Abstract
The most important question concerning picture perception is: what perceptual state are we in when we see an object in a picture? In order to answer this question, philosophers have used the results of the two visual systems model, according to which our visual system can be divided into two streams, a ventral stream for object recognition, allowing one to perceive from an allocentric frame of reference, and a dorsal stream for visually guided motor interaction, thus allowing one to perceive from an egocentric frame of reference. Following this model, philosophers denied that we can be in a dorsal perceptual state when perceiving a depicted object. This is because a depicted object is not physically graspable or manipulable and, in turn, it cannot be egocentrically localized, as a normal object, by the dorsal stream. Thus, the impossibility of manipulating depicted objects and of localizing them from an egocentric frame of reference has led some people to be sceptical about the possibility of a representation of action properties in the perception of objects in pictures, which pertains to the dorsal visual system. The aim of the present paper is to show that it is possible for the depicted object to be represented by dorsal perception. That means that we can ascribe action properties to depicted objects as well, even if depicted objects cannot be egocentrically localized—at least, not as much as normal objects can.
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Notes
I am not defending a representationalist point of view at the expense of the anti-representationalist one. Everything I say here can be reformulated in anti-representationalist terms (e.g. presentation).
Of course, not all properties that we represent objects as having are perceptually represented. I perceive a cup of coffee as black, as spatially located and as big. But I can also represent it as having the property of being the same cup of coffee I used yesterday to drink water, and this would be an example of how it is possible to attribute properties non-perceptually to objects, or, to represent them non perceptually (Nanay 2011b).
Of course, in answering (1) it does not seem strange to argue there are properties that can be perceptually represented in both real object perception and picture perception (colors, shapes, etc.) while other properties can be attributed only to real objects—or picture surfaces, which are real objects (the spatial localization in egocentric coordinates)—but not to depicted objects.
I mean among those that can be given in the framework of the dorsal/ventral accounts of picture perception.
However, Matthen and Nanay share virtually the same ideas, albeit with some differences (Nanay 2011a, p. 477). For the purposes of my paper, the important one is the exception for the necessity of (b). Moreover, in place of ventral vision and dorsal vision Matthen talks about, respectively, descriptive vision and motion-guiding vision. Here this distinction is not important.
...whereas, as we have said, Matthen does, but given what I have clarified above, there is no real conflict.
I do not address the different notions of egocentric space. Here, egocentric space is action space, sometimes referred to in the empirical literature as the peripersonal space “within our reach”. Moreover, Nanay appeals to a weaker notion of egocentric localization with respect to Matthen. For the purposes of this paper this is not relevant. Indeed, even though with some differences Matthen and Nanay share almost the same ideas (Nanay 2011a, p. 477).
Matthen uses the term affordance. For philosophical reasons, I prefer to use here the expression action possibility, and, in turn, the related component of action possibilities called action property.
This position is not different from the one endorsed in the dorsal/ventral account (Nanay 2011a, p. 461). I leave aside the issue concerning the cognitive penetrability of the visual streams.
A large portion of neurons in this area discharge during object fixation and are selective for object properties, such as shape, size, and orientation (Verhoef et al. 2010).
These “visuomotor” neurons showed a specific selectivity, discharging more strongly during the fixation of certain solids as opposed to others, the difference between them depending on the kind of grip afforded by those objects (e.g. precision grip, finger prehension, etc.).
In experiments with monkeys, just as the subject looks at the object its neurons fire, activating the motor program that would be involved were the observer actively interacting with the object. The evoked motor potential (linked to MEP) is just a potential act. This will be important for the evidence in (Sect. 4).
There are different notions of simulation: here I mean an automatic mechanism with the perceptual function to facilitate the motor preparation (Gallese 2000, 2007, 2009). That is, when a visual stimulus is presented, it directly evokes the simulation of the congruent motor schema which, regardless of whether the action is executed or not, maps the stimulus position in motor terms. This is really important insofar as motor activation frames the represented action within the constraints of a real action: represented actions correspond to covert actions as neurophysiological simulation of the mechanisms normally involved in the physical action generation (Jeannerod 2006, pp. 130–131). Also, motor activation is highly specific to the action that is represented. However, neural commands for muscular contractions are effectively present, but simultaneously blocked by inhibitory mechanisms (Jeannerod 2006, Chap. 2.3.3). From a philosophical point of view, this is really important because, while overt action execution is necessarily preceded by its covert representation and simulation, covert representation and simulation are not necessarily followed by overt execution (Jeannerod 2006, p. 2; Chap. 2, 6). An important point: visuomotor representations deal with the process of transformation of the visual percept, that is, with the transformation of the geometrical properties of the objects into action properties and then into motor acts; the recruitment of the suitable motor acts, as a result of the visuomotor transformation, is linked to the motor simulation concerning the selection of a motor plan on the basis of the translation of the properties of the perceived object into action properties (Borghi and Cimatti 2010; Decety and Grèzes 2006; Borghi et al. 2010).
