

Restoring Integrity to the Academy: Some Sweeping Suggestions for Wholesale Change

Joseph S. Fulda

© 2013 Joseph S. Fulda All Rights Reserved.

1. *Introduction.* The academy, broadly construed to include faculty, administrators at all levels, and editors, referees, and publishers of academic work, is beset by more ills bespeaking of a fundamental lack of integrity than can possibly be enumerated in a single monograph; nevertheless, as the need is urgent, and everyone seems to prefer either silence or piecemeal treatments, myself heretofore included, five ills are enumerated herein, then traced to seven deadly sins that beset the entire enterprise—although not in its entirety, of course—and some surprisingly simple, commonsensical, and practicable solutions are advanced.

If the above is true, why has there been such a deafening silence or, in some cases, merely piecemeal attempts to fix systemic and systematic problems? The answer, I think, cannot possibly be that *no one* else sees what I see or sees what I see but not as I see it, nor is it at all plausible that no one else can think of solutions that I myself just termed "surprisingly simple." It inheres, rather, in human nature. No one put this better than Thomas Jefferson, who wrote these immortal words: "All experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they have become accustomed."¹ But as he was speaking of armed revolt, restraint was *deeply* admirable—up to a point. But as I am speaking of no such drastic remedies, while the statement remains true, it stands not as admirable but as a stern indictment, and can be traced to the deadly sin of "sloth," which means not "slowness," but "indolence." As the meaning of "sloth" has become corrupted

¹ This is the wording of both Jefferson's original draft and the adopted Declaration of Independence, available from the National Archives and Records Administration.

by popular misuse, we will henceforth refer to "indolence" or, in the alternative, cowardice, which is a form of inner indolence.²

The solution to this one is indeed very easy; speak up! This could not be simpler, now could it?

2. *Enumeration of the five ills.* One ill we discuss here is the academic caste system, which employs three castes of faculty members: adjunct, sessional, or hourly faculty; temporary faculty of various stripes; and permanent faculty. Another ill parasitic on the previous ill is the "tenure-track." Another ill is the multiplicity of ranks, which aggravates the previous two ills and which may well be, in some of its particulars, illegal under the United States civil rights laws as well—and there is a critical lesson here for student grading as well. Another ill is the manner in which faculty are determined to be credentialed, which is implicated in *all* of the above ills. The final ill, worse than all of the above—yet not really easily possible if the solutions herein advocated were to be followed *in full*; the subjunctive indicating a lack of expectation of impact—is the curious simultaneous over-supervision of faculty members in ordinary academic matters coupled with culpable failure to act—turning a "blind eye"—towards serious misconduct, which in most of the world where virtually all higher and tertiary educational institutions are organs of the state constitutes nonfeasance in office on the part of those who avert their gaze, and either misfeasance in office or malfeasance in office on the part of those actually committing the misconduct—each is a variety of official misconduct. See §9, below.

Implicated in some way in each and every one of the above ills in some way is covetousness, disguised, ever-so-often even to one's own self, as the need to earn one's keep. As this need is *real*, no treatment can avoid this issue without being seriously deficient. Money is, of course, *not* the root of all evil, but the desire for ill-gotten gains is, indeed, one of the seven roots of the evils we discuss here, and this is part of what is known as covetousness, for whatever is ill-gotten truly belongs to someone else.

² The ills and the sins are intertwined throughout this essay, because following Sean O'Casey, the former are believed merely "outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual disgrace." (O'Casey, 1949: 58).

That, of course, is the bad news, although most of it—possibly excepting how serious academic misconduct becomes serious official misconduct in much of the world—hardly qualifies as news at all. The good news, and this is perhaps news at least to many, is the surprisingly simple, commonsensical, practicable solutions to all these problems, which to be effective, however, would require *simultaneous* deployment, for which reason I have used the singular "is" rather than the formally proper "are," not *piecemeal* deployment, and also for which reason I above used the subjunctive mood. Package deals are well known to be a "hard sell." This, then, is one man's good-faith attempt to undertake the monumental task involved in such a "hard sell."

3. *The caste system.* Let us start at the beginning. While it may be true that no one "deserves" life tenure, it is essential anyway and therefore must be granted regardless of "inherent" desert, both for teaching—which otherwise runs the very considerable risk of amounting to a popularity contest with curricula watered down wholesale, as have both already largely occurred and must also be reversed—and for scholarship and research,³ for reasons far too obvious to need restating. I have seen only a single argument to the effect that scholarship and research thrives best in a rigidly controlled setting, and I must confess it left me puzzled because I am by training a logician.⁴ The argument made by Thomas Molnar, a very distinguished scholar, points to the true integrity of such exemplars as Solzhenitsyn and his ilk under the most repressive regimes, and argued very persuasively that it was precisely that hardship that brought out the best in these

³ Research pursues original ideas; scholarship rearranges existing material in the hope of disclosing a new perspective. The border between them is, of course, vague. That conceded, they are two different concepts and ought not to be conflated. See, for example, Title 17 of the United States Code, one of the finest examples of legislative drafting; in 17 U.S.C. §§107, 108, and 1201, "scholarship, or research" occurs in just that form, indicating both separate concepts and, through the use of the inclusive disjunction, the possibility of overlap. See the next section for elaboration.

⁴ With five undergraduate courses (in two departments) and six graduate courses (in three departments) in aspects of the subject, and an additional one and one-fifth at both levels in closely allied areas, as well as two comprehensive graduate examinations (in two departments).

exemplars.⁵ Well, but few of us are Solzhenitsyns; the argument, in other words, violates the restriction on universal generalization, by taking most decidedly non-arbitrary individuals and generalizing from them, and this is true even if we relax his statement to a mere generic generalization or even if it is relaxed further to a statement about "most" in the sense of "a majority" rather than its more typical, less accurate sense as "almost all."

If life tenure is essential to academic integrity in both teaching and in scholarship and research, it follows immediately that it must be awarded, not by force of law of course, but out of practical necessity. There can thus be no temporary faculty, with the sole exception of those who are *genuinely* visiting from another institution, from the world of commerce or industry, or from the professions. Likewise, there can be no part-time faculty other than those, who, although *not* visiting, *genuinely* have no intention whatsoever of leaving other areas of endeavor, and merely wish to enrich themselves and their students by teaching *no more* than a single course per term at a single institution.⁶

The immediate reply to the all-faculty-tenured-upon-appointment suggestion is based on two arguments I find specious, and one that will and, indeed, must be addressed below. The first argument is that this is plain foolish because one cannot know in advance how a faculty member will perform and the second argument is that those in the lower castes have fewer credentials, and deserve, at least in the main, to be where they are. The first issue cannot be addressed without addressing how faculty are determined to be credentialed and how they are appointed, which will both be treated below; the second is due in part to the first issue, in part to the rather obvious retort, "Well, what do you expect for nothing, anyway?" another instance of a form of covetousness—to expect

⁵ Molnar (1995). Molnar does not actually mention Solzhenitsyn, but he is the archetype of that which he *does* discuss.

