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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
1 Miller, Michael, ‘Aquinas on the Passion of Despair’, New Blackfriars 93 (2012), p. 396CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Ibid., p. 390.
3 Ibid., p. 396.
4 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 23, a. 1, sc: “Passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi.” N.B. All English citations of the Summa theologiae, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the translation provided by the English Dominican Province published in 5 volumes, now available as Summa Theologica (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981). The Latin text may be found on the Web, http://www.corpusthomisticum.org. Some of the more important texts of Aquinas concerning the passions are: STh I, qq. 75–82, I-II, qq. 22-48; Summa contra Gentiles I, chaps. 89-91; and De Veritate, qq. 25 and 26.
5 For a precise and thorough treatment of Aquinas on the passions, see Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22 to 48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Cates, Diana Fritz, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009)Google Scholar. For a briefer introduction, see White, Kevin, ‘The Passions of the Soul’, in Pope, Stephen J., ed., Essays on Aquinas's Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), pp. 103-15Google Scholar.
6 See STh I, q. 80, a. 2.
7 See I, q. 81, a. 2.
8 I-II, q. 23, a. 1. “Obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum . . . bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis.”
9 See I-II, q. 48, a. 2. We need not agree with the particular example to see Aquinas's general point here—namely, the passions have an effect on the passable body.
10 For a treatment of some of the various and related uses that Aquinas makes of the term passion, see: Floyd, Shawn, ‘Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to some Recent Interpretations’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998), pp.161-75Google Scholar, esp. pp.162-64.
11 The passions are voluntary, Aquinas explains, “either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.” STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1.
12 Ibid. “Passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno modo, secundum se.”
13 Ibid. “Alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis.”
14 Ibid. “Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.”
15 Aquinas spells out more clearly how the sensitive appetite obeys reason in Questiones Disputate de Veritate, q. 25, a. 4. He says that there are three ways that the irascible and concupiscible appetitive powers are subject to reason. The first is on the part of reason itself. Reason can consider the same object in various ways, and move the sensitive appetite accordingly through the medium of the imagination. For example, the reason may present a dish of food as delightful, or knowing it to be poisoned, as repulsive. The second is on the part of the will. An intense movement of the will can cause an overflow in the lower sensitive powers such that they follow the movement of the will. The third is with respect to the actual execution of the act to which the sensitive appetite inclines. Because humans are rational, we can check a movement of the sensitive appetite by not carrying out the action that the sensitive appetite inclines us toward.
16 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 390.
17 Ibid., p. 396.
18 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1: “Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est.”
19 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 390.
20 Ibid., p. 396.
21 It does seem quite probable that Aquinas held that each of the eleven main species of passion could, depending on the circumstances, either be in accord with or go against the order of reason. Miller argues that this is not the case for despair. This question will be taken up in section III of the essay.
22 Aquinas treats the passions in questions 22-48 of the prima secundae. Aquinas divides the treatise into a general consideration of the passions in qq. 22-25, and a particular consideration of each of the eleven passions in qq. 26-48. It is in the general consideration of the passions that Aquinas argues that they are morally neutral considered in themselves, or according to their natural genus.
23 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 390 (emphasis added). Miller is here quoting STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4. My contention is that this is not the only condition in determining the moral quality of a passion, for it must also be voluntary.
24 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4. “Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione, sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius.”
25 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 390 (emphasis added).
26 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4.
27 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 390 (emphasis added).
28 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1 (emphasis added). “Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est.”
29 See I-II, q. 24, a. 4. “Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis.”
30 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 391.
31 See ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. Miller lists courage among the passions that “move the soul to some perceived good.” In fact courage, or daring (audacia), in Aquinas's account, has an evil object, and is an irascible passion that attacks a looming (absent) evil. See STh I-II, q. 45, a. 1. Nevertheless, if one follows Miller's explanation of how fear and anger can lead to some good, it is rather easy to see how courage can as well.
34 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 391.
35 Ibid., p. 392.
36 Ibid., p. 393.
37 Ibid.
38 See STh I-II, q. 26, a. 1 and 2.
39 For Aquinas's derivation of the eleven passions in terms of their objects see: STh I-II, q. 23, a. 4.
40 Aquinas explains the difference between the concupiscible and irascible passions as follows: “Whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such as daring, fear, hope and the like.” “Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.” STh I-II, q. 23, a. 1.
41 Aquinas treats despair in I-II, q. 40; daring in I-II, q. 45; and anger in I-II, q. 46-48.
42 See Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, pp. 392-93.
43 See STh I-II, q. 40, a. 1.
44 I-II, q. 23, a. 2. (emphasis added): “Et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis.”
45 I-II, q. 25, a. 3. “Desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens.”
46 I-II, q. 45, a. 2. “Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum” (emphasis added).
47 I-II, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic sunt nomina vitiorum.”
48 For Aquinas's fascinating and insightful treatment of the way hope and despair are found in animals, see I-II, q. 40, a. 3. It is of great importance here that it is God's apprehension that moves the sense appetite of irrational animals. Thus, when they are moved to despair, it is certainly in accord with reason. Aquinas says, “In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e., the divine, reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.” I-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3.
49 I-II, q. 40, a. 6.
50 I-II. “Duo etiam istorum sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.”
51 I-II, q. 40, a. 5, ad 3. “Ad tertium dicendum quod stultitia et inexperientia possunt esse causa spei quasi per accidens, removendo scilicet scientiam per quam vere existimatur aliquid esse non possibile.”
52 I-II, q. 39, a. 1. “Ex suppositione alterius.”
53 Ibid. “Sic igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat.”
54 This refers to natural evil rather than a moral evil.
55 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 393.
56 See ibid., pp. 393-94.
57 Ibid., p. 394 (emphasis added).
58 See ibid., pp. 393-94nn25-29.
59 Nn. 25-29 are improperly cited as belonging to the prima secundae in Miller's piece. Miller is citing, or refering to, articles from the secunda secundae.
60 Aquinas argues explicitly that the theological virtue of hope is in the will as subject in STh II-II, q. 18, a. 1. The sin of despair, which is a vice contrary to the theological virtue of hope, would also be in the will as subject.
61 II-II, q. 20, a. 1: “Et ideo omnis motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui vero, est secundum se bonus, omnis autem motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui falso, est secundum se malus et peccatum. Circa Deum autem vera existimatio intellectus est quod ex ipso provenit hominum salus, et venia peccatoribus datur . . . Falsa autem opinio est quod peccatori poenitenti veniam deneget, vel quod peccatores ad se non convertat per gratiam iustificantem. Et ideo sicut motus spei, qui conformiter se habet ad existimationem veram, est laudabilis et virtuosus; ita oppositus motus desperationis, qui se habet conformiter existimationi falsae de Deo, est vitiosus et peccatum.”
62 This is not to say that the passion of despair could not in some cases lead to the despair that is a sin against the virtue of hope, but that they are essentially distinct, and should not be equated.
63 See STh II-II, q. 20, a. 1.
64 Miller, ‘Passion of Despair’, p. 394 (emphasis added).
65 Ibid., p. 395.