The concept of “most suitable” is not linked to the demand character of action properties, but to the embodied motor possibilities of the subject with respect to the action he can perform. That is, the object is not prescribing a precise kind of action, even though our motor system detects only a small set of action possibilities to the extent that only few motor acts are possible due to bodily constraints.
See footnote 19.
See the case of canonical neurons in (Sect. 3).
For technical, neurological details concerning AIP encoding with respect to action possibilities and geometrical figures and F5 encoding with respect to motor acts as well as the different contribution in the encoding on those by AIP and F5 see (Romero et al. 2014).
For exceptions, see footnote 26.
The notion of apparent possibility of interaction will be important given the nature of dorsal processing. I will talk about this in (Sect. 4.2).
As already said, for the purposes of this paper, it not necessary to question the concept of egocentric space. Here I use this as a synonym of peripersonal space: both are concerned with action space, or the space within one’s reach.
See also Vainio et al. (2011), who revealed a compatibility effect for the orientation of the image of a graspable object.
As in the case of the connection between the AIP and F5, and VIP and F4, the same extremely complex interplay holds between the entire parieto-premotor networks VIP-F4 and AIP-F5 (see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008).
See footnote 26.
There is also evidence that sometimes egocentric/peripersonal encoding might not be necessary. Cardellicchio et al. (2011) showed that, whereas MEP can be modulated by the orientation of the part of an object which is suitable for motor interaction, it can also be modulated by its spatial location, regardless of the fact that this location overlaps with the peripersonal space of the observer. Similarly, Tucker and Ellis (2001) suggested that in order to detect action possibilities it is not necessary for the object to be placed in the peripersonal space. This appears to conflict with the result by Costantini et al. 2010. However, as Zipoli Caiani (2013, footnote 5) observes, while in the experiment by Costantini et al. 2010, motor elicitation is observed only when the image of the target was apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space and apparently reachable by the observer, contrarily, for Tucker and Ellis (2001), “affordance-related compatibility” effects (as they are called in neuroscience) are not dependent on the object being presented within the actual reaching space of the observer. This is because in the experimental settings of Tucker and Ellis, objects are presented behind a plastic LCD screen that inevitably biased any attempt to modulate their reachability by varying the spatial distance between the target and the observer (see also the end of Sect. 4.2 for similar discussions). I would like to point out that, moreover, while in the case of Costantini et al. action is evoked “only” when the object is presented within the portion of the peripersonal space, in the case of Cardellicchio et al. (2011) also non-reachable objects can evoke motor responses; however, the authors found “higher” MEPs during the observation of graspable objects falling within the reachable space compared to the observation of either a non-graspable object or a graspable object falling outside the reachable space. But, as the authors affirm, this evidence clearly indicates that visuomotor recruitment is spatially constrained, as it depends on whether the object falls within the actual reaching space of the onlooker. Note that, in the case of Cardellicchio, we are still talking of virtual two-dimensional images of objects on a computer screen with a resolution of 1024 horizontal pixels by 768 vertical pixels, at a distance of approximately 57 cm (1370). The response may arguably be due to the fact that the computer screen may be perceived, by the subjects, as being in the peripersonal space, and thus, even those objects that are apparently located in the virtual extrapersonal space are perceived as being reachable—and, maybe, just smaller. On the other hand, in the case of Costantini, the presence of the panel influenced the visual perception of the participants, as in the case of Tucker and Ellis (2001). I am not concerned with this exception here. Indeed, my claim is that dorsal perception can ascribe action properties to those depicted objects which are apparently located within the peripersonal space of the observer and which are apparently reachable and this is sufficient in order to extend the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. I just require that action properties can be represented on the basis of motor responses. Establishing whether or not this is really possible also in the case of those objects which cannot be egocentrically encoded goes beyond the purposes of this paper. Finally, the difference in experimental setting may be investigated from the perspective of inflection. Inflection is the phenomenon according to which some of the seen features of the picture’s surface are relevant in characterizing some features of the depicted object as seen in that vehicle (see Voltolini 2013; Nanay 2010). Here I do not need to account for this phenomenon, insofar as different (similar kinds of) pictures induce the same “dorsal” response. Moreover, as I have said, I am not concerned with particular kinds of pictures involving trompe l’oeil.
See footnote 15.
Here I have maintained the neuroscientific terminology.
I want to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting me to specify this point.
“My strategy was to show that we do not localize depicted objects in our egocentric space. Thus, the argument I presented in this section, rephrased using the terminology of the three visual subsystems framework, aimed to show that our ventro-dorsal visual subsystem does not represent the depicted object” (Nanay 2011a, p. 470). See also “The perceptual individuation of visual objects by location” in Jacob and Jeannerod (2003).
Note that, while Nanay suggests that D-D deals with manipulation, whereas it is V-D that deals with egocentric localization, we have evidence that neuronal activity in area V6A of the dorso-dorsal stream can also specify object position with high specificity for the peripersonal (reachable) space not only during reaching tasks (Fattori et al. 2001, 2005; Hadjidimitrakis et al. 2013; Bosco et al. 2014). However, data suggest the leading role of V-D concerning reaching and grasping activities (Maranesi et al. 2014, Turella and Lignau 2014; Gallese 2007; Rizzolatti and Matelli 2003; Borghi and Riggio 2015; Bosco et al. 2014; Castiello 2005). For the purpose of this paper, this should suffice.
