VALUES IN EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY Danny Frederick ___________________________________________________________________________ In Autumn 1996, the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority in the UK issued a Consultation On Values In Education And The Community (COM/96/608). It included a proposed statement of values and concerned the role of schools and other sections of society in promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils. The aim was to gain “wider social acceptance of shared values to which all can subscribe” (p. 2). At the start of January 1997, I submitted a response to the consultation, which is reproduced below. ___________________________________________________________________________ 1. SUMMARY 1.1 The School Curriculum and Assessment Authority propose a set of values to which everyone can subscribe which can provide schools with a secure basis for the provision of spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. The Authority propose to develop a programme of study incorporating the values which could be included in the school curriculum. The Authority would then monitor the performance of schools with regard to spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. 1.2 However, this idea of a code of values to be prescribed for all state schools is misguided because: 1.3 (a) the content of the code could only be determined by political negotiation, which would make it a hotchpotch of pressure-group hobby-horses which would bring the whole idea of moral education into disrepute; (b) imposing the code on all state schools would amount to political indoctrination; (c) the prescribed code would be an impediment to moral advancement, since our knowledge and understanding grow by trial and error which requires freedom to experiment with the values, standards and modes of behaviour that are taught and the ways in which they are taught; (d) in a pluralistic society like ours, any statement of values which is not completely empty will meet with objections from some sections of society. Specific problems with the proposed statement of values are that it: (a) is open to objections on moral and other grounds; (b) mixes up moral principles with political ones; (c) includes collectivist and ‘green’ political manifestos which are partisan and highly controversial, and which it would be tendentious to try to instil in our children under the guise of moral education. 1.4 Schools have an increasingly important role to play in the moral education and training of youth. A prescribed set of values to be taught will not assist them in this. Instead, schools should be allowed to innovate in moral teaching and training. Parental choice should be strengthened and competition between schools fostered, so that new ideas are encouraged, successful schools thrive, failures are closed, and all schools are thereby given incentives to improve. The simplest, cheapest and most effective way of securing this would be to privatise schools; but, tragically, that would meet with overwhelming opposition at the present time. A practical step forward would be to alter the Local Management of Schools regime to strengthen parental choice, to allow failing schools to close through lack of parental interest, and to allow new schools to enter the field. 2. INTRODUCTION 2.1 The School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) is consulting widely on a proposed statement of values and the role of schools and other sections of society in promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils. The statement of values is expounded in the document Consultation On Values In Education And The Community (COM/96/608) which describes the initiative as “a way of gaining wider social acceptance of shared values to which all can subscribe” (p.2). 2.2 At the same time, the authors emphasise that there can be no consensus on the source (God, human nature, etc.) of shared values or on ways in which the values should be applied in specific circumstances. They also point out that, because of the religious and cultural diversity in our society, the values in the statement cannot be a complete list of values that people hold and will of necessity omit some values that some people deem to be of great importance. 2.3 The authors suggest that a statement of shared values, agreed by society in general, would provide schools with a secure basis for the provision of spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. They propose that SCAA should: - undertake an audit of schools’ practice in this area; - consider a programme of study (which could be statutory) embracing the essential values that schools should teach; - monitor moral education in schools. 2.4 The following submission expresses grave concerns about this approach to moral education, points out some serious flaws in the proposed statement of values, and suggests an alternative way to make progress in this area. 3. VALUES IN EDUCATION 3.1 If children are to grow into responsible citizens, then their education and training must encompass moral values, including norms of behaviour that exhibit a respect for others as well as the pursuit of personal fulfilment. Traditionally, the sources of such education and training have been families, schools, churches, voluntary societies and local communities. In the present day, the influences of many of these institutions are attenuated: (a) the decline of religion means that churches reach far fewer people and have less of an influence even on those they do reach; (b) voluntary societies have been largely wiped out by the development of the welfare state, which replaces co-operation and mutual aid with an individual (or family) dependence-relationship to the impersonal state; (c) local community ties have been severely weakened by the greater mobility of labour as well as by the break-up of voluntary societies; (d) the recent increase in the number of family breakdowns, as well as the loosening of extended family ties, seems sure to have an adverse impact on the efficacy of the family in education and training for citizenship. As a consequence, schools appear likely to acquire a greater importance in ensuring that the young receive an education and training which fits them for fruitful participation in a modern civilised society. 