze describes this as, “the movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned.” [LS 213] Mimesis is proved to be ineffective in the straight line of time because the irreversible nature of time always intrudes upon the intentionality of the ego. The ego is confronted by its actions as if they were alienated labors: all products of the will take on a life of their own. It is when we are confronted with the uncanny nature of the product that we tend to see them as “signs” or symptoms instead of products of the will. It is at that moment that time *itself* usurps the role of creator of the new: no longer is it the “artist” that is expressed but only the independence of artwork itself.

2.4 Deleuze criticizes the notions of temporal repetition that are found in cyclic theories of history. The first of the cyclic repetitions that he critiques in *Difference and Repetition* is the intracyclic: “An intracyclic repetition, which involves the manner in which the first two ages repeat one another – or rather, repeat one and the same ‘thing’, act or event yet to come.” [DR 93] This form of cycle implies that in each of the series of repetitions there is some “thing” that is repeated. This form of cycle is based upon a series of correspondences between an event in one cycle and another event in another cycle. The theory of “past lives” belongs to this type of cycle. Karmic debt is a belief that a “sin” in a past life is repaid in another life by a punishment or a repetition of the event where one is the victim rather than the one who commits the act. This notion of repetition presupposes a universe in which everything is “just,” meaning that debts are partial and can be repaid by a repetition

of the same. This form of traditional repetition gives meaning to suffering and thereby transforms the meaning of history. According to Mircea Eliade:

The sufferings of one's present life are not only deserved—since they are in fact the fatal effect of crimes and faults committed in previous lives—they are also welcome, for it is only in this way that it is possible to absorb and liquidate part of the karmic debt that burdens the individual and determines the cycle of his future existences.<sup>68</sup>

In this vision of cyclic history, pain is meaningful because everything is equal; in this way nothing is pointless in existence, and guilt is unnecessary. However, all of this is based upon analogy. The “payment” of debt is never a personal repayment to the person wronged, but only an abstract form of payment to an abstract metaphysical system. In conclusion, the cycle of debt and the cycle of payment remain external to one another. Only the “idea” of payment establishes a resemblance between the first time (of contracting the debt) and the second time. Furthermore this “first time” remains hypothetical since it is based upon the idea that for every pain there is a debt: in short, every pain is a motivation to find a repetition. This is not, in fact, a repetition at all but a projection of the pain in the present cycle into an imagined debt in a previous cycle. The resemblance, therefore, remains ideal and abstract. There is no memory of the previous cycle. The idea of punishment and debt is repeated *because there is no knowledge* or no consciousness of fault in a previous cycle. This form of cycle corresponds to the first repetition that Deleuze spoke of: the repetition of the *before*. The image of debts haunts the believer in karma because there is *no recollection* of the previous cycle.

2.5 The second type of cycle that Deleuze examines is the cycle of history discovered by Vico: “A cyclic repetition in which it is supposed that, at the end of the third age and at the end of a process of dissolution, everything recommences with the first age: here, the analogies are drawn between two cycles (Vico).” [DR 93] Vico’s conception of history is based upon a detailed analysis of the ascents of civilizations and their downfalls. In this case there is a *historical record* of the previous cycles. According to Vico there are three ages: the age of gods, the age of heroes and the age of men. Ultimately, after the last age the civilization would destroy itself (or be destroyed) and the cycle would start again. The trouble with Vico’s theory, from Deleuze’s standpoint, is that in the search to supply order to history Vico neglects the differences between civilizations. Therefore, all of his “cycles” are based upon analogies drawn *only in the mind of Vico* about the course of history. It is easy to set up a structure and to make history conform to it; it is another thing altogether to say that history *itself* follows a pattern or a law. According to Deleuze the repetitions that historians notice are those repetitions that do not actually belong to history itself:

The first time being regarded as the Same, the question is asked whether the second displays sufficient resemblance with the first to be identified as the Same again: a question which can be answered only by the establishment of relations of analogy within judgment, taking into account the variations in empirical circumstances (is Luther the analogue of Paul, the French Revolution the analogue of the Roman republic?). [DR 294-295]

Who decides if one event is sufficiently “similar” to another event to determine if there is an *actual* repetition? There is a clear difference between the historical actor’s

conception of his own actions and the historian's conception. The historical actor is unaware of the repetition as being identical; it is only the historian that places the judgment of identity upon it. What the historical actor is aware of is the "heroic" symbols and archetypes that haunt his imagination. It is not history that repeats. It is the judgment of historians that draw resemblances between historical events. There is a difference between mimesis and historical resemblance. In mimesis the "once and for all" nature of the heroic *symbol* is not reducible to some event that happened in the past; rather, it is a *timeless* image that haunts the scene of action. The historian, however, looks at two separate actual occurrences and draws analogies. This is why Deleuze says: "The question whether the first time escapes repetition (in which case it is referred to as 'once and for all'), or, on the contrary, is repeated within a cycle or from one cycle to another, depends entirely upon the reflection of an observer." [DR 294] If the observer is *within* the action, then it will appear differently than if it is observed from the historian's armchair. To conclude, the cyclic repetition of Vico corresponds to the "tragic" repetition of the "during." It differs from it insofar as reflection differs from action. History is never written from the point of view of those undergoing the action; rather, history is an afterthought.