The same dependence between the two processings seems to hold for the D-D. See footnote 32.
Tsutsui et al. (2002) explored the sensitivity of caudal intraparietal (CIP) neurons in the dorsal stream to texture-defined 3D surface orientation. CIP neurons are involved in high-level disparity processing (the reconstruction of 3D surface orientation through the computation of disparity gradients). Some CIP neurons are sensitive to texture gradients, which is one of the major monocular cues. Some of them are sensitive to disparity gradients, suggesting their involvement in the computation of 3D surface orientation. Moreover, those sensitive to multiple depth cues were widely distributed together with those sensitive to a specific depth cue, suggesting the involvement of CIP neurons in the integration of depth information from different sources. The convergence of multiple depth cues in CIP seems to play a critical role in 3D vision by constructing a generalized representation of the 3D surface geometry of objects (Tsutsui et al. 2005). See footnote 40.
Accordingly, prior to discriminating depicted objects as such, infants seem to perceive depicted objects as real objects affording action and they even grasp at the pictures as if trying to pick up the depicted objects (DeLoache 2004, p. 68; see also Pierroutsakos and DeLoache 2003; DeLoache et al. 1998).
Volumetric object representation is necessary for the visual control of grip formation and response selection, to ensure that we do not attempt to reach for objects that cannot be grasped (Westwood et al. 2002).
It is computationally efficient for one visual system to handle both response selection and object recognition: both require complete/detailed information about 3D object structure (Goodale and Milner 1992).
One must perceive objects to be different in order to treat them differently.
For the difference between shape perception and volumetric object recognition see (Briscoe 2008).
We have further evidence that picture perception and face-to-face perception are, in general, very close with regards cues relevant for action. Indeed, while the perception of depicted objects lacks a precise sensation of a possibility of complete egocentric localization (in line with the claim of Matthen and Nanay) that a normal object can offer, because the perception of depicted objects leaves absolute depth cues optically unspecified, depicted objects can foster in us the experience of 3D shapes, orientations, relative sizes, and depth ratios, which resemble those real properties found in ordinary 3D objects, for which egocentric localization is not needed (in accordance with Sect. 4; for a review see Vishwanath 2014). This strengthens the fact that we can represent depicted objects as having action properties. Furthermore, if, according to recent evidence, we were to explore the connections between the two streams, we would have a more complete account of how different cues for action can be transferred between the streams. This would better explain the resemblance between face-to-face perception and picture perception concerning all the empirical data reported here on action properties. I do not address this issue here.
This is in line with what I said about the AIP and its interplay with F5 during the perception of depicted objects (Sect. 4).
Of course there are cases in which we guide action using visual consciousness. However, in most cases, dorsal perception does not attach much relative importance to contextual depth cues in situations in which action is extremely rapid or automatic (Briscoe 2009), which seems to be the usual scenario (Pacherie 2007). But sometimes, when the dorsal stream’s preferred sources of spatial information are unavailable or when “there is time”, dorsal perception uses the outputs from ventral processing; thus, the process might be conscious (for a complete overview see Briscoe 2009, p. 441). Note that, at a first step, the visuomotor system processes a gist of the motor act suitable in the given situation regardless of the fact that, in a second step, this motor act will be automatically executed or inhibited, or consciously monitored or diverted, or irrespective of whether we actually guide action consciously or not. This doesn’t conflict with what I say in (Sect. 4) concerning different encodings (automatic/online) for the ventro-dorsal and the dorso-dorsal stream.
It has been claimed that, most of the time, when we look at pictures we ignore the surface (Levinson 1998; Lopes 1996) and that we represent both the depicted object and some of the properties of the picture surface (while we may or may not attend to the surface) (I found this discussion in Nanay 2011a, pp. 463–464).
I want to clarify that I am not arguing that it is not possible. I simply do not focus on this possibility.
Although I have reported several differences, the point, with respect to the received view, is that also the dorsal stream can, in some way, encode depicted objects.
The most important difference between face-to-face and picture perception is the impression of stereopsis, which is not possible in pictures, whose relative depth cues cannot be scaled in absolute depth cues, through which stereopsis is induced (see Vishwanath 2014). I cannot deal with this here.
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Acknowledgments
Special thanks go to Bence Nanay, who read previous drafts of this paper and provided several crucial comments. I also warmly thank these scholars who discussed with me, with enthusiasm, several topics mentioned in this paper and provided numerous insightful comments after reading previous drafts: Mohan Matthen, Mario Alai, Silvano Zipoli Caiani, Pierre Jacob, Corrado Sinigaglia, Alfredo Paternoster, Dan-Cavendon Taylor, Maarten Steenhagen, Grace Helton, Neil Van Leeuwen, Laura Gow. Finally, I want to thank two anonymous referees for their important comments.
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Ferretti, G. Pictures, action properties and motor related effects. Synthese 193, 3787–3817 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1097-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1097-x