“I wanted to become a theologian; for a long time I was unhappy. Now, behold, God is praised by my work even in astronomy.” – Johannes Kepler
“What more powerful form of study of mankind could there be than to read our own instruction book?” – Francis S. Collins
“Those who have dissected or inspected many [bodies] have at least learnt to doubt; while others who are ignorant of anatomy and do not take the trouble to attend it are in no doubt at all.” – Giovanni Battista Morgagni
“The size and age of the Cosmos are beyond ordinary human understanding. Somewhere, something incredible is waiting to be known.” – Carl Sagan
“[Defining Life] The constant uniformity of phenomena under diversity of external influences.” – Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus
“The significant chemicals of living tissue are rickety and unstable, which is exactly what is needed for life.” – Isaac Asimov
“The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth.” – John 1:14
Volume: 4, Issue: 1, December 2017 Publisher: EDIS - Publishing Institution of the University of Zilina Powered by:RCDST (Research Center on the Dialogue between Science & Theology), Ovidius Univesity of Constanta. Romania
The theoretical distance between the Cartesian concept, on the one hand, and the Platonic concept and Medieval tradition, on the other, would be incomprehensible unless one were to take into account the fundamental link, that lies in the thought of John Duns Scotus. The scope of this contribution is to illustrate the theoretical bearing of the turnabout in theology operated by Scotus as regards the concept of ideas. In fact, for Scotus, as we shall see, the concept of the idea is profoundly transformed, loses its exemplary value and takes on a new semblance that is nearer to the Cartesian concept, all this starting from a theological framework.
Author keywords
Plato
Augustine
Descartes
idea
exemplary
thought
Henry of Ghent
John Duns Scotus
References
[1] See Ariew, Roger and Marjorie Grene. “Ideas In and Before Descartes.” Journal of
the History of Ideas, 56 (1995): 87–106, Clark, Desmond. Descartes’ Theory of
Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, Costa, Michael. “What Cartesian Ideas
are not.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 21 (1983): 537–49, Lennon,
Thomas. “The Inherence Pattern and Descartes’ Ideas.””Journal of the History
of Philosophy, 12 (1974): 43–52, Nadler, Steven. Arnauld and the Cartesian
Philosophy of Ideas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, Rozemond, Marleen.
Descartes’ Dualism. Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, Wells,
Norman.“Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suárez.” Journal
of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1990): 33–61, Idem –––, “Descartes’
Idea and its Sources.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 62 (1993):
513–536.
[2] see Renè Descartes, Meditationes metaphysicae III, vol. 7 of Oeuvres de Descartes,
edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Vrin, 1996, p. 36.
[3] see ibidem, p. 160.
[4] see ibidem, pp. 41-42, 102.
[5] see ibidem, p. 40.
[6] see Idem, Meditationes metaphysicae, praefatio, vol. VII of Oeuvres de Descartes, p.
8.
[7] The meaning of the idea as the thought dominates the cognition theory by John Locke,
see Yolton, John W., Locke and the compass of human understanding : a selective
commentary on the Essay, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
[8] see PÉPIN, Jean. “Idea dans la Patristique grèque et latin.» in Idea, Atti del
VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo Roma 5-7 gennaio 1989,
edited by Marta Fattori and Massimo Luigi Bianchi, 23-36, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1990.
[9] see Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus 83, quaestio 46, edited by Almut
Mutzenbecher, Turnhout: Brepols, 1975, pp. 70-73, Fiorentino, Francesco. Francesco di
Meyronnes. Libertà e contingenza nel pensiero tardo-medievale, Rome: Antonianum,
2006, pp. 126-132.
[10] see plato, Timaeus II, 39e-40b, edited byJan Hendrik Waszink, Leiden: Brill, 1962,
pp. 32-33.
[11] see J. Pépin. Jean. “Idea dans la Patristique grèque et latin,” pp. 23-36.
[12] see Henry of Ghent. Quodlibet VII, quaestio 1, edited by Gordon A. Wilson, Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 1991, p. 5.
[13] See ibidem, pp. 19-21.
[14] See Lucio Anneo Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, epistula 58, edited by
Leighton I. Reynolds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 157.