⁶ Those who choose to teach as an avocation—if otherwise qualified—because independently wealthy should be excluded from both limitations. For them, there is no practical necessity of life tenure and they are in a separate class anyway; therefore, this entire argument is plainly inapplicable.

something for nothing, with the exception of *true* labors of love or of *true* charity or philanthropy⁷—that which comes from the *heart*—is not all that different from any other desire for improper gain, and in part to another deadly sin—and here we deviate from "envy," a narrower term, to "jealousy," a broader term—which besets the academy (but, of course, "besets" does *not* mean "pervade" or "permeate";⁸ there are *many* fine exceptions) in numerous forms: personal jealousy, professional jealousy, and disciplinary jealousy chief among them. The argument that remains to be addressed below is not at all specious, but is rather the practical concern about costs.

There is also a positive argument in favor of the all-faculty-tenured-upon-appointment suggestion beyond its clear necessity to restore integrity both in teaching and curricula and in scholarship and research. It, too, was articulated by Thomas Jefferson, albeit, again, in another context: "the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God."⁹ We will refer back to this simple enough idea in discussing the next as well as later in discussing the fourth ill treated here.

4. Research, Scholarship, and the Academic Disciplines, and the Ills Associated with the Distinction.

Most people use *research* and *scholarship* interchangeably, but scientists notably prefer the former, and other academicians often use the latter. To us, they are markedly different concepts: Research pursues original ideas, while scholarship rearranges existing

⁷ The difference between the two is discussed extensively in Fulda (1999).

⁸ A synonym study puts it this way: "PERVADE, PERMEATE suggest a slow diffusion and an ultimate saturation of something." [ACD, 1970: 905] After this, the differences, rather slight, are given. "Beset," on the other hand, does mean attacked or assailed on all sides, as in "*our besetting sins*." [ACD, 1970: 116]. But it also suggests that resistance is clearly possible; whereas once something is literally saturated with evil, hope is lost.

⁹ Foley (1900: 7628).

material in the hope of disclosing a new perspective. These are different *forms* of originality and ought not to be conflated.

If one is a Platonist about mathematics and science, as I am, there aren't any truly new ideas anyway; rather everything under the sun is discovered and nothing at all is invented. Tellingly, I have *never* heard an engineer refer to his work as "scholarship"; the word "research" is *always* used, because even a Platonist (Plato himself would certainly have disagreed, as a table is an engineering artifact) must concede the obvious—that inventions are invented. Nevertheless, a "new idea," for our purposes, is one that to the best of the author's, referee's, and editor's knowledge does not preëxist in the store of *human* knowledge, which takes care of the true Platonists among us. Of course, both researchers and scholars are, on occasion, wrong about this—hence the critical qualifications "pursues" for the former concept and "in the hope of" for the latter concept.

The question is, or at least the question considered here is, what to make of this distinction. I think it a distinction both well worth making and well worth keeping in mind, provided it is *clearly* understood as, in itself, descriptive and not normative. To make this even clearer, to understand what follows otherwise is to *misunderstand* it.

Research as thus defined applies only to those subdisciplines in which scientific or mathematical approaches are apt, while scholarship applies to those same subdisciplines when using qualitative approaches, historical approaches, and non-analytic philosophical approaches. Some disciplines, such as ethnography, archeology, history, and ethics are almost entirely devoid of research in the sense intended here, although scientific and mathematical approaches can help *foster* scholarship in these disciplines. What I mean by this is almost obvious: Anything excavated was already in the store of human knowledge; history already occurred and was recorded (or one moves into the realm of prehistory, on which see archeology). Finally, all science and mathematics, I believe, can show of ethics is that certain ethical problems admit of no best (or even satisfactory) solution—"rational choice theory," this is called—but it is a negative finding, rather than an affirmative discovery *within* ethics proper. It can also, on occasion, make an ethical

point crisp enough and thereby add a great deal of clarity, despite the fact that it cannot resolve it.

There are a fair number of academicians who would differ with this last point; the ethical problems they consider, however, are typically marked by one or both of two considerations: The former consideration is that the problems themselves are not ones ordinarily faced (to put it gently), while the latter consideration is that either or both the perspectives used or the considerations factored into the ethical dilemma are not those anyone I know of actually uses. The *locus classicus* of this second point is whether procreation is ethical. Although a sizable minority do use similar perspectives, they simply do not factor into their decisions the sorts of considerations that these formal ethicists do (to put it *very* gently).

Other subdisciplines blur the line we have drawn. As computers can and have been programmed to produce beautiful art and paleontologists may both supervise and evaluate excavations of items no human eyes have ever beheld, these are among them. There are, of course, numerous others.

Although this is a purely descriptive observation, some rather significant normative conclusions relevant to what is under discussion here can be drawn. What *cannot* be intended is what has been soundly disclaimed, if not in these terms: the superiority of one form of originality over the other, or worse still and by inappropriate extension, of some academic (sub)disciplines over others. I, for one, do *not* see an entirely fresh look at a literary masterpiece as less worthy an endeavor than a neat, new algorithm for automating some important task; all I claim is that these two types of originality qualitatively differ, with neither one superior to the other. The reader who harbors doubt about whether this is my honest belief has only to look at my own bifurcated work—a sizable fraction involving the one, another sizable fraction involving the other. (And, for good measure, still another sizable fraction involving *expository* scholarship *sans* any attempt at originality.)

So, then, what normative points do I intend. Well, two interrelated ones, followed by a simple, commonsensical, and practicable solution. First, that researchers and scholars,

respectively, be content with the type of work they do as is (while always striving to improve its quality, of course) without over-describing the one as the other in a show of entirely unwarranted disciplinary jealousy—when in fact any such jealousy is entirely an artifact of the alleged superiority of the one concept over the other—which has been repeatedly denied. Second, and as a consequence, it would be well if the “social sciences” were largely and far more honestly and aptly once more described as “social studies” (or, better, “human studies”). Even as an undergraduate taking introductory psychology, considered by many the paradigmatic social science, I was struck by how inapt the scientific method often—but not always—was. For biopsychology or psychobiology, as well as for studies in primatology and the social insects, it is by no means inapt. But as applied to us human beings in social contexts, it seemed even then that almost all of the experiments were either flawed (and almost necessarily so, more on which presently) or merely confirmed what everyone already knew from the humanities.

