

# Philosophical Expertise

---

Bryan Frances

Draft for James Chase and David Cody (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology*, Routledge.

## Abstract

Philosophical expertise consists in knowledge, but it is controversial what this knowledge consists in. I focus on three issues: the extent and nature of knowledge of philosophical truths, how this philosophical knowledge is related to philosophical progress, and skeptical challenges to philosophical knowledge.

## 1. Introduction

Poets are experts at poetry, chemists are experts at chemistry, and philosophers are experts at philosophy—or so it seems. In most fields it is agreed that there are experts and that they have plenty of subject-specific knowledge that people outside the field lack. The pressing questions for those fields involve issues such as trust, fallibility, and public recognition. But in philosophy things are more controversial. Even if it's plausible to understand philosophical expertise as involving special knowledge that non-philosophers tend to lack, what might this knowledge, call it *p-knowledge*, be? Before we can get to any issues such as those concerning the epistemology of expertise (e.g., the role of “intuition”), we need to know if there is any philosophical expertise at all. First things first.

Some philosophers have told me, in casual conversation, that they think philosophical expertise just doesn't exist. I don't know how seriously to take this claim. For instance, it should be clear that if a person has been declared an epistemologist, by the profession as it were, has published a half-dozen

research papers in epistemology, and has been granted tenure based on those publications, then she has *some* kind of expertise not had by an arbitrarily chosen undergraduate or even a philosopher who has done virtually no work in epistemology. The task is to figure out what that expertise consists in.

On the one hand, p-knowledge might consist mainly of knowledge of *truths*. If so, then the next task is to characterize the body of truths philosophical experts know and others generally do not know. If this can't be done, then the claim of propositional p-knowledge is suspect. One might think the task can't be done. After all, it seems as though philosophers disagree on just about everything of philosophical substance. So how could there be widespread p-knowledge among philosophers of some philosophical doctrine when so few philosophers will even believe it? And given the amount of disagreement in philosophy, even if some of us have true beliefs in substantive philosophical claims, don't the facts about disagreement provide defeaters for many of those true beliefs, thereby ruling them out as knowledge?

On the other hand, perhaps p-knowledge is more like the expert knowledge poets have—whatever exactly that kind of expertise is (e.g., some kind of know-how). We wouldn't say that expertise in poetry primarily consists in knowledge of truths, at least in any straightforward sense, so maybe p-knowledge isn't primarily knowledge of truths either. Of course, poets know many truths that non-poets lack; truths about meter, rhyme, and the history of poetry for instance. But that's not the *main* part of expertise in poetry. Might p-knowledge be closely akin to whatever expert knowledge poets have, something far from knowledge of truths? The idea is *prima facie* implausible given how different philosophy and poetry are (please: let's not be sentimental here).

In the next section I'm going to argue that *a great deal* of p-knowledge is straightforwardly factual—and I do this without claiming that know-how doesn't compose much p-knowledge. The main reason this thesis is surprising is that philosophers focus almost all their attention on the controversial aspects of philosophy, and ignore the uncontroversial bits that constitute our expert knowledge. In subsequent sections I take up the question of how philosophical expertise and philosophical progress are related, and the question of whether there are worrisome skeptical challenges to the existence of propositional p-knowledge. I will also briefly compare expertise in philosophy with that of the hard sciences.

## 2. A Body of Knowledge of Philosophically Substantive Truths

Philosophers like to think that they are particularly good at a certain type of critical thinking, one that is difficult to characterize but might be thought to be one kind of philosophical expertise. That may be so, but in this essay I will focus on the issue of what kinds of *substantive philosophical content* that philosophers know and non-philosophers know only rarely. In this section I will defend the thesis that there are four classes of propositional p-knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

It's worth starting with the obvious. We know what the main subfields are in philosophy, and we know what the topics, questions, problems, tasks, concepts, arguments, thought experiments, and proposals are in those subfields. We often write whole books, *textbooks*, conveying this information, much of which can be stated in straightforward factual terms. We tend to *agree* on this body of knowledge, when it comes in the form of claims (e.g., most philosophy of mind textbooks look awfully similar in content). This is the first of four classes of claims we have p-knowledge of: what I will call **Textbook** claims. Non-philosophers have very little of this knowledge. This puts us on a par with the chemists in one respect: there is a great deal of *factual* p-knowledge.

