Journal of the History of Philosophy

Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 (2002) 313-338

Learning to Love:
From Egoism to Generosity in Descartes

Patrick R. Frierson

The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics, and morals. (Principles of Philosophy, I.186; AT IXB.14) ¹

Descartes is well known for his metaphysics and physics, the roots and trunk of his philosophical project. But Descartes's morals are generally neglected, partly because they are so difficult to find. He does not dedicate a major published work to morality. His most direct comments on it are in letters to Princess Elizabeth and Pierre Chanut. The published work that most touches on moral issues is The Passions of the Soul, which is primarily a treatise on the relationship between mind and body. As a result of this lack of primary sources (and perhaps also a general prejudice in favor of metaphysics and epistemology in the history of philosophy), there have been only a few significant studies of Descartes's moral philosophy in French, and only two major works devoted to it in English. ²

This neglect of Descartes's ethics is unfortunate, not least since ethical concerns sometimes influence his work in other areas. This influence is particularly evident in his account of the passions, which is presented in the context of a practical program of self-discipline and moral cultivation. Although this paper [End Page 313] does not focus primarily on Descartes's moral theory as such, it shows how moral considerations play an important part in a specific problem that arises for Descartes's account of love. ³ Descartes's moral concerns lead him to describe the passion of love as altruistic and involving self-sacrifice. His general account of passions, however, suggests that all passions (including love) spring from and promote self-interest. This paper addresses the problem of reconciling the apparent contradiction between a selfless account of the passion of love and an egoist account of passions in general.

In part 1, I discuss the structure of Descartes's The Passions of the Soul and point out the role of egoism—by which I mean a concern for the preservation of the mind-body unity that constitutes one's life—in the account of passions. Part 2 draws attention to Descartes's non-egoist account of the passion of love. In this context, I show that non-egoist love is neither improper nor purely intellectual. Part 3 sketches a general framework for alleviating the tension between an altruist love and a selfish account of the passions in general. Finally, in parts 4 through 6, I apply this framework to unfold three ways of explaining altruism. The first is broadly metaphysical. If one makes certain metaphysical claims, the egoism of the passions in general can, it seems, be reconciled with love. Although this might be a way of solving the problem, I suggest that on its own, it is one with which Descartes should not be entirely satisfied. The second explanation is practical; it turns on a developmental theory of the passions. It makes sense from the agent's own point of view at each stage in moral development to progress to the next stage. Eventually an egoist love develops into a morally rich, self-sacrificial love. The third explanation roots all love in the love of God. This account need not conflict with or make superfluous either of the first two, and it has the advantage of providing a way to reconcile Descartes's practical foundation for ethics with his beliefs about the nature of God. Ultimately, the strongest account that integrates altruism with the passions uses all three explanations.

1. Descartes's Account of the Passions as Egoist

1.1 The structure of The Passions of the Soul

Descartes's account of the passions is explained in the greatest detail in his published work, The Passions of...