Let us take the first observation first. Unlike social insects and even primates, we are rather good at guessing experimenters’ purposes. This entails that psychological experiments involving conscious behavior and human beings must rely on a crucial amount of deception. This seemed to me of little avail, and I have not changed my mind since, because people will still imagine all sorts of other (incorrect) ends, biasing the experiment in ways that cannot be predicted and that may even remain unknown (one can always ask the subjects their guesses, though). Much more importantly, however, aggregating over the most highly idiosyncratic species—us—is highly problematic academically. While statistics help a great deal, and meta-analyses help still more, there will always remain significant and strong counters. If this is true in clinical medicine, how much more so in the other human sciences! (We will recur to the abrupt break in parallel structure.)

Then, there are the experiments that are, indeed, conclusive, such as Stanley Milgram’s. He proved just how easy it is to bring out the worst in people. Here, however, the question is different. Did we need this social science. Or was the core teaching already borne witness to by all history, most painfully by the Holocaust. And, are not the everyday “success” (read “moral failure”) of sting operations further proof of this, for those who know no history, to borrow from the popular song. (It is obvious from this

remark that I regard law as among the humanities, albeit one in which formal methods can be of much use in much of the judicial function, but far less so in the legislative function.) So, the first normative lesson is this: Use words that describe your work properly without embarrassment, jealousy, or discontent.

Now, in the closing sentence of the paragraph before the preceding one we broke parallelism. Why. Well, the disciplinary jealousy and research-scholarship dichotomy cause yet another deadly sin, anger, fools' anger resulting in internecine battles within departments over *approach* and very often resulting in departmental receivership, as the department cannot even agree on a presiding officer.

The solution to this one is really simple. Reorganize the academy by *approach*, rather than discipline. There will still be three divisions, only there isn't any appreciable difference worth considering between the humanities and the human studies, and they are best grouped together. Then, place true social science or human sciences in another division. Finally, leave the natural sciences and mathematics as they are.¹⁰ The principle is known even to grade-school teachers: *Separate* those who fight over naught.

5. *The tenure-track*. The tenure-track is, in principle, designed to address the first argument *against* tenure-upon-appointment, that one cannot know anything—at least not particularly well—about how one will perform until one puts them to the trial. That is the theory; the practice, however, is rather different. The tenure-track selects *for* cowardice generally, *for* teachers who teach towards radio-button student evaluations,¹¹ and *for* watered-down curricula. In scholarship and in research it selects *for* quantity

¹⁰ Approaches in the life sciences also differ, particularly in ecology, evolution/systematics/taxonomy, and ethology. If this causes a problem, those doing mathematical work can be separated from those doing descriptive work by having the former housed in an applied mathematics department, but in the same division.

¹¹ See Fulda (2000) for some discussion of this; see also Algozzine *et al.* (2004). My piece raises a number of points, including indolence on the part of academic administrators; Algozzine *et al.* raise many others.

over quality rather than quality *in addition to* quantity, for bulk *over* thought,¹² for complexity *over* simplicity, for an abundance of frivolous citations *over* carefully selected, selective sources, and for publication in journals and with publishers who largely improperly pride themselves on high rejection rates and high impact factors, when the former is more often a sign of no-value-added refereeing and editing (indolence, yet again) and the latter often an artifact of statistical measures based on raw scores of little value, rather than on any true measure of impact, which is entirely in the minds of readers and is therefore almost¹³ by definition unmeasurable (and yet another indication of

¹² While bulk *per se* is objectionable, let me not over-claim. I am talking of the needless (and often immodest) display of erudition that dots many journals and books, while adding nothing whatsoever to the argument; I am also talking of the rebuttal of counterarguments that are little more than straw men. My views on this are expressed briefly in Fulda (1995). But while it is always possible to be concise, it is not always possible to be brief. In particular any argument based in large part on empirical or experimental studies, studies with data-driven results, must be presented in enough detail to be reproducible or falsifiable. (On occasion data-driven arguments can be presented concisely by the extensive use of tables, but if the data are integral to the argument, the author runs the risk of having the tables viewed without attention to the text and notes, in which case even this is not all that desirable.) Then there are also exceptionally comprehensive and broad-ranging studies that are not too bulky, although indeed exceptionally long, and not data-driven, either—the sole problem with some such studies is their submission as "articles" to journals, when, in fact, with perhaps a bit more polish, they qualify as books. In such cases, the job of the editor is to refer the author to an appropriate publishing house, particularly if the journal is published by a company which puts out books as well.

¹³ There are, of course, exceptions. Gettier's (1963) three-page paper comes to mind. So does Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* (1980 [1972]). Notice, however, in both those cases, that it is not really the citations that show much. It is the occurrence of their concepts and their approach and their name in the text itself and even in the titles of countless articles and a fair number of books.

indolence because software now does all this for one [although not particularly well], relieving one of the need to actually think about anything qualitative).¹⁴

It also very frequently raises hopes, only to dash them;¹⁵ very often, intentionally so. To put this last clause differently, things that were very well-known to those who made the decision at the time of initial appointment are dredged up anew every year, two years, or three years by those very same folks, as if they were new discoveries; they are then dredged up one last time during the tenure process.

¹⁴ Shaw (2012) briefly points out the unethical nature of the UK's so-called "research excellence framework," and touches on a bit of this, including the incentive for deceptive attribution of authorship. Mumford (2012), while conceding this especially for the sciences (I am not so sure about that "especially"), argues that "a system of oversight could counteract that" and no doubt tongue-in-cheek writes, "Perhaps academics could be called in the middle of the night and asked to explain the main thesis of their coauthored paper...." Personally, I do *not* see a way to counteract the problems with the REF without extensive intrusiveness; it follows that it, too, should be abolished. However, a general rule for when co-authorship is appropriate can be stated: Whenever the piece would be sufficiently lacking without the efforts of any of the co-authors so as to be unpublishable (or unpublishable without [further] major revisions), co-authorship is appropriate.

What goes unmentioned is the incentive for UK academics to veto perfectly fine papers from non-UK academics in so-called high-impact journals when serving as referees. The suggestions in Fulda (2007), coupled with the peremptory vetoes discussed in §8, could counteract this. But they will do nothing to counteract the opposite incentive, *viz.* the incentive to favor papers from within their own little areas.

It goes without saying that the problems in the previous paragraph arise from the digital age and the enormous difficulties involved in any form of genuine blind review.

All these problems apply equally to the "Research Excellence Assessment," the predecessor to the REF. While the criteria for "excellence" differ, the incentives for each of the above unethical maneuvers are identical.

¹⁵ See Fulda (2011a) for a gruesome portrait.

While it is true, of course, that *many* do survive the tenure-track, the relevant question is whether they survive with character intact. Given what is actually selected *against*, integrity, it requires an almost superhuman effort to uninstill from within one's own psyché the negative character traits the candidate has been effectively coerced to bring within.

