Journal of the History of Philosophy

520 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that we could never make a mistake here, or never be in doubt about what to say" (p. 98). Moore may be uncovering something important here, but the discussion is too brief and obscure to tell for sure. Moore tends to relate Biran to his eighteenth and nineteenth century contemporaries or to recent analytic philosophers of mind such as Wittgenstein and Malcolm. But readers who are familiar with the broad tradition of phenomenology, which includes figures such as Brentano, Husserl, James, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, will see that Biran anticipates, at least in general outline, some of the most basic themes of phenomenology . The attempt to probe experience at its roots and to look for points of certainty, the use of a reflective or introspective approach in describing and understanding experience , an emphasis on the relation between the self and the world, a stress on the primary of will and the selectivity and intentionality of consciousness--all of these themes are developed and analysed in phenomenology and all of them can be found in Biran as well. Moore does not discuss these relationships, but his book indicates that scholars of the phenomenological tradition will be well advised to read and study Biran in detail. Moore has made a valuable contribution to philosophical scholarship. One only wishes that he had taken his exposition and analysis further. He suggests that Biran has provocative insights in fields other than philosophical psychology. Having done so well in dealing with the psychological aspects of Biran's thought, one would like Moore to cover the metaphysical and religious views of Biran in more detail. By the same token, the book does not go far in relating Biran to the development of important contemporary positions and problems. There is a discussion of the differences between the views of Biran and Malcolm on dreaming, but the contemporary field is richer than that. It is to be hoped that Moore will do more in the future to relate Biran to contemporary discussions and that he will also use his historical studies as a stepping stone to develop his own views more fully. The skills he has shown in The Psychology o/ Maine de Biran indicate that he is well equipped to do good work in all of these areas. JOHN K. ROTH Claremont Men's College Die beiden Labyrinthe der Philosophie. Band I: Einleitung. l. Teil: Neopositivismus und Diamat (Histomat). By Erich Heintel. (Wien und Mtinchen: Verlag R. Oldenbourg , 1968. Pp. xx+892. Paper DM 79, DM 84) That Vienna is now very traditional, and not quite of this century as it was at its beginning when it was much responsible for laying the foundations of modernism must readily be admitted. And it must also be admitted that; nowadays, "Vienna . . . probably breathes a sigh of relief" at the departure of that modernist culture and any of its expressions, as was asserted in an article in the New York Times (July 20, 1969), entitled "It's Still Yesterday in Vienna." Yet can we claim, in its last third, that this century has provided us with a viable alternative to traditional culture? It is with this question in mind that we must look at the vast and robust conceptual design that has been submitted to the philosophical world by a professor at the University of Vienna. Erich Heintel rides deliberately on the back of the great philosophical tradition from Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel. He moves back and forth between what he calls Aristotelianism and transcendentalism, with Aristotle and Kant respectively as main guides--and again within the latter BOOK REVIEWS 521 between Kant and Hegel--in a truly gigantic attempt at a systematic solution, resolution , and dissolution of the entire range of the problems of philosophy. Leibniz is his model. In him he finds the idea of a perennial philosophy that preserves the traditional philosophic enterprise, and carries it out and forward in the present. In him he sees joined the master-motifs of Aristotelianism and transcendentalism with Substance (obt~{ct), and Freedom (Freiheit), respectively, at their con. ceptual center. The phrase Substance and Freedom, incidentally, serves best, according to Heintel, to circumscribe...