Abstract
Although much has been written on Descartes’ thought on animals, not so much has originated in, or has taken full account of, Descartes’ views on (human) emotions. I explore here the extent to which the latter can contribute to the debate on whether he embraced, and to which extent, the doctrine of the bête machine. I first try to show that Descartes’ views on emotions can help offer new support to the skeptical position without necessarily creating new tensions with other central aspects of his philosophy. And second, I sketch the type of theory of animal passions which Descartes could have accepted. The general conclusion I draw is not that Descartes did not hold the view of the bête machine but rather that we can find within his thought a solid stream of ideas, which became stronger towards the end of his life, that points in the opposite direction.
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Notes
By received view I refer to the view commonly presented as representing Descartes’ position, namely, that animals are machines. In Gary Hatfield’s terms this is the view “that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things” and attributes it to “most of Descartes’ followers and interpreters” (“Animals,” in A Companion to Descartes, Janet Broughton and John Carriero, eds. [Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., c2008, ch.24], p.405; later on: “most scholars rend Descartes as denying sentience to animals” [p.420]). This view appears not only in general studies on Descartes or on animals but also on specific works on Descartes’ position on animals. Among the former—i.e. general studies—are Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.)‘s Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, c1976) where we read that “[i]n Descartes’ view, animals are automata—‘machines.’ Like manmade machines, animals are not conscious beings; they are ‘thoughtless’” (p.4); A. Boyce Gibson, who in The Philosophy of Descartes (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967 [c1932]), p.214, wrote that “it is satisfactory to convict Descartes’s method of excessive zeal in the pursuit of uniformity: for the theory of the animal-machine is a grim foretaste of a mechanically minded age, and it brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things”; Stephen R. L. Clark, who in The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), attributes to Descartes the “irredeemably fatuous belief” that animals lack “some sort of inner life” (p.37). More recently a similar view can be found in Peter Harrison’s “Do Animals Feel Pain? (Philosophy 66, n. 255 [Jan. 1991]), p.28: “for Descartes, animals too were merely automatons, albeit organic ones”; or, in Kristin Andrews, who thinks that “on his [Descartes’] view animals are soulless machines” (Andrews, Kristin, “Animal Cognition,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Fall 2014 Edition], Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cognition-animal/; see section. 2 [“Foundational Issues”]). Among the more specialized studies, Norman Kemp Smith, in his New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963 [c1953]), wrote a section titled “Descartes’ further contention that the brute animals are sheer automata, lacking in conscious awareness” where he attributes to Descartes the view that “animals not only possess internal mechanisms for the regulation of their behavior, but, considered as units, are themselves simply machines, mere automata, entirely lacking in conscious awareness of any kind, as incapable of experiencing the feelings of well-being or the reverse, hunger or thirst, the gentler or the fiercer emotions, as they are incapable of the higher experiences and of the artifices and inventions which the powers of self-conscious reflection make possible for man.” [p.135]); or Dennis Des Chene who, in his Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2001) says that “Cartesian animals are self-moving machines” (p.13); or Gary Hatfield, who thinks that “Descartes considered human animals to be mere machines, devoid of mental substance and of all properly mental states” (Hatfield, “The Passions of the soul and Descartes’ machine psychology,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38 (2007), p.3); or, finally, in Gary Hatfield also, who starts his “Animals” (op. cit.) with the statement: “Descartes notoriously proposed that (non-human) animals are mere machines, devoid of sensation and feeling” (p. 404). He also writes that Descartes “described animals as purely material bodies, which he labeled as ‘machines’ due to their intricate organization” (p.407) and later on talks about animals as being “unfeeling machines” for Descartes (p.418).
One of the most frequently quoted passages by Descartes expressing this view is this: “I do not explain the feeling of pain without reference to the soul. For in my view pain exists only in the understanding [la douleur n’est. que dans l’entendement]. What I do explain is all the external movements which accompany this feeling in us; in animals it is these movements alone which occur, and not pain in the strict sense [non la douleur proprement dite]” (To Mersenne, 11 June 1640, AT III 85: CSMK 148). I use AT to refer to C. Adam and P. Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes (12 vols., rev. ed., Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964–76); CSM to refer to J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols. I and II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and CSMK to refer to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III (The Correspondence), by the same translators plus A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). English translations of Descartes’ texts not accompanied by a reference to CSM or CSMK are mine.
This “like ours” is essential to the issue, and to the argument of this paper. The question is not whether animals can have passions but passions like ours, i.e. what we understand (and experience) as passions. See, e.g. Descartes to Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638 (AT II 41: CSMK 99). Descartes seems to be adding a similar qualification when he talks about “pain in the strict sense [ la douleur proprement dite]” in To Mersenne, 11 June 1640 (AT III 85: CSMK 148). A reference to the lack of behavior like ours in animals can be found in Discourse V, AT VI 57: CSM I 140. According to Gaukroger, only this position—that animals “have no thoughts or sensations like the ones we have” [emphasis added]—is compatible with “the ambitious programme of L’Homme” (S. Gaukroger,Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], p.202).