A good many of the problems involved in all personnel processes is the deadliest sin of all, and one for which there is no word in our tongue: *schadenfreude*. The end of the tenure-track, the end of the caste system, and the entire remainder of this essay, save the final two sections, are designed to completely eliminate the malicious joy some feel at the discomfiture or pain of others, a sin very nearly unpardonable, and implicated in all this. It is unfortunate, but true, that many feel the need to put others through whatever they have been put through, right or wrong.

6. *The multiplicity of ranks*. Granting all faculty tenure-upon-appointment will do little, however, in and of itself, to address the second quotation from Jefferson above, nor will it do anything much to stem the deadly sin of jealousy. One particular requirement, years in rank, might also well be illegal under the United States civil rights laws, provided the person is over forty years of age. It must be shown that experience matters for it not to be an illegal proxy for age, except when otherwise specified by federal law—such as in the federal civil service or in the military service. I know of no persuasive research showing that teachers improve their abilities after five years *at all*, much less significantly. Naturally, scholars and researchers gain knowledge that can and should be brought to bear on their teaching, even holding teaching ability—expository ability, broadly construed—*per se* constant; and how can one question that one's scholarship and research have a cumulative and cumulating effect? Articles, or groups of articles, are refined and polished into full-length books, after all, all the time. Well, I make *no* such claims, of course. My point is far simpler. Since these factors *can* be evaluated directly, they obviously *should* be, and using a proxy for it is at the minimum *prima facie* suspect, and yet another manifestation of indolence.

Moreover, there is and should be recognition for accomplishment and therefore a distinction between a fine scholar-teacher and a truly accomplished scholar-teacher. But the large number of ranks—generally four—plays to human weaknesses, and also suggests a degree of precision that is largely an illusion. What is suggested here, then, is not the elimination of rank, but its minimization—two seem just right, say, Preceptor and Professor,¹⁶ and no more. This would take into account the added knowledge brought to teaching and the cumulative impact of a life of the mind alike, without the pretense of measuring what can only be evaluated in broad-brush strokes, not with mechanical precision. The lesson promised above for student grading is clear—in all divisions save that comprising the natural sciences and mathematics, those plus- and minus-modifiers should go.

To put it far more concretely in terms only faintly reminiscent of Robert Frost,¹⁷ two neighbors with adjacent fields sharing twelve borders, or even three, are far more likely to engage in border-conflicts than if they have respectively four borders or just one border. As faculty are often even more prone to conflict among themselves than they are with their students, cutting the number of borders from three to one should do wonders for amity between colleagues. Likewise, student-faculty conflict may be greatly ameliorated by reducing the borders from twelve to four, or perhaps even three. There is a difference between standards and the pretense of precision; the former is part and parcel of that for which the academy is supposed to stand; the latter simply creates entirely unnecessary conflicts.¹⁸

¹⁶ These titles, however, are deserved, because teachers at these levels teach well beyond the walls of their classrooms by their published work.

¹⁷ I refer, of course, to his immortal poem "Mending Wall."

¹⁸ In discussing *unnecessary* conflicts, brought about by structural deficiencies, I am referring again to the deadly sin of anger. Anger over naught is bound to bring about conflict over naught, and is the source of many of the troubles of our time. The difference between an unnecessary conflict and a necessary one is, in brief, the difference between uncompromising and being unwilling to become compromised.

In this regard, administrators and faculty members are under another illusion as well, and the selfsame one that students are under. Universities do *not* properly *bestow* ranks—and with rare exceptions¹⁹ when they do, this is a form of corruption; instead, they merely *recognize* ranks. Likewise, faculty do *not* assign grades; they merely *record* the grades that students have given themselves as faithful secretaries, and *no more*. To do otherwise, again with rare exceptions,²⁰ is the selfsame form of corruption. Unfortunately, both forms of corruption are hardly unknown.

It also implicates another deadly sin, pride, and if one believes in naturalism that means illegitimate pride; if one does not believe in naturalism, then all pride save that which one has in the good one does and the evil one abstains from is illegitimate. Nevertheless, and contrary to the author's own views, let us argue here from the naturalistic perspective, and ask some rhetorical questions. From whom do students learn the trait of illegitimate pride if not from their teachers who show the very same trait. And, from whom do faculty, in turn, learn this very trait if not from the administrators and governing boards which bestow upon their own institutions the designation "university" rather than the far less pretentious and, as a generality, far more honest designation "college." The designation "university" suggests both a breadth of offerings culminating in doctoral studies of an academic nature and a substantial research mission. Lacking any of these three criteria (studies not of an academic nature, such as counseling psychology, may

¹⁹ One such exception is a newly appointed dean, who under the present regime has to pass on promotions, and cannot do so effectively without possessing the professorial title as well. Again, though, this is a matter of practical necessity, not inherent desert. Such a dean would be wise not to use the title, however, until such time as it is understood to have been earned. At least two other exceptions of this nature come to mind, but this one is sufficient. It should be noted, however, that this is already a concession to a weakness, a defect, in human nature. Ideally, everyone would see that it is often easy for one to recognize, say, an artistic work of genius or a technological marvel and declare it as it is without having even the faintest ability of producing either.

²⁰ This can occur due to the recognition by the teacher of a sampling error, for example. See Fulda (2009). I can also think of another instance as well, but again one will suffice.

have value but do not belong in a university properly so-called) and nevertheless designating the institution a "university" is yet another form of pretense—of false pride, with rare exceptions,²¹ and it is both vain and foolish to expect faculty to do anything but follow suit and, in turn, both vain and foolish to expect students to do anything but, in turn, follow suit. Very few people are above *all* pretense, including all manner of self-deception; most of us, instead, act as our putative leaders act.

Put differently, sometimes good leadership really means *lowering* expectations, or one risks a double- or triple-standard, one for the administration, another for the faculty, and still another for the students.

7. *Faculty credentialing.* The current method of credentialing faculty, the earning of the academic doctorate, fails on ever so many levels. To begin with, it lacks a conceptually viable rationale, as indicated by its most often being described as a "screening device" or a "union card." Although there went but a pair of shears between these two designations, the former suggests that graduate students ought to spend several years simply to make the task of hiring faculty easier, while the latter suggests that people ought to pay for the privilege to work in a given field *per se*. One of the world's foremost researchers told me²² that the doctorate "is not the next step up the academic ladder and should only be

²¹ An exception here would be a school which once met these requirements, but due to retrenchment no longer does. It is objectionable for schools to improperly bestow upon themselves undeserved designations; but by the same token, it is neither necessary nor desirable for schools to publicly humiliate themselves, as it were. The case of a school which has improperly granted itself a status that it does not deserve, and continues not to deserve, presents a puzzle: On the one hand, a reduction in status might be a form of atonement; on the other hand some innocent of the original aggrandizement might be unnecessarily punished for the sins of others. We are, after all, dealing with people; institutions themselves have no metaphysical existence—they are mere hypostatizations, social facts parasitic on legal fictions; this is, after all, why I qualified the second sentence of this note with "as it were."

