

Book Reviews

Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruijer: HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds and Modern Studies.

Dordrecht-Holland/Providence, Rhode Island, Foris Publications, 1987. viii, 333pp. US\$22.90 ISBN 90 6765 330 6

Review by JAMES B. FREEMAN, Hunter College of The City University of New York.

This book should have significant interest for many readers of *Informal Logic*. Recent developments, in particular the 1986 first International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam, indicate that scholars from many disciplines are actively investigating argumentation. A significant literature has developed over some years, much of it unfamiliar to North American philosophical audiences. What are the most significant contributions to this literature, who are its central figures, and with which problems in particular do these scholars deal? What work is relevant to what problems? Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruijer's book is well titled, for it provides a guide to certain major contributions of philosophical interest in this recent literature. It describes their work, while indicating the main issues of argumentation theory and its classical background.

The authors begin by presenting their own understanding of argumentation and its theory. According to them, "Argumentation is a social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation [based on rational assessment] of the audience." (p.7) This not only defines "argumentation"

but delimits argumentation theory, which is concerned with developing criteria for the rational assessment of argumentation. The authors state that at present, no theory or approach dominates the field. Theories differ in their conception of rationality and in their particular aims. Most conceptions of rationality are normative/analytic although some are empirical. Besides developing these points, the authors present an overall model of argumentation and an elaboration of the basic premises of argumentation theory in their first chapter.

The second chapter reviews three backgrounds to argumentation theory: classical logic, dialectic, and rhetoric; fallacy study; and modern formal logic. Coverage of the classical period reviews Aristotle's contribution together with later Roman rhetoric. Discussion of fallacy study again considers Aristotle's contribution along with many other common fallacies familiar from standard textbooks. The review of modern logic also summarizes familiar textbook material on truth functional propositional logic, with a brief look at some advanced topics. The authors in addition develop how the standard logician's treatment of argument form is the result of a number of levels of abstraction from the concrete situation of dialectical argumentative exchange.

In Chapter Three, the authors turn to less familiar material: Arne Naess' analysis of discussions, Crawshay-Williams' analysis of controversy, and Barth and Krabbe's formal dialectic. The Naess material concerns principally the issues of meaning and preciseness, and weighing the strength of argumentation for a thesis. Crawshay-Williams' contribution centers on dimensions of meaning involved in disputes and their resolution. Barth's formal dialectics

presents rules which define the roles, proper moves, and overall conduct of proponent and opponent in a dialectical exchange. The authors also review her interesting and, I think, provocative views in logical theory.

The two most important recent contributions to argumentation theory, in the authors' view, come from Toulmin and Perelman. They devote a chapter to each. In Chapter Four, they examine Toulmin's views on argument analysis and evaluation, including his well-studied model and his conception of what is field dependent and field invariant, presented in *The uses of Argument*. The authors use the model both to analyse an argument and to review how the model has been extended in the literature. In Chapter Five, they examine Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new rhetoric. For these authors, soundness of argumentation is intuitively connected with its persuasive effect. Argumentation theory systematically studies how to bring about "purposive, persuasive effects." This does not mean, however, that argumentation lacks any normative dimension. What gains the approval of the universal audience—the totality of reasonable or rational persons—is convincing as opposed to merely persuading. However, this universal audience is apparently speaker-relative, reflecting his or her idea of rationality. The authors then review Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca's account of the basic premises and argumentation moves (analogous to inference rules) in argumentation, and use these concepts in argument analysis.

To suggest that this *Handbook* is totally exposition and devoid of critical comment would be misleading. Both the chapters on Toulmin's model and on the new rhetoric end with sections of criticism. In addition, the book closes with a chapter indicating how the various contributions surveyed fit together. This book might be adopted as a text in graduate courses focusing on the theory of informal logic or argumen-

tation. It is a useful reference work for anyone doing research in this area. □

Irving Copi: INFORMAL LOGIC

New York: Macmillan, 1987. xi, 354pp.
Paper: US\$22.50, CDN\$32.50 ISBN
0-02-324949-4

Review by WAYNE GRENNAN, St. Mary's University

Those who noted in the Macmillan catalogue a new text *Informal Logic* by the best-selling author of *Introduction to Logic* will be astonished and disappointed by this recent publication. The publisher's blurb for the new text is quite different from that for *Introduction to Logic* (to be referred to here as ITL), suggesting that we will see a different approach. But roughly speaking, this is ITL (sixth edition) with Part Two ("Deduction") left out. Therefore, in this review I shall discuss only the more significant new material since the rest has been reviewed by reviewers of ITL in one or more of its many editions.* Most of the new material occurs in Chapters One and Three.

Besides the new section on problem solving, the new material in Chapter One includes some new material on diagramming argument structure. The chapter is reasonably satisfactory for developing argument analysis skills but, as in ITL (6th ed.), it is merely grafted onto the material in earlier editions of ITL. Diagrams are not used outside the first chapter, not even in the chapter on fallacies. An instructor who wished to make diagramming a central technique in a course would be on his/her own in using this text.

Section 1.6, entitled "Problem Solving", seems to this reviewer to have been included for marketing reasons. There is a discussion of some strategies for dealing with the type of puzzle found in Chapter One of ITL. The main strategy

is the systematic elimination of possibilities using a grid for recording decisions. The techniques presented deal well enough with the highly artificial cases presented. As such they are probably helpful in solving problems on the LSAT or other professional school admission test. In defending inclusion of this section Copi says that "A useful kind of exercise to help strengthen one's problem-solving abilities is the logical puzzle, or 'brain-teaser' " (p. 58). At the end of the section, though, he includes a paragraph describing a number of important respects in which "real problems in the real world" differ from the examples presented. To my mind, the paragraph nicely refutes the above claim. The issue is the extent to which skill in solving such artificial problems transfers over to real-life problems. I suspect the skills required are too different because the problems are too different.

Chapter Three is the same chapter from ITL on informal fallacies, expanded somewhat and with a new section on formal fallacies that, in my opinion is too slight to be useful. Indeed, it would have been better to leave it out because, after discussing Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent, he presents examples that are supposed to show that arguments of these forms can sometimes be formally valid. The examples are not adequate to show this because in each case the conditional premiss is logically redundant, but the main point is that students will be seriously confused.

Professor Copi's publisher, Macmillan (New York), has brought marketing cynicism (perhaps we ought to say chutzpah) to new heights in representing this as a new text. Granted, they do alert the reader (or at least one who reads the copyright page) that "a portion of this book is reprinted from *Introduction to Logic*, Sixth edition..." (my stress). This caveat is a gross understatement. A close comparison reveals that about 85% comes from ITL!

This text will appeal to those who

presently use ITL but do not cover Part Two of it. Their students will appreciate the lower price and lesser bulk. There are many exercises to work on. For those looking for new techniques the text has nothing to recommend it.

*[Editors' Note: Ronald Roblin reviewed Copi's *Introduction to Logic* (6th edition) in *Informal Logic* IV.3 (July) 1983, pp. 12-13.] □