At this point many people will complain that although philosophers know many Textbook claims (and non-philosophers don't know them), philosophy is still very different from chemistry and other fields in which it's clear that experts have a great deal of substantive propositional knowledge not had by non-experts. It's different in the interesting sense that knowledge of *philosophically substantive* truths, as opposed to *chemically substantive* truths, is vanishingly small.

I suspect this is false. Arbitrarily confining ourselves to epistemology, I list fifteen substantive truths, which are among those I will call the **Basic** ones. Most philosophers know most of these truths. However, it's not the case that most non-philosophers know most of these truths. And while some non-philosophers are or would be disposed to believe some of these truths, many would fail to know them. Overall, knowledge of these truths, among non-philosophers, is much rarer than it is among philosophers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Much of this section is taken from my 2017B.

1. Beliefs can be positive, negative, trivial, controversial, silly, serious, short-term, long-term, and concern just about any topic.
2. Some beliefs are true while others are false.
3. Evidence can be positive or negative. Positive evidence for a belief B is evidence that suggests B is true; negative evidence regarding B is evidence that suggests B is false.
4. One's overall evidence is the combination of all one's evidence regarding that belief. Overall evidence can be weak or strong (or somewhere in between).
5. Two people could have the same belief but one person's belief is irrational while the other's is rational, often due to the fact that the first person's belief is based on weak overall evidence and the second person's is based on strong overall evidence.
6. A belief can be reasonable but false provided the person with the belief bases it on excellent overall evidence.
7. A belief can be unreasonable but true provided the person with the true belief has very poor evidence that she is basing her belief on.
8. There are at least three important cognitive attitudes one can take to a claim: believe it, disbelieve it, or suspend judgment on it. Moreover, one can endorse a claim to different degrees, as when one person is extremely confident it's true while another person agrees it's true but isn't as confident as the first person that it's true.
9. In some cases suspension of judgment is temporary; other times it is permanent.
10. Just because you suspend judgment on some claim (so you don't believe it or disbelieve it) doesn't mean that you can't act on it.
11. Knowledge requires truth: you can't know something unless it's true.
12. Knowledge requires good evidence, of some kind or other: you can't know something unless your belief is based on good overall evidence. However, we have to be open-minded about the radically different forms evidence comes in.
13. Knowledge is objective in this sense: just because someone *thinks* she has knowledge doesn't always mean that she *really does* have knowledge.
14. One can have a true belief without it amounting to knowledge.

15. One can have a belief based on excellent overall evidence that doesn't amount to knowledge.

Not every philosopher, or even epistemologist, will agree with each of (1)-(15), but I suspect that for each claim over 90% of epistemologists will accept it (some of the claims may well receive nearly 100% endorsement). The list is not anywhere in the vicinity of being exhaustive; with effort any competent team of expert epistemologists could make it a couple hundred claims long. I am not saying that every area of philosophy can generate long lists of agreed-upon Basic claims, but I think it can be done with many if not most areas of philosophy.

Agreement is important: in order for a claim to qualify as part of philosophical expertise, the experts in question have to actually know it; and in order to know it as a body, they have to agree to it as a body.

Each of (1)-(15) is a substantive claim about notions central to epistemology: belief, true belief, evidence, knowledge, etc. Philosophers who actually listen carefully to their youngest students, before teaching or indoctrinating them, will realize that few of the fifteen claims are obvious to non-philosophers. I suppose the realization of this fact is highly dependent on (i) where one teaches, and (ii) how much one shuts up and listens to one's students' "unfiltered" views. For instance, I recently read an article on the difficulties in using 'belief' in characterizing Islamic religious attitudes, and the author was utterly confused about how 'belief' functions in English despite his being a native speaker of English (this is not to say that all philosophical uses of 'belief' are synonymous with non-philosophical uses). The basics of epistemology are basics only to philosophers. And even though the fifteen claims are considered obviously true to almost all philosophers, this is no mark against the idea that they are substantive. It's also obvious that the earth is round, electrons weigh less than protons, and that other things being equal 10 kg objects fall at the same rate as 5 kg ones, but those are still substantive claims of physics. Substantive ≠ controversial.

