Kierkegaard on Hope as Essential to Selfhood Kierkegaard differs from his contemporaries Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by emphasizing the value of hope and its importance for human agency and selfhood or practical identity. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard argues that despair involves a loss of hope and courage that is extremely common. Moreover, despair involves being double-minded by having an incoherent practical identity (although it need not be recognized as such if the agent mistakes his identity). A coherent practical identity, by contrast, requires wholehearted commitment towards ideals and the hope that our ideals are realizable. Whereas Rudd and Davenport argue that a coherent practical identity requires unconditional moral commitment, the present text argues that it also requires hope. More specifically, the text reconstructs Kierkegaard’s argument for hope as essential to practical identity. The latter is understood as “a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking”. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 101. See also Anthony Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); John Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard (London: Routledge, 2012). Although Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death is well known, his equally important analysis of hope is largely neglected. Notable exceptions include William McDonald, “Hope.” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Envy to Incognito, ed. S.M. Emmanuel, William McDonald and Jon Stewart (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 15, tome III), 163–68; Roe Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God: Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), ch. 9; Mark Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Terence Sweeney, “Hope Against Hope: Søren Kierkegaard on the Breath of Eternal Possibility,” Philosophy and Theology 28 (2016): 165–84. To some extent, the present text draws on Roe Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Despair and Nihilism Converge,” in Modernity – Unity in Diversity? Essays in Honour of Helge Høibraaten, ed. K.K. Mikalsen, Erling Skjei and Audun Øfsti (Oslo: Novus, 2016), 455–77; Roe Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard’s Post-Kantian Approach to Anthropology and Selfhood,” in The Kierkegaardian Mind, ed. Patrick Stokes, Eleanor Helms and Adam Buben (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God. There seems to be two reasons for this neglect. First, Kierkegaard’s account of hope is spread out over a number of lesser-known writings such as For Self-Examination, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, Christian Discourses, and Eighteen Upbuilding Writings in addition to the better-known Works of Love. Whereas The Sickness unto Death analyses despair systematically, these lesser-known writings give a somewhat fragmented account of hope that is largely overlooked by commentators. The Sickness unto Death is published under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. However, Kierkegaard introduces Anti-Climacus only because he does not claim to live up to the latter’s ideals, although he fully accepts these ideals and the views of Anti-Climacus. For this reason, we attribute the views of Anti-Climacus to Kierkegaard. See SKS 22, 130, NB 11:209 / KJN 6, 127. (Partially as a result, Kierkegaard is known as the melancholic Dane.) Second, Kierkegaard’s via negativa methodology approaches hope (as well as selfhood and practical identity) indirectly by focusing on despair. For Kierkegaard’s negativistic methodology, see Theunissen, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair; Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet. However, despair itself is described as hopelessness both by The Sickness unto Death and various commentators (SKS 11, 133f., 153 / SUD, 18, 37f.). . Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet: Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 151; Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays (London: Routledge, 2006), 142. Kierkegaard even argues that hope proper, that is hope against hope, presupposes despair while overcoming it at every instant (see Section 5). On Kierkegaard’s account, hope and despair are therefore so closely connected that it is difficult to separate them without ignoring his dialectical and negativistic approach to selfhood. In the following, we will start by introducing Kierkegaard’s influential account of despair and then show how it not only points toward moral commitment but also towards hope and religiousness. Instead of giving a full account of despair, the present text limits itself to elements of despair that are directly relevant for Kierkegaard’s account of hope. Despair as Loss of Hope and Courage Kierkegaard characterizes despair both as hopelessness and as double-mindedness. Here we will start by discussing the former, while the next section will discuss double-mindedness. It is often the case that despair is contrasted with hope, since despair seems to entail hopelessness. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard follows this common usage of the terms by characterizing despair as hopelessness (SKS 11, 133f., 153 / SUD, 18, 37f.). . Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard, 58ff.; David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as a Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 155ff.; Michael Theunissen, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). More specifically, he takes despair to involve an act whereby the agent actively give up hope and courage. . Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet, 152f. On the one hand, despair involves passivity by virtue of resulting from an experience of loss or disappointment. By suffering (what he takes to be) a fatal loss or disappointment, the agent gives up all hope and courage. As a result, he is stuck in a desperate situation and can neither cope with the loss nor accept himself (SKS 11, 176ff. / SUD, 60ff.). The demonic, for example, is deeply disappointed over the impossibility of self-creation and defiantly rejects all help to overcome despair (SKS 11, 182–7 / SUD, 67-74). On the other hand, despair involves activity since the agent takes the loss (or disappointment) to be significant enough to give up hope and courage. Kierkegaard is particularly interested in radical despair that gives up all significant hope and courage by attributing infinite value or importance to the loss or disappointment. . Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet, 143-53. Despair is then not merely something one suffers passively, since it always involve actively abandoning hope and courage. It is not only a psychological phenomenon but also a moral notion that refers to an unwillingness to accept human agency in general and moral responsibility in particular. . Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142f., 154, 206–8. On this account, despair presupposes that the agent has ideals, values or at least something he identifies with, which he takes to be actually impossible to realize. For instance, the agent values his personal freedom and identifies fully with it, but takes it to be impossible to realize because it is conditioned by states of affairs that do not obtain (e.g. due to imprisonment). Hope, by contrast, sees the good as possible to realize. Kierkegaard describes hope as expectancy of the possibility of good (SKS 9, 249 / WL, 249), as an anticipation that what one hopes for can be realized. The object of hope then represents the ideals or values of the agent. Both despair and hope seem to involve a fundamental tension, or conflict, between ideals and reality. Both presuppose that world is not as it should have been. Still, despair and hope represent fundamentally different attitudes towards the conflict between ideals and reality. Hope takes this conflict to be resolvable, whereas despair takes it to be irresolvable. Despair therefore overlaps with forms of nihilism and pessimism, which hold that the world as it is ought not to be, whereas the world that ought to be does not exist. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, vols. 1–15 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), vol. 12, 366; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1968), §585A. There is substantial overlap between nihilism and despair, see Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche”. Still, pessimism may only overlap partially with Kierkegaardian despair, since pessimism lacks hope but retains courage, whereas despair lacks both hope and courage. For pessimism, see Frederick Beiser, Weltschmertz: Pessimism in German Philosophy 1860–1900 (Oxford University Press, 2016), 282. Pessimism was developed by Schopenhauer, who Kierkegaard read in 1854–55. Although Kierkegaard shares Schopenhauer’s view that the world is unacceptable in its actuality, he nevertheless affirms a hopeful perspective by viewing the world as acceptable in its potentiality. Merely accepting the world as it is – as Nietzsche suggests – would amount to a fatalistic acceptance of evil and injustice in the world. Hope, by contrast, involves a protest that makes it possible to try to overcome evil and injustice by enabling progress towards ideals in the future. Nietzsche, by contrast, argues that we must either accept the world unconditionally (by saying yes to the eternal recurrence of the same) or be pessimists or nihilists who condemn it as being incompatible with our ideals or values. To Kierkegaard, this represents a false dilemma, since hope represents a third option that offers the possibility of reconciling ideals and reality. Despair as Double-Mindedness: Incoherent Practical Identity The above account of despair, points to a further idea – emphasized by Kierkegaard – that despair takes the form of double-mindedness. Just like the German Verzweiflung, the Danish word for despair – Fortvivelse – is based on the numeral “two,” (Danish tvi or tve; German zwei) suggesting that despair involves a split or duality. Based on this, Kierkegaard writes, “[E]veryone in despair has two wills, one that he futilely wants to follow entirely, and one that he futilely wants to get rid of entirely.” (SKS 8, 144 / UD, 30) Despair involves being double-minded by having an incoherent will. However, rather than merely referring to volition, it involves an incoherent practical identity with different motives. . Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality, ch. 3; Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, 42ff. To despair is simply to lack a coherent practical identity. On Kierkegaard’s account, despair results from a tension that is fundamental to human agency and selfhood. More specifically, our agency and selfhood is characterized by both facticity and freedom. Facticity represents a given, inescapable socio-historical context as well as embodiment that limits or constraints human agency. Freedom, by contrast, represents the human ability to transcend limitations by gradually and partially reforming and modifying facticity. Hence, Kierkegaard stresses the interplay (or dialectics) between facticity and freedom. Human freedom is always situated in a particular context or situation that limits it. The result is a fundamental tension between freedom and facticity that is constitutive of human nature, since both freedom and facticity represent constitutive features of our nature. Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, 31ff.; cf. Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality. At this point, Kierkegaard influenced continental philosophy from Heidegger to Sartre and Habermas. However, Rudd and Davenport also show that it is relevant to Anglophone philosophy after MacIntyre and Frankfurt. Davenport argues that Kierkegaard’s account of human nature is either a two-aspect account of body and mind or some form of Aristotelean hylomorphism. See John Davenport, “Selfhood and Spirit,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. J. Lippitt and G. Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234. For that reason, any attempt to identify only with facticity or freedom is self-defeating and will result in double-mindedness. Unless freedom and facticity are reconciled, the tension between freedom and facticity results in double-mindedness that exaggerates either freedom or facticity. Someone who identifies with only one of these two constitutive features is double-minded, since he is split between what he identifies with and what he wants to avoid. The Sickness unto Death argues that despair is dominated either by weakness or by defiance (SKS 11, 162 / SUD, 47). The “despair of weakness” does not want to be the self it is, whereas the “defiant” “desperately wants to be [….] a self that he is not (for the will to be the self that he is in truth is the very opposite of despair)” (SKS 11, 136 / SUD, 20). The “despair of weakness” understates the possibilities represented by freedom, while exaggerating limitations. The “defiant,” by contrast, exaggerates possibilities, while understating limitations. Neither of them want to be themselves wholeheartedly, since both forms of despair identify with – or value – something they are not. Overcoming despair then requires accepting oneself completely by taking full responsibility for one’s whole life here and now. Stokes argues that selfhood in Kierkegaard concerns not only practical identity but also a naked (minimal) self that takes full responsibility for itself in the present. Exactly how the naked self relates to practical identity is a contested issue that I do not discuss here. See Patrick Stokes, The Naked Self: Kierkegaard and Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 167. Without unconditional willingness to be itself, the self is double-minded, since it is split between ideals, which it identifies with, and reality, which it does not fully accept or endorse. Despair therefore refers to an unwillingness to accept human agency. . Cf. Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, 142f., 154, 208. Wholeheartedness as Constitutive of Selfhood: Coherent Practical Identity Kierkegaard thinks that despair is extremely common, since it results from a tension that is constitutive of human nature (i.e., freedom vs. facticity; defiance vs. weakness; activity vs. passivity). This tension will result in double-mindedness, unless the two opposites, such as freedom and facticity, are reconciled. In order to avoid double-mindedness, the agent therefore needs to actively shape and unify his entire practical identity so that it becomes coherent. However, this shaping requires a self with higher-order motives. The Sickness unto Death maintains that the potential for selfhood is latent in human nature, although the self cannot be identified either with human nature or with any of its constitutive features (facticity or freedom) (SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13). Instead, selfhood requires higher-order motives that identifies with some lower-order motives, while distancing itself from other motives. . Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality, 117. For Kierkegaard, the self is a reflexive self-relation that relates actively to human nature (and others) by forming higher-order motives and volitions. It is therefore conceived of in hierarchical and relational terms. . Stokes, The Naked Self, 145; Davenport, “Selfhood and Spirit,” 239n. However, non-ideal selves that despair consciously differ from ideal, wholehearted selves. The former are double-minded, although they are aware of both despair and selfhood. The latter, by contrast, actively overcome despair at every instance by unifying their identity. (Human beings who are not selves, by contrast, lack higher-order motives.) Kierkegaard emphasizes that only a wholehearted or unified self avoids double-mindedness (SKS 8, 138ff. / UD, 24ff.). However, in order to become wholehearted, the self needs an unreserved orientation towards the good that defines its whole identity. The self cannot shape and unify its whole identity if it is only conditionally, occasionally, or partially committed to some project. Instead, a coherent self, which unifies freedom and facticity, needs categorical commitment towards the good. Only such commitment always make it possible to unify one’s whole identity coherently and to coordinate different roles and various other projects. Without unreserved commitment to good, agency therefore lacks coherence and unity. . Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, 139f., 187f. There are two different problems here. One problem is that agency could be fragmented into different projects and roles that are not integrated as parts of a single life. Such a life would lack coherence and unity but it need not be contradictory. Another problem, however, is that agents may pursue projects and roles that are incompatible with each other, either in principle or in fact. An underlying orientation towards good prevents these problems by being a meta-project that shapes, unifies and coordinates all other projects and roles that we engage in. As such, it underlies the specific projects and roles that we have. However, not any categorical commitment to a project or cause will do if double-mindedness is to be avoided. Rather, we need a normative standard that makes it possible for agency to either fail or succeed in shaping and unifying its identity. This requires a fundamental form of normativity that is basic to human agency and selfhood. However, this normativity cannot be unique to each individual but must rather be shared by all agents, since our very self-relation is intertwined with our relation to others (cf. SKS 3, 250 / EO2, 262). In general, becoming a self requires ethics that is other-regarding rather than egoistic or eudaimonistic (cf. SKS 7, 121ff., 385ff. / CUP1, 129ff., 423ff.). More specifically, proper self-love requires neighbor-love; and hope for ourselves requires hope for all others (SKS 9, 227ff., 246ff. / WL, 225ff., 246ff.; SKS 10, 127–32 / CD, 116–22). Both our self-relation and our relation to others then involve a shared normative constraint, which Kierkegaard identifies with the good and the divine (SKS 9, 111–24 / WL, 107–21). John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 56f., 90ff., 121f. Kierkegaard identifies the good and the divine. See SKS 4, 160 / FT, 68; SKS 7, 133, 143 / CUP1, 142, 153f.; SKS 8, 151–53, 364, / UD, 39–41, 268. See also note #30 below. Kierkegaard holds the good to be inescapable (SKS 8, 123 / UD, 7). He writes: “[T]he person who in truth wills only one thing can will only the good [….] The person who wills one thing that is not the good is actually not willing one thing; [...] he must be, double-minded.” (SKS 8, 138–40 / UD, 24f.) Only categorical moral dedication therefore allows wholeheartedness; anything else involves double-mindedness. . Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality, chs. 3-4; Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, chs. 2, 6-7; Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard’s Post-Kantian Approach to Anthropology and Selfhood”. Practical Commitments Require Hope However, unconditional moral commitment do not suffice to rule out despair. Like anyone else, moral agents may experience loss, disappointment or hardship and feel stuck in situations that appear hopeless. Moral agents may even suffer from depression or unhappiness that makes them self-preoccupied and therefore less responsive to the – morally decisive – needs of others. . Cf. M.K. Martin, Happiness and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 109. Worse still, morality often requires sacrificing prudential interests. Conflict between morality and prudence can even lead to despair that weakens or deteriorates moral motivation. In situations that may involve either serious normative conflict or the experience of loss, disappointment and hardship, there therefore is a tendency towards despair and – partially because of this – demoralization (i.e. a psychological loss of resolve to continue to be moral). . Cf. Robert Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 151ff. In many situations, it seems impossible or improbable to realize our ideals. Unless we manage to reconcile ideals and reality, by hoping (or believing) in realizability, the result is a double-mindedness that is split between the ideals it identifies with and the reality it is stuck with. Hope seems necessary, since moral commitments often transcend available evidence, making it necessary to act in the face of uncertainty and put up with difficulties. Indeed, moral agency often involves being committed towards projects whose feasibility cannot be known by us. . Cf. Onora O’Neill, Kant on Reason and Religion (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1997), 287. Since evidence is insufficient, we then need hope that our projects can be realized. Kierkegaard here accepts the broadly Kantian idea that our practical commitments clearly go beyond available evidence (cf. SKS 9, 229ff. / WL, 227ff.). Like Kant, he appeals to the hope that we can realize our moral (and prudential) interest, even though it is not warranted by evidence. Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, ch. 9. In the context of religion, Kierkegaard repeatedly contrasts Kant’s “honest way” with the dishonesty of post-Kantian philosophy (notably Hegelianism). See SKS 6, 142 / SLW, 152; SKS 19, 170, Not4:46 / KJN 3, 167; SKS 20, 229, NB2:235 / KJN 4, 229; SKS 22, 215, NB12:121 / KJN 6, 216f.; SKS 27, 390, 415, Papir 365:2, 369 / JP 1, 649, 654. For Kierkegaard’s reference to Kant on hope, see SKS 19, 140, Not 4:11 / KJN 3, 139, 539; SKS K19, 198f. Onora O’Neill makes a similar point, writing: [W]e must assume that […] our future is one in which we can act, and in which the aim of moral action is not absurd: it must be possible to insert the moral action into the world [....] we are committed to moral aims whose feasibility we cannot prove theoretically; to make sense of this we need to postulate, assume, or hope for a human future that allows room for human progress […] these hopes for the future of humankind cannot be renounced if we are committed to morality. . O’Neill, Kant on Reason and Religion, 282, 287f. The point is not that it psychologically hard to live without hope. Rather, it is that it is incoherent to live without hope, unless we also give up moral agency. . O’Neill, Kant on Reason and Religion, 284 Morality requires action but this does not make sense unless the moral agent takes moral action to be possible. Moral agency that does not have any hope of making good by acting seems incoherent, since its ideals and values does not cohere with its perception of reality. Without hope, it cannot reconcile ideals and reality, and therefore finds itself stuck in a hopeless situation. Different Types of Hope: Christian and Human Hopes Kierkegaard describes hope as an expectation of the possibility of good (contrasting it with fear as an expectation of the possibility of evil – SKS 9, 249 / WL, 249). He seems to assume that what we hope for must be possible yet uncertain, if there is to be room and need for hope (cf. SKS 10, 117–24 / CD, 106–13; SKS 11, 153f. / SUD, 38f.). In addition, it must be difficult to attain, since there is hardly any need for hope if what we hope for is easily attainable (SKS 10, 117–24 / CD, 106–13). The argument so far indicates that a unified practical identity requires hope of realizing moral commitments. However, Kierkegaard goes even further by arguing that hope and charity are insufficient, since Christian faith is also needed. Kierkegaard therefore distinguishes between Christian and non-Christian hopes (SKS 8, 214ff. / UD, 112ff.; SKS 13, 99, 103f. / FSE, 77, 82f.; Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668). Non-Christian hope is not based on divine revelation and divine grace as Christian hope is. Kierkegaard therefore describes it as “natural hope” and “human hope”. In the following, we will discuss human hope first and then turn to Christian hope and its justification. Human hope takes many different forms. Kierkegaard here distinguishes between a pre-reflexive and reflective hope (Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668). The former expects the possibility of good when the outcome is objectively uncertain, but it does not realize that it hopes for something that is uncertain or difficult to attain, since it lacks reflection. This hope involves a pre-reflexive expectation similar to immediate trust or confidence. . Cf. Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, 179. It appears identical or closely related to, the hope that Kierkegaard elsewhere claims, “expects victory in everything” “without a struggle” (SKS 5, 29 / EUD, 20). It lacks reflection and experience, and assumes that everything is (humanly) possible. . John Lippitt, “Learning to Hope: The Role of Hope in Fear and Trembling,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Critical Guide, ed. Daniel Conway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 125. Reflexive hope, by contrast, realizes that it hopes for something uncertain that is difficult to attain. The notions of possibility and uncertainty here are subjective notions, referring to how things appear to the agent. Kierkegaard claims that this hope is based on the calculations of the understanding (Forstanden – Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668.). Although he hardly explains what the understanding is, it nevertheless seems to involve the following elements: It represents a natural human faculty, elsewhere described as reason. . Cf. Andrew Burgess, “Forstand in the Swendson-Lowrie Correspondence and in the ‘Metaphysical Caprice’,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. Robert Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994) (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), 109–28. It involves a rational capacity for calculation and manipulation, at least for practical purposes. It only allows risks that are likely to pay off. It does not represent moral rationality, but rather prudential and instrumental rationality that is informed by experience. It involves a naturalism that excludes reference to the supernatural and eschatology. . Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapid: Eerdmans, 2014), 91ff.; Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, 97 and ch. 7; John Davenport, “Faith as Eschatological Trust in Fear and Trembling,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. Edward Mooney (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 196–233. It is concerned with what is humanly possible, not with what is divinely possible. More specifically, it is concerned with practical possibility in which an agent contributes to the realization of an end by acting. Mere metaphysical or divine possibility is not sufficient. It seems to involve evidentialism about belief, according to which rational beliefs require sufficient evidence. Based on this concept, Kierkegaard assumes that non-Christian hope is typically concerned with the pursuit of personal happiness. Moreover, he associates reflexive non-Christian hope with finite worldly wisdom that offers prudential advice based on experience, under the motto that everything only holds “to a certain degree” (SKS 5, 30 / EUD, 21). However, Kierkegaard insists that non-Christian hope leads to hopelessness (cf. SKS 5, 100f. / EUD, 94f.). On the one hand, he argues that hopelessness results from misfortune, hardship and distress (SKS 10, 117–24 / CD, 106–13). As we have seen, the idea seems to be that by suffering a loss or experiencing normative conflict, the agent gives up hope (see Sections 1 and 4). On the other hand, Kierkegaard claims that one must despair or give up hope, since one fails to realize the infinite ethical requirement (SKS 9, 252, 261 / WL, 252, 262). In this context, “infinite” seems to mean “divine” and “inexhaustible,” although it might also suggest that the ethical task is categorically overriding and highly demanding. The latter claim suggests that the one despairs (or that one ought to despair), due to one’s moral shortcoming. But it could also mean that despair itself results from not just any moral failure but from the failure of unifying one’s identity. Rather than presupposing immoral actions, despair then results from an incoherent identity that is morally objectionable. Morality, hope, and despair are then interconnected. Like hope and despair, morality can be approached from both a non-Christian and a Christian perspective. Kierkegaard’s “first ethics” represents non-Christian ethics, whereas the “second ethics” represents Christian ethics. Kierkegaard argues that the first ethics constitutes the natural starting point, although it collapses internally due to human guilt and sinfulness (SKS 4, 323ff. / CA, 16ff.). It fails to live up to its own ideals (and is therefore split between ideals and reality), something that involves despair (double-mindedness) that prepares the transition to Christian ethics. From the Christian perspective, Kierkegaard identifies despair with sinfulness. See Part II of The Sickness unto Death, which has the title “Despair is Sin”. Kierkegaard’s argument here emphasizes the moral gap between our moral obligations and our natural capabilities. Hare uses the moral gap to defend religious ethics, partially by basing his argument on Kant and Kierkegaard. See J.E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). For Kierkegaard’s interpretation of original sin and radical evil, see Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, ch. 2. This gap is closed by Christian ethics that relies on forgiveness of sins and divine assistance (SKS 4, 323ff. / CA, 16ff.). In addition, we will see that it involves hope against hope that radically transcends ordinary hopes. To support his views, Kierkegaard relies on the classical idea that our final end is the highest good. . Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, chs. 5–6. Although he does not identify it with eudaimonia, he still takes the highest good to include virtue and happiness, describing it as eternal happiness (Salighed), which Christians may hope for or expect (SKS 5, 214, 250ff. / EUD, 214, 253ff.). . Cf. Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard, 115; Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love, 147ff. In addition, he follows the Augustinian tradition by interpreting the highest good as an ethico-religious community – “the kingdom of God” – that cannot be realized by any individual alone (SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 258f.; SKS 7, 356 / CUP1, 391; SKS 8, 303–6 / UD, 208–12). It is the highest good in this collective form that represents the ultimate object of justified hope for Kierkegaard (as for Kant and much of the Augustinian tradition). However, Kierkegaard accepts a Kantian critique of eudaimonism, denying that virtue should be motivated by the prospect of happiness. Cf. SKS 7, 367, 387 / CUP1, 403, 426; SKS 20, 223, NB2:211 / JP 2, 1510; SKS 27, 277, Papir 283:1 / JP 3, 2349. However, this end cannot be realized by human effort alone. First, moral virtue is undermined by moral failure and evil. Second, we could end up being unhappy even if we were morally perfect. Finally, the highest good takes the form of a kingdom that cannot be realized by an individual alone. As a result, human agents cannot possibly realize the highest good even collectively, unless divine assistance is introduced. Secular hopes for the highest good must then be disappointed. . Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, ch. 9. However, Kierkegaard maintains that Christian hope is only possible as a response against human despair (Pap. VI B53, 13 / JP 2, 1668). The reason for this is that Kierkegaard follows Paul in taking Christian hope to be “hope against hope,” that is, as hope in a hopeless situation (SKS 13, 102–4 / FSE 81–83). The idea is that when everything breaks down due to despair, God offers new hope as divine gift that, once accepted, makes it possible to overcome all human (non-Christian) despair (SKS 13, 102–4 / FSE, 81–83, cf. SKS 5, 100f. / EUD, 94f.; Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668). It is only God, for whom everything is possible, that can guarantee that there is always hope (cf. SKS 11, 185 / SUD, 71). Only Christian religiousness overcomes all despair by hoping against hope. Kierkegaard thinks that this hope is found in our innermost being, although we only become aware of it when we despair over our whole situation. Despair abandons human hope while procuring Christian hope (SKS 10, 121–23 / CD, 110–12, cf. SKS 8, 214ff. / UD, 112ff.). To procure this hope, we need to give up human hopes and to accept the gift of divine assistance (which is given universally). Bernier has a long, critical discussion of Theunissen but he does not discuss Grøn’s development of Theunissen’s reading. Grøn claims that despair gives up hope, whereas Bernier claims that it rejects hope. However, Kierkegaard’s point seems to be that despair abandons human hope and rejects Christian hope against hope. See Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard, ch. 4; cf. Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet, 142ff.; Theunissen, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair. Kierkegaard maintains that the Christian hope for the highest good cannot be disappointed, since it is based on eschatology and patiently expects something that transcends our finite schedules and probabilities. Cf. R.C. Roberts, “The Virtue of Hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. Robert Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2003) (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), 192f., 200f. Kierkegaard endorses Paul’s statement that someone who only hopes for this life is the most miserable of all. SKS 8, 329 / UD, 228, cf. CUP1, 389 / SKS 7, 355. It is not a specific hope for a particular event (which may be disappointed) but something that lies beyond human calculation and all time limits. . Lippitt, “Learning to Hope,” 136ff. As such, it may be realized in another form and at another time than expected. The assumption is that it will be realized somehow, sometime. Like faith and charity, Christian hope is not based on evidence or knowledge. Rather, it goes beyond available evidence (cf. SKS 9, 229ff. / WL, 227ff.). Still, this does not amount to a blind leap of faith, since it is based on practical or pragmatic considerations. More specifically, religiousness fits a natural human need for coherent selfhood by offering a way out of despair and demoralization. Instead of being justified epistemically, religious hope and faith is then justified practically. Like Kant, Kierkegaard therefore seems to be a pragmatist (non-evidentialist) about belief and hope. For Kierkegaard’s pragmatism about belief, see C.S. Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief: An Historical, Critical Study (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982); S.E. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest God, ch. 6. Kierkegaard does not distinguish between belief and faith, since the Danish “Tro” covers both terms, just like the German “Glaube”. However, Kierkegaard goes beyond Kant by accepting not only (moral) natural theology but also divine revelation. The idea seems to be that Christian doctrine fits a natural need, although it cannot be reduced to human needs or natural theology since it relies on revelation, which has its own language and perspectives. Faith, Hope, and Charity In Works of Love, Kierkegaard emphasizes that Christian hope requires charity that expects good for both oneself and one’s neighbor alike. Kierkegaard claims that charity mediates between hope for oneself and hope for all others. He writes, “love is [ ...] the middle term: without love, no hope for oneself; with love, hope for all others—and to the same degree one hopes for oneself, to the same degree one hopes for others, since to the same degree one is loving.” (SKS 9, 259 / WL, 260) Kierkegaard first claims that justified hope requires charity, since there are moral restrictions on hope. Hope depends on commanded love: “Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love [...] eternally and happily secured against despair.” (SKS 9, 36 / WL, 29). He therefore holds that hope is nothing without love (SKS 9, 258 / WL, 259). He then claims that charity itself is “built up” (opbygges) and nourished by Christian hope (SKS 9, 248 / WL, 248). That is, hope cultivates and strengthens love and prevents us from giving it up by despairing. Works of Love therefore contrasts despair not only with hope but also with charity (SKS 9, 248–59 / WL, 248–60). However, The Sickness unto Death contrasts despair with Christian faith, whereas For Self-Examination contrasts it with Christian hope (SKS 11, 195f. / SUD, 81; SKS 13, 99, 103f. / FSE, 77, 82f.). This suggests that only the theological virtues avoid despair (cf. SKS 8, 204f. / UD, 100f.; SKS 9, 227ff., 248ff. / WL, 225ff., 248ff.; SKS 10, 127–32 / CD, 116–22). Although these virtues represent character-traits, it is still the case that they must be actively maintained and renewed if we are to be wholehearted agents. Despair must therefore be constantly overcome by hoping, believing, and loving. Gene Fendt comments: There is a unity of the theological virtues, but they are not the same thing. Insofar as faith believes God, believes in God, and believes that God makes good, it is distinct from hope which is an expectation of the good for both oneself and one’s neighbor. But insofar as faith believes that God makes good it is inseparable from the hope which expects the good for both oneself and one’s neighbor. If the first (faith) is given up, then the second (hope for both oneself and others) is ipso facto given up. If, on the other hand, one does not expect the good for both oneself and one’s neighbor, then one lies if he says he has faith. . Gene Fendt, For What May I Hope? Thinking with Kant and Kierkegaard (Bern: Peter Lang, 1990), 168. In a work influenced by Fendt, Mark Bernier concludes, (1) [D]espair can be characterized as an unwillingness to hope an in authentic way; (2) authentic hope [hope for eternal happiness, the highest good] constitutes the primary task of the self; and (3) faith is a willingness to hope, wherein the self secures a ground for the possibility of hope. . Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard, 212. However, (1) it is only complete despair over one’s situation in general that involves an unwillingness to hope (in a hopeless situation) by rejecting Christian hope against hope. (2) It is not only hope but the theological virtues that constitutes the primary task of the self. These virtues represent intrinsic, non-instrumental goods essential to selfhood (cf. SKS 10, 129 / CD, 118). Finally, (3) faith is not identical to “a willingness to hope,” but the theological virtues are interconnected. Kierkegaard emphasizes that hope is nothing without charity, although charity is nourished by hope (SKS 9, 248, 258 / WL, 248, 259). Moreover, hope in God requires faith and trust in God and vice versa. . Gouwens, Kierkegaard as a Religious Thinker, 157. The religious believer expects that good is possible for himself and his neighbor alike, since he believes that God makes good for all. Conclusion and Comparison with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche Despite the fact that it is often neglected, Kierkegaard’s account of hope lies at the very heart of his theory. Bernier therefore concludes: “[H]ope is a fundamental theme in Kierkegaard’s narrative, connecting despair, faith, and the self. Indeed, we cannot adequately understand Kierkegaard’s view without drawing out this theme of hope.” . Bernier, The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard, 212. As we have seen, Kierkegaard argues that hope is necessary in order to overcome double-mindedness. Wholeheartedness requires not only categorical moral dedication but also hope and faith that supports moral agency. However, even Christians become double-minded if they lack hope, faith, and charity. This means that shaping and unifying human identity is highly demanding on Kierkegaard’s account. Double-mindedness is therefore far more common than wholeheartedness. Indeed, it is possible to be in despair without knowing it. This is a form of self-deception Kierkegaard calls “inauthentic despair”. See SKS 11, 138-57, 209, 212 / SUD, 22–42, 96, 99f. Kierkegaard’s account of hope deserves attention for the following reasons: It represents an existential account of hope that emphasizes the interrelation between hope and despair, seeing both as crucial for human agency and selfhood. More specifically, Kierkegaard defends the strong view that we should always hope for the good, no matter how bad the situation might be. Put differently, Kierkegaard therefore sees hope against hope as necessary for human agency and selfhood. His emphasis lies not so much on a description of what hope is as an analysis of what justified hope is. More specifically, he argues that justified hope is interrelated with charity and religious faith, and has the highest good as its proper object. As such, it belongs not only to a Judeo-Christian tradition that focuses on the Pauline triad of faith, hope, and charity but it also belongs to a philosophical tradition from Augustine and Kant that views the highest good (the summum bonum), a synthesis of virtue and happiness, as the ultimate object of hope. However, Kierkegaard goes beyond his forerunner by developing a via negativa approach to hope that starts with hopelessness and despair before it proceeds to hope. Indeed, Kierkegaard holds that proper hope, hope against hope, both presupposes and overcomes despair. Kierkegaard differs from his contemporaries Schopenhauer and Nietzsche not only by viewing hope as valuable but also by viewing it as indispensable for human existence. Without hope, human selfhood and identity involves despair (and self-deception), Kierkegaard argues. Still, Kierkegaard does not rule out the possibility of false hopes that may involve self-deception or irrationality. However, it is crucial to Kierkegaard that not all hopes are false, since there are justified hopes that are central to human existence. This means that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche may be justified in criticizing false hopes as long as this critique does not undermine hope altogether. Schopenhauer argues that it natural for humans to hope, since hope expresses the will to life that lies at the ground of everything. . Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), vol. 2, §313. However, this will is not only blind and irrational but the source of all suffering. Schopenhauer therefore describes hope as a “folly of the heart” that confuses what we wish for with what is probable. . Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2, §313. Hope distorts our thinking by engaging in wishful thinking that increases suffering. On this pessimistic view, hopes inevitably lead to disappointment and suffering, since genuine, lasting satisfaction is impossible for us. Even if we are lucky and get what we hope for, this will not cause real happiness but only increase striving and suffering. A similar point is made by Martin, who writes: “[T]here is no tight correlation between satisfying your desire and being satisfied with what you get. Hence the saying: Be careful what you wish for, lest you get it. [.…] Even when realization brings satisfaction, the satisfaction is short lived, as we adjust and take for granted what we gained.” Martin, Happiness and the Good Life, 98. Ultimately, this view rests on the pessimistic claim that neither individual happiness nor moral improvement is humanly possible. Schopenhauer argues that comprehensive happiness involves final satisfaction, which is impossible, since our life oscillates between pain and boredom. . Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover, 1969), vol. 1, 312, 360 (§§57, 65). Still, Schopenhauer thinks that the experience of hopelessness – and not hope – is beneficial, since it facilitates an ascetic denial of the will to live. Only asceticism provides a permanent liberation from suffering, since it negates the will to life that causes suffering in the first place (aesthetic experience, by contrast, only provides a temporal escape from suffering). . Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, books 3-4. Although there is a tendency towards asceticism and pessimism in the late Kierkegaard as well, he still does not accept Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Yet, he agrees with Schopenhauer that the experience of hopelessness is beneficial, since it rejects false hopes. However, whereas Schopenhauer uses hopelessness to deny the will to life, Kierkegaard uses it to highlight the Pauline idea of hope against hope, which promises hope in a hopeless situation. Whereas Kierkegaard advocates Christian hope, both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche reject religious hopes. Nietzsche tends to share Schopenhauer’s negative evaluation of hope as a form of self-deceived escapism. In Human, All Too Human, he describes hope as “the worst of evils because it prolongs the torments of man”. . Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 2, 82; Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human and Beyond Good and Evil, ed. H. Zimmern and P.V. Cohn (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2008), 53 (Human, All Too Human §71). This claim, which is from his comment on the myth of Pandora, is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s view that hope leads to suffering. But in his later writings from the 1880s, Nietzsche offers a reason for rejecting hope that differs strongly from Schopenhauer’s reason. The problem with hope is not that it increases suffering but rather that it involves nihilism (or pessimism). To hope is generally to hope for some perceived good that seems lacking in one’s current situation. Hope thereby depreciates reality, and values something else (e.g. the future) instead. It finds reality insufficient and the object of hope valuable. It thereby involves a nihilistic conflict between ideals and reality. Nietzsche writes, “A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist.” . Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 12, 366; Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §585A. Nihilism presupposes that we hope for (or expect) values that is not found in the world (and that alternative values are lacking). The problem arises because our values or ideals are unrealistic and impossible to realize, both now and in the future. They cannot be realized in this world, and there is no other world in which they can be realized either. . Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism (London: Harvard University Press, 2008), 8. Nietzsche therefore associates hope with otherworldly escapism. This is the reason why he warns against those who speak of extra-terrestrial hopes and dismisses hope in “hidden harmonies, in future blessedness and justice”. . Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 4, 15 and vol. 5, 74; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian del Caro and Robert Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6; Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human and Beyond Good and Evil, 560 (Beyond Good and Evil, §55). Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same represents an influential alternative to the Platonico-Christian tradition that Kierkegaard represents. Nietzsche argues against this tradition and against escapism, other-worldliness and transcendence that belittles or depreciates this world. From this perspective, Schopenhauer’s atheistic pessimism is just as nihilistic as the religious tradition that Kierkegaard represents. Indeed, Schopenhauer belongs to the very same tradition from Nietzsche’s perspective. It is this tradition that Nietzsche wants to overcome by criticizing nihilism. Somewhat paradoxically, he describes the overcoming of nihilism (and pessimism) in terms of hope. He writes, for instance, “the bridge to the highest hope” is “that mankind be redeemed from revenge,” something that refers to revenge as a reactive and nihilistic emotion. . Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 4, 128; Nietzsche, Thus spoke Zarathustra, 77. Nietzsche can thus be said to hope for the end of hope, by hoping to overcome the nihilism and hope of the tradition. He finds the tradition unacceptable, judging that it ought not to be, whereas the Übermensch that accepts the eternal recurrence of same does not yet exist. He thereby stands in danger of repeating the nihilism that he tries to overcome. Somewhat surprisingly, Kierkegaard anticipates Nietzsche’s warning against religious nihilism and escapism. In 1844, he writes: [T]he expectation of an eternal salvation is able (which otherwise seems impossible) to be two places at the same time: it works in heaven and it works on earth, “it seeks God’s kingdom and his righteousness and gives the rest as an over-measure” (Matthew 6:33). If the expectancy does not do this, then it is fraudulent, the craftiness of a sick soul that wants to sneak out of life, and not the authentic presence of a healthy soul in the temporal; then it is not the expectancy of the eternal but a superstitious belief in the future […] (SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 259) Unlike Nietzsche, Kierkegaard develops an anti-nihilistic, existential approach to religion, which makes it possible to orient oneself in this life (SKS 5, 256 / EUD, 259). Nothing seems to capture this better than the notion of hope against hope, which lies at the heart of Kierkegaard’s theory. References Kierkegaard’s Writings CA: Concept of Anxiety. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. CD: Christian Discourses. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. CUP1: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. EUD: Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 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