2.6 Nietzsche's conception of the *eternal return* cannot be reduced to either of the above cyclic conceptions of history. First, the karmic conception of cycles presupposes that when all karmic debt is paid, then history will come to an end and vanish into a state of "Nirvana" or nothingness. This means that a final state of equilibrium would be achieved. Nietzsche expressly denied this possibility:

That a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible. But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached. Likewise in a



spherical space. The *shape* of space must be the cause of eternal movement, and ultimately of all “imperfection.” [WP #1064]

The karmic notion of the repayment of debts is a notion that presupposes a process whereby *the world is made perfect or balanced*. Then when the reactionary conception of “justice” is placed within a cyclic history it seeks to *bring an end* to suffering at some future point of equilibrium. Nietzsche’s conception of the *eternal return* excludes the possibility of moral progress or a “moral” purpose. In fact Nietzsche tells us that, in order to endure the thought of the eternal return, we need “freedom from morality” [WP #1060] and an “abolition of the ‘will’” [WP #1060] so that all notions of personal fault and expiation must be eliminated. As for Vico’s conception of history, it presupposes the eternal recurrence of the “same” or “similar” occurrences within time. Vico is attempting to impose a “law of nature” upon the becoming of history. He is imposing the character of “being” on becoming. Moreover, he is proposing to evaluate two different occurrences in history and impose an “equivalence” upon them. In the following passage Nietzsche shows how his idea of the *eternal return* is opposed to this type of thinking:

To impose upon becoming the character of being—that is the supreme will to power. Twofold falsification, on the part of the senses and of the spirit, to preserve a world of that which is, which abides, which is equivalent, etc. That *everything recurs* is the closest *approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being*:--high point of the mediation. From the values attributed to being proceed the condemnation of and discontent with becoming, after such

a world of being had first been invented. The metamorphosis of what has being (body, God, ideas, laws of nature, formulas, etc.) [WP #617]

Vico's conception of cyclical history has the character of placing "being" or identity upon becoming. First of all, it is a formula of analogy between cycles. Second, it is postulated as a law of nature, and third, it stabilizes the nature of things by postulating an identity of that which returns. Nietzsche's vision of *eternal return*, on the other hand, is the closest approximation that we have to this world of becoming. Why? First of all the *eternal return* is not a historical proposition: Nietzsche never tries to prove his hypothesis by appealing to "similar" recurrences in the history of mankind. His is a cosmological theory about the tendency of energies to re-form themselves in a series of combinations: "The law of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence*." [WP #1063] Since it is based upon "conservation of energy" his theory wholly concerns the *ability* of that energy to re-create "combinations" [WP #1066] that will recur again and again. Therefore it is not based upon "similarities" between occurrences in the mind of any historian. Nor is it theories of "equilibrium" in which differences cancel each other out (karma). He specifically calls it "the great dice game of existence" [WP #1066] in order to illustrate its difference from the classical notions of cyclic history. Deleuze specifically tells us that these two cyclic hypotheses of recurrence do not return in the *eternal return*:

This superior repetition, understood as an eternal return *in* the third state, is precisely what is needed both to correct the intracyclic hypothesis and to contradict the cyclical hypothesis. In effect, on the one hand, the repetition in

the first two moments no longer expresses analogies of reflection, but the conditions under which eternal return is effectively produced by means of some action or other; on the other hand, these first two moments do not return, being on the contrary eliminated by the reproduction of the eternal return in the third. [DR 93]

To make this clear we must distinguish the two different levels that the divergent conceptions of eternal return and cyclic history are on. Cyclic history presupposes two things: analogy in judgment (the recognition of identical occurrences) and the concept of a personal “will” (the notion that ill will is balanced by punishment in another cycle). On the other hand, the *eternal return*, as Deleuze conceives of it, does not include the return of “judgment” or the “will.” For Deleuze, the eternal return is an “energetic” hypothesis about the return of “differences” or the pre-individual conditions for perceptions. If I may use an example drawn from Leibniz: the sound of a wave is made up of many little sounds of each drop of water. Now, according to Deleuze’s hypothesis, what returns in the eternal return is the sound of each little drop of water and *not the sound of the wave itself*. In us, what returns is all the little contradictory impulses in the organism and not the “will” of the person. What returns in the mind is all the contradictory “presentations” in the preconscious and not the negation of “judgment.” In short, what returns is the “molecular” and imperceptible differences that make up our world and not the “molar” or recognizable forms of things. This is what “returns.” The eternal return is a series of islands of order in a sea of chaos: the combinations return, not the thing.

2.1 The difference between the “before” and the “during”: having an identity rather than a personality.	2.3 Mimesis only exists in the mind of the actor. His actions take on an unintended meaning. This is the autonomy of the result.	2.5 The cycle of Vico is based upon the analogies of judgment. This is based upon the mimesis of the “during.”
2.2 The “during” is dramatic mimesis in which the actor plays an “eternal” role.	2.4 The cycle of finite debt is based upon the idea of justice. It remains an abstract repetition of the “before.”	2.6 The eternal return opposes both a final state of justice and the identities of analogy. Only the petite perceptions return.

### c) Static Repetition and The Eternal Return

3.1 Deleuze also finds examples of these three static repetitions of time in Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The static genesis of the before, during and after can be seen in Zarathustra’s reaction to the doctrine of the eternal return of the same. Let us start by considering the first reaction. Deleuze tells us that Zarathustra’s first reaction to the news of the eternal return is one of disgust and loathing and that this constitutes the static “repetition” of the *before*:

The largest part of the book is taken up with the before, in the mode of a defect of the past: this act is too big for me (compare the idea of ‘criminal blame’, or the whole comic story of the death of God, or Zarathustra’s fear before the revelation of the eternal return – ‘your fruits are ripe but you are not ripe for your fruits’). [DR 92]

This is the reaction of someone who is not ready to hear the news. Such was the case in the story of the madman who announced the death of God. Nietzsche says that the

news has come too early even though the event of the death of God has already happened:

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment... I have come too early... my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men.<sup>69</sup>

The news of a terrifying event that implies a *complete* nihilism (or the destruction of all meaning) is either greeted with laughter or anger. The “eternal return” deserves the title of tremendous “event” because it is always shocking to those who first consider it *seriously*. Because Zarathustra takes the news seriously he has problems coming to grips with the news. At first he misconceives of the eternal return as a return of the “same” things. This is his “most abysmal thought”: the idea that all the things that annoy him, all the petty and stupid frustrations of existence will come again. Deleuze explains this first conception of the eternal return as being one of the “same” or the “similar”:

As he explains later in interpreting his nightmare: he fears that eternal return means the return of Everything, of the Same and the Similar, including the dwarf and including the smallest of men... He particularly fears that repetition will only be negative and will occur only by default: that one repeats only because one is deaf, lame and a dwarf, perched on the shoulders of others; or because one is incapable of an act (the death of God), even though the act has already occurred. [DR 298]

