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Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 August 2013
Abstract
In this paper, I develop an interest-relative theory of justification in order to answer the question, “How can I maintain that P when someone whom I consider to be my epistemic peer maintains that not-P?” The answer to this question cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone, I argue, since justification cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone. Rather, in order to determine whether a subject S is justified in believing that P at time t, we need to assess her evidence in favour of P in proportion to her interest in P.
Dans cet article, je développe sur la question de la justification une théorie reliée à l’intérêt afin de répondre à la question suivante : «comment puis-je affirmer que P quand quelqu’un que je considère comme mon homologue épistémique soutient que non-P?» Je soutiens que la réponse à cette question ne peut pas être déterminée à partir des seuls éléments de preuve, puisque la justification ne peut être déterminée en examinant les données seules. Au contraire, afin de déterminer si un sujet S est justifié à croire que P au temps t, nous devons évaluer son témoignage en faveur de P en proportion de son intérêt pour P.
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- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 587 - 604
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013
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