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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2022

James Fritz
James Fritz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA
*
Email: jamie.c.fritz@gmail.com
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly to my view; it can help them explain why it can be unfitting to hold on to hope and worry in the face of overwhelming evidence, and it can also help them explain the sense in which knowledge that p and hope that –p are in tension with one another.

Keywords

Hopeworrysuspension of judgmentfittingnessepistemic possibilityfallibilisminfallibilism
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 8 , November 2021 , pp. 573 - 587
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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