Experts in philosophy also have impressive factual knowledge that is less mundane, so to speak. Here is a sample of much more advanced claims that something like 90% of philosophers with the relevant expertise (i.e., several publications in the "area of specialization") will agree on:

1. Epistemicism faces a serious objection regarding how sharp meanings are fixed.

2. There are good reasons to think that truths about causation are closely connected to certain counterfactual truths and/or truths about laws of nature.
3. The thesis that our belief contents are fixed by the internal goings-on of our bodies faces a serious challenge from Putnam's elm-beech story, in which the two terms counterfactually switch meanings while the protagonist is the same physically from the skin in.
4. Solving the problems of material composition will probably require solutions to various puzzles about vagueness, such as the forced-march sorites paradox.
5. Kripke's puzzle about belief provides a strong challenge to the basic Fregean argument that the interchange of coreferential proper names in belief contexts doesn't always preserve truth-value.
6. Most initially intuitive solutions to the alethic paradoxes are inadequate, as they stand, because they are unable, as they stand, to successfully deal with certain clever "revenge" sentences.
7. The plausible idea that the traditionally conceived God would have to make the best universe within his power to make is challenged by the idea that there are good non-religious grounds for thinking there is no such possible universe.
8. When people who are mathematically not sophisticated make the base rate fallacy in arguing for a certain conclusion, although their conclusion may not be supported by their evidence, they are in an important epistemic sense blameless in drawing that conclusion.
9. If there are good non-theistic, purely naturalistic reasons for thinking that we are truly awful at judging when an instance of suffering is directly or indirectly paired with an outweighing good, then there is a good chance the theist has a reasonable response to the problem of gratuitous evil.
10. The presentist idea that what really exists doesn't include past or future entities faces a serious challenge from the General Theory of Relativity.

I call these **Reasons** claims because they are claims about reasons for or against key philosophical positions. Continuing the list is a mere matter of patience and, of course, *expertise* in the relevant subfields of philosophy. I am not saying that every area of philosophy can generate a long list of Reasons claims that garner expert agreement rates of over 90%, say, but I would guess that most could.

Those ten claims are, I claim, both *substantive* and *very widely agreed upon by philosophers with the relevant expertise* (e.g., multiple research publications in the relevant field).

Regarding the second point, about large percentages of agreement, there are some points worth making. First, the claims are intended to be sociological facts about the opinions of the philosophical community when it's doing its best. For instance, when (1) says that epistemicism faces a "serious" objection, what is meant is that the relevant community of experts *judges* the objection to be one that is important in some relevant manner—and the judging in question is the usual kind of careful thinking employed by philosophers who are pretty much doing their best. The use of 'good' is similarly interpreted. Second, just because there is agreement doesn't of course mean the agreed-upon claims are all true. Third, there is of course no *universal* agreement about any of the ten claims, even restricting the pool of philosophers to those with the relevant expertise. But that is true for just about any field of study that has at least a thousand thoroughly trained practitioners. Philosophy is different from other fields—probably almost all other fields—in that no matter how carefully a claim is formulated, a relevantly competent and informed philosopher can be found who won't accept it, even after a great deal of expert reflection on the matter. At the outer limit, a philosopher might think that in order to "accept" a claim one has to hold that it's *true*, but truth is an inconsistent and hence empty concept (as the alethic paradoxes show, or so she thinks); as a result, she refuses to accept literally any claim (even the claim that truth is inconsistent; this is a tricky position to maintain, as she has to give a slightly different interpretation of 'maintain' or 'endorse').

Regarding the first point, about the *substance* of the ten claims, I have four comments. First, think about how long and hard one must work before one realizes the truth of (1)-(10): it can take months of exposure to many readings and lectures before a student can even *fully grasp* (1)-(10). They are hardly trivial claims. Second, it took researchers *many years* to establish them. Third, these are not merely claims about the "current state of play", at least if that phrase is supposed to indicate a consensus that lasts for only a few years. For instance, it's been known *for centuries* that substance dualism faces a difficult (not to say insurmountable) problem of interaction (that's an eleventh Reasons claim). Fourth, these claims guide our research in enormous ways, again suggesting their importance. For these reasons, there is good reason to include them as "substantive".

The fourth and final category of p-knowledge claims are perhaps more familiar if harder to formulate, and for that reason alone I am less sure of its existence: the **Conditional** ones, which are conditional claims about the truth-values of various philosophical claims (and not merely the reasons for and against claims, as with the previous category). Example 1: a philosopher might not agree with 'There is a priori knowledge', because she is an anti-realist about knowledge, but she will agree with 'If anti-realism about knowledge is false, then there is a priori knowledge'. Example 2: a philosopher might not agree with 'Content externalism is true for belief contents', because she thinks there is no such thing as sharable belief content, but she will agree with 'If there is sharable belief content, then content externalism is true for such content'. Example 3: a philosopher might not agree with virtue ethics, because she thinks consequentialism is superior, but she will agree with 'If consequentialism is false, then virtue ethics is true', as she thinks that deontological theories are all false. Example 4: I may not agree with 'Propositions contain concepts as parts', because I'm a nominalist, but I will agree with 'If propositions exist, then they contain concepts as parts'. Example 5: although an epistemologist doesn't agree that external world skepticism is false, she agrees that if epistemic externalism is true, then external world skepticism is false. Example 6: although I don't think presentism is true, I do think that if the General Theory of Relativity is false, then presentism is true.