Hatfield, in his exhaustive overview and discussion of Descartes’s position on animals in his “Animals” (op. cit.) refers to a “minority” of scholars that either (a) “argues that he [Descartes] ascribes limited mental properties to them [to animals]” (p.420), among whom Hatfield mentions A. Vartanian’s Diderot and Descartes: A Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); or (b) make animals “sentient but not (reflectively) conscious” such as John Cottingham in “‘A Brute to the Brutes?’: Descartes’s treatment of animals” (Philosophy 53, n. 206 [October 1978], pp.551–59, repr. in J. Cottingham, ed., Descartes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998]); or (c) “additionally argue that Descartes needs to invoke intentionality in order to successfully explain the behavioral capacities of animals” such as S. Gaukroger in his above-mentioned Descartes’ System..., pp.201 and 203. Gaukroger is among the few scholars, if not the only one, who have strongly defended that Descartes “attributes not just cognitive but also affective states to them [animals]” (Gaukroger, op. cit., p.199; Gaukroger refers here to Descartes’ letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 574 in support).
This revised theory of passions departs somehow—especially regarding the function and intentionality of passions—from those proposed and discussed by others. I will not be able to elaborate its defense here but I have done it in my “Cartesian Passions: Our (Imperfect) Natural Guides Toward Perfection” (Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 41 [2016], pp. 401–438); and I have extended the view to what Descartes calls émotions in “The Function and Intentionality of Cartesian Émotions” (Philosophical Papers, vol. 44, n. 3 [2015], pp. 277–319).
As Lex Newman has pointed out, the explanation of the behavior that accompanies or follows animals’ sensations was already a criticism against the idea of the soulless animal that Descartes had to face in the Fourth and Sixth Objections (see AT VII 205: CSM II 144, and AT VII 414: CSM II 279) (Newman, “(“Unmasking Descartes’s Case for the Bête Machine Doctrine,” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 3 [Sep. 2001], p.399). Gaukroger sees sentience behind that behavior: “their behavior [i.e. the “behavior of automata”] indicates that they are sentient” (Gaukroger 2002, p. 203).
Drawing the conclusion that Descartes did not believe that animals had passions because he could not have believed it is a way of arbitrarily giving priority to a set of beliefs that supposedly configure the core of Descartes’ thought and which somehow remained stable throughout his life. Very significant in the context of the discussions that pertain to this paper is Lex Newman’s “Descartes does sometimes use ‘soul’-talk in connection with brutes, but his career-long position is that the souls (so to speak) of brutes fully reduce to corporeality” (Newman, op. cit., p.420). That such an attitude should be seriously challenged—and, very especially, regarding Descartes’ view of the mind--has been defended by Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire: “any scholar who cites early Cartesian texts in support of late Cartesian positions, or uses later texts in conjunction with early ones to support a reading of Descartes’ philosophy, will inevitably fall into interpretative errors.” (P. Machamer and J. E. McGuire, Descartes’s Changing Mind [Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009], p.1). In this sense, Colin Allen has also questioned the existence of certain supposed “ontological principles” which apparently maintain the traditional association between Descartes’ dualism and the view that animals lack minds (“Cartesian dualism is, of course, traditionally associated with the view that animals lack minds”): “[t]here is, however, no ontological reason why animal bodies are any less suitable vehicles for embodying a Cartesian mind than are human bodies. Hence dualism itself does not preclude animal minds” (ibid.). (Colin Allen, “Animal Consciousness,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/consciousness-animal/).
See To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT I 415: CSMK 63; To Buitendijck, 1643[?], AT IV 65: CSMK 230; and To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 278: CSMK 366.
Some often-quoted passages from Descartes’ writings have contributed too. One of these is the 1649 letter to More, where Descartes himself seems to be simultaneously affirming sentience in animals and denying a soul in them: “I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of the heart; and I do not even deny sensation, in so far as it depends on a bodily organ [nec denego etiam sensum, quatenus ab organo corporeo dependet]” (To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 278: CSMK 366).
As Hatfield notices, Vartanian (1953: 210–12), Cottingham (1998), and Gaukroger (2002: 201, 203) are among those who have somehow followed this way of thinking (Hatfield, “Animals,” op. cit., p.420).
J. Cottingham, “A Brute to the Brutes?,” pp. 555–556. “I maintain that Descartes’ characterization of animals as ‘machines’ and ‘automata’ is of itself quite insufficient to allow us to conclude that he thinks animals lack feelings” (Cottingham, “A Brute…,” p.554).
Cottingham is using the same definition of "automaton" we find in Descartes: “automaton (that is, a self-moving machine) [automate (c’est.-à-dire autre machine qui se meut de soi-même)]” (Passions I, art. 6, AT XI 330–31: CSM I 329–30). Dennis Des Chene, in his Spirits and Clocks, op. cit., uses the same definition, which he takes to be the “usual” one: “Cartesian animals are self-moving machines, automata in the usual sense of the word” (p.13; see also e.g. p.3). This sense of automaton happens to be practically the same one can find in the Oxford English Dictionnary, which considers it obsolete but, interestingly, illustrates its usage with references from 1639 to 1877: “†2. In literal sense. A being or thing having the power of spontaneous motion or self-movement. Obs.” (“automaton, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 22 February 2015). Gaukroger himself also seems to be following the same sense of “automaton” via Cottingham (Gaukroger, Descartes’ System…, p.198) and adds the important clarification that “[t]he association of the mechanical with the inert, by contrast of the organic, seems to be a late eighteenth-century notion” (Gaukroger, p.198, n.33; Gaukroger is following Judith Schlanger’s Les metaphors de l’organisme [Paris: J. Vrin, 1971], pp.50–51). In fact, according to Gaukroger, “there is no evidence that clocks ever formed a model for a mechanistic physiology” (2002, p.199). He thinks that the model, if any, was rather water fountains and hydraulic systems, which have a “a much more intuitively ‘organic’ feel to it” (p.199).
See Gaukroger 2002, pp.198 and 200.