In short, Zarathustra conceives of the eternal return in “moral” terms. All the bad things that happened in his life will happen again and again for an infinite number of times. Who could affirm this? Even if one wanted to affirm this, one’s biological principle that seeks only pleasure would revolt against this. One could only half-heartily affirm such a “return.” This is Zarathustra’s reaction: “‘Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man’—thus yawned my sadness and dragged its feet and could not go to sleep.” [Z 219] He is haunted by the possibility of the “small man” and the petty annoyances of life returning (he could not go to sleep). It weighs upon him like a nightmare: repeating “the small man will return... the small man will return...” and he makes himself sick by his inability to accept this. Deleuze notices that when Zarathustra is confronted with the problem of the eternal return again, he denies that it is a circle:

That is why Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies to the dwarf: ‘Spirit of Gravity, do not simplify matters too much!’. By contrast he holds that time is a straight line in two opposing directions. [DR 298]

This is a surprising fact that few people have noticed. Zarathustra actually describes time as two paths that go off in two different directions and only meet at the present. In “On the Vision and the Riddle” Zarathustra speaks of two *different* eternities of the past and the future (as a straight line of time) and *not* a circle of time:

Behold the gateway, dwarf! [...] It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. [Z 157]

It is at this point that the dwarf interjects “all that is straight lies... All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle.” [Z 158] It is at this point that Zarathustra gets *angry* with the dwarf and accuses him of making things too simple. Why does Zarathustra get angry at the statement that time is a circle? Is it because he fears the return of the “same thing?” No. Because he goes on to say that “whatever *can* walk—in this long lane out *there* too, it *must* walk once more.” [Z 158] It is because he is beginning to understand the eternal return as the return of the “path” and not the return of the dwarf who “cannot” walk because he is lame. Therefore the path returns, but only that which *can* walk (that is, affirm the return) will return.

3.2 Deleuze defines the moment when Zarathustra becomes *capable*: “Then comes the moment of the caesura or the metamorphosis, ‘The Sign’, when Zarathustra becomes *capable*.” [DR 92] At the end of the book Zarathustra looks up at a star (an ego ideal) and realizes that this ideal is for him alone and that others are sleeping (they do not realize the ideal): “You great star... you deep eye of happiness, what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine? And if they stayed in their chambers even after you had awakened and come and given and distributed, how angry would you be!” [Z 324-235] He sees this as a “sign” that he can follow in order to “go to his work.” This means that all of Zarathustra’s previous hesitations are at an end. He ascends the mountain again after *wasting* his time with the people below. He realizes that they are not his true companions and that he must strive to overcome himself by taking *action*: “Well then, they still sleep, these higher

men, while *I* am awake: *these* are not my proper companions. [...] I want to go to my work, to my day: but they do not understand the signs of my morning; my stride is for them no summons to awaken.” [Z 325] Deleuze compares this moment to Hamlet’s sea voyage. Zarathustra forsakes the “comic” misunderstandings of his encounters with different characters in a drama of misrecognition and takes on a heroic role. This is why Zarathustra is like Hamlet according to Deleuze: “Zarathustra is like Hamlet; the sea voyage has made him *capable*, he has reached the becoming-similar or the becoming-equal of the heroic metamorphosis; yet he feels that the hour has not come...” [DR 298] The heroic metamorphosis is only the beginning. Zarathustra feels that he must struggle and that his struggles have not yet come to an end. He speaks of his “most abysmal thought,” namely the eternal return, that he does not have yet the strength to summon:

Alas, abysmal thought that is *my* thought... Your gravity was always terrible enough for me; but one day I shall yet find the strength and the lion’s voice to summon you. And once I have overcome myself that far, then I also want to overcome myself in what is still greater; and victory shall seal my perfection. [...] As yet the hour of my final struggle has not come to me—or is it coming just now? Verily, with treacherous beauty sea and life look at me. [Z 162-163]

But what does it mean to overcome oneself? In order to answer this question we must turn to his notes in *The Will to Power* where he lists what can make us endure the thought of the eternal return:



To *endure* the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from morality; new means against the fact of *pain* (pain conceived as a tool, as the father of pleasure; there is no cumulative consciousness of displeasure); the enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism, as a counterweight to this extreme fatalism; abolition of the concept of necessity; abolition of the “will”; abolition of “knowledge-in-itself.” The elevation of the consciousness of strength in man, as he creates the overman. [WP #1060]

This is the answer to “what would give us the strength to think the eternal return?” First, eliminate the idea that “events” are good and bad: this means that we *must* reevaluate pain and pleasure, thereby making pain an affirmation of life. Second, we must not seek to *plan* our lives according to a set and *intended* path: we should have no idea what our life will turn out to be, no goal or aim. Third, we must abandon our faith in the “identity” of things: this means that all logic of identity and abstract conceptions of reality must be replaced by a concrete synthesis of differences. Recall the quote above: “Verily, with treacherous beauty sea and life look at me.” [Z 163] Life is the treacherous beauty of the sea: it is under no control of the will. It is indifferent to our pleasure or pain, and it is unknowable in itself. If we can accept the treacherous beauty of the sea (like the multiplicity of drops of water) then by that means we can have the *strength* to affirm the thought of the eternal return. But this means a shift from the stage of “heroic struggle” in which we seek to overcome our own weakness to a stage where these weaknesses are *already dissolved*. At the stage of the “during” or the becoming-equal the “overman” becomes an ego-idea that we seek to copy. But this is a paradox: the “overman” is the one who is dissolved, but by being an ideal for the heroic mimesis, it is *mistaken for an identity*. This is why

Deleuze says: “Nevertheless, the becoming-equal or becoming-capable of the metamorphosis has only brought him to supposed ordinary identity: he has not yet banished the apparent positivity of the identical.” [DR 298] In order to overcome oneself one must also overcome the “overman” as an *aim to be achieved*. For as long as the heroic metamorphosis takes place in the repetition of the “during,” it will always have an *aim* that is “identical” in itself. The paradox is: the *aim* of metamorphosis must be to overcome the “aim.”

