Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern MetaethicsGuy Fletcher, Michael Ridge A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts. |
Other editions - View all
Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics Guy Fletcher,Michael R. Ridge Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
a-expression accept action agent amoralist Angie Angie’s argue assertion attitude expression Bar-On Bertie Big Hypothesis Boisvert cheesehead cognitive cognitivism cognitivist committed conventional implicature conversational Copp Descriptive relativism desire-like attitudes disapproval endorse ethical claims ethical sentences example explain Finlay Frege-Geach problem grass is green Guy Fletcher Hybrid Expressivism hybrid expressivist hybrid theories hybrid view illocutionary act implicating inconsistent inference-licensing insulting interpretation intuitively irrational jure kind logical Mark Schroeder mental Metaethics metamoral metonymy moral belief moral judgment moral language moral predicates Moral Realism moral sentences moral terms moral thought moral utterances morally wrong motivation noncognitive normative concepts normative disagreement normative judgment one’s Oxford University Press Philosophy plausible pragmatic preference premises primary set problem proposition propositional attitude R. M. Hare rational realist-expressivism relativism Ridge Schmidt Schroeder secondary set semantic speaker speech act stealing is wrong successful[s,t things tion tive token true truth conditions valid arguments wrong-judgments