The section “Affective States in Animals” where Gaukroger starts this development is only two pages long (Gaukroger, op. cit., pp. 213–214).
Since no observations allow us to say that animals act “in the way in which our reason makes us act [de même façon que notre raison nous fait agir]” (Discourse V, AT VI 57: CSM I 140), and all we can see in them can be explained by the organization of their organs (“it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs” [Discourse V, AT VI 58–59: CSM I 141]), we cannot say animals have a mind like ours. This includes “instincts” and “appetites,” no matter how complex they may seem. “Everything in them which we can call natural appetites or inclinations [appétits naturels ou inclinations] is explained on my theory solely in terms of the rules of mechanics [par les seules règles des mécaniques]” (Descartes to Mersenne, 28 October 1640, AT III 213: CSMK 155). Acting by instinct—as opposed to acting by thinking (“they act only by instinct and without thinking [par instinct, et sans y penser]” [To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304])--can be explained mechanically. This potential double “dependence” of motion, either on matter or on thought, is expressed by Descartes in terms of two “principles causing our movements” in the letter to More of 5 February 1649 (AT V 276: CSMK 365). Notice also that the fact that animals “do many things better than we do [font beaucoup de choses mieux que nous]” is for Descartes, rather than an indication that animals can think, something that “can even be used to prove” instead that they “act naturally and mechanically, like a clock [agissent naturellement et par ressorts, ainsi qu’une horloge]” (To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 575: CSMK 304).
The formulation of his dualism does not seem to leave room for different types of souls (see Principles of Philosophy I, art.63, AT IXB 30–31: CSM I 215). As to his criticism of Plato, already in 1641 Descartes reminds Regius that “there is only one soul in human beings”: “There is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul; for no actions can be reckoned human unless they depend on reason.” (To Regius, May 1641, AT III 371: CSMK 182). These ideas remain more or less firm until the Passions (1649): “[T]here is within us but one soul, and this soul has within it no diversity of parts: it is at once sensitive and rational too, and all its appetites are volitions.” (Passions I, art. 47, AT XI 364: CSM I 346); “I part company with the opinion of all who have written previously about the passions. […] For they derive their enumeration [of the passions] from a distinction they draw, within the sensitive part of the soul, between the two appetites they call ‘concupiscible’ and ‘irascible’. As I have said already I recognize no distinction of parts within the soul; so I think their distinction amounts merely to saying that the soul has two powers, one of desire and the other of anger.[…].” (Passions II, art. 68, AT XI 352: CSM I 379)
The acceptance of a human soul in animals would imply that “they [the beasts] would have an immortal soul like us [elles auraient une âme immortelle aussi bien que nous]” (To the Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304). Similarly, in the 1649 letter to More, Descartes denies that animals have thoughts because otherwise we would be forced to attribute “immortal souls” to them (To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 277: CSMK 366), that is, souls like those humans have. And accepting such a possibility for certain animals, Descartes thinks, would require that we accept it for all animals, something which is still more implausible. “[I]f they [the beasts] thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul like us [si elles pensaient ainsi que nous, elles auraient une âme immortelle aussi bien que nous]. This is unlikely because there is no reason to believe it of some animals without believing it of all, and many of them such as oysters and sponges are too imperfect for this to be credible [trop imparfaits pour pouvoir croire cela d’eux].” (To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304) And in To More, 5 February 1649: “[I]t is more probable that worms, flies, caterpillars and other animals move like machines than that they all have immortal souls [animalia immortali anima prædita esse, quam machinarum instar se movere].”] (To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 277: CSMK 366). But rather than offering an explicit philosophical argument to deny immortality in animals, Descartes seems to reject it as an almost theological “error” (Discourse V, AT VI 59: CSM I 141).
Descartes does not leave many doubts in the Passions of the Soul (1649) about the need of a soul in order to have passions (see, e.g., Passions I, arts. 17, 25 and 27). He calls them, after all, passions of the soul—even if the precise meaning of the expression could be debated. “[E]ven if we are asleep and dreaming, we cannot feel sad, or moved by any other passion, unless the soul truly has this passion within it [qu’il ne soit tres vray que l’ame a en soy cette passion].” (Passions I, art.26, AT XI 349: CSM I 338). The causal account Descartes provides in the treatise also makes explicit the role the soul plays in the arousal of a passion. At least three stages in the causal process that results in the arousal of a human passion are clearly mental, namely: (a) the representation of the “importance” of an object (see e.g. Passions I, art. 17, 34, 52), (b) the strengthening of that representation (Passions I, art. 74), and (c) the resulting disposition of the will (see e.g. Passions I, arts.40 and 47; and II, art. 52). We could also include here the sensations caused by some of the physiological changes which take place as we undergo the passion, as well as, in some cases, the very sensible perception of certain objects which triggers the passion.
Newman, “Unmasking Descartes’s Case…,” p.390. On the critical side, Cottingham also gives to Discourse V especial significance (“‘A Brute…,” p.552).
Descartes, Replies to Sixth Set of Objections [to Meditations] 9, AT VII 436–37: CSM II 294–295.