3.3 Deleuze tells us that the “third moment” of the “after” is missing from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* because Nietzsche did not finish this work. Looking at Nietzsche’s outlines for the work Deleuze concludes that he planned it but never actually wrote it: “The third moment remains absent: this is the moment of the revelation and affirmation of eternal return, and implies the death of Zarathustra.” [DR 92] We have seen, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the moment of the “before” when he has nightmares about the return of the small man and the second moment of the “during” when he affirms the straight line of time where not everything returns, but what is lacking is the “after” where the eternal return is presented as a “selective” doctrine. What do we mean by calling the eternal return a “selective” doctrine? On one level, we mean that only those who have gained the strength to affirm it, by eliminating the weaknesses that we have seen above, can be selected as the “overmen.” On another level, we must see the process of “combinations” as a selection in itself: the repetition of combinations “select” which elements return. This is why Deleuze says: “The highest test is to understand the eternal return as a selective thought, and repetition in the eternal return as selective being.” [DR 298] It is both a selective thought *and* a selective being. To move into the third repetition of the “after” the thought of the eternal return must be replaced by the *selective being* of

the eternal return. In short, it is no longer a question of having the *strength* to affirm the “thought” of the eternal return. Now that one *has* the strength the thought is no longer important. What is important is the experience of the *return* as an impersonal process. It is in the moment of the affirmation of the “return” that the whole thought of the eternal return is rendered useless and absurd. This is why Deleuze says “it is not a doctrine but the simulacrum of every doctrine...” [DR 95] Having a belief or a faith in a doctrine only makes sense if one has an “aim,” as one does in a heroic metamorphosis. In this “third” stage all doctrines are treated superficially and are not taken seriously. In this last stage there is a realization that all doctrines and beliefs are only symptoms of weakness and that only the “great dice game of existence” [WP #1066] has any importance. This is why Deleuze describes the “comedy” of the Overman as joyfully nihilistic: “The eternal return is only for the third time: the time of the drama, after the comic and after the tragic (the drama is defined when the tragic becomes joyful and the comic becomes the comedy of the Overman).” [DR 298-299] The “tragic” man of metamorphosis treats his idols very seriously. They are the means by which he is able to take action and transform himself. But Nietzsche lists him as among those who must perish and “go under.” The “small man” or “last man” is the one who repeats because he is incapable of action (the repetition of the before); the great heroic and active man or the “one who wants to perish” is the one who repeats in order to become-equal to the action (the repetition of the during) and yet both of these must perish in the third time. Deleuze tells us that they do not survive the “selective” test of the eternal return: “(Nietzsche carefully indicates the two distinct types who do not survive the test: the passive small man or last man, and the great heroic active man, the one who has become the man ‘who wants to perish’).” [DR 299] This is perfectly in keeping with Nietzsche’s sentiment that man

is something to be overcome: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an *overture* and a *going under*.” [Z 15] The heroic man of metamorphosis is just a stage on the way to the overman. But what keeps “man” from achieving the stage of the overman is his vanity. The heroic metamorphosis demands that the ego maintain an “ideal” of itself by which it unifies its “identity” in the image of action. The hero is like Narcissus who falls in love with a mirror image and what he sees in the mirror is the *sublime* image of himself. In the chapter “On those who are Sublime”, Nietzsche tells us what the “soul’s secret” is:

Indeed, you that are sublime shall yet become beautiful one day and hold up a mirror to your own beauty. Then your soul will shutter with godlike desires, and there will be adoration even in your vanity. For this is the soul’s secret: only when the hero has abandoned her, she is approached in a dream by the overhero. [Z 118-119]

The secret is: only when one has abandoned her (the sublime image) will the image be opposed by the “overhero.” In short, Nietzsche is telling us that heroic mimesis and idol worship are liabilities that will keep us from being “selected” by the eternal return. To put it simply, the ideal image of ourselves *does not return* because it is a fiction of our imagination. Only the “real” returns, only the multiplicities of singularities that make up sensations return, not the “image,” “form,” or “idea” of a thing. Deleuze tells us that this new repetition of the future (or “the after”) is not a repetition of “someone” but an impersonal repetition: “For ‘one’ repeats eternally, but ‘one’ now refers to the world of impersonal individualities and pre-individual singularities.” [DR 299] This world of impersonal individualities is the world of the

“unequal” or the dice game of existence that has no final aim. There are no images of this “dice game” only a continuous metamorphosis of energy. The heroic metamorphosis was mistaken as to what its aim was. It sought to be equal to an image; instead what Deleuze tells us is that we must become-equal to the “unequal.” This is what Deleuze says must happen to Zarathustra: “Zarathustra-hero became equal, but what he became equal to was the unequal, at the cost of losing the sham identity of the hero.” [DR 299] Essentially, this involves a replacing of the “idol” of mimesis with the “being of the sensible.” What does this mean? According to Nietzsche it is a “monster of energy” [WP #1067] that is “a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms...” [WP #1067] and this is also the world that Deleuze calls the *innocence of becoming* upon which no blame can be cast and no guilt accrued. Becoming-equal to the unequal means that we make ourselves strong enough to affirm chaos. But this first requires our giving up our ego-ideal.

3.4 The repetition of the “before” is essentially a triumph of “reactive forces” as Deleuze uses this term in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. What are the “reactive” forces? They are the forces that seek to preserve the self and its organism at the price of forsaking all will to overcome the self. In *The Will to Power* Nietzsche questions the supremacy of the self-preservative instincts:

E.g., that which is useful for the long life of the individual might be unfavorable to its strength and splendor; that which preserves the individual might at the same time arrest and halt its evolution. On the other hand, a

*deficiency, a degeneration*, can be of the highest utility in so far as it acts as a stimulant to other organs. [WP #647]

