Abstract
A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are non-achievable in simple games. Moreover, it is also proved that all achievable hierarchies are already obtainable in the class of weakly linear games. Our results prove that given an arbitrary complete pre-ordering defined on a finite set with more than five elements, it is possible to construct a simple game such that the pre-ordering induced by the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices coincides with the given pre-ordering.
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Research partially supported by Grants SGR 2005-00651 of Generalitat de Catalunya and MTM 2006-06064 of the Education and Science Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.
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Freixas, J., Pons, M. Hierarchies achievable in simple games. Theory Decis 68, 393–404 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9108-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9108-0