Descartes, Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections 9, AT 436–37: CSM II 294. Eric Dayton believes that, according to Descartes, “[a]nimals do not have souls, yet they are nonetheless ‘epistemic’ engines.” This means, according to Dayton, that they have representational states, but these are “representational states [which] in animals do not have the function of causing the soul to perceive, but rather only the function of causing behavior” (Eric Dayton, “Could It Be worth Thinking About Descartes on Whether Animals Have Beliefs?,” in History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1 [Jan. 2004], p.68). Given how Dayton speaks, though, “representational” does not mean mental, but only bodily—which does not seem to be the use of “representation” in the Passions, the writing where Descartes talks about “the three kinds of passions of the soul” that Dayton refers to in this context (see Passions I, arts 22–25). See also, e.g. Passions I, arts. 47 and 50, where Descartes uses variations of the expression “represent[s] to the soul” or Passions II, arts. 79 and 81 where he uses variations of “appear[s] to the soul” where the mental aspect of the representation seems to be quite explicit.
Notice, in particular, two things: (1) CSM’s translation of Descartes’ primus sentiendi gradus (AT VII 437) as “first grade of sensory response” may imply more than what Descartes wants to say. The latter seems to convey more forcefully the idea that this gradus is already a form of perception (as we understand it in humans). And (2) saying, as Descartes does, that we (humans) share this first gradus “in common [communis]” with animals, does not necessarily imply that the possibility of sharing the second gradus is closed (i.e. the gradus that “arise[s] from the union and as it were the intermingling of mind and body [quas oriri ex unione ac quasi permistione mentis cum corpore]” [CSM II 294]).
His 1649 Passions (see, e.g., Passions I, arts. 23–25) would not allow us to call passions (or sensations) an event that can occur without a soul. It is true, it could be replied, that what Descartes might want to say in 1641 is precisely that animals cannot have sensations or passions. But it is also true that, if that were his view then, it could have changed later on. Notice, in any case, that already in the Second Set of Replies [to Meditations] AT VII 160–161: CSM II 113 Descartes considers the senses as thoughts: “Thought. I use this tem to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus, all the operations of the will, the imagination, and the senses are thoughts.”
Four of the places where Descartes compared animals to “automatons [automates],” in the chronological order in which they appear in Descartes’ writings, are: Discourse V [1637], AT VI 55–56: CSM I 139–40; Descartes to Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638, AT II 41: CSMK 100; Descartes to Mersenne, 30 July 1640, AT III 121: CSMK 148–49; and Descartes to More, 5 February 1649, AT V 277: CSMK 366. Descartes also compares certain specific animals (“swallows [hirondelles]”) to clocks [horloges] in, e.g., Descartes to Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 575: CSMK 304, and “beasts [bêtes]” in general (instead of “animals,” if the difference is of any significance) to automates in the Appendix to the Fifth Set of Objections and Replies: Descartes To Clerselier, 12 January 1646 [pub 1647], AT XIA 208: CSM II 272–73. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.)‘s Animal Rights and Human Obligations (op. cit.) includes, under the title “René Descartes: Animals Are Machines,” a selection of paragraphs from the Discourse [Part V, AT VI 55–60: CSM I 139–141], and the letters to the Marquess of Newscastle on November 23, 1646, and to Henry More on February 5, 1649). The expression “animals are machines” cannot, however, be found in that selection. The closest is “These natural automata are the animals,” and even such a statement is neither present in the original Latin (AT V 277) nor is it supported by other translations (see, e.g., CSM I 366). John Cottingham admits that the thesis “animals are machines” “is not explicitly asserted by Descartes in this form” but he (Cottingham) nevertheless believes that “he [Descartes] commits himself to it in so many words in the famous passage on animals in Part V of the Discourse […]” (J. Cottingham, “‘A Brute to the Brutes?’,” p.552).
Descartes recognized that, unlike clocks which are artificial, animals are “incomparably more accomplished [plus accomplis]” (To Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638, AT II 41: CSMK 100). To Descartes, however, Pollot’s request was simply the result of wrongly drawing from “resemblance” the conclusion that animals “act by an interior principle like the one within ourselves, that is to say, by means of a soul which has feelings and passions like ours [agissent par un principe intérieur semblable à celui qui est en nous, c'est-à-dire par le moyen d’une âme qui a des sentiments et des passions comme les nôtres]” (Descartes to Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638, AT II 41: CSMK 99). Descartes then recapitulated for Pollot the two main reasons he had already provided in the Discourse (1637) to show that resemblance with animals does not serve as sufficient reason: (a) animals cannot use language as we do: “such automatons never answer in word or sign, except by chance, to questions put to them” (Descartes to Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638, AT II 40: CSMK 99); and (b) they cannot convincingly imitate a human “in certain things [ils manquent néanmoins en plusieurs choses, qu’ils devraient faire pour nous imiter]” (Descartes to Reneri to Pollot, April or May 1638, AT II 40)—where these “certain things” amount, primarily, to the use of language as humans do.
This passage is, however, open to interpretation. Notice two things. (1) The statement is issued in the correspondence and almost ten years before the publication of the Passions of the Soul. If we read it literally, the statement would be in clear conflict with Descartes’ later understanding (in Passions) of what a passion is. And (2) since the statement is not accompanied by any independent supporting argument, we may be justified in reading it in a weaker fashion, that is, not as a conclusion but rather as if it were preceded by an “all we can say (about that pain) is….”
“It is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be observed in us to oppose our reason [auquel seul on peut attribuer tout ce qui peut estre remarqué en nous qui repugne a nostre raison].” (Passions I, art. 47, AT XI 365: CSM I 346) See also, e.g. Passions I, art. 16.
Notice that the supposed identifications with automatons would not be enough, as Cottingham and others have pointed out, to conclude that animals do not have souls.