²² Oral communication to the author by Turing Award winner, the late Alan Jay Perlis.

undertaken by those planning a serious career in research." But despite a long discussion, it was never made clear how the former enables the latter in any real sense. It has also been termed an "educational exercise" (Bailey, 1984: 287), a phrase far more appropriate to an undergraduate or master's thesis, which are not, as a rule, expected to be publishable. Finally, I have seen a published argument that it is well for even those who will merely teach to go through a one-time experience such as this for their own "self-esteem," a position which makes no sense to the present author whatsoever.

It fails on the practical level, because it usually leads not to a faculty position but to a research post-doctoral position, which although it may include limited teaching duties, is a *de facto* indication that the potential faculty member has not produced the research necessary for a Preceptorship. It fails on the academic level, because virtually no academic doctoral dissertations are accepted by any serious publisher (i.e., unless out-of-print, the publisher both makes a print run, rather than print-on-demand, and does not ask for subsidies) without major revisions, due to both the artificiality of the form required and the content.²³ This, of course, does not mean to cast doubt on the research itself; but

²³ This is hardly a new or original observation. As long ago as 1984, Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., who is described as then having had "nearly four decades of publishing works of scholarship at Princeton University Press," wrote: "I believe that the most baleful influence on footnotes, and on the text, too, has been the machinery of the Ph.D. dissertation as imposed by professors...." which he terms is, in his best understanding, "an educational exercise." Later, he adds, "Thus, having been trained to a kind of writing that is not attractive to scholarly readers and not acceptable to publishers of scholarship, the young scholar is turned loose in a highly competitive academic environment in which publication is expected. Virtually all Ph.D. theses must be drastically [we would say very substantially] reworked before publication...." (Bailey, 1984: 287). He does suggest, in passing, a partial solution vaguely reminiscent of the third proposal below; in the present author's view, it is far too conventional to work—but, in Bailey's defense, that is not his point; like almost everyone, including heretofore the present author, he points to the problems without providing a genuine framework for their comprehensive solution. In addition, Bailey tells us that he has treated his proposal at greater length elsewhere, but does not say where. Nor is he the only one to advocate the third proposal below; a full-length monograph does so as well, but for entirely different reasons. Those reasons all revolve around the author's disgust at professors producing clones or carbon copies of

if it is not publishable without prior major revision, it is not on its face appropriate research training; that is, the faculty have failed the student. The last problem has recently been greatly exacerbated by the worldwide folly of mandating that doctoral dissertations be posted on the Worldwide Web, thereby rendering even otherwise publishable work very nearly unpublishable.²⁴

themselves through the process of doctoral education, that is at indoctrination, rather than true education, which comes from the word "eduction," meaning drawing forth. I do not doubt that looking at dissertations, on the one hand, and adviser's views and positions, on the other, there tends to be a close match, but this is far more simply explained as generally good pairing between doctoral candidates and advisers; but even in those cases where this is not so and there is a degree of indoctrination, it alone would not justify scrapping an entire long-standing system. If that were *all* that were wrong with the present manner of doctoral education, it would be better repaired in far less sweeping ways.

²⁴ Cassuto (2011), who interviewed book publishers, put it this way: "Don't make your dissertation available online. Book editors seem unanimous on that point for obvious reasons. ... Information may want to be free, ..., but if it's free, then you can't expect a publisher to pay for it, even in a later version." Thus do graduate schools awarding doctoral degrees based on dissertations whose ostensible purpose is publication actually act to preclude proper publication by "scooping" the author on work that is not (or should not be) theirs, and making the academic jobs for which the degrees are supposedly preparatory far harder to get.

About articles, the verdict is less clear. What can be said, however, is that they had better be kept sketchy, so that no one but the author can actually put the work together into a full-length monograph. By this I am *not* suggesting that others will take someone's group of articles and turn them into a full-length book: That degree of brazen plagiarism is much too unlikely to be of serious concern. Instead, I am talking about keeping that eventual monograph marketable to publishers because nobody can put it all together even close to the way the author can.

In addition, if there has been more than a little indoctrination in any unpublished matter that is added to the material submitted as a thesis, copyright should be declared and no

It also fails on the ethical level. I enumerate some of those failures. First, a student confessed to me that he was worried about both the bulk of his dissertation and the number of references it contained, so he quietly examined a large number of other dissertations accepted by the institution in which he was matriculated and padded both his dissertation and the references to be just above the average as best as he could determine it. This is not merely dishonest, although it may well have been (or at least seen to have been) a practical necessity, it is a waste of time, effort, and spirit, and instills a tendency to continue such practices, as delineated above. The student in question, of course, is far less to blame for this than the faculty.

Second, three other students, who received their doctorates from three entirely different graduate schools, all in mathematics—unlike the first student, whose dissertation was in a different field, confessed to me not merely that the ideas in the dissertation were not their own, but that they themselves did not understand their "own" work. Their doctorates were in mathematics and in a sense not relevant here the only truly easy subject, but in another sense the very hardest subject in which to earn a doctorate, because it is supposed to display creativity. The faculty awarding the degrees probably did so, and in one case the principal faculty member's letter of recommendation made that fairly clear, because they thought, probably correctly in two of the cases but certainly incorrectly in one, that their students would make good teachers. The solution to this problem is another and equivalent *permanent* rank, both in pay and status, to Preceptor but with a higher teaching load, and with teaching duties only, Lecturer, earned by completion of the United States M.Phil. degree, meaning the relevant coursework and examinations, without the dissertation *at all*. The rationale for this is that most teaching of mathematics in colleges and "universities," but not Universities, is, in fact, secondary school mathematics and introductory calculus, the former often under the rubric of remediation or preparatory mathematics.

In this regard, some notes of caution are in order. It is *not* intended by this suggestion to reinstitute a caste system; this rank *must* be open only to those *genuinely* without the

agreement should be signed to deposit the same on the Web, even there is *no* intent to turn the articles into a book. How much is a quintessential judgment call.

ability to publish, but *with* the ability to teach, and those who appoint people to this rank who have demonstrated that they do indeed have the ability to publish have committed academic misconduct. Second, the necessity of the M.Phil. is itself an artifact of watered down curricula and grade inflation largely due to teaching towards radio-button evaluations and the like, for it consists of no more than coursework followed by a variety of comprehensive or qualifying examinations. Were the coursework both appropriately distributed and also appropriately taught and evaluated, such examinations would be entirely redundant. That they are not so proves clearly that the taught program is quite obviously deficient, in the opinion of the very faculty who both teach the courses and then require the comprehensive or qualifying examinations.