3.2 It is, however, important to distinguish between: (a) recognition of an enhanced role for schools in instilling values and standards of behaviour; (b) compulsory adoption by all state schools of a uniform national code of values. The latter, to put it bluntly, is the same as state indoctrination. And the set of values to be taught in all state schools would be determined by the political process, that is (in a democratic society like ours), by a mixture of which political party is in power at the time and which organised special-interest groups are most skilful in bringing pressure to bear. The resulting set of values will be a hodgepodge of compromises and concessions to special pleading, which is sure to bring the whole idea of “values in education” into disrepute. (I would guess that this is becoming evident from the responses to the consultation.) 3.3 Even apart from these problems of politicisation, it would in any case be wrong to prescribe the values to be taught in all state schools. For human beings are fallible creatures. Our knowledge grows by trial and error. New ideas and insights are continually brought forward and tested, and old ideas repeatedly subjected to criticism. Through this process of “conjecture and refutation” our knowledge and understanding advances, often in surprising ways (e.g. old ideas at one time discarded can later be brought back into service). All this applies to moral knowledge as much as to any other. It even applies where people draw their moral principles from sacred texts, since the texts are continually re-interpreted in the light of improved understanding. In consequence, our moral advancement requires freedom of discussion and, perhaps more importantly, freedom to experiment with the values, standards and modes of behaviour that are taught and the way in which they are taught. A national code of values imposed upon all state schools would therefore be an obstacle to moral improvement. And this would be so even if the code received general approval, since the general consensus is often mistaken (this has certainly been so in the past, when all manner of moral horrors have met with general approval at some time or another, such as slavery, to give a gross example). 3.4 Finally, in a pluralistic society like ours, it is likely to be impossible to get general agreement on any set of values that is not completely banal and empty. Even the SCAA’s minimal set of “shared values to which all can subscribe” (p.2) are highly contentious as well as being flawed in other ways, as I will explain in the next section. 4. SHARED VALUES? 4.1 The SCAA’s set of values consists of values statements and associated principles for action, grouped under four headings which I will consider in turn. In this discussion I am concerned only to indicate the more salient flaws in this proposed set of values. I do not make proposals for an alternative set of values since, for the reasons given above, I think this approach is misguided. My own view of a better way to bring about an improvement in moral education is given in Section 5, below. Society 4.2 The values statements under the heading of “society” are as follows. “We value truth, human rights, the law, justice and collective endeavour for the common good of society. In particular we value families as sources of love and support for all their members and as the basis of a society in which people care for others.” I have two objections to these. 4.3 First, the law is often an ass. It is sometimes in conflict with human rights. For example, there are several men in prison at present for engaging in sado-masochistic sex between consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes. I do not value the law that those men contravened. That law is an abomination; and it is an abomination because it violates human rights (which I do value). Similarly, it is the government’s boast that this country has the toughest anti-pornography laws in Europe. These laws are a suppression of freedom of expression (a fundamental human right). Bad laws should not be valued, they should be criticised and changed. But, in a democracy, they should be changed by lawful means. What should be valued is the rule of law, not the law as such (much of which has negative value). 4.4 Second, apart from national emergencies, e.g. war, it is doubtful whether we should value “collective endeavour for the common good of society”. There are many worthwhile “collective endeavours” such as firms, co-operatives and voluntary organisations which exist to promote the common good of their members and to produce benefits for others in society. But a collective endeavour for the common good of society can only be some form of collectivist central planning. Such central planning is wrong in theory and has been calamitous wherever it has been practised. As many economists have laboured to explain in detail, the extensive and intricate cooperation and co-ordination required for the common good of society can only be achieved through markets; it cannot be achieved through collective endeavour. 4.5 A form of collectivism seems to infect all of the principles for action which are based on these values statements, since each of the principles is prefaced by “we as a society should”. This collectivist preface actually makes some of the principles unintelligible. For example, the first principle reads: “we as a society should understand our responsibilities as citizens”. The only way I can make sense of this is by changing it to read: “we, as members of a society, should...” It is then a very reasonable, if very banal, statement. Some of the other principles similarly have to have the preface reread in this way, namely, that we, as members of a society, should - obey the law and encourage others to do so, - contribute to, as well as benefit fairly from, economic and cultural resources. 4.6 On the other hand, some of the other principles for action under this heading can only be read in a collectivist way, i.e. the principles are about what the government should do, namely: - support families in raising children and caring for dependants; help people to know about the law and legal processes; provide opportunities to all; promote participation in our democracy; make truth and integrity priorities in public life. The remainder of the principles could be read either as principles about what citizens should do or as principles for government action, but they seem to be intended in the latter way: - be ready to challenge values or actions which may be harmful to individuals or communities; - accept diversity and respect people’s right to religious and cultural differences; - support people who cannot sustain a dignified lifestyle by themselves. 