None of the above are good examples of Conditional p-knowledge claims, because too few philosophers are even disposed to believe them. But think about how informal philosophical discussion often proceeds. Suppose there are five philosophers sitting at table having a meal. One says P and another expresses disagreement. In the ensuing discussion, the two of them wholeheartedly agree that if Q and R, then P. This type of "antecedent building" can continue until all five philosophers with the relevant expertise agree on the conditionalized claim.

In order to win significant agreement amongst philosophers, one has to pack significant material in the antecedents of the Conditional claims. Without offering any defense, I want to leave room for the view that one doesn't have to pack so much in that the conditionals become logically, conceptually, or trivially true. So at least some of the conditionals may be substantive.

### 3. Comparing Philosophy and Science



Someone might think that since philosophical disagreement is rife compared to that of other fields, there is much less expert factual knowledge in philosophy. And if that's right, then there must be something wrong with the preceding arguments.

There are two claims here: (1) there is much more disagreement in philosophy than in other fields, and (2) if (1) is true, then there is much less expert factual knowledge in philosophy. I will examine just (1).

I agree that there are many central philosophical problems that have been unsolved for centuries. The results of the 2009 PhilPapers survey regarding thirty central philosophical issues supports that thesis (Bourget and Chalmers 2009, 2010). But three things are worth keeping in mind when thinking about age-old philosophical controversy.

First, the same is true for virtually any scientific field that has been around for centuries, even the most successful ones. For instance, a team of competent physicists would not have too much trouble coming up with thirty questions in physics that got comparable rates of disagreement—despite the fact that that field is probably the most successful empirical one ever.

Second, some of the open questions in physics—the ones for which there is little expert agreement—have been around for centuries, *just like in philosophy*. Hence, even though the problem of universals and the sorites paradox, for instance, have been around for millennia and are still unsolved (at least at the community level; there may be few geniuses who *know* the solution, and not merely have true beliefs in it), we are in the same boat as physicists—a pretty impressive boat.

Third, it is not at all obvious that most of the questions that we find most important were addressed at all many centuries ago, appearances to the contrary. For instance, the metaphysical mind-body problem was not nearly as well recognized before Descartes' time as it is now.

However, expertise in physics seems importantly different from expertise in philosophy, at least when it comes to factual knowledge. There is a set of “textbook” claims: the ones that are taught to undergraduates. But the textbook claims in philosophy are more about the apparatus of philosophical thinking, whereas in the hard sciences they are more about the results and methods of obtaining results. The analogy to Basics claims would, I guess, be simple claims about mass, momentum, electricity, force,

etc. The primary analogy to Reasons claims would be claims of the form 'This data supports this hypothesis'. I assume there are analogies to Conditional claims as well, involving advanced hypotheses.

This essay is on the *metaphysics* of philosophical expertise: what does such expertise *consist in*? The epistemology of philosophical expertise is another issue: what is the actual, operative, epistemic basis for such expertise? I will not address the latter issue.

## 4. Skeptical Challenges to Philosophical Expertise

There are at least two interesting skeptical issues about philosophical expertise. The first one, which I take up in the first subsection, is whether there are any skeptical challenges to expert philosophical belief that undermine the existence of p-knowledge that *goes beyond* the four classes of claims mentioned above. A particularly interesting issue is whether a good portion of philosophers have knowledge of philosophical claims that are controversial even amongst philosophers. The second issue, which I take up in the second subsection, concerns whether there is a more radical skeptical challenge that undermines the alleged knowledge in the four classes of claims mentioned above.

### The First Challenge

There is good reason to think that philosophers have very little knowledge of philosophical claims that are controversial amongst philosophers. The basic idea here has nothing specifically to do with philosophy however, as it will apply to many other fields as well provided the practitioners are suitably reflective (more on that issue below). Briefly put, when one knows that one's belief is highly controversial, then one has available a good if potentially defeasible reason R for serious doubt; if R isn't defeated, then it looks as though one's belief won't amount to knowledge. Since so many of the philosophical theses we debate are obviously highly controversial, it looks as though we lack knowledge of them unless there are quite a few defeaters of R lying around.

