Abstract
The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered.
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Frost-Arnold, G. Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms. J Philos Logic 37, 239–257 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9067-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9067-x