Yet a third ethical problem is the co-opting of graduate students into projects and tasks in which they have little or no interest when their source of funding is not the graduate school itself, but an entirely outside source. Needless to say if someone is hired as a research assistant with tuition remission and possibly a stipend, this is legitimate; likewise, it is legitimate if the faculty member offers to pay the student out of the faculty member's own funds and the student accepts. But in the case at hand, the student told me of his considerable upset at a veritable barrage of illegitimate requests, and acceded to only one (a grant proposal), and ultimately left the school for another institution and received the doctorate there. I want to emphasize that the barrage of requests refused were entirely unrelated to the student's proposed dissertation. This is, of course, an unmistakable example of covetousness and clear academic misconduct, however widespread.

If a system not only lacks a viable conceptual rationale but also fails on the ethical, academic, and practical dimensions, it stands to reason that it ought to be abolished in its entirety; it is just beyond fixing, or if it can be fixed, the present author cannot see how. So, given that conclusion, what should take its place, for students who do have the creativity to not only teach but also publish scholarship or research? This is the hard question, but it turns out not to be so hard at all, but to have a surprisingly simple, commonsensical, and practicable solution as well.

Some students can work independently; in such cases, an M.Phil. or, in a more-perfect

world, a properly distributed, properly taught, and properly evaluated master's degree followed by three original²⁵ publications, intimately related to each other²⁶ and reasonably related to the discipline in which the person wishes to enter as a permanent academician should suffice—in some of the humanities and the qualitative social sciences to use the present designations—an accepted book (not a contract, but a completed manuscript) should be required. In the case of students who wish one-on-one advice on preparing such manuscripts for publication, tuition for as long as it takes to produce three such publications (or the book) should suffice. However, the university ought not to award a degree; the published work ought to speak for itself.

I think, however, this is far too radical to gain acceptance even in the limited sense to be advocated in the concluding section. However, this is the only suggestion that can completely end yet another manifestation of what above was termed the deadliest sin of all, *schadenfreude*. So I also offer two different, less ideal but likely more practicable solutions along the same lines.

The first solution is for the student to pay for one-on-one instruction at one school and upon completion of a traditional thesis have it ratified by a committee of entirely external academicians at another school, after which the degree is formally awarded by the second school. Because this will be a traditional thesis, rather than already-published work, and the committee must, in effect, guess as to its publishability, the ratification cannot be automatic even if the degree is clearly earned—one way of handling this is seeing to it that the defense is public, so that no matter what the committee may initially think, a hostile questioner may always show up and ask a barrage of questions which if handled incorrectly may nevertheless result in something other than ratification. Modifications of

²⁵ "Original" in either sense given in n. 3.

²⁶ One can be a review article, original in the first sense, setting the context for the succeeding two, original in the second sense, for example. Another, and superior, suggestion is for the second to put into perspective the first, and the third to tie the whole thing together. There are, of course, any number of ways for publications to be intimately related.

this scheme are also possible.²⁷ However, although this is probably the more realistic of the two options, since it involves prediction it is far less desirable than the next option.

The second solution is for the student to receive whatever one-on-one assistance is needed, for whatever length of time is needed to produce the three intimately related publications reasonably related to the discipline or the scholarly book, pay tuition for that length of time to the institution, and then have the degree automatically awarded.²⁸

²⁷ The present author holds a doctorate based on a modification of this scheme, that is a *de facto* external degree, and, indeed, a hostile questioner somehow showed up and asked a barrage of questions which were handled to everyone's satisfaction. *That* degree involved *no* indoctrination and *no* academic or ethical problems.

²⁸ A variation on this scheme is Sieber (2011), whose dissertation consists of a twelve-page introduction, followed by three chapters totaling 67 pages, drawn entirely from three co-authored articles, the longest of which is twenty journal pages, and one of which is, in turn, based on two previously co-authored articles, followed by a final twelve pages of bibliographic references. Certainly, no one can claim that Germany does not understand the doctorate! There is, of course, a considerable discrepancy between the 67 pages in thesis format and the considerably fewer total number of published pages, because, naturally, journals are not formatted in thesis format, but (generally) in small font, with lesser spacing, smaller margins, and sometimes larger pages.

It should not be supposed that criminal corruption cannot occur in either this scheme or the ideal scheme. If the person(s) engaged to advise the student serves knowingly as a referee for any piece that will be included or, alternatively, there are one or more external reviewers whose reports have been forged or ghost-written by anyone internal, the entire degree is tainted. The student may obviously not accept the degree, all tuition, fees, and all manner of other out-of-pocket expenses incurred, directly or indirectly, by the acts of corruption must be refunded, and the entire matter constitutes grand theft by all involved. It goes without saying that dismissal for cause is mandatory in such cases, and criminal prosecution is advisable, especially if it can be proven that both such actions occurred. This is not a mere conflict-of-interest (which is sometimes resolved honorably and sometimes not), but a change in the *nature* of the degree from what the student paid to study for—the opportunity to earn an external degree or the equivalent—into an ordinary

Despite its apparent simplicity which is almost as simple as the ideal solution presented in the first instance, neither solution can work unless the publication process is also addressed, which is why, already in the introduction, I spoke of the academy "broadly construed" and expressly included editors, referees, and publishers.

8. *Academic publishing for these purposes.* The present author has had the gall earlier in this essay to label editors and referees, generally, "indolent." Yet, however true, this was done, carefully, in a parenthetical remark, as an aside, because it is, indeed, gall. Why? As almost all editors are not properly paid and referees are very nearly *never* paid, to label them indolent *per se* would itself be a form of covetousness, an expectation of something for nothing, which is nevertheless what the academy expects. It seems obvious to me that editors must be paid considerably more than they are and that referees must likewise be paid a not insubstantial amount commensurate with the quality and

internal doctorate, which he did not bargain for, did not want, would not have studied for, and for which he would have incurred no expenses, because of lack of interest in such a degree.

In addition, an institution which countenances such behavior ought to be stripped of its not-for-profit status, tax exemption, tax deductibility of donations and tuition and fees, suspended from offering further research degrees until the entire system is reorganized under a new administration, and all funds for the programs involved subject to criminal asset forfeiture, with restitution made to the victims of the grand theft. This is, of course, white-collar crime.