The drive for self-preservation is an “incomplete nihilism” because it seeks only to eliminate those things that threaten the survival of the organism and the self. This is why the repetition of the “before” must be considered as a reactive force of self-preservation. For example: the repetitions of king Oedipus’s questioning is due to the drive to preserve himself from the “traumatic” realization that he is the murderer he seeks. Another example: Hamlet questions the meaning of his existence because he is unwilling to risk his life to kill the king. These two examples are “reactive” because they turn the energy that should be used for action *against the will to power* and instead seek to silence the will so that the action will become unnecessary. In short, Hamlet seeks to “talk” himself out of action and thereby turns his active forces (those that seek to kill the king) into reactive forces (those that contemplate suicide). As a result Hamlet is trapped in a hesitant repetition of the “before” that seeks the discharge of action but at the same time turns that impulse to action into a reactive obsessional thought. Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all! According to Deleuze what Nietzsche hates above all is this hesitant obsessional thought:

One thing in the world disheartens Nietzsche: the little compensations, the little pleasures, the little joys and everything that one is granted once, only once. Everything that can be done again the next day only on the condition that it be said the day before: tomorrow I will give it up – the whole ceremonial of the obsessed. And we are like those old women who permit themselves an excess only once, we act and think like them. [NP 68-69]

Hamlet keeps saying to himself: I will do the deed tomorrow but he never does. The “test” of eternal return is a means by which this obsessional hesitation is put to an end. Deleuze sees the test of the eternal return as a reformulation of the categorical imperative: “*what ever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.*” [NP 68] An obsessive thinker who hesitates to act, when he asks himself the question whether he would like to live that moment of indecision an infinite number of times, brings his self doubt to a point of crisis. Given the choice of an eternity of self doubt or an eternity of action, the obsessive person will choose action (even if it risks his life) rather than bear the burden of an eternity of hesitation. The test of the “eternal return” gives him an image of his own action under the light of eternity, and thereby promotes the vision of an ego-ideal upon which he can become-equal. In short, by envisioning his action as an “eternal” action, a Hamlet can become-equal to the role that destiny has set out for him. He would have exchanged the “no” of judgment that has kept him from action for the “no” of the deed that drives him to action. For Nietzsche this is a transition from passive nihilism to an active nihilism. He says: “It is the condition of strong spirits and wills, and those do not find it possible to stop with the No of ‘judgment’: their nature demands the No of the deed.” [WP #24] When this happens the negation of the *will to act* has another negation that negates the “negation” of hesitation. Deleuze describes this as a “self-destruction” of the reactive forces that keep us from acting: “Only the eternal return can complete nihilism *because it makes negation a negation of reactive forces themselves.* By and in the eternal return nihilism no longer expresses itself as the conservation and victory of the weak but as their destruction, their *self-destruction.*” [NP 70] In short, a weak and hesitating Hamlet is destroyed and is replaced by an active and

determined Hamlet. Hamlet's words: "My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!" [Act 4, scene 4] According to Nietzsche all attempts to escape the passive nihilism of weak values cannot be achieved without the active and nihilistic destruction of those values that make us weak: "Attempts to escape nihilism without reevaluating our values so far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute." [WP #28] Deleuze believes that the answer to incomplete or passive nihilism is the complete or active nihilism of the eternal return:

And if the eternal return is the most extreme form of nihilism, nihilism itself (separated or abstracted from the eternal return) is always an "incomplete nihilism"... however far it goes, however powerful it is. Only the eternal return makes the nihilistic will whole and complete. [NP 69]

An incomplete nihilism is "incomplete" because it tries to compensate for the aimlessness of existence by placing ideals, aims, and justifications upon it. For example: Hamlet hesitates to kill the king because of the fears of "hell" and "false spirits" and the prohibition against killing a king. These values are the "source" of his relative and incomplete nihilism of hesitation. However, if someone like Hamlet were to think of the "eternal recurrence" of that doubt and hesitation, he would turn away from those weak values that keep him from action and instead follow the image of the action that he would will to "return" an infinite number of times. When existence is denuded of all aim and meaning those "prohibitions" of values are suspended. According to Nietzsche this is the main function of the thought of the eternal return: "Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothing: *the*



*eternal recurrence.*” [WP #55] In this phase of the thought of the eternal return, only the image of an “action” being accomplished for an “infinite” number of times remains. This is a powerful motivation for the second static repetition that Deleuze describes: the repetition of the “during.”

3.5 The essential point of transition from the repetition of the “before” to the repetition of the “during” is the displacement of the negative and destructive forces away from the self and towards an external object. The becoming-active of forces means that the forces that were turned against the ego are now transmuted into the will to mastery and the will to power. Freud was clearly inspired by Nietzsche when he wrote the following lines:

The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfills the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards – soon with the help of a special organic system, the muscular apparatus – towards objects in the external world. The instinct is then called the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power. [11Freud 418]

Freud’s interpretation of the “will to power” corresponds with Deleuze’s conception of the repetition of the “during.” The second moment of repetition is the moment in which self-destructive forces that were manifested in neurotic symptoms are transmuted into a kind of “acting-out” in which the external object takes the place of the ego. (Hamlet kills the king instead of slowly killing himself with doubt.) Freud identifies this movement with sadism: “This is sadism proper.” [11Freud 418] This sadism is the process whereby negation is affirmed as an “absolute.” One rejoices in the destruction of objects as an affirmation of one’s own power over the world. In the

eternal return one “affirms” the eternal return of one’s sense of mastery over things through active negation. The thought of the eternal return intensifies this experience of mastery: not only does one master the object, but one also thinks of oneself mastering the object an infinite number of times. This constitutes the “repetition” of the *during*. According to Deleuze this is the affirmation of negation itself: “In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes itself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of affirming, an affirmative power.” [NP 71] What is striking in this repetition of the *during* is that all thought of the previous repetition of the “before” is eliminated. When mastering the object in a negating *action*, the whole thought of *hesitation*, which haunted the conscience before, is *completely forgotten*. It is as if there were no “before” or no hesitation before the act: the affirmation of one’s mastery becomes the *only* repetition that is affirmed in the thought of the eternal return. (One imagines oneself accomplishing the “image of action” an infinite number of times *at the same time* that one forgets that one ever hesitated to act.) This is why Deleuze claims that the “reactive forces” of self-doubt and self-destruction do not return: “The second selection in the eternal return is thus the following: the eternal return produces becoming-active. It is sufficient to relate the will to nothingness to the eternal return in order to realize that reactive forces do not return.” [NP 71] Essentially, when the ego turns its destructive forces outwards it takes all the things that it hated about itself before and *projects* them onto the object to be destroyed. In *Coldness and Cruelty* Deleuze tells us that the superego *projects* the ego onto its victims: “the sadistic superego expels the ego and projects it into its victims, it is always faced with the task of destroying something outside itself again and again...” [CC 126] In

*Difference and Repetition* Deleuze describes the confrontation with “stupidity” that reaches a point of crisis:

...madness arises at the point at which the individual contemplates itself in this free ground – and, as a result, stupidity in stupidity and cruelty in cruelty – to the point that it can no longer stand itself. ‘A pitiful facility then emerges in their minds, that of being able to see stupidity and no longer tolerate it...’.”

