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Offering more without offering compensation: non-compensating benefits for living kidney donors

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Abstract

While different positions on the permissibility of organ markets enjoy support, there is widespread agreement that some benefits to living organ donors are acceptable and do not raise the same moral concerns associated with organ markets, such as exploitation and commodification. We argue on the basis of two distinctions that some benefit packages offered to donors can defensibly surpass conventional reimbursement while stopping short of controversial cash payouts. The first distinction is between benefits that defray the costs of donating an organ and benefits that incentivize donation by offering something in excess of defraying. The second distinction is between benefits that compensate donors and benefits that are non-compensating. We argue that non-compensating benefits are innocent of moral concerns typically associated with controversial cash payouts, and thus may be a morally promising avenue for increasing rates of kidney donation to address the tragic results of undersupply.

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Correspondence to Kyle Fruh.

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Fruh, K., Duman, E.K. Offering more without offering compensation: non-compensating benefits for living kidney donors. Med Health Care and Philos 24, 711–719 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10034-3

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