Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive ScienceA collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, "Representations" convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research.One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of "functionalism" considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of "reductionism" considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophical approach to ontology of the mental.The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes which emerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in the remaining essays.Not all of these essays are "re-presentations." The new introductory essay seeks to present an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalism makes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previously published, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure of concepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositional attitudes," a critical examination of some of D. C. Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewritten for this volume." A Bradford Book. " |
Contents
Something on the State of the Art | 1 |
The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explana | 63 |
Propositional Attitudes | 177 |
Copyright | |
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Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science Jerry A. Fodor No preview available - 1983 |
Common terms and phrases
argue argument ascriptions assume assumption behavior behaviorist belief bridge laws canonical causal claim cognitive psychology complex computational concept attainment construal corresponding criteria criterion Dennett descriptions distinction dream elephants are gray empirical Empiricist English entails event example experiences explanation express fact facto flurg FSIT function hence idea inference innate insofar intensional intentional stance intentional theories internal representations John believes kind predicates language learning lexical concepts logical machine table mental processes mental representations mind Nativist neurological nomologically notion objects ontological opaque organism particular philosophical plausible primitive concepts principle probabilistic automata propositional attitudes prototype psychological theories qualia question raining rational reduction reductionism reference relation representational theory satisfy semantic properties sense sensory sentence sort special sciences specify structure suppose T₁ things tion token physicalism triggering true Turing machine type identity type physicalism unity of science verbs verificationism virtue vocabulary Wittgenstein