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I wish to thank Prof. Marcelo Dascal of Tel-Aviv University and Prof. Joseph Agassi of Tel-Aviv and York Universities for their prompting, help and fruitful criticism.
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Fisch, M. Hempel's ravens, the natural classification of hypotheses and the growth of knowledge. Erkenntnis 21, 45–62 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00176182
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00176182