4.7 There are two problems with these principles for government action. First, being largely collectivist principles, they are highly contentious and are consistently and openly rejected by many politicians, commentators and academics. Second, being principles for government action, they do not belong with the values statements which are meant to provide principles for action for good citizens. To put it bluntly, the principles of action look like an attempt to pass off a partisan political position as moral values to be taught to our children (which should set off the alarm bells of political indoctrination, mentioned in paragraph 3.2). Relationships 4.8 The values statements under this heading read: “We value others for themselves, not for what they have or what they can do for us, and we value these relationships as fundamental to our development and the good of the community.” The principles of action based on these values enjoin us to: - 4.9 respect the dignity of all people tell others they are valued earn loyalty, trust and confidence work co-operatively with others be mutually supportive respect the beliefs, life, privacy and property of others try to resolve disputes peacefully. The main problems here seem to be the following. First, there is nothing wrong with valuing people for what they have or what they can do for us, and it is perfectly consistent with also valuing people for themselves. Second, there are relatively few people we can get to know well enough to value for themselves. Third, some people throw away their dignity and forfeit their right to respect, e.g. I do not respect the Yorkshire Ripper or value him for himself. Fourth, it is wrong to say that we should respect the beliefs of others. We should certainly respect people’s right to hold whatever beliefs they like, but the beliefs themselves should be open to criticism from any quarter; and some beliefs, e.g. some forms of racism, frankly deserve nothing but contempt (though we should still defend people’s right to hold such beliefs). The problem with respecting people’s beliefs, rather than respecting their right to hold them, is that it discourages evaluation and criticism; but these are precisely the activities that need to be encouraged if our enlightenment is to advance. The Self 4.10 The values statements are: “We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic worth, with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development and change.” The associated principles of action are that “we, as individuals” should: - try to understand our own character, strengths and weaknesses; develop a sense of self-worth; try to discover meaning and purpose in life and how life ought to be lived; try to live up to a shared moral code; - make responsible use of our rights and privileges; - strive for knowledge and wisdom throughout life; - take responsibility for our own lives within our capacities. 4.11 The problems here should be clear from what has been said above. First, who in their right mind could really value the Yorkshire Ripper as “a unique being of intrinsic worth”? It has to be recognised that people can forfeit their claims to rights, respect and value by their appalling behaviour. Second, the injunction to try to live up to a shared moral code is wrong, morally wrong. It is also inconsistent with the injunction to strive for knowledge and wisdom throughout life. For illustration, consider an enlightened man in a slave-owning society. He may see pretty clearly that slavery is wrong, but he may also be quite alone in this. He should certainly not abandon his own judgement and “try to live up to a shared moral code”. Instead he should “strive for knowledge and wisdom” by discussing his concerns with others and trying to persuade them of the wrongness of slavery. In short, he should let his conscience be his guide, not some shared moral code. The Environment 4.12 Here are the values statements: “We value the natural world as a source of wonder and inspiration, and accept our duty to maintain a sustainable environment for the future.” The principles of action based thereon are that we should: - 4.13 preserve balance and diversity in nature wherever possible; justify development in terms of a sustainable environment; repair habitats devastated by human development wherever possible; preserve areas of beauty wherever possible; understand the place of human beings within the world. There is much that is wrong with these values and principles, but I will try to be brief. First, as a matter of moral logic, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’: we can only have a duty to do something if it is within our power to do it. However, it depends on cosmic forces entirely outside of our control whether or not there is going to be a “sustainable environment” for the future. Consequently we can have no duty to maintain such an environment. Second, human life and happiness depend on us actively changing the balance of nature and bringing natural forces under our control. In our ‘wars’ against disease, pestilence and predators we have reduced the diversity of nature and made the world a much better place as a consequence. Civilisation, art, convenience and relief from suffering are all the result of human interference with the balance of nature. Third, there is no point in repairing habitats or preserving areas of beauty unless this will yield benefits to human life which are greater than the benefits of alternative courses of action. Indeed, when it is remembered that all the money and time spent on the environment could instead be spent relieving the starvation, suffering, disease, etc. that afflict so many millions of people, then the injunctions to repair habitats and preserve areas of beauty wherever possible appear to be morally wicked. Fourth, the injunction to understand our place in the world suggests that it is known what our place in the world is, whereas in fact that is a very disputed question. Fifth, the principles here seem again to be principles for government action, and they enunciate a ‘green’ platform which is highly controversial. Once again, it looks as if political indoctrination is being passed off as the teaching of moral values to our children. 