References
Austin, J. L.: 1950, ‘Truth’, inPhilosophical Papers, Oxford University Press 1990, 117–133.
Barwise, Jon and Etchemendy, John: 1987,The Liar, Oxford University Press.
Burge, Tyler: 1978, ‘Belief and Synonymy’,The Journal of Philosophy 75, 119–138.
Field, Hartry: 1984, ‘Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge?’,The Philosophical Review 93, 509–552.
Forbes, Graeme: 1985,The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press.
Forbes, Graeme: 1987, ‘Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective’,The Philosophical Review 96, 3–31.
Forbes, Graeme: 1989,Languages of Possibility, Basil Blackwell.
Forbes, Graeme: 1990, ‘The Indispensability ofSinn’,The Philosophical Review 99, 535–63.
Forbes, Graeme: 1992, ‘What Speech Reports Mean’, unpublished manuscript.
Kaplan, David: 1989, ‘Demonstratives’, inThemes from Kaplan edited by J. Almoget al., Oxford University Press, 481–566.
Lewis, David: 1983,Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Oxford University Press.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1961, ‘Reference and Modality’, inFrom a Logical Point of View, Harper and Row, 139–59.
Salmon, Nathan: 1986,Frege's Puzzle, The MIT Press.
Schweizer, Paul: 1992, ‘A Syntactic Approach to Modality’,The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21, 1–31.
Yagisawa, Takashi: 1984, ‘The Pseudo-Mates Argument’,The Philosophical Review 93, 407–418.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Forbes, G. Reply to Marks. Philos Stud 69, 281–295 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00990090
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00990090