In 1637 he says that the reason why he does not want to say more about, among other things, the issue of sensations in animals is “partly for fear of writing something false while refuting falsehood, partly for fear of seeming to want to ridicule received scholastic opinions” (To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT I 415: CSMK 63). Six years later, he acknowledges again his self-imposed silence on the matter: “I do not remember ever having written that motion is the soul of animals [motum esse brutorum animam]; indeed I have not publicly revealed my views on the topic” (To Buitendijck, 1643[?], AT IV 65: CSMK 230). And twelve years later, the same year in which he wrote the Passions, he explicitly acknowledges that he prefers not to say more about his denial of “thought [cogitationem]” in animals: “For brevity’s sake I here omit the other reasons for denying thought to animals [Reliquas rationes cogitationem brutis adimentes, brevitatis causa, hic omitto]” (To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 278: CSMK 366).
Vartanian, skeptical that the bête machine doctrine was Descartes’ actual position (see p. 210), suggested that its “pious utility” (pp. 207–208) as well as the “hope of eventually explaining mechanically all their multiform manifestations of life, sensibility, and an inferior (or non-reflective) intelligence” (Vartanian, op. cit., p.211) could explain Descartes’ apparent defense of the doctrine.
See To Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 573–574: CSMK 303, and AT IV 574–575: CSMK 303; and two passages in To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 278: CSMK 366. Notice that, as mentioned above, some of these letters also include reasons often used by commentarists to support that Descartes’ thought did not depart from the doctrine of the bête machine.
“[W]e should use the term ‘action’ for what plays the role of a moving force, like volition in the mind [quæ se habet ex parte motoris, qualis est. volitio in mente], while we apply the term ‘passion’ to what plays the role of something moved [parte moti], like intellection and vision in the same mind.” (To Regius, December 1641, AT III 455: CSMK 199)
Notice that the lack of a causal role for the body (i.e. for the “spirits”) leaves out of this definition of “passions of the souls” what Descartes calls émotions, and to which he refers to in different parts of the treatise as if they were of two kinds: “intellectual [intellectuelle]” émotions (e.g. Passions II, arts. 91, 92 and 93); and “internal” or “interior” [émotions intérieures] (Passions II, arts. 147 and 148).
See Passions I, arts.10, 11, 13, 15, 34–37, 40, 47 and 52; II, art. 112; and Treatise on Man, AT XI 176.
Rather than the cause, or a first cause, of the passions, these spirits are their “ultimate and most proximate cause [derniere & plus prochaine cause]” (Passions II, art. 51, AT XI 371: CSM I 349; see same expression in, e.g. I. art. 29). Descartes explicitly mentions four possible types of, as he puts it, “first causes”: an “action of the soul,” “the temperament of the body,” “impressions that happen to be present in the brain,” and “objects which stimulate the senses” (Passions II, art. 51, AT XI 371: CSM I 349).
Among those other flows, particularly significant are the ones towards the heart and limbs in order to maintain and strengthen the passion (Passions I, art. 36), produce their expression (Passions II, art.114), and prepare the body to move (Passions I, art.11).
The soul “has as many different perceptions as there occur different movements in this gland” (Passions I, art. 34, AT XI 355: CSM I 341); “[T]he movements (both of the gland and of the spirits and the brain) which represent certain objects to the soul are naturally joined to the movements which produce certain passions in it” (Passions I, art.50, AT XI 369: CSM I 348).
“[T]he feeling of fear moves the soul to want [l’incite à vouloir] to flee, that of courage to want to fight, and similarly with the others” (Passions I, art. 40, AT XI, 359: CSM I 343).
“[W]e commonly call something ‘good’ or ‘evil’ if our internal senses or our reason make us judge it agreeable or contrary to our nature [convenable ou contraire à nostre nature].” (Passions II, art.85, AT XI 391: CSM I 358) Since all the primitive passions represent goods or evils (see Passions II, arts. 61, 70, 79, 86, 91, and 92), and “all the others are either composed from some of these six or they are species [espèces] of them” (Passions II, art. 69, AT XI 380: CSM I 353), we can in principle say that all passions represent goods or evils.
We should not forget, in any case, that “as it [the body] is only the lesser part, we should consider the passions chiefly in so far as they belong to the soul” (Passions II, art. 139, AT 432: CSM I 377).
Passions perform this discriminatory-evaluative task by, first, representing objects worth joining (or worth avoiding) in order to constitute unities of greater perfection with them; and, second, by disposing us to join (or avoid) those objects.
“There is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul [anima in homine unica est, nempe rationalis]; for no actions can be reckoned human unless they depend on reason [a ratione dependent]. The vegetative power and the power of moving the body [vis autem vegetandi, et corporis movendi], which are called the vegetative and sensory souls in plants and animals, exist also in human beings; but in the case of human beings they should not be called souls, because they are not the first principle of their actions [non sunt primum ejus actionum principium], and they belong to a totally different genus from the rational soul [et toto genere differunt ab anima rationali].” (To Regius, May 1641, AT III 371: CSMK 182 [italics in CSMK]) The same year (1641), in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes talks about the presence in him of different “faculties for certain special modes of thinking” (AT VII 78: CSM II 54).
That “reflective thoughts” are actions is quite explicit in the Passions: reflections are “perceptions” which “depend chiefly on the volition which makes it [the soul] aware of them” (Passions I, art. 20, AT XI 344: CSM I 336). Notice also that if “reflective thoughts” are (active) thoughts on (passive) thoughts, e.g. thoughts (reflective) on “perceptions” (direct), not only we must “attribute” reflections to the “intellect alone” (For [Arnauld], 29 July 1648, AT V 220–21: CSMK 357) but think of “direct” thoughts as passive thoughts proper of both children and adult humans.