5. THE WAY FORWARD 5.1 It is not only schools which are responsible for the moral education and training of our children. But with the weakening of the other institutions that have traditionally played a part, the role of schools seems sure to gain in importance. Certainly, one would expect that parents will be looking to schools to play an enhanced role, and will evaluate schools’ performance in this area, particularly when making their choice about the school to which they should send their children. 5.2 Given human fallibility and the way in which knowledge and enlightenment advance, it would appear that the best way forward would be to: (a) allow schools to decide for themselves the best way to proceed with regard to moral education, so that different schools will do things in different ways and all schools can draw lessons from the experiences of others; (b) allow parents free choice of schools for their children, so that the betterperforming schools (in morals as well as in other areas) will attract the greater number of pupils; (c) ensure that money follows the pupils, so that successful schools are rewarded and receive funds to expand or improve; (d) allow new schools to be set up to compete against existing schools, so that full scope is given for the introduction of new ideas or methods, and to prevent existing successful schools from becoming complacent; (e) permit unsuccessful schools to close, so that the prospect of closure will provide an incentive to all schools to improve their performance. 5.3 The simplest way in which to bring this about would be to privatise all state schools and have parents pay for their children’s education directly to the school they choose. To enable parents to pay for these costs, the education budgets of central and local government would have to be returned to the citizens. The experience of other privatisations (as well as economic theory) indicates that the consequences will be not only better quality services but also significant cost savings as education provision becomes more efficient. So, far from parents not being able to afford private education, they will actually be financially better off. In so far as there is a concern specifically about poorer people not having the means to pay for their children’s education, the benefits of the tax cut could be skewed toward the lower paid. 5.4 Unfortunately, all the political parties are opposed to privatisation of schools; and so is the education establishment (which would be exposed to the winds of competition if privatisation were to proceed). It may be, then, that the only practical way in which to make any progress in moral education is by adjustment to the Local Management of Schools (LMS) regime. The most important changes to be made would be to allow failing schools to close, to allow new schools to enter the field, and to allow schools to compete on cost (which may require the introduction of a voucher scheme with parental top-ups). In whatever way such changes are brought about within LMS, it will require a large bureaucratic structure to implement, which is bound to be very costly; but the benefits are so important that they seem sure to justify the cost. Once the effects of competition and parental choice have started to improve educational performance, an imposed national code of values should be seen on the ground to be unnecessary and undesirable - and so, indeed, should the straight-jacket of the National Curriculum. 6. CONCLUSION 6.1 To support schools in promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural education and development of pupils, SCAA has proposed a statement of shared values. The values are to be agreed by society in general and used to inform schools’ practice in this area. SCAA is also considering the development of a programme of study, covering the essential values that schools should teach, which could be incorporated into the National Curriculum. In addition, SCAA proposes that it have responsibility for monitoring moral teaching in schools. 6.2 There are the following problems with this approach. In a pluralistic society like ours, only the most vacuous statement of values could be “agreed by society in general”. As a consequence, even the minimal set of values proposed by SCAA is highly contentious. A national code of values imposed upon all state schools would in any case amount to political indoctrination, especially since the content of the code would be determined by the ‘horse-trading’ between sectional interests that is inherent to the democratic political process. This is already evident in the SCAA statement of values which incorporates collectivist and ‘green’ political platforms which are tendentious and controversial. Further, this approach to moral education fails to recognise the way in which human knowledge and understanding grow (in morals and everywhere else). As a result, the prescribed values would be an impediment to moral progress. In consequence, SCAA’s proposals would only make things worse. 6.3 If our moral enlightenment is to be secure, and is to advance, then there must be the widest scope for freedom of discussion and schools must be allowed to innovate in moral teaching and training. Further, parents must be able to choose between schools on the basis of an evaluation of how well the schools are performing, with new schools being free to enter the field and bad schools being forced to close through lack of parental interest. 6.4 The simplest, cheapest and most effective way of securing these results would be to privatise schools and return the education budgets to the citizens. Unfortunately that solution seems to be ruled out at present by political and professional opposition. The only practical option for the time being seems to be to alter the LMS regime to strengthen parental choice, to allow failing schools to close, and to allow new schools to enter the field and compete against existing schools. The bureaucratic costs of such changes seem bound to be heavy; but the costs of leaving things as they are seem sure to be greater.