[DR 152]

It is the test of the eternal return that throws a light on our stupidity, so that we come to a point at which we can no longer stand it. At that point we project our *own* stupidity onto the *other* and destroy them *at the same time* that we destroy stupidity in ourselves. This is why Deleuze tells us that: “Laziness, stupidity, baseness, cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal return would no longer be the same laziness, stupidity etc.” [NP 69] When the thought of these despised things returning an infinite number of times haunts us (like it did Zarathustra) we expel these things from our “ego” and *actively* destroy them in an *other*. This “stupidity” does not return as “affirmed.” What returns as affirmed is the feeling of mastery that we have when we are “negating” these stupidities. In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche champions Socrates and his sermon *against* stupidity over the Christian sermon against selfishness. They are diametrically opposed: the sermon against selfishness says that “everyone must be equal” and no one should strive to go beyond the “ground” of the normal; while the sermon against stupidity taught that our misfortunes come from our mindlessly accepting the “equality” of opinions with our neighbor. The first sermon is one of “weak” values that belongs to the repetition of

the “before” in which we cannot act because of our conscience which is really the mindless acceptance of the values of others. The second sermon of Socrates against stupidity as the source of our misfortunes belongs to the repetition of the “during” in which stupidity becomes something *shameful* (the acceptance of “common” values is shameful) and we are enjoined to overcome these stupid values. This is the opposition of philosophy to common sense. Nietzsche tells us that philosophy does *harm* to stupidity: “What is certain, however, is that it deprived stupidity of its good conscience; these philosophers *harmed* stupidity.”<sup>70</sup> This is what Deleuze tells us is at the basis of becoming-active: we turn against the “reactive” forces of stupidity and bring shame to them. We turn our negative and destructive energies towards *destroying* or *doing harm to* these “stupid” values. The activity of thought is, therefore, essentially destructive and negative for Deleuze. Deleuze describes this stupidity as the “transcendent element” that cannot be thought. He takes up Heidegger’s proclamation that *what I most thought provoking is that we are not yet thinking*: this is the essence of stupidity. Deleuze says that, “this unthought has become the necessary empirical form in which... thought at last thinks the *cogitandum*; in other words, the transcendent element which can only be thought (‘the act that we do not yet think’ or ‘What is stupidity?’).” [DR 153] In short, stupidity does not return.

3.6 The destruction of “stupidity” or the revaluation of all values lead to the third repetition of the “after.” What is essentially destroyed in the static repetition of the “during” is the ego-ideal. The common *herd* values of “equality” and universal “truths” support the idea of the “self.” Having common values is the means by which people recognize one another. An example: human rights are the means by which each person gives up some of his own power to act (such as the prohibition against

stealing) in exchange for being recognized as having “rights” as a person. These “values” are laws of exchange: one person “contracts” a debt to another if they violate the other’s “rights” and this debt must be paid by a punishment. These are the prohibitions that serve as a basis of “neurosis” in the field of sexuality in which human “rights” and individualities are ill defined. If this were the case, then one would spend most of one’s life worrying about the “debts” that one has contracted against others. In the first half of Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet worries about the debts that he owes to his dead father and the debts that he owes to his new king. The second repetition of the “during” suspends these worries about debts to others and acts in an unequal and unjust manner: sadism. Sadism is not the “law” but the suspension of the law and the values that it implies. For Deleuze the becoming-active of thought implies sadistic suspension of the law. In an “ironic” twist, the powers of thought take on the aggressive features of the law and turn it against the “law” itself. Thought is essentially unjust, aggressive, and unequal. From the point of view of the “herd instinct” thought must appear evil. But the aim of this “thought” is to constitute a new innocence: the innocence of becoming. The sadist or thinker is not at all concerned with “evil” nor does he delight in transgression because this would reaffirm the values that he seeks to destroy. Instead he contemplates the “energy of destruction” and its impersonal nature. In *Coldness and Cruelty* Deleuze says of one of Sade’s characters Saint-Fond, that he delights not in transgression but in the destructive molecules: “Again, in Saint-Fond’s system, the value of punishment lies solely in its capacity for infinite reproduction through the agency of destructive molecules.” [CC 119] Moreover, he also says that the law must be transcended towards a pure vision of anarchy: “Sade often stresses the fact that the law can only be transcended towards an intuitional model of anarchy.” [CC 87] Such a vision

excludes the roles of a punisher and someone who is punished, just as it excludes the Law as a payment of debts. It mirrors the activity of nature insofar as, in nature, there are no debts and payments but only perpetual destruction and reformation. This is the vision that pure thought tends towards: a purely mechanical or molecular conception of transformations. The repetition of the “after” is then a purely cosmological conception of the eternal return. For Nietzsche, the cosmological vision of the eternal return is essential to understanding why it is a repetition of differences or “combinations.” It is worthwhile to reproduce here the whole passage in which Nietzsche compares the cosmological doctrine of the eternal return to a game of dice:

If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force—and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless—it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game *in infinitum*. [WP #1066]

