

Introduction

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In 2009 we initiated the annual workshop series entitled *Mind Knowledge!*, which is dedicated to topics at the interface of epistemology and philosophy of mind. The first workshop within this series was held at the University of Graz in October 2009 and focused on intentionality and related issues.

The papers collected in this issue were presented in an earlier form at this workshop. They can be divided into two sections: The first section includes articles which focus on the phenomenon of intentionality itself: Keith Lehrer's keynote lecture about what intentionality is like, Dale Jacquette's analysis of intentionality as a conceptually primitive relation and Guido Melchior's investigation of how we can refer to our own mental states and those of others. The second section contains papers dedicated to intentionality and experiences: Johann C. Marek investigates the difference between expressing and describing experiences, Martina Fürst analyzes the content of intentional states involving phenomenal concepts of color-experiences and Nenad Mišćević focuses on secondary qualities; in particular on a neo-Lockean, response-dependence view on colors.

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