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intervention problem, insisting that such intervention is not possible given that e_1 caused f_1 and given that we are concerned with his so-called “primordial” (p. 30) notion of causation. The intervention issue, however, does at least make clear just how little Fales’ notion of causation has to do with the concept of causation employed in everyday thought and talk. Furthermore, Fales hasn’t really stated an analysis of anything, because he hasn’t told us what this relation C is. I am able to raise certain counterexamples because (i) I can make sense of causation as a relation between events, and (ii) Fales has stated a biconditional that in effect places conditions on C ’s obtaining in terms of this familiar relation. But the direction of the philosophical explanation was supposed to be the other way around! We are given no *independent* description of C .²

There are other weak aspects of this book. Fales is cavalier about our ability to draw conclusions from the character of our phenomenal experience. For instance, according to Fales, it is from the character of our experience that we know that causation, qua relation between events, is asymmetric (p. 17 and p. 123). But asymmetry is a general property. It is the property that, for *all* events e and f , if e causes f , then it is not the case that f causes e . How could one learn that causation has this feature directly from experience? His criticisms of nominalism are also disappointing, not going much beyond the criticisms raised by Armstrong in *Nominalism and Realism*.³ But, as I said at the outset, *Causation and Universals* does include much that is useful. Among the more useful parts of the book is a rather extended development of a unique ontology, one that realists about universals will certainly find interesting. There is also an especially elegant discussion of the possibility of perceiving that e caused f when e and f are external events (pp. 251–52). Finally, there is refreshing emphasis on the connections between spatiotemporal matters and the other topics.⁴

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The Non-Reality of Free Will. RICHARD DOUBLE. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. 247.

Double begins by developing what he takes to be a plausible account of free will. This account is an extension of the hierarchical account of free will proposed by such philosophers as Harry Frankfurt. Double argues his approach can successfully avoid various counterexamples to the simple versions of the hierarchical account (“such as those based on Martian remote-controllers, hypnotists, ingenious neurosurgeons, and so forth”) while still remaining compatibilistic. The refinements of the simple theo-

² Some philosophers appear to think that, on one of its ordinary uses, the verb ‘to cause’ expresses a relation between properties; e.g., in the sentence ‘Smoking causes coughing’. One might be tempted to think that this relation is, or could play the role of, the relation C . Giving in to this temptation would be a mistake. I have argued that there is no such relation. See my “Property-Level Causation?” *Philosophical Studies* LXIII (1991): 245–70.

³ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). For some especially convincing replies to Armstrong, see Michael Devitt’s “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* LXI (1980): 433–39, and David Lewis’ “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* LXI (1983): 343–77.

⁴ I am grateful to Keith DeRose and Stephen Schiffer for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this review.

ries proposed by Double involve five “autonomy variables”: self-knowledge, reasonability, intelligence, efficacy, and unity. Double develops these notions in such a way that they (allegedly) block the typical counterexamples to the hierarchical account of free will.

Double then extends the compatibilist account to apply to moral responsibility. He argues that a compatibilist can assign a strong content to ascriptions of moral responsibility (i.e., that he can embrace the full range of robust “reactive attitudes”) and also justify such ascriptions on non-consequentialist grounds. Double’s argument here is on “formalistic grounds”.¹

Although Double develops these compatibilistic accounts of free will and moral responsibility and defends them against certain objections, he ultimately does not endorse them. Indeed, he wishes to argue that the ordinary notions of free will and moral responsibility are incoherent; that is to say, the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” do not pick out unified phenomena analogous to natural kinds. The central argument for this conclusion is as follows. Double claims that “free will” and “moral responsibility” are paradigm or exemplar concepts whose applications are governed by conflicting paradigms. An exemplar concept is one that we decide applies more or less to an object in virtue of the degree to which that object approximates the paradigm we associate with the concept. The problem then with “free will” and “moral responsibility” is that they have multiple, conflicting paradigms.

More specifically, Double argues that we can construct examples in which our intuitions “move in opposite directions” (and in which our intuitions thus do not help us properly to resolve the cases). He claims that there are certain particularly salient issues relative to which this is the case: 1) whether persons must meet certain normative requirements of free will, 2) whether bribes ever reduce our freedom, 3) whether we are made unfree by forces that strongly influence, without absolutely dictating, our choices; and 4) whether being free requires feeling free. Double then presents three exemplars: i) the reasonable man, ii) the pure rational ego, and iii) the nonegocentric actor. He claims that our intuitive conflicts about what to say in the above four sorts of cases issue from our attempts to apply these three conflicting exemplars: application of one exemplar leads us in one direction, whereas application of a different exemplar leads us in another direction. Since “free will” and “moral responsibility” are exemplar notions in which the pertinent exemplars conflict in certain ways, Double concludes that the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” do not refer to any sort of unified, interesting phenomena—there is no objective and real set of phenomena corresponding to these concepts.

Double gives some reasons to think that this result is not surprising. He criticizes various libertarian accounts of free will. Also, he argues against the doctrine of moral realism. If moral realism is false and such notions as “free will” and “moral responsibility” have some normative content, then it would not be surprising that these notions do not correspond to any objective reality.

This is a lively, thoughtful, well-informed book. The reader will find many insights along the way. Here I wish to challenge (in a brief way) the central thesis: that such notions as “free will” and “moral responsibility” are governed by conflicting paradigms. A problem with the argument is that “free will” is being treated as an umbrella term which covers various importantly distinct notions. Once this is seen, it emerges that it is possible that the alleged inconsistencies identified by Double is-

¹ For a presentation and criticism of this argument, see the review of Double’s book by Mark Ravizza, *Philosophical Review*, forthcoming.

sue from conflating the different distinct notions (subsumed under the umbrella notion). Alternatively, they may issue from problems with certain subsumed notions which do not afflict others. If the latter is the case and the pertinent notions are prized apart, perhaps it can be seen that there are *certain* notions of free will and moral responsibility which do not obviously suffer from inconsistencies (putatively coming from inconsistent paradigms).