To summarize the important aspects of this passage: the universe is an absolute chaos of forces; however, there are a limited number of combinations that this force can

take on; therefore, there must be some instances of “repetition” in this chaos. Further, *every possible combination* must at some time have been actual: this means that all *divergent series* of possible outcomes of *each* action must have been actualized. This is why the eternal return is *not* a determinism the way Leibniz’s theory of monads appears to be. There is no God that orders the world into the “best” possible world; instead, every world is simultaneously actual. The determination as to which world will become actual in *the present series* is determined by the chance throw of the dice. Chance *does not negate* chaos the way Leibniz’s God negates impossible worlds. Leibniz’s “world” or monad is one in which everything is balanced and there is a “justice” to the final order of things. (Small injustices are necessary for the *overall* good of the compossible world.) Nietzsche’s vision of chaos eliminates all notion of justice from the start: only anarchy reigns in the eternal return. This is why Deleuze says that the eternal return is the system of the future in which *all possible outcomes are affirmed simultaneously*:

The system of the future, by contrast, must be called a divine game, since there is no pre-existing rule, since the game bears already upon its own rules and since the child-player can only win, all of chance being affirmed each time and for all times. Not restrictive or limiting affirmations, but affirmations coextensive with the questions posed and with the decisions from which they emanate: such a game entails the repetition of the necessary winning move, since it wins by embracing all possible combinations and rules in the system of its own return. [DR 116]

This is why the repetition of the future or the “after” *cannot* be expressed as an “anticipation of the future.” To anticipate the future is to place limits upon chance: to envision, in advance, what would count as a winning move. The phenomenological explanation of the structure of “expectation” has no place in Deleuze’s conception of the future as a static repetition of time. The repetition of the future or the “after” is always the affirmation of all possible outcomes and the vision of chaos or injustice. Thought of the future embraces injustice as a principle. That is why political philosophy is antagonistic to this form of “thought.” The vision of the eternal return as a cosmological doctrine eliminates all conceptions of human rights, values of humanity, the dignity of persons, and the sanctity of doctrines. This is why the institution of active thought, according to Deleuze, involves a “complete” nihilism.

<p>3.1 Zarathustra’s first reaction: disgust at the thought that the “same” things return (all the petty annoyances). But he soon realizes that only the affirming returns. (Not the dwarf.)</p>	<p>3.3 The “third” stage is the eternal return as a selective doctrine. It is “being” that selects by chance, therefore one must give up the power of judgment to realize it.</p>	<p>3.5 In “becoming active” destructive (sadistic) forces are turned outwards towards stupidity. Stupidity is a symptom of common values of equality.</p>
<p>3.2 Zarathustra’s second reaction: The courage to struggle to affirm the idea. This “heroic” struggle of the overman must itself be overcome.</p>	<p>3.4 The repetition of the “before” are the reactive forces of incomplete nihilism. The test of the eternal return brings the reactive forces to a crisis point, eliminates values.</p>	<p>3.6 In the “afterwards” of the overman there is a vision of pure anarchy. This is the cosmological doctrine of the eternal return that eliminates “human” values.</p>



## Conclusion

How is one to conclude a thesis such as this? There is no sense of a central point. There can be no proper conclusion to a thesis that does not seek to solve a problem. This thesis offered no final solutions. Instead it sought to expose the full complexity of the three syntheses of time. As such, it must raise more problems than it solves. In short, this thesis sought to make a systematic and full study of the details of the three syntheses of time. Because of the detailed nature of this study it is not possible to summarize it in a conclusion. Instead, at the end of this work we must instead ask ourselves a series of pointed questions about the importance of the topic of time. It is best to end such a “problematic” thesis by asking what the significance is of the major problems that it raises. The proper place of such a conclusion is to give the readers a sense of the importance of a work they have just read. Further, because each section ends with a table that summarizes the main points of that section, there is no need to give an overall summary here. This work has progressed by addressing problems as they arose in each section. As such it may appear to be fragmented into a series of unrelated theories. However, if the main problematic is kept in mind at each step, the reader may then see a pattern and a progression from one problem to the next. I hope this ending will instill this sense of a pattern or progression in this work for the reader.

Deleuze devotes much of his work to the problem of time. But why should we be concerned with the problem of time? Often people do not see the immediate significance of time in other problems that philosophy faces. Here is my sense of the problems that the theory of time in the work of Deleuze raises. First, there is the problem of “recognition.” This is one of the major themes of epistemology, ethics

and other branches of philosophy that seek to *ground* knowledge and establish a system of truth. For Deleuze the problems of “representation” are addressed in his theory of memory. Much of what we saw in this thesis was Deleuze’s attempt to redefine memory in such a way that it would not be reducible to recognition. To do this he found an alternative to the Platonic system of reminiscences. Therefore, his main object of attack is the notion that memory reproduces actual events that took place in the past. Because of this he seeks to expose those instances of “false” memory, not as mistakes of memory, but as essential components of memory itself. Here is the problem: if memory is merely “recognition,” then the active faculties of the intelligence would synthesize time. But, the rational intellect has no motivation to recall any images from the past. Therefore, what *makes us* remember? There must be some involuntary force that cannot be explained by the faculty of recognition. Deleuze’s answer, as we have seen, is that there is an “erotic” component to memory that essentially *disguises* the past and brings the “false” images into the heart of memory itself. Second, there is the problem of “perception.” Many philosophers take objects in the world as a *given* and reduce our complex relationship to these objects as one of recognition. However, Deleuze does not simply reduce our object relations to this over simplified version of recognition. Instead, his theory of *duration* takes into account all the complex and psychological complexities of object relations. He addresses “need” on a biological or organic level of which we are not fully conscious. Our duration is not “expectation” in a simple sense of a self that waits for a desired object; rather, there are tiny syntheses of need in every cell of the body. The result is that there is not “one” duration but *many durations* from which our sense of time is derived. These micro-durations are the very material of signs: the organism perceives signs that never are registered in consciousness. These are the signs of the

