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The Genetic Privacy Act: An Analysis of Privacy and Research Concerns

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Edwin S. Flores Troy
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In the last few years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the effects that the achievements of the Human Genome Project will have on the confidentiality of medical information. The Genetic Privacy Act (GPA) is an attempt to address the privacy, confidentiality, and property rights relating to obtaining, requesting, using, storing, and disposing of genetic material. The GPA grew out of concerns over the vast amount of genetic information that is a product of the Human Genome Project. The central goals of the GPA are twofold: (1) to define an individual's right to control access to their genetic material and the privilege to control the information derived therefrom; and (2) to prevent potential and actual abuse of genetic information by third parties, such as insurance companies, employers, and government. The GPA is one of a group of proposals that seek to control the flow of medical information from the individual to health care professionals and to other persons.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , Winter 1997 , pp. 256 - 272
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1997

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References

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Will information about my DNA [from my banked sample] get into the wrong hands?;Google Scholar
It is my DNA [my banked sample], right?;Google Scholar
Can I withdraw my personal involvement [my banked sample] from this research project at any time?;Google Scholar
How long do you plan to keep my DNA [my banked sample]?;Google Scholar
If you find something important about me from my DNA [my banked sample], will you tell me? What if I don't want to have that information?;Google Scholar
Will other people in the future have access to my DNA sample [genetic information about me]?; andGoogle Scholar
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