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How to be an anti-reductionist about developmental biology: Response to Laubichler and Wagner

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Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg recently claimed (1997) that developmental biology is currently being reduced to molecular biology. cite several concrete biological examples that are intended to impugn Rosenberg's claim. I first argue that although Laubichler and Wagner's examples would refute a very strong reductionism, a more moderate reductionism would escape their attacks. Next, taking my cue from the antireductionist's perennial stress on the importance of spatial organization, I describe one form an empirical finding that refutes this moderate reductionism would take. Finally, I point out an actual example, anterior-posterior axis determination in the chick, that challenges the reductionist's belief that all developmental regularities can be explained by molecular biology. In short, I argue that Rosenberg's position can be saved from Laubichler and Wagner's criticisms and putative counter-examples, but it would not survive a different kind of counter-example.

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Frost-Arnold, G. How to be an anti-reductionist about developmental biology: Response to Laubichler and Wagner. Biology & Philosophy 19, 75–91 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BIPH.0000013291.43498.1f

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