Izvorni znanstveni članak
Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose
Danny Frederick
orcid.org/0000-0003-3011-0393
; Hunstan Lane, Old Leake, Boston, United Kingdom
Sažetak
G. F. Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.
Ključne riječi
Action explanation; eliminativist; infinite regress; introspection; perception; purpose; Schueler; theory-laden
Hrčak ID:
83142
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.6.2012.
Posjeta: 1.149 *