“[I]nfants are in a different case from animals: I should not judge that infants were endowed with minds unless I saw that they were of the same nature as adults [eos esse eiusdem naturae cum adultis]; but animals never develop to a point where any certain sign of thought can be detected in them.” (To More, 15 April 1649, AT V 345: CSMK 374)
Option (b) seems to be invoked in the Discourse. An animal soul must be rejected because “it would be incredible that a superior specimen of the monkey or parrot species should not be able to speak as well as the stupidest child—or at least as well as a child with a defective brain—if their souls were not completely different from ours [si leur ame n’estoit d’une nature du tout differente de la nostre]” (Discourse V, AT VI 58: CSM I 140). In To Regius, May 1641 (AT III 371: CSMK 182) Descartes says that the two supposed souls would “belong to a totally different genus from the rational soul [et toto genere differunt ab anima rationali]” [English italics in CSMK]. Later on, Descartes generalizes this idea to point out that the key difference (that we can observe) is rather the use of language: unlike animals “even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their thoughts [en sorte que ceux qui sont sourds et muets, inventent des signes particuliers par lesquels ils expriment leurs pensées]” (To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 575: CSMK 303). And still later: “it has never been observed that any brute animal has attained the perfection [ullum brutum animal eo perfectionis devenisse] of using real speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or sign something relating to thought alone and not to natural impulse [ad solam cogitationem, non autem ad impetum naturalem]. Such speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body [unicum est. cogitationis in corpore latentis signum certum]” (To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 278: CSMK 366).
In other places, and in earlier years, Descartes himself had made some comments suggesting that the explanation of the main differences between humans and animals should not be placed in the body: “the organs of their [i.e. animals’] bodies are not very different from ours” (To the Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304). The similarity between animal and human organs is also affirmed in Discourse V (see AT 57: CSM I 140; and AT 58: CSM I 141).
“Our soul and our body are so linked that the thoughts which have accompanied some movements of our body since our life began still accompany them at present […].” (To Princess Elizabeth, May 1646, AT IV 408: CSMK 286) Similarly, the state of the union between soul and body would explain why joy, love, sadness and hatred are the first passions we experience and why at the beginning they were only sensations: “Those four passions [joy, love, sadness, hatred], I believe, were the first we had, and the only ones we had before our birth. I think they were then only sensations or very confused thoughts, because the soul was so attached to matter [l’ame eftoit tellement attachée à la matière] that it could not yet do anything else except receive various impressions from it” (To Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 605: CSMK 308).
“I did not find within me all the attributes which I had formerly referred to the soul; the only one I found was thought, and hence I did not say I was a soul but merely that I was a thinking thing.” (Seventh Set of Objections with Replies, AT VII 4911: CSM II 332)
The term volonté [will] seems to become the preference--in detriment of raison [reason]--to refer to the faculty responsible for the actions of the mind as Descartes immerses himself more fully in the study of passions. See e.g. To Elisabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV 310: CSMK 270; Passions I, art.16, AT XI 341–42: CSM I 335; Passions I, art. 17, AT XI 342: CSM I 335; and Passions I, art.47, AT XI 366: CSM I 346–47.
To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 575: CSMK 303. The idea--which is emphasized by Descartes’ use of the term “thoughts [pensées]” as synonym of active thoughts throughout the 5 February 1649 letter to More--can also be seen behind the opposition between human sign and (simply) the “movement of some passion [mouvement de quelqu’une de ses passions]” in the letter to the Marquess of Newcastle of 23 November 1646 (AT IV 574: CSMK translates “expression” instead of “movement” [CSMK 303]).
This is also clear in the view of reason as “universal instrument [instrument universel]” which he presents in the Discourse V (AT VI 57: CSM I 140).
“[A]ll the things which dogs, horses and monkeys are taught to perform are only expressions of their fear, their hope or their joy [ne sont que des mouvements de leur crainte, de leur espérance, ou de leur joie]; and consequently they can be performed without any thought [ils les peuvent faire sans aucune pensée]” (To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 574–75: CSMK 303).
“[T]he same cause that produces a certain passion in the soul [qui excite en l’âme quelque passion] often also produces certain movements in the body, to which the soul makes no contribution [auxquels l’âme ne contribue point] […].” (Passions I, art.47, AT XI 366: CSM I 346) This “no contribution” seems to mean “without the occurrence of the will”: “the term ‘passion’ can be applied in general to all the thoughts [pensées] which are thus aroused in the soul by cerebral impressions alone, without the concurrence of its will [sans le concours de sa volonté], and therefore without any action of the soul itself [sans aucune action qui vienne d’elle]; for whatever is not an action is a passion.” (To Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV 310: CSMK 270) This is also the sense in which we can say passions do not “depend” on thought (i.e. the will): “it is nevertheless very clear that they [the “movements of our passions”] do not depend [ne dépendent pas] on thought, because they often occur in spite of us” (To the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 573–574: CSMK 303).
“[E]very movement we make without any contribution from our will [sans que notre volonté y contribute]—as often happens when we breathe, walk, eat, and, indeed, when we perform any action which is common to us and the beasts—depends solely on the arrangement of our limbs [ne dépendent que de la conformation de nos membres] and on the route which the spirits, produced by the heat of the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves, and muscles. This occurs in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced merely by the strength of its spring and the configuration of its wheels.” (Passions I, art.16, AT XI 341–42: CSM I 335) Notice that, according to Descartes, the movements of our body should be “attributed” either to the body or to the will: “[i]t is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be observed in us to oppose our reason [auquel seul on peut attribuer tout ce qui peut estre remarqué en nous qui repugne a nostre raison]” (Passions I, art. 47, AT XI 364–65: CSM I 346). This means that the movements of the passions must be attributed to the body even if they are accompanied by thought.
