Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of ContentPhilosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind. |
Contents
Chapter 1 Mental Content and the Problem of De Se Belief | 3 |
Chapter 2 In Favor of the Property Theory | 25 |
Chapter 3 Alternatives to the Property Theory | 59 |
Chapter 4 Arguments against the Property Theory | 91 |
Chapter 5 The Property Theory and De Re Belief | 117 |
Chapter 6 The Property Theory Rationality and Kripkes Puzzle about Belief | 141 |
Chapter 7 The Property Theory Twin Earth and Belief about Kinds | 163 |
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Common terms and phrases
argue arthritis bears BEL relation belief attribution belief content belief reports believe the proposition believes that London believes that topaz chapter Chisholm claim Clark Kent cognitive attitudes conception consider contradictory beliefs Descartes dicto discuss doctrine of propositions dyadic propositionalism dyadic propositionalist dyadic relation entails erty example exist explain fact false Father Christmas Fran Fregean given guise haecceity internalism internalist intuitively kind terms Kripke’s puzzle Let’s Lewis Lingens London is pretty Markie mess object one’s Oscar believes Perry Perry’s philosophy of mind phlogiston Pierre believes plausible possible world premise problem property F property theory property-theoretic psychological properties relation of acquaintance relevant Salmon se belief secret admirer seems self-ascribes a property self-ascribes the property semantic sense sentence singular proposition sort Stalnaker Stalnaker’s supervenience tallest mountain tion topaz is yellow triadic relation triadic theorist true truth conditions Twin Earth argument Twin Oscar Valerie