present. As a result, our duration is not fully subjective as Kant thought; but rather, it is organic or pre-personal. Time is composed step by step as a synthesis of many organic rhythms of need and satisfaction. Third, there is the problem of “ideas.” For traditional philosophers “ideas” are the entities of reason. Not so for Deleuze. For him ideas are essentially problems. What does he mean by a problem? He means the system of pure events that have neither subject nor object, nor a sense of order or a place in time. Such ideas are never the products of reason. Instead, they give rise to reason that seeks to *negate* contrary possibilities. Leibniz’s God was such a contemplator of ideas (in Deleuze’s sense) when he sought to eliminate the impossible divergent series from the best possible world. Our own attempts at reason are also a denial of problems and ideas. For Deleuze ideas as problems are the system of the future because the future is “open” and positive just as are the problems. What Deleuze challenges by this conception of the idea is the rival conception of “clear and distinct ideas.” Clear and distinct ideas are the ultimate expression of the denial of chance in the universe: it expresses the will to order and mastery over chaos. However, Deleuze corrects this vision of the idea by exposing the prior condition of chance and chaos *before* there are any clear conceptions. In short, clear and distinct ideas only *come after* the *negation* of divergent possibilities just as Leibniz’s God created a clear and coherent world by negating other possible worlds. Deleuze’s discussion of the future as a dimension of time is also an attack on the ground of clear and distinct ideas. Because of the above, Deleuze’s conception of time is also implicated in his overall critique of the history of philosophy. If we are concerned about the foundations of philosophical thought, we must also consider the importance of the theory of time in each of these foundations. Deleuze’s theory of time seeks also to expose the weaknesses of his predecessors.

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- <sup>1</sup> Immanuel Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. New York: Prometheus Books, 1990.pg. 35.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid, pg. 28.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>4</sup> Marcel Proust *The Way By Swann's* Trans. Lydia Davis. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 34.
- <sup>5</sup> Marcel Proust *The Guermanties Way* Trans. Mark Treharne. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 546.
- <sup>6</sup> Gilles Deleuze *L'Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze* Trans. Charles J. Stivale. in section entitled (style)
- <sup>7</sup> A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the principle sources with philosophical commentary* London: Cambridge University Press, 2001. pg. 306.
- <sup>8</sup> *The Way By Swann's* pg. 370.
- <sup>9</sup> Strictly speaking Jealousy is not a form of involuntary "memory" but rather a form of involuntary intelligence. In the case of jealousy the mind is provoked by pain to seek out signs from the past that would explain the present problem. The "memory" is voluntary because it is provoked by the intelligence; however, the faculty of intelligence is involuntary because the painful and deceptive signs of love provoke it.
- <sup>10</sup> *The Way By Swann's* pg. 280.
- <sup>11</sup> Marcel Proust *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower* Trans. James Grieve. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 31.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid. pg. 31.
- <sup>13</sup> *The Way By Swann's* pg. 430.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid. pg. 227.
- <sup>15</sup> *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower.* pg. 472.
- <sup>16</sup> *The Way By Swann's* pg. 186.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Marcel Proust *Finding Time Again* Trans. Ian Patterson. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 215.
- <sup>19</sup> *Finding Time Again.* pg. 217

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- <sup>20</sup> Marcel Proust *The Prisoner and The Fugitive* Trans. Carol Clark and Peter Collier. New York: Penguin Press, 2002. pg. 144.
- <sup>21</sup> *Finding Time Again*. pgs. 204-205.
- <sup>22</sup> *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*. pgs. 417-418.
- <sup>23</sup> *Finding Time Again*. pg. 204.
- <sup>24</sup> *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*. pg. 415.
- <sup>25</sup> *Finding Time Again*. pg. 198.
- <sup>26</sup> *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*. pg. 429.
- <sup>27</sup> *In The Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*. pg. 431.
- <sup>28</sup> Sigmund Freud *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* Trans. Alan Tyson. London: Penguin Books, 1991. pg. 88.
- <sup>29</sup> *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* Trans. Alan Tyson. London: Penguin Books, 1991. pg. 88.
- <sup>30</sup> *The Way By Swann's* pgs. 48-49.
- <sup>31</sup> Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank *The Development of Psychoanalysis* Trans. Catoline Newton. Connecticut: International Universities Press, 1986. pg. 54.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid*. pg. 20.
- <sup>33</sup> Sigmund Freud *Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis* Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1949. pg. 60.
- <sup>34</sup> Sigmund Freud *An Outline of Psycho-analysis* Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1949. pg. 61.
- <sup>35</sup> Sigmund Freud *Civilization and its Discontents* Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961. pgs. 29-30.
- <sup>36</sup> Victor Burgin *Formations of Fantasy* London: Routledge, 1986. pg. 22.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 22-23.
- <sup>38</sup> Gilles Deleuze *Bergsonism* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1991. pg. 53.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 52.
- <sup>40</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 323.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 205.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 219.

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- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 216.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 55.
- <sup>45</sup> *The Interpretation of Dreams*, pgs. 761-762.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 762.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 400.
- <sup>49</sup> Gilles Deleuze *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. pg. 60.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 61.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 23.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 25.
- <sup>53</sup> Jacques Lacan *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955*. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988. pgs. 196-197.
- <sup>54</sup> Immanuel Kant *Critique of Practical Reason* Trans. T. K. Abbott. New York: Prometheus Books, 1996. pg. 101.
- <sup>55</sup> Gilles Deleuze *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. pg. 33.
- <sup>56</sup> Jacques Lacan *Écrits A Selection* Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977. pg. 287.
- <sup>57</sup> Sigmund Freud *Three Case Histories* Trans. Philip Rieff. New York: Touchstone, 1963. pg. 67.
- <sup>58</sup> Sigmund Freud *Totem and Taboo* Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1950. pg. 69.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 70.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 142.
- <sup>62</sup> André Green *Life Narcissism Death Narcissism* Trans. Andrew Weller. London: Free Association Press, 2001. pg. 222.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid*.

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<sup>64</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, pgs. 149-150.

<sup>65</sup> Gilles Deleuze *Essays Critical and Clinical* Trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. pg. 33.

<sup>66</sup> Deleuze and Guattari tell us that the very form of the novel demands an infinite series that can never end: "The idea of ending with K's execution is contradicted by the whole direction of the novel and by the quality of 'unlimited postponement' that regulates *The Trial*." *Kafka, Towards a Minor Literature* Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. pg. 44.

<sup>67</sup> Mircea Eliade *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History* Trans. Willard R. Trask.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. pg. 76.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, pgs. 98-99.

<sup>69</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche *The Gay Science* Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.  
Fragment #182.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, Fragment #328.

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