Let's say that the *controversy skeptic* thinks that even if a controversial belief starts out as knowledge, once one appreciates the controversy one's belief will no longer amount to knowledge, or, if it does,

there is something unwise in the belief retention.<sup>2</sup> In philosophy, the cases of controversy that generate powerful arguments for types of skepticism that have real bite typically satisfy the following conditions.

The belief B in question has been investigated and debated (i) for a very long time by (ii) a great many (iii) genuine experts on the relevant issues who (iv) have worked very hard (v) under good conditions to figure out if B is true. (vi) These people have not come to any significant agreement on B's truth-value, and (vii) those who endorse B are not, as a group, in a significantly better position to judge B than those who reject it.

Do (i)-(vii) mean that all or most members of the philosophical community lack knowledge of B?

There are four relevant sets of philosophers to consider, assuming that each believes B:

- a. Those who think that B isn't controversial among philosophers because most of them accept it. They reject some or all of (i)-(vii).
- b. Those who agree with (i)-(vii) but also think that the group of philosophers who endorse B are much better positioned to judge B than those who reject it.
- c. Those who agree with (i)-(vii), admit that the philosophers who reject B are in no worse position to judge B, but who also think that this time around the ones who got it right were the ones who endorsed B—a bit similar to how two athletes can be equally "positioned" to make a particular kind of play but on the occasion in question one did it right while the other didn't.
- d. Those who agree with (i)-(vii), at least dispositionally, but have no significant dispositions about the facts about the controversy.

Regarding groups (a) and (b), it's at least arguable that if one happens to have excellent overall evidence for B, and B is true, then one's false belief that there is no real controversy over B, or that the supporters of B are much better positioned to judge B, does not ruin one's chances of knowing B. Yes, the person has a false and probably unjustified belief that they probably should have avoided: the belief that there is no expert controversy, or that B's supporters are much better positioned than B's detractors. But that

---

<sup>2</sup> The next few paragraphs are modified from my 2015, 2017A, and 2017B.

is arguably a separate matter, one that may not mean that their justified belief in B fails to amount to knowledge. For similar reasons, I think the members of group (d) might be able to know B even though they are missing some information they probably should be aware of. Those in group (c) may not have made any epistemic mistake but I suppose one could question the basis for their confident opinion that they are the ones who happened to get B's truth-value right, given that they have admitted that the deniers of B were just as well positioned to judge B correctly.

In any case, we see that there may be ways to know B even though B is controversial amongst experts, although this is a tricky issue.<sup>3</sup>

Even if this skeptical challenge fails, so at least some philosophers can know philosophical claims that are in fact controversial in the way specified by conditions (i)-(vii), it remains true that the philosophers in groups (a) and (b) are making serious epistemic mistakes, as they have false and unjustified beliefs that they probably should not have, given their place in the philosophical community (*we should, as philosophers, know when our theories are controversial in our own community*). If so, then we have avoided one epistemic pitfall—believing but not knowing B—for another epistemic pitfall—having a false and unjustified belief we shouldn't have.

Whether the members of groups (a)-(d) can know the controversial B probably depends on what knowledge comes to. Over the centuries many philosophers have thought that knowledge is something pretty special, something that has to be fought for with real cognitive power. Others have thought that any two year old child has loads of knowledge: if she is minimally functioning, then she will know an enormous number of mundane facts. I won't enter that debate here.

## The Second Challenge

There is a much more devastating skeptical challenge, one that applies to many more philosophical beliefs but does not infect non-philosophers.

---

<sup>3</sup> Fumerton 2010, Kornblith 2010, Kornblith 2013, Goldberg 2009, Frances 2010, Frances 2013, and Christensen 2015 each address the epistemology of controversial belief.

Philosophers often embrace radically anti-commonsensical theories, even today. Some of them say that there are no baseballs. Or that nothing is morally wrong. Or that twice two isn't four. Others truly believe that there are no beliefs. Or that taking one cent from a rich person can instantly make them no longer rich. Or that no claims using vague concepts are true. Some hold that nothing is true, as truth is an inconsistent concept. Some think that fire engines aren't red (or any other color). And of course some hold that we know next to nothing about the external physical world.