The importance of external research degrees can hardly be overstated. Fulda (2009) points out that, as a consequence of the Arrow impossibility theorem, even in a cut-and-dried subject such as mathematics, and even without partial credit, given a sufficiently knowledgeable teacher (of his students, not his subject) objectivity is chimerical; he adds that this is particularly true if the class is *small*. It goes without saying that a class of one is as small as it gets. This is yet another reason for relegating the adviser to a truly advisory role, and leaving the outcome in the hands of external assessors, preferably in the form of real research or scholarly training *by publication*, with the vagaries of that process rectified as discussed in the next section.

thoughtfulness of their reports; this money must *not* come from universities; rather it must come from publishers. There is, at present, considerable anger, and not for naught, at the large for-profit publishers who themselves show covetousness by selling to university libraries their own products without paying the academicians who oversee the process appropriately. If they do not stop this practice, it is distinctly possible that the open-access movement will replace them and they will go bankrupt, the normal result of all overreaching; this would be most unfortunate, since the open-access movement, while obviously well-intentioned, is likely to prove disastrous to the academic enterprise.²⁹

At any rate, as long as traditional academic publishing continues to be fairly widespread, the qualifying publications must quite obviously not be paid for, either directly or indirectly in any way, shape, or form, not by submission fees, not by conference registration fees, not by page charges, not by subsidy publishing, or the like. This taints the process, in ways too numerous to discuss here.³⁰

In addition, the peer-review process must be modified as discussed elsewhere,³¹ with the additional proviso that referees (who remember will be paid, as will editors) can be peremptorily vetoed by the author without providing any reason.³²

²⁹ See Fulda (2011b) and Fulda (2012) as to why.

³⁰ See the previous note.

³¹ See Fulda (2007) advocating a single-blind system in reverse, with the opportunity for reply or rebuttal, and an unusual method for reviewer selection; added here are peremptory challenges.

³² Beyond the lack of sufficient payment for editors and the lack of payment for referees, there is another problem, for which I do *not* have a solution. Both editors and referees are generally selected on the basis of research or scholarly achievement. While it is obviously necessary for editors and referees to understand the subject and for referees to be familiar with the literature, it is *by no means* sufficient, any more than a good researcher or scholar necessarily makes a good teacher or a fair grader. In fact, my experience with *both* editors *and* referees, particularly in the discipline of philosophy where the problem seems most acute is that the considerable majority are incompetent *as*

Shatz (2004) offers the main, well-known alternative—post-publication open peer review. His book, a mix of empirical findings and analytic arguments, is extremely persuasive as to the problems plaguing the existing system, but this particular solution runs the risk of embarrassing the author for no genuinely good reason. If there is a method of pre-publication review, which avoids the most serious problems he enumerates, I would prefer it. It is to that end that the suggestions just proffered have been.

9. *Breach of contract, misconduct, and appointment and promotion.* These next two subsections, of course, are the least pleasant to write, yet it cannot be denied that the all-faculty-tenured-upon-appointment recommendation coupled with the absence of supervision (absent misconduct) in ordinary academic matters previously advocated in the enumeration of the ills that beset the academy is bound to lead to still more indolence and worse—outright, serious misconduct.

Ordinary indolence shows up in teaching by repeated absences without good cause, repeated lateness without good cause, and such inanities as the use of true-false or multiple-choice questions on examinations. It is not well understood why these latter are so objectionable, although their indolence is perfectly obvious. It is objectionable for two reasons, which amount to one: First, the correct answer is simply there; second, to make it work as an examination, the questions must be tricky; in the technical parlance that psychometricians use, in fact, the incorrect choices on multiple-choice examinations are

editors and referees—not merely indolent, although they are certainly that, too, by and large—whatever their other (often very considerable) accomplishments may be. Yet, as noted, I am unable to think of a better way to select either editors or referees, aside from the suggestions already made in the previous note, and accompanying text.

Shatz (2004), an esteemed philosopher, attributes the problems in the discipline both to what constitutes philosophy and to what constitutes "good" philosophy. I am not sure, but am inclined to think rather that it is the problems enumerated in n. 12 that are particularly acute in this discipline. Regardless, it behooves me to say just a few words as to what constitutes editorial and refereeing incompetence or indolence. In brief, anything that would constitute the same for any other form of grading.

termed, quite accurately, distractors. I have heard only two defenses of this widespread inane practice. The first is "survival," which, if true, is the school's fault for overloading its faculty and, if false, is the teacher's rationalization for indolence. The second is that it correlates well with performance on other questions; if this is true, it is nearly a sure sign that the questions are indeed tricky, rather than thoughtful. In fact, radio-button tests *cannot* really be thoughtful; they can be easy or not, and if not, they must be tricky. Then there are faculty members who simply read from the textbook aloud. All these, and similar matters, are clear breaches of contract and warrant sanctions up to and including dismissal, tenure notwithstanding. The definition of breach of duty must be spelled out clearly and unmistakably in simple and plain writing and personally handed *prior to* appointment to each new appointee, so no defense other than innocence can later be raised. Obviously, breach of duty must not be expanded to include any matter not genuinely reflecting indolence sufficient to constitute dereliction of duty. Thus, given the lack of consensus, at present, about the value of student peer instruction, it must be tolerated, although the present author believes it just another rationalization for teacher idleness. Also, obviously, this last comment does not apply to recitations, genuine discussions in true seminars, and the like. These are, of course, valuable, if done right; if done wrong, nothing is valuable, a point I will soon address in discussing the appointment process.

Misconduct, as I am using the term here refers to *academic* misconduct which includes *financial* misconduct relating to *academic* matters—such as demanding or soliciting a bribe or extortion of funds for the awarding of, or potential awarding of, degrees, or the demanding, soliciting, or acceptance of a good and valuable consideration in return for a better grade, all of which *may* become *official* misconduct, punishable by the criminal law. Its definition is any academic action taken on other-than-academic grounds³³ or

³³ Defining an "academic action" in simple and plain writing should not prove particularly difficult; however, defining "other-than-academic grounds" may prove a tricky matter. It cannot be defined so narrowly as to vitiate its purpose, nor so broadly as to, for example, bar all research funding conditioned on pursuit of a particular line of research (as opposed to a particular research outcome), lest the institution lose too much funding and the faculty barred from expanding their interests and competence outwards from the margins. Only a framework is provided here, so as to allow institutions to fill

their own niches with a degree of flexibility that nevertheless does not invite misconduct to waltz back in. It is clear to the present writer, that although still legal (perhaps not for all that long; the lack of clarity here mirrors the lack of clarity in *Grutter v. Bollinger*) and even before its legality was time-limited (or expected to be so; see *Grutter*), it was *never* mandated by law, simply accepted (by a plurality opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, not a clear-worded majority opinion; I refer to the rationale given by Justice Powell alone in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* and then hesitantly endorsed in *Grutter v. Bollinger* and *Gratz v. Bollinger*; the matter is now being revisited by the Supreme Court), and although often misread as mandated (that something survives strict scrutiny and is called a "compelling state interest" does not in fact mandate it, but allows it), hiring someone on the basis of race or not hiring someone on that basis is not only an academic action on other-than-academic grounds, but completely perverse and corrupt, because race is an accidental rather than an essential feature of a human being. (I am aware that this case law applies to student admissions, not faculty employment; but this is a *legal* point; morally, educationally, etc. there is no difference whatsoever. As the reader can tell, I am not a legal positivist.)

