Abstract
This chapter consists of a systematic introduction to the nature and function of habitus in Latin medieval philosophy. Over the course of this introduction, several topics are treated: the theoretical necessity to posit habitus; their nature; their causal contribution to the production of internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes their unity when they can have multiple objects and work in clusters. Finally, we examine two specific questions: why intellectual habitus represent a special case that triggered considerable debate; how human beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus.
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Notes
- 1.
Nickl deals with the concept of moral habitus in Aristotle and Aquinas, before discussing its progressive disappearance in Scotus and Ockham, as well as Luther and Descartes . He then turns to its renaissance in Schiller and Kierkegaard , before surveying twentieth-century conceptions.
- 2.
The first part of their volume deals with some ancient, medieval and early modern conceptions of habitus, including Aristotle’s and Aquinas, while the second part deals with modern theories , such as Suárez’s and Descartes’s. The third and final part deals with contemporary conceptions.
- 3.
- 4.
As far as we know, there is no significant Platonic influence on the development of the notion.
- 5.
See, for example, Nielsen (1982) for the so-called habitus theory of the Incarnation, defended by Peter Lombard , who regards “the union in Christ between the two natures or between the human person and divine nature as a habitus” (p. 359). This doctrine enjoyed some success in the school of the Lombard, until it was condemned as heretical in the 1170s.
- 6.
Namely, Olivier Boulnois , Isabelle Bochet , Bonnie Kent , Kristell Trego , Nicolas Faucher, Rolf Darge , Can Laurens Löwe , Juhana Toivanen , Jean-Luc Solère , Pascale Bermon , and Tarek Dika .
- 7.
Namely, Hamid Taieb, Peter J. Hartman , Martin Pickavé , Magali Roques, Jenny Pelletier , Gyula Klima , Jack Zupko , Monika Michałowska , and Dominik Perler .
- 8.
In contrast to the term habitus, consuetudo is not a concept that was used in addressing theological and philosophical problems in the Middle Ages. Like the term “habit,” it has a broad usage, whereas habitus has more precise and specialized meanings.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
See Korolec (1982).
- 12.
See the classic study by Wolter (1990).
- 13.
The most notable exception is the class of infused , or God-given, habitus, such as the theological virtues of faith, hope , and charity , which exist in the baptized subjects before any kind of corresponding act is, or even can be, performed.
- 14.
See Kent (2002).
- 15.
See p. 49.
- 16.
Yet another kind of disposition, stemming from theological developments , is posited by medieval authors, namely what they call innate habitus , such as synderesis , which is defined by Aquinas as an innate habitus of practical principles (see De veritate, q. 16, art. 1). The status of such dispositions and what distinguishes them from instinct is unclear. The classic study of this issue is Lottin (1948a) .
- 17.
On the relation between habitus and inner experience , see, among others, Spencer (2015a).
- 18.
See p. 39 and p. 272.
- 19.
See idem, p. 270–271.
- 20.
See idem, p. 191–196.
- 21.
- 22.
See p. 67–85.
- 23.
See Darge (1996).
- 24.
See p. 273–274.
- 25.
For how this fits with Ockham’s ontological parsimony , see Roques’s paper in the present volume, p. 268–270.
- 26.
See p. 321–331 and p. 333–346.
- 27.
On this subject, see Spencer (2015b).
- 28.
See p. 247.
- 29.
See p. 229–231.
- 30.
See p. 379–383.
- 31.
See idem, p. 367–372.
- 32.
See idem, p. 217–221.
- 33.
See p. 253–260.
- 34.
See p. 230.
- 35.
See p. 333–346.
- 36.
See p. 375–379.
- 37.
See Jung (2011). See also Sylla (1973), Murdoch and Sylla (1978), Solère (2000), Roques (2016). The two dominant models of interpretation of the intension and remission of forms are the “succession” theory (a stronger or weaker form succeeds another of the same species at every instant of the intensification or remission) and the “addition” theory (degrees of forms of the same species are added or subtracted to each other at every instant of the intensification or remission). Another model is Aquinas’s, according to which what varies during the change is the degree of participation of the accidental form in the subject. On Aquinas, see Boland (2001).
- 38.
See p. 349–354.
- 39.
See p. 357–360
- 40.
See p. 301–319
- 41.
See p. 287–293.
- 42.
See p. 293–297.
- 43.
See idem, p. 278–281.
- 44.
See p. 385–401.
- 45.
See p. 252.
- 46.
See idem, p. 107–126.
- 47.
See p. 249–253.
- 48.
See p. 127–141.
- 49.
See p. 215.
- 50.
See p. 231–239.
- 51.
See p. 215–217.
- 52.
See p. 237–239.
- 53.
See Liebowitz and Margolis (2000).
- 54.
See p. 35–39.
- 55.
On this topic, see Porter (2013).
- 56.
See p. 143–165 and p. 167–184.
- 57.
See p. 196–202.
- 58.
See p. 174–182.
- 59.
See p. 39–43 and p. 99–102.
- 60.
See p. 120–124.
- 61.
See p. 257–258.
- 62.
This is the position defended by Taina Holopainen (1991). She claims (150): “The deontological structure of Ockham’s ethics was found in the theory according to which the term ‘virtuous’ is predicated of acts of will, some of which are intrinsically virtuous acts and some extrinsically virtuous acts i.e., acts which are virtuous due to the former. I have shown through a detailed analysis how Ockham specifies a basic intrinsically virtuous act, which is an act of willing to fulfill moral law qua moral law, and how all other acts may be called virtuous through a denominative predication.”
- 63.
For an examination of the difficult relation between virtue ethics and natural law, see Irwin (2012).
- 64.
See note 16.
- 65.
We thank Ian Drummond for enlightening discussion on this subject. We are also extremely grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their remarks. We also thank the participants in the Helsinki medieval philosophy seminar, organized by Simo Knuuttila and Ritva Palmén, for their helpful comments.
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Faucher, N., Roques, M. (2018). The Many Virtues of Second Nature: Habitus in Latin Medieval Philosophy. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_1
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