[15] See Bos, Egvert P. “Theory of ideas according to Francis of Meyronnes. Commentary
to the Sentences Conflatus I distinctio 47.” in NÉOPLATONISME et PHILOSOPHIE
MÉDIÉVALE. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou 6-8 octobre 1995 organisé par
la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, edited by
Linos G. BENAKIS, 211-227, Turnhout : Brepols, 1997, PORRO, Pasquale. “Possibilità
ed esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand, in Henry of Ghent, edited by Willy VANHAMEL,
11-253, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996, Idem, “Res a reor reris, Res a
ratitudine. Autour d'Henri de Gand.» in Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach,
edited by Inigo Atucha, 617-628, Turnhout : Brepols, 2011.
[16] See Henry of Ghent. Quodlibet VII, quaestio 1, edited by Gordon A. Wilson, pp.
19-21, Idem, Quodlibet IX, quaestio 2, edited byRaymond Macken, Leuven: Leuven
University Press, 1983, pp. 34-38 , Quodlibet X, quaestio 7, edited byRaymond Macken,
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1981, p. 151.
[17] see Aristotle, Metaphysica VII, 15, 1040a27, edited by Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem,
Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 152.
[18] See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, quaestio 2, edited by Raymond Macken, pp. 34-38.
[19] For these works by Scotus see Fiorentino, Francesco. “Introduzione. Conoscenza e
attività in Giovanni Duns Scoto.” in Il Prologo dell’Ordinatio di Giovanni Duns
Scoto, introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento, 1-153, Rome: Città Nuova, 2016.
[20] The same thing is evident in Plato, who was the first to introduce ideas and discuss
them. In fact, he placed the sensible world outside, in the existence of things, and
the intelligible world inside the divine mind, calling the intelligible world the
idea of the sensible world and of the things that are outside. Instead, the
intelligible world and the idea in the mind are nothing other than the sensible
world, being inside the divine mind as knowable objects. In this way, the idea of the
world as the extrinsic thing is nothing other than the intelligible world or the
world itself in its known being. And it is not worthwhile worrying, at this point,
whether one or more ideas correspond to the world of extrinsic things. This is also
evident as based on Augustine, because Augustine imitates Plato as regards ideas. But
now Plato places the idea inside the divine mind, in the way that Aristotle falsely
imputed to him, of placing ideas within extrinsic things, according to the
Commentator in the first book of Ethics, chapter 7. In fact, Aristotle imputed to him
that he had placed ideas as essences of sensible things, existing in themselves.
Therefore, if he placed ideas in the divine mind as essences known by the divine mind
and not as relations, then it is evident from the above-mentioned small parts that
the definition of the idea is attributable to him.
[21] This seems to be concordant also with Plato’s statement, from which Aristotle drew
the name idea. In fact, he claimed that ideas are already existing essences of things
in the divine mind, that is bad according to Aristotle and good according to
Augustine. So sometimes he speaks about what the intelligible world is in his view.
Thus, in the same way as ideas were seen as the essence of things according to
Aristotle’s imposition as to how they were placed according to Plato, so could it
be said of the essences that had their known being in the divine intellect. Having
said this, it is not worth making a formal effort to define some relations as ideas,
regardless of whether they are, in the divine essence, objects, reasons or acts of
the divine intellection. On the contrary, it is the known object itself that is the
idea according to this statement.
[22] John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, DISTINCTIO 35, quaestio unica, edited by Carlo
Balìc. vol. VI of Opera omnia. Vatican City: Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis, 1963, p.
258: «Along these lines, it is evident to whom the idea belongs because it is that
of every secondary object, regardless of whether it is producible or not producible,
and is singular or universal, and again universally inferior or superior, as you
proceed about the intellect.»
