Abstract
This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the mental states. In Section 3, I explore the correctness of normative practical reasoning. I conclude with the sceptical view that correct practical reasoning cannot require us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Strictly speaking, Raz’s proposal cannot be entirely correct in suggesting that the conclusion of practical reasoning may be a “deontic statement”. A deontic statement may be the content of the conclusion of a practical inference – in which case the conclusion of a practical inference is a deontic or normative belief. Thus, I will assume that Raz’s third proposal (c) is that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is a deontic or normative belief.
“The most exciting thing which Aristotle has to say about the topic is that a practical inference leads up to or ends in an action, that its conclusion is an action” (von Wright 1978, p. 46). Note, however, that my definition of reasoning at the beginning of this section implicitly excludes the view that reasoning concludes directly in a physical act. I said that reasoning is a mental process which takes place between mental states. Since acquiring a new mental state is clearly not an (physical) action, reasoning cannot end in an (physical) action. However, I think this is not a disadvantage of my definition; to suppose that reasoning can directly conclude in an action is a very implausible view as I argue below.
Out of politeness, I shall speak of “you” instead of a universal person P. All that applies to P, also applies to you.
This state cannot require any further reasoning to cause an action, because then it would not qualify as the conclusion but rather as a (further) premise of the reasoning process.
More precisely, intentions are mental events which cause you to act in a certain way in particular trigger circumstances. A distinctive property of an intention is that it does not require further reasoning to cause an action (i.e., reasoning is not a part of the trigger circumstances)(cf., Lewis 1989, pp. 116–7).
Raz argues that both mental states, i.e. an intention and a normative belief, are likely to cause an action. “Cleary, an intention leads or tends to lead to an action and so do one’s beliefs as to what one ought to do” (Raz 1978, p. 5). However, the real question at stake is whether normative beliefs, like intentions, lead to an action without requiring further reasoning.
Thus, both views fail to consider that “the connection between moral judgements and motivation [might be disconnected by] practical irrationalities of various kinds […] [which] can leave someone’s evaluative outlook intact while removing their motivations altogether” (Smith 1994, pp. 120–1). Also, cf. Stocker (1979, p. 774).
In Section 3 I discuss the proposal that correct practical reasoning leads you from your belief that you ought to ϕ to your intention to ϕ and thus closes the gap between normative beliefs and intention. But in this case, the normative belief is not the conclusion but the premise of the reasoning process.
Cf., Raz (1978, p. 6), Kenny (1975, pp. 97–8). Note that according to the view that practical reasoning concludes in an action, the conclusion of practical reasoning can only be drawn at or just a moment before the action occurs. However, intuitively it seems clear that rational decision making can take place long before the time of the action.
I say “more or less” because one could argue that Kant’s remark is still not entirely correct. Suppose Linda (a philosophy student) intends to get an “A” grade on her final exam paper. She believes that a necessary means to get an “A” grade is that her lecturer reads her exam paper. However, if Linda believes that this will happen even without her intending it, it seems that Linda is not required to intend that her lecturer reads her exam paper (cf., Broome 2002, pp. 90–2).
I borrow the following schema from Broome (2002).
Regarding the validity of this inference, premise (3b) is certainly stronger than it needs to be. If (3b) were a simple material conditional, the inference would still be valid (Broome 2002, p. 89).
As Kenny notices, the contents of this inference represent the fallacy of affirming the consequent (cf. Kenny 1975, p. 70).
On this possibility see Broome (2001, pp. 187–93).
For an explanation of why this does not affect the correctness of practical reasoning, see Broome (1999, esp. pp. 411–3).
References
Aristotle. (1978). De Moto Animalium, trans. M.C. Nussbaum. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Audi, R. (1989). Practical Reasoning. London and New York: Routledge.
Broome, J. (1997). Reason and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Volumes, 71, 131–46.
Broome, J. (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio, 12, 398–419.
Broome, J. (2000). Instrumental Reasoning. In J.Nida- Rümelin and W. Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure. Kluwer, 195–207
Broome, J. (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning. Proceedings of theAristotelian Society Supplementary, Volumes, 75, 175–93.
Broome, J. (2002). Practical Reasoning. In J. L. Bermúdez & A. Millar (Eds.), Reason and Nature: Essay in the Theory of Rationality (pp. 85–111). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dancy, J. (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell: Oxford and Cambridge (Mass.)
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kamm, F. (2000). The Doctrine of Triple Effect and why a Rational Agent needs to Intend the means to his end. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Volumes, 74, 21–39.
Kant, I. (1948). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Patron. London: In The Moral Law, Hutchinson.
Kenny, A. (1975). Will, Freedom and Power. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1989). Dispositional Theories of Values. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 63, 113–37.
Millgram, E. (1995). Was Hume a Humean? Hume Studies, 21, 75–93.
Parfit, D. (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 71, 99–130.
Piller, C. (2000). Doing What is Best. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 208–26.
Piller, C. (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 75, 195–216.
Raz, J. (1978), (ed). Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell: Oxford and Cambridge (Mass.)
Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 738–753.
Vogler, J. (2001). Anscombe on Practical Inference. In E. Millgram (Ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning (pp. 434–464). Cambridge: MIT Press.
von Wright, G. H. (1978). On So-called Practical Inference. In J. Raz (Ed.), Practical Reasoning (pp. 46–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to audiences at Budapest, Cork, and Warwick, and to an anonymous referee of Acta Analytica for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This paper was written with financial support of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. I thank the Academy for its generous support.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fink, J. What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?. Acta Anal 28, 471–482 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0191-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0191-7