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The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience

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  1. Philosophy Department, SUNY Fredonia, Fenton Hall, Fredonia, NY, 14063, USA

    Neil Feit

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  1. Neil Feit
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Correspondence to Neil Feit.

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Feit, N. The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philos Stud 131, 447–457 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-0016-z

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