“I consider that they [animals] imitate or surpass us only in those of our actions which are not guided by our thought [qui ne sont point conduites par notre pensée].” (To the Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 573: CSMK 302)
And according to Descartes the actions we perform without the guidance of our thought are not, properly speaking, actions: they are simply movements of our body according to mechanical laws (Passions I, art. 6, AT XI 330–31: CSM I 329–30).
Descartes sees in Principles more “perfection” in actions than in passions because “to be acted upon is to be dependent on something else” (Principles I, art. 23, AT VIIIA 13–14: CSM I 201). See also To the Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304. Notice that an interesting consequence of the extension of the idea of perfection that seems implicit here would be a hierarchy of souls from God’s (which only has actions) on the top, to humans’ (which have actions and passions), to animals’ (which would have only passions).
This is a common phrase also in the Discourse (1637), e.g.: “les animaux sans raison” (AT VI 46), or “animal sans raison” (AT VI 56), or “[…] ceci ne témoigne pas seulement que les bêtes ont moins de raison que les hommes, mais qu’elles n’en ont point du tout” (AT VI 58).
“[A]ll the animals devoid of reason [animaux sans raison] conduct their lives simply through bodily movements similar to those which, in our case, usually follow upon the passions which move our soul to consent to such movements [auxquels elles incitent notre âme à consenter].” (Passions II, art. 138, AT XI 431: CSM I 376–77)
In some of his earliest writings, Descartes reserves “mind” for humans and talk as if the “lack of mind” means lack of “soul”: “I do not admit that the powers of growth and sensation in animals deserve the name ‘soul’ [animae], as does the mind [mens] in human beings. This common view is based on ignorance of the fact that animals lack a mind [mente]. So the term ‘soul’ is ambiguous as used of animals and of human beings” (To Regius, May 1641, AT III 370: CSMK 181). The identification of “mind” with “thinking thing” in later writings (“In applying the term ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’ to the thinking thing, I did not intend to endow the term ‘mind’ with any more weighty significance than the phrase ‘thinking thing’ […].” [Seventh Set of Objections with Replies, AT VII 4911: CSM II 332]), however, opens the possibility of talking—after the introduction of the action/passion distinction--about thinking things which have active minds (humans) and thinking things which have passive minds (animals).
“[L]ike the Bible, I believe, and I thought I had clearly explained, that the souls of animals are nothing but their blood, the blood which is turned into spirits by the warmth of the heart and travels through the arteries to the brain and from it to the nerves and muscles. […] I do not see how those who credit animals with some sort of substantial soul distinct from blood, heat and spirits can answer such Scripture texts as Leviticus 17: 14 (‘The soul of all flesh is in its blood, and you shall not eat the blood of any flesh, because the soul of flesh is in its blood’) and Deutoronomy 12: 23 (‘Only take care not to eat their blood, for their blood is their soul, and you must not eat their soul with their flesh’).” (To Plempius from Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT I 414: CSMK 62) “I do not remember ever having written that motion is the soul of animals; indeed I have not publicly revealed my views on the topic. […] I would prefer to say with Holy Scripture (Deuteronomy 12: 23) that blood is their soul [sanguinem esse illorum anima], for blood is a fluid body in very rapid motion, and its more rarefied parts are called spirits. It is these which move the whole mechanism of the body as they flow continuously from the arteries through the brain into the nerves and muscles.” (To Buitendijck, 1643[?], AT IV 65: CSMK 230)
Peter Harrison admits we should concede that animals have souls (which he supports with the passage quoted above where Descartes says the souls of animals are “nothing but their blood” [To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT I 414: CSMK 62]), and agrees that “Descartes allows them [animals] sensations” (Harrison, op. cit., p.224) but denies this implies consciousness: “There is nothing in Descartes’ attribution of sensation to animals which necessitates their conscious awareness” (ibid., p.224). In support of this idea, Harrison refers to Passions I, art 38.
Passions I, art. 31, AT XI 352: CSM I 340. In other words, “the soul has its principal seat in the small gland” (Principles I, art. 34, AT XI 354: CSM I 341).
To the Marquess of Newscastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV 576: CSMK 304 [my translation].
As to why immortality cannot be attributed to animals, Descartes' argument seems to escape the philosophical realm. To affirm the oppositewould be, “after the error of those who deny God,” one that “leads weak minds further from the straight path of virtue” (Discourse V, AT VI 59: CSM I 141).
To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 277: CSMK 366. This paper, however, would not go as far as to say that the possible acceptance by Descartes of the view that animals could have emotions implies that all animals could.
If rationality is what makes the soul immortal (even if we do not know why), rationality would be the only one feature missing in animals.
Hatfield, “Animals,” p. 420.
Hatfield, “Animals,” 408.
The passages Hatfield refers to are: AT VII 28, 78–79, 160, 559 (CSM II 19, 54–5, 113, 382) and AT VIIIA 17 (CSM I 204).
The need of an action of the mind in this sense is also defended and further elaborated in P. Machamer and J. E. McGuire, Descartes’s Changing Mind (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), ch. 6: “Mind-Body Causality and the Mind-Body Union: The Case of Sensation,” pp.198–241.