I wish to pursue this last possibility. Begin by noting that there are two importantly different notions of free will which are conflated by Double: "acting freely" and "freedom to do otherwise". (Alternatively, the first notion is "choosing freely", whereas the second is "freedom to choose otherwise". For the sake of simplicity, in this review I shall lump together "acting and choosing"; the important point here is that the first notion of freedom does not imply alternative possibilities, whereas the second notion does imply alternative possibilities.) The first notion corresponds to the traditional idea of the liberty of spontaneity, whereas the second notion corresponds to the traditional idea of the liberty of indifference. Of course, some philosophers believe that they are intimately related; that is, some argue that acting freely requires freedom to do otherwise (and the liberty of spontaneity requires the liberty of indifference). But other philosophers have argued (with some plausibility, in my view) that acting freely (the liberty of spontaneity) does *not* require freedom to do otherwise (the liberty of indifference). Indeed, the contemporary philosopher Harry Frankfurt (from whom Double takes his cue in regard to the hierarchical approach to free will) has vigorously argued for the latter thesis. Further, he (and others) have argued that it is only acting freely and the liberty of spontaneity which are associated with moral responsibility, *not* freedom to do otherwise and the liberty of indifference.

These points bear crucially on Double's strategy of argumentation for his central thesis. Consider the following case in which there purportedly is an inconsistency in the notion of free will. Double argues that there is an irresolvable dispute between those who argue that "could have done otherwise" should be analyzed hypothetically (the compatibilists) and those who argue that it should be analyzed categorically (the incompatibilists). The dispute here may indeed be irresolvable, but note that it pertains only to freedom to do otherwise, not to acting freely. Thus, if we focus solely on acting freely as the notion of free will that is relevant to moral responsibility, this possible source of inconsistency is eliminated.

Double says, "That compatibilists and incompatibilists are committed to the view that any acceptable sense of 'free will' must entail that free persons could have chosen otherwise is shown by the extensive twentieth-century debate over whose account of this notion captures 'the' prephilosophical notion..." (p. 219) But of course the mere existence of such a debate shows at most that *many* philosophers have thought that freedom to do otherwise is entailed by any notion of free will connected to moral responsibility; it does not show that *all* philosophers have thought this, or that it is the *only* plausible position. Further, the existence of this debate seems to me simply to indicate that freedom to do otherwise is an intrinsically interesting notion of freedom (involved centrally in our intuitive picture of ourselves as practical reasoners and deliberators) which is very hard to explicate. Later, Double says, "If the main theme of this book is correct, then the attempt by both sides to give a single correct analysis of the notion of choosing otherwise is fruitless, since there is no single *analysandum* to be captured." (pp. 219–20) But at most Double is entitled to conclude that there is no single notion which corresponds to freedom to

do otherwise; he is *not* entitled to move from this point to the claim that there is no notion of free will which is coherent and related (in an important way) to moral responsibility.

I have only focussed on one argument here. But I am inclined to think this example points to a general problem with Double's strategy (although I cannot establish this here). He argues that the notions of "free will" and "moral responsibility" do not correspond to a unified objective set of phenomena because they are governed by conflicting paradigms. But the apparent inconsistencies may come from treating "free will" as an umbrella term and failing to distinguish the various notions it covers. Some of these subsumed notions may be incoherent, or at least very difficult to explicate. Further, in some cases the appearance of inconsistency may come from attempting to combine exemplars which apply to different subsumed notions. In any case, because of his conflation of various importantly different notions of freedom, I do not believe that Double has established his central contention.

Here is a final example of the confusions generated by Double's failure to distinguish the relevant notions of freedom. In the first part of the book, he gives the following argument for the plausibility of what he calls the "internalistic" view of free will (and moral responsibility):

Imagine that on Earth and on its molecule-for-molecule replica, Twin Earth, there are two persons who are likewise qualitatively identical (including the states of their Cartesian minds, if they have them), call them 'Jim' and 'Twin Jim'. Imagine also that (i) all of Jim's and Twin Jim's choices are qualitatively identical, as are their entire psychological histories, and (ii) some of Jim's choices satisfy the libertarian notion of freedom (that is, there are other causally possible Earths where Jim's choices are different given the conditions that hold on Earth), whereas all of Twin Jim's choices are determined. Now, if the dignity objection to determinism is sound, it seems that Jim, but not Twin Jim, is sometimes worthy of dignity. But how can that be? They have done all the same things for the same reasons—they are qualitatively indistinguishable physically, intellectually, emotionally, and so on. (p. 58)

Double's view is that the internalistic view of such notions as free will and moral responsibility (favored by the compatibilist) has considerable plausibility, but ultimately it cannot be combined with other more externalistic considerations (favored by the incompatibilist) to get plausible and coherent concepts. But it seems to me that the thought-experiment simply shows that determinism in itself does not seem to threaten *acting freely* and thus moral responsibility (and dignity). Of course, if the relevant freedom notions are distinguished, it would not follow that determinism poses no threat to *freedom to do otherwise*. It may be that Jim is free to do otherwise, whereas Twin Jim is never free to do otherwise, and yet they are equivalent with regard to moral responsibility ascriptions. So even if there are powerful reasons for thinking that causal determinism threatens freedom to do otherwise, one can say the intuitively plausible thing about the thought experiment *without* generating any sort of inconsistency. A more articulated view of "free will"—in which different notions of freedom are distinguished—can help to make at least some of the apparent tensions and inconsistencies disappear.

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