Abstract
The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism.
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Notes
In the earlier versions of her capabilities theory Nussbaum focused on what a ‘truly human’ life requires, whereas in her more recent versions the focus is on what a ‘dignified life’ requires. Despite this shift, her list of central capabilities remains the same (Claassen and Düwell 2012). The concept of dignity does not play an important role in Amartya Sen’s version of capabilities theory.
Admittedly, this is what Nussbaum does at times, such as in Nussbaum 2009.
See, for example, Nussbaum 2006, p. 70.
For example, in defence of her claim that human dignity has ‘broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive power’, Nussbaum argues that dignity is an ‘idea that lies at the heart of tragic artworks, in whatever culture’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 72). But this clearly refers to the concept, rather than to her conception, of dignity.
A distinction along these lines is often made in the literature on dignity. For example, Sensen (2011, pp. 162–3) makes a similar distinction, which he claims is prevalent in historical conceptions of dignity, between ‘initial’ (our status) and ‘realized’ (our achievement) dignity; Neuhäuser and Stoecker (2014) between what they call ‘human dignity’ (our status dignity) and ‘dignity proper’ (our achievement dignity); and Schroeder (2010) between ‘inviolable’ (our status) dignity and ‘aspirational’ (our achievement) dignity. However, since we spell out this distinction in our own way, we prefer to introduce our own terms. This distinction also roughly corresponds with Darwall’s (1977) distinction between recognition-respect and status-respect.
For example, in debates about euthanasia in which disputants on both sides of the debate appeal to human dignity to defend their position, the defenders of euthanasia seem to be both appealing to a particular conception of achievement dignity (relating to bodily comportment and control) and rejecting the particular conception of status dignity that is assumed by the critics of euthanasia (Schroeder 2008). Such defenders of euthanasia might, then, be understood as endorsing only a particular conception of achievement dignity and rejecting all (or at least some) conceptions of status dignity. This shows that it is possible to have a conception of one type of dignity but not the other.
In addition, according to Nussbaum (2009, p. 355), the Stoic conception of dignity differs from the Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions in being committed to the worthlessness of ‘external goods’, such as health, friendship, and the lives of one’s children.
But these moral obligations cannot form part of Nussbaum’s political conception of dignity and thus would need to be independently defended.
This claim is different from (but not in tension with) the claim that it is difficult from a policy perspective to assess whether a capability is present without the presence of the corresponding functioning (see e.g. Deneulin 2002, p. 502). It is also different from the claim that at a societal level functionings and capabilities are interconnected; for example, members of a society can only have the capability of living in a clean environment if enough people function in a certain way (e.g. by disposing of their waste in appropriate ways). Our distinct claim is that in some cases, such as practical reason, an individual cannot have the capability without some degree of functioning, and therefore the very distinction between capabilities and functionings collapses in these cases (but not in all cases).
Nussbaum (2006, pp. 383–84) acknowledges that her ‘idea of cross species dignity’ is a controversial metaphysical idea that isn’t (at present) supported by an overlapping consensus. However, what she fails to acknowledge is that her conception of human dignity as based in species specific norms of flourishing and the active striving to meet needs is also a controversial metaphysical idea since it is this conception that commits her to the status dignity of animals.
As opposed to the far less controversial claim that the unnecessary suffering of animals matters morally.
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We would like to thank this journal’s three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Formosa, P., Mackenzie, C. Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities Approach to Dignity. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 875–892 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9487-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9487-y