Newman, “Unmasking Descartes’s Case…,” p.424
If, as Gaukroger believes, sentience requires intentionality --“sentient beings are able to process information: they are able to interpret stimuli” (Gaukroger 2002, p.203)--the alterable evaluation that seems to be required in the case of passions would reinforce that need.
Since lack of reason means lack of volonté (will), we cannot consider “animals that lack reason” to be free, that is, to be capable of choosing to—or not to—follow (to “consent” or not) the dispositions brought about by their passions. “As for animals that lack reason it is obvious that they are not free [libres], since they do not have this positive power to determine themselves [puissance positive de se déterminer]; what they have is a pure negation, namely the power of not being forced or constrained [mais c'est en eux une pure négation, de n’être pas forcés ni contraints].” (Descartes to Mesland, 2 May 1644 [?], AT IV 117: CSMK 234)
“They [passions] may sometimes be caused by an action of the soul when it sets itself to conceive one object or other […].” (Passions II, art. 51, AT XI 371: CSM I 349) We (humans) can, for example, cause joy in ourselves by thinking about joyful moments (e.g. To Princess Elizabeth, May or June 1645; AT IV 218: CSMK 249). This also means that animals would not be able either to actively associate the perception of an object (that triggers a particular passion) to a representation that might trigger a different passion (see To Princess Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV 312–313: CSMK 271–72).
As in humans its natural constitution and past experience (Passions I, art. 36, AT XI 356: CSM I 342) could dispose a cat to experience fear in the presence of a lion. This means that, as in humans as well, new experiences in animals would produce new impressions (“folds”) in their brains “through habit,” which in turn would produce new motions of the gland--which in turn would trigger certain passions by association to certain representations (of goods or evils) (Passions I, art. 50, AT XI 369: CSM I 348).
Different experience means different information for the dog about the importance (for its natural perfection) of the objects available to him in the world. The dog’s owner appears to be “important” precisely because her presence arouses a distinctive emotional reaction in the dog. The joy (passion) that accompanies the sensation (seeing her)—and which is not triggered by other objects—is the indication of that importance. That particular object arouses that particular emotion in the dog because, through experience, the sensation the presence of his owner causes has been associated in the dog (in its nature) to the representation (and accompanying bodily movements) proper of the passion of joy.
“Pain is the body’s representative in the mind’s decision-making process. Without pain, the mind would imperil the body (as cases of insensitivity to pain clearly show). But without the rational, decision-making mind, pain is superfluous. Animals have no rational or moral considerations which might overrule the needs of the body.” (Harrison 1991, p.38)
“[I]t is only through a feeling of pain that the soul is immediately advised [avertie] about things that harm the body: this feeling produces in the soul first the passion of sadness, then hatred of what causes the pain, and finally the desire to get rid of it. Similarly the soul is immediately advised [avertie] about things useful to the body only through some sort of titillitation, which first produces joy within it, then gives rise to love of what we believe to be its cause, and finally brings about the desire to acquire something that can enable us to continue in this joy, or else to have a similar joy again later on.” (Passions II, art.137, AT XI 430: CSM I 376)
“[A] good condition of the body naturally gives us joy.” (To Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 605: CSMK 307) “[W]hen we are in good health and things are calmer than usual, we feel in ourselves a cheerfulness which results not from any operation of the understanding but solely from impressions formed in the brain by the movement of the spirits. And we feel sad in the same way when our body is indisposed even though we do not know that it is.” (Passions II, art.94, AT XI 398–99: CSM I 361)
In fact, it could be a behavior resulting from the arousal in them of the first among the six basic passions which is wonder (see Passions II, arts. 69–78; and on wonder Passions II, art. 70, AT XI 380: CSM I 353): “[o]f wonder […] we may say it is useful in that it makes us learn and retain in our memory things of which we were previously ignorant. For we wonder only at what appears to us unusual and extraordinary […]” (Passions II, art. 75, AT XI 384: CSM I 354).
“The wildebeest dies silently and does not endanger the herd. But does it die courageously? Does it bear the pain to the end? Does it have a reason to remain silent? No, because it does not have a choice. All wildebeest behave in this fashion. And if it does not have a choice, there is no requirement for the dismemberment of its body to be represented mentally as pain.” (Harrison, “Do Animals Feel Pain?,” pp.37–38)
Instead of talking about a volition against a disposition (see Passions I, art 47, AT XI 366: CSM I 346) in this case we would have a disposition against a disposition, or several dispositions against each other simultaneously.
“[T]here is no conflict here except in so far as the little gland in the middle of the brain can be pushed to one side by the soul and to the other side by the animal spirits (which, as I said above, are nothing but bodies), and these two impulses often happen to be opposed, the stronger canceling the effect of the weaker.” (Passions I, art. 47, AT XI 364–65: CSM I 346)
A. Vartanian, Diderot and Descartes, op.cit., pp. 207–208.
“Descartes’ real criteria of mind properly understood, have less to do with what kind of substance a thing is than with its function in producing behavior. To have a mind is to act in a way which is guided by reason and mental states are individuated by their epistemic and cognitive powers, not by the stuff of which they are composed.” (Eric Dayton, “Could It Be worth Thinking About Descartes on Whether Animals Have Beliefs?,” op. cit., p.75).
Dayton’s view would be in agreement with the idea that Descartes had a “changing mind” and that “perhaps, at the end of his life, Descartes was not much of a dualist after all,” as Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire (2009, p.241) have suggested.
