Skip to main content
Log in

Was Spinoza fooled by the ontological argument?

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  1. Church, A., “A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation”, inStructure, Method, and Meaning, edited by P. Henle et al., New York, 1956.

  2. Davidson and Harman (eds.),The Logic of Grammar, Encino, California, 1975.

  3. Descartes, R.,Meditations on First Philosophy, inDescartes Selections, R. M. Eaton (ed.), New York. 1927.

  4. Donagan, A., “Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's Metaphysics”, in Grene (1973).

  5. Frege, G.,The Foundations of Arithmetic, translated by J. L. Austin, New York. 1950. (original 1884).

  6. Frege, G., “On Sense and Reference”, In Davidson and Harman (1975). (original 1892).

  7. Friedman, J. I., “A Forrnalization of Spinoza'sEthics, Part I” (1975), to appear.

  8. Friedman, J. I., “The Universal Class has a Spinozistic Partitioning”,Synthese 32 (1976).

  9. Frege, G. Friedman, J. I., “Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in Man and God”, inSpinoza's Philosophy of Man: Papers presented at the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium 1977, Oslo, 1978.

  10. Frege, G., Friedman, J. I., “An Overview of Spinoza'sEthics”, Synthese, 37 (1978).

  11. Frege, G., Friedman, J. I., “The Mystic's Ontological Argument”, inThe American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979).

  12. Kripke, S., “Naming and Necessity”, (1970 lectures), in Davidson and Harman's,Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht-Holland, 1972.

  13. Grene, M. (ed.),Spinoza: a collection of critical essays, Garden City, N. Y., 1973.

  14. Hartshorne, C.,The Logic of Perfection, Open Court Edition, 1962.

  15. Hume, D.,A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888.

  16. Jarrett, C., “The Logical Structure of Spinoza'sEthics, Part I”,Synthese, 37 (1978).

  17. Leibniz, G.,The New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, translated by A.G. Langley, New York and London, 1896.

  18. Mark, T., “The Spinozistic Attributes”, to appear.

  19. Plantinga, A. (ed.),The Ontological Argument, Garden City, N.Y., 1965.

  20. Mark, T., Plantinga, A. (ed.),The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, 1974.

  21. Mark, T., Plantinga. A. “De Dicto et De Re” (1969), inNecessary Truth, ed. by R.C. Sleigh Jr., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972.

  22. Quine, W.V.O., “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes” (1956), reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1975).

  23. Mark, T., Quine, W.V.O., “On What There Is” (1948), reprinted inFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass., 1953.

  24. Russell, B., “On Denoting” (1905), reprinted inLogic & Knowledge: essays 1901–1950, ed. by R.C. Marsh, London, 1956.

  25. St. Anselm,Proslogion, reprinted in part in Plantinga (1965).

  26. Spinoza, B.,Ethics, ed. by J. Gutman, New York, 1949. (Also see Everyman's Library edition, with an introduction by G. Santayana).

  27. Mark, T. Spinoza, B.,Opera Posthuma, ed. by C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg. 1925.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

This paper is based, to a large extent, on my previous paper, “A Formalization of Spinoza'sEthics, Part I” (1975), yet to appear.

A word should be said about Charles Jarrett's formalization of Part I, which appears inSynthese 37 (1978). Both our formalizations were developed independently, about the same time (1975). Indeed, our formalizations are radically different. The main difference is that whereas I use a minimum of modal logic, packing many modal notions into the predicates, Jarrett uses modal logic extensively, with two different modal operators for necessity, each with their own set of axioms. Thus, our formalizations offer an interesting contrast. I sincerely hope both will contribute tofuture Spinoza research.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Friedman, J.I. Was Spinoza fooled by the ontological argument?. Philosophia 11, 307–344 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02380843

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02380843

Keywords

Navigation