It's arguable that these theories satisfy (i)-(vii) amongst the relevant sets of philosophical specialists. If the conjunction of these conditions, or our awareness of its truth, provides an undefeated hurdle to knowing the falsehood of any of those theories, then we fail to know that they are false. For instance, we will believe but not know that there are trees.

This skeptical challenge probably doesn't apply to non-philosophers, as they are not part of the philosophical community and are non-blamelessly completely unaware of the controversy surrounding them. I won't take up an evaluation of this skeptical challenge here.

## 5. Expertise and Philosophical Progress

Assume for a moment that I'm right that there are these four classes of claims that a decent portion of philosophers know but the vast majority of non-philosophers fail to know. Assume further that this propositional p-knowledge is *a large portion* of expertise in philosophy. Then it isn't difficult to see what one large part of philosophical progress is: it's progress in the four classes. The most obvious source of progress will probably be in the Reasons claims. Most of the ten I listed in section 2 are 20<sup>th</sup> century results. But the set of Textbook claims changes significantly over the centuries and decades as well, as new thought experiments, central arguments, distinctions, theories, topics, questions, problems, tasks, and proposals are discovered while old ones might be discarded due to the judgment that they are not useful.

However, even under those assumptions it's not simple to evaluate progress in philosophy. I'll look at just three reasons why.

First, in order to evaluate progress one should not focus just on success—new members in the sets—but failures, of at least two kinds: (a) truths that used to be known but are lost through neglect or other factors, and (b) falsehoods that come to be endorsed by many experts. For an example of kind (a), it might be the case that insights into the metaphysics of thought content that were revealed in the heyday of work on that topic, roughly 1975-1995 (think of Fodor, Dretske, and Millikan here), are in the process of being lost since a great many philosophers of mind since then have been focusing more on consciousness and perception and less on thought content. For an example of kind (b), imagine that knowledge is just true belief and the Gettier cases show only how ‘knows’ has odd semantics and pragmatics; if so, then the last fifty years have seen a great many philosophers endorsing falsehoods.

Second, I suppose we can agree that not all philosophical claims are equally important, although it will be more difficult to agree on particular cases. It’s natural to think that of two additions C1 and C2 to our p-knowledge, one might be more of a contribution to philosophical progress than another. However, it might be the case that we can keep track of that difference in contribution through the number of subsidiary truths added: perhaps C1 adds many more elements to the four sets than C2. An analogous idea would apply to subtractions from the four sets.

Third, the expansion of philosophical expertise is clearly not the whole of philosophical progress. By my lights, the largest progress is made when philosophy positively and significantly influences or even creates fields or intellectual movements that become more or less independent of philosophy: think of symbolic logic, the set-theoretic foundations of mathematics, computational theory, decision theory, the enormous influences in linguistics and psychology, etc. And that’s just the beginning. But this isn’t a paper on philosophical progress.

## References

Bourget, David and Chalmers, David (2009). PhilPapers survey. [philpapers.org/surveys/](http://philpapers.org/surveys/).

Bourget, David and Chalmers, David (2010). “On the Conception and Design of the PhilPapers Survey”, <http://philpapers.org/surveys/designthoughts.html>.

- Christensen, David. (2015). "Disagreement and Public Controversy", In Jennifer Lackey (ed.) *Essays in Collective Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 142-166.
- Frances, Bryan. (2017a). "Skepticism and Disagreement", in Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (eds.), *Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present*, Continuum Press.
- Frances, Bryan. (2017b). "Extensive Philosophical Progress and Agreement", *Metaphilosophy*, 48, 47-57.
- Frances, Bryan. (2015). "Religious Disagreement", in Graham Oppy (ed.) *Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*, Acumen Press, 180-192.
- Frances, Bryan. (2013). 'Philosophical Renegades'. In Lackey and Christensen eds. *New Essays on Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 121-66.
- Frances, Bryan. (2010). 'The Reflective Epistemic Renegade'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81, 419-63.
- Fumerton, Richard. (2010). 'You Can't Trust a Philosopher'. In Feldman and Warfield eds. *Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 91-110.
- Goldberg, Sanford. (2009). 'Reliabilism in Philosophy'. *Philosophical Studies*, 124: 105-17.
- Kornblith, Hilary. (2013). 'Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?' In Machuca ed. *Disagreement and Skepticism* (New York: Routledge), 260-76.
- Kornblith, Hilary. (2010). 'Belief in the Face of Controversy'. In Feldman and Warfield eds. *Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 29-52.