Gender, on the other hand, is, of course, an essential feature of what makes a human being a human being, but its relevance, and certainly its materiality, to the academic missions of teaching, scholarship, and research seems to the present writer completely nonexistent, and a departure from merit on these grounds also perverse and corrupt, albeit not completely so—and therefore, also, an academic action on other-than-academic grounds, and clear academic misconduct.

What *is* true is that hiring on these bases has been permitted, encouraged, and taken as mandated (by the courts, not the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or its original intent) in the limited case of past discrimination as a *remedy*, not for *diversity* or other purposes. I do not accept this, either, because it falls prey to the selfsame racial essentialism heretofore decried. Put more simply, it is an argument that two wrongs makes a right, which nobody accepts in general. A *true* remedy remedies the individual harmed, not some other person sharing some characteristic, essential or accidental, with the person harmed. (Again, as this is an ethical point, the difference between employment law and student admissions is of no particular interest here.)

otherwise tainting the degree award process, in the absence of *seriously* extenuating circumstances. This, too, must be defined far more specifically in simple and plain writing and personally handed *prior to* appointment to each new appointee, so no defense other than *seriously* extenuating circumstances and innocence can later be raised. However, no matter what is put in writing, violations of the criminal law that meet the very general definition given above cannot be tolerated. (Other criminal matters are best left to the authorities; given the generally poor way in which colleges, "universities," and Universities alike handle academic misconduct which is within their proper purview, matters outside their proper purview, academics, should be left to those competent to handle them.)³⁴ Unlike indolence, where sanctions can range from an oral warning to a

Ethnic origin and nationality are akin to race and gender, but religion, faith, creed, and core beliefs may well not be. This depends on the school's mission and the like. After all, a person's deepest beliefs (whether or not part of a formal religion or faith) are perhaps *the* second most essential part of his humanity, second only to how well he is able to live up to them. Moreover, unlike race, ethnic origin, or gender (excluding drastic measures), even if one is born into a faith, he may come to reject its tenets, and most faiths actively seek converts, and those which do not nevertheless accept them graciously. Thus, these are not "closed systems." This is why, an interview, one-on-one with any faculty member willing to spend the time (as suggested below, in note 35), is not inappropriate *at all*. The possession of scholarly or research skills and teaching skills tells you nothing about *the person*. An in-depth discussion with a succession of faculty members does.

³⁴ An editor suggested that cases like these are best illustrated by an example. A very senior official of a prominent school in London accepted an extraordinarily large donation from a mass-murderer, as was widely reported. This alone, in some nation-states, would be "another criminal matter," justifying a lengthy prison term, but in Britain, it is apparently legal. Added to that, the mass-murderer's son received a doctorate while advised by this person. The *quid pro quo* is perfectly obvious, although perhaps difficult to prove, depending on the rules of procedure and evidence. In the United States, for example, I cannot imagine a jury not convicting on both the acceptance of the money and on bribery charges, and the person sentenced to *de facto* life in prison for good cause, with a large number of others who either knew or should have known

written reprimand onwards, with multiple chances, academic misconduct, whether or not coupled with financial misconduct, is a very serious matter which can only result in suspension without pay for two years or demotion for five years (in the case of professors), followed by dismissal for a second offense. In some cases, a criminal referral may also be indicated.

If there is to be a regime of all-faculty-tenured-upon-appointment, and a maximum of one promotion, the possession of an M.Phil. for a Lecturer and published work over and above that for a Preceptor, there has to be a clear understanding that these are the *academic* qualifications, demonstrating, respectively, knowledge and creativity, but as they do not (necessarily) relate to teaching, something more than this must be shown before appointment. Here is a suggestion for a tri-partite vetting process, beyond the possession of the relevant credentials. Before being invited to campus for an interview,³⁵

about this sentenced to lesser terms. As it is, nothing happened, beyond a sheepish explanation and a resignation.

The degree, however, was reviewed and was found to require minor modifications. However, the manner in which this was handled simply indicates yet more corruption. The committee investigating the matter was internal, whereas any reasonable, honest new administration would have ensured an entirely external panel selected by an entirely neutral body. Of course, this does *not* mean that the degree was not truly earned, nor again that even a *single* member of the investigating panel was not scrupulously honest. Instead, it simply means nothing at all to anyone who has not actually read the dissertation and who also has the ability to make a judgment on the merits. Moreover, this would be just as true were the committee to have recommended no changes, minor modifications, moderate modifications, major modifications, or revocation. All of them might well be very different ways of whitewashing their employer or honest assessments, with no way to tell which is the case and with none inspiring any confidence. In other words, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodet?* This is no way to run a school, to put it mildly.

³⁵ An interview suggests beyond the more-formal tri-partite vetting, at least as I see it, a one-on-one discussion with each faculty member wishing to spend the time; the entire process, therefore, may well take a week or more. If the candidate is from the same country, the university should therefore be expected to pay only for lodging and board;

the prospective appointee should be *honestly* informed about the level of both the undergraduate and, where applicable, graduate students. The prospective appointee must then provide in advance a fair number of courses at both the undergraduate and, where applicable, graduate level that he is capable of teaching. To gauge the candidate's expository ability, two to three hours of preparation each should be provided after one topic (preferably different for each level) is named for *any* of the undergraduate courses and *any* of the graduate courses in which competence is claimed, and a relevant lecture or seminar given in each of those courses with questions and answers, of course, after which a two-thirds vote of the permanent faculty (that is, all faculty) shall be necessary for appointment; likewise, for faculty with research duties, a typical research seminar with a clear research program outlined in the process should be expected, with questions most definitely allowed, after which another vote of the permanent research faculty (that is, the preceptors and professors) shall be taken, and upon the concurrence of two-thirds, the appointment shall be made.

As for promotion from Preceptor to Professor, all permanent faculty with research duties should collectively name, say, some 300 peer institutions, and a panel of three Professors selected entirely at random³⁶ from within that pool³⁷ shall be presented with whatever published work the candidate decides best demonstrates scholarly or research accomplishment. The panel should be paid, and the random selection should be done by an outside auditing firm or the like with no member of the panel informed of the identity of the other panelists who must each be from *separate* peer institutions, with three written reports presented to the auditing firm, and then forwarded *unopened* to the candidate and colleagues, with recommendations. Upon the concurrence of two of the three panel

out-of-country candidates should be paid for round-trip air-fare, but for neither lodging nor board, otherwise the process will prove too expensive.

³⁶ Technically, pseudo-random. The inability to produce even a single truly random number is sufficient, all by itself, to justify the nonnaturalist position. It is a highly pared down version of the argument from design.

³⁷ Bearing in mind their areas in the slightly non-standard sense of Fulda (2007), with neither of the other two suggestions in that piece apposite in this context.

members, the candidate shall be automatically promoted; otherwise, the candidate—to save institutional funds—must wait a minimum of two years before reapplication. This is probably the best way to minimize both cronyism and unjustified, