Abstract
Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character.
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Gomes, A., French, C. On the particularity of experience. Philos Stud 173, 451–460 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0501-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0501-6