[23] Idem, Reportatio Parisiensis I-A, distinctio 36, pars 1, quaestio 2, edited by Alan
B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, vol. 2 of The examined report of the Paris lecture
Reportatio 1.-A : latin text and english translation, St. Bonaventure, Franciscan
Institute, 2004-2008, , p. 403: «However, first of all it is necessary to know what
the idea is. So I state that the idea is an eternal reason in the divine mind, in
accordance with something that can be formed according to its own reason. So it is
evident that the idea is not a reason, but the known object in the divine mind, where
the creatures are, in the objective sense. This is proven firstly by means of the
Philosopher in the seventh book of Metaphysica, where he states that everything that
is made, is made in a univocal way, not only as regards natural things but also
artificial things, like the extrinsic house from the intrinsic house, that is in the
mind of the maker. In fact, the house in the mind of the maker is objectively within
the species house. But the species of the extrinsic house is in the soul, because
otherwise the extrinsic house could not be thus present to the soul, because the soul
is not inside the soul but in its species. Therefore, the extrinsic house is made in
the soul of the house because it is objectively inside its species in the soul. Thus,
the objective house in the soul, according to which the extrinsic house is made, is
the idea of it, because it is the house that was thought of. But the created object
cannot be present in this way to the divine mind, because this would vilify the
intellect. Therefore, it is opportune that it should be objectively in the divine
essence, that virtually contains those of everything. In fact, because the divine
essence represents all things in the same thing and reason, and because in this way
it contains a creature as the object, it will be the idea of the extrinsic object, so
that the idea of the stone is nothing other than the stone that was thought of.»
[24] See ibidem, DISTINCTIO 36, pars 1, quaestio 2, P. 405.
[25] See ibidem, DISTINCTIO 36, pars 2, quaestio 1, p. 425.
[26] See ibidem, DISTINCTIO 36, pars 2, quaestio 1, p. 425.
[27] ibidem, DISTINCTIO 36, pars 2, quaestio 1, p. 425: «I add, also, that any idea is
practical in its own way, not a simple way, so that its object is sometimes produced
according to it, but is naturally adapted to being produced according to it, if the
will accepts this through its own act. This is proven because the maker that
produces, through knowledge, an operable thing in accordance with all that is within
it, has a distinct knowledge of everything that is operable within it, and of every
part and incident of the operable thing. But the maker is God, so He has a distinct,
practical knowledge of everything that He produces in the operable thing, and hence
possesses the distinct principle of the practical knowledge, that is the idea.»
[28] So, in this context: the divine intellect thinks first of all of the essence, and in
the second instant thinks of the creature in its thinkable being, not through an act
of comparison but, for the stone, as a direct act following the relation to the
divine intellect or the divine science according to the third mode of the relation.
Thus, in this case the stone as a thinkable being is referred to the divine science
in the same way as the measurable is to the measure. So in this way, thinking of the
stone is nothing other than the fact that the stone being, produced as a thinkable
being, is related to the divine science as an absolute essence and not as referred in
reverse. So the creation of the stone by God is nothing other than the fact that the
stone produced as a being in existence is referred to God, seen as absolute in the
sense of being the term of the relation, not as referred in reverse. Instead, in the
third sign or third instant of nature the divine intellect compares the essence from
which a certain ideal relation was caused to the stone in its thinkable being.
Instead, in the fourth instant it reflects upon this comparison and on the act of
comparing and so knows the idea. Thus, the idea as a certain entity follows the
intellection of the creature in the third sign and it is in the other instant, the
fourth, that the knowledge and the understanding of this idea and of that relation
follow.
[29] But according to the first opinion the order of the intellect to them is such that
God, in the first instant, knows the essence and in the second instant knows and
thinks of the creature through its essence. In this case, according to this pathway
the knowable object depends on the divine thought of the known being, because the
object is constituted in its known being by means of this thought. And God, through
pure, absolute reason, terminates the relation of the creature. Instead, in the third
instant the divine intellect can compare the essence with the extrinsically thinkable
object according to its relation with reason, even if this is not necessary for the
intellection of the creature, because it follows this intellection. But according to
the other pathway, it should be stated that in the second instant, when God thinks of
the stone and it is constituted in its known being, the creature is not referred to
God nor depends on Him, because otherwise there is nothing in the thing and in every
thing of the same kind, or in the whole instant when God thinks of the stone without
any dependence of the stone on it. In this case, like before, God compares Himself to
the stone as thought of and so has a relation of reason with it. So in the fourth
instant God can think of this relation of reason.
[30] It can be described in these terms: in the first instant God thinks of the essence
according to pure, absolute reason. In the second instant He produces the stone as a
thinkable being and thinks of the stone, so in the stone that has been thought of
there is a relation with the divine intellection. But at that moment there is no
relation to the stone in the divine intellection. But the divine intellect terminates
the relation of the stone as thought of. In the third instant, perhaps, the divine
intellect can compare its intellection to any thinkable thing with which we could
compare it. In this case, comparing itself to the stone that was thought of can in
itself cause the relation of reason. In the fourth instant He can reflect on this
relation caused in the third instant and in this case the relation of reason will
become known. Thus, in this way the relation of reason is not necessary in order to
think of the stone, as if it were before the stone as object. Indeed, because it has
been caused, it is posterior in the third instant and so, as known, it will be
posterior because it is in the fourth instant.
[31] Idem, Lectura I, distinctio 35, quaestio unica, edited by Carlo Balìc. vol. XVII of
Opera omnia. Vatican City: Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis, 1966, p. 456: « So, the idea
is the essence that has been thought of and from which something can originate that
is similar to the outside world. Therefore, in the first instant the divine intellect
thinks of the essence and in the second, of the essences of the others, that are
called ideas because they are thought of in this way. In the third instant the divine
intellect compares the essence to the essences and so the relations of reason are
caused, that can be called certain other ideas. Therefore, Augustine does not state
that the idea is the reason according to which the divine intellect thinks, but
rather according to which it forms everything that can be formed. In fact, if it were
according to reason that it thinks, because the thing is thought of, the divine
intellect would be vilified by this thinking. However, if by some means the idea is
prevented from being the reason according to which it thinks, then it must be thought
of as a known object, not as an object that activates the act of thought.»
[32] See ibidem, DISTINCTIO 36, quaestio unica, pp. 464-466.
[33] ibidem, distinctio 36, quaestio unica, pp. 468-469: «For this reason I state that
the thing has not received, from eternity, the true being of the essence or
existence, but rather founds the ideal relation according to the weakened being that
it has received from eternity, that is the real being, distinct from the being of the
essence and of existence, as is evident in the sixth book of Metaphysica. It is as
if, taking the case that I came from eternity, and from eternity I thought of the
thing, then from eternity I thought of the stone according to its being of the
essence and being of existence and yet I have nothing other than the known object. As
if now the rose were nothing at all, I think of the rose according to the being of
the essence and of existence and yet I have neither of them. Therefore, the term of
the intellection is the being of the essence or the being of existence and yet what
is presented as object to the intellect only has a weakened being in the intellect.»
[34] See ibidem, distinctio 36, quaestio unica, p. 469.
[35] See ibidem, distinctio 36, quaestio unica, Pp. 471-472.
[36] ibidem, distinctio 39, quaestio 3, p. 510: « […] the divine intellect, that in
the first instant reviews its essence, sees all things according to their thinkable
being, because in this case they are constituted in their thinkable being. But then
their being is not inside the producible essence until they have been willed by the
divine will. Therefore, when the thing has that reason, it is seen when reviewing the
essence.»
[37] See ibidem, distinctio 43, quaestio unica, p. 534.
[38] see Boulnois, Olivier. « Theologie, metaphisique et reppresentation de l’etre
selon Jean Duns Scot, » in Metaphisiques mèdièvales. Etudes en l'honneur d'André
de Muralt, edited by Curzio Chiesa and Leo Freuler, 83-102, Geneve: Cahiers de la
Revue de thèologie et philosophie, 1997, Fiorentino, Francesco. “L’autonomia
ontologica delle idee platoniche. Il dibattito ottocentesco e le radici
scolastiche,” in Platone nel pensiero moderno e contemporaneo, edited by Andrea
Muni, 21-64, Villa Santa (MB): Limina mentis, 2014, Idem. “La disputa tra Giovanni
Punch e Bartolomeo Mastri riguardo allo statuto ontologico delle essenze in quanto
enti possibili sulle orme dello scotismo delle origini,” in FILOSOFI E MODERNITÀ.
Antichi e nuovi sentieri II, edited by Alessandro Pizzo and Ivan Pozzoni, 87-120,
Villa Santa (MB): Limina Mentis, 2015, Francis E. Kelley. “Some Observations on the
Fictum Theory in Ockham and its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis,” Franciscan Studies,
38 (1978): 260-282, Panaccio, Claude. “Intuition and Causality: Ockham's
Externalism Revisited,” Quaestio, 10 (2010): 241-254, Tachau, Katherine H. “Some
Aspects of the Notion of Intentional Existence at Paris, 1250-1320,” in Medieval
Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the Symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of
Medieval Philosophy’ january 10-13, 1996, edited by Steen Ebbesen and Russel L.
Friedman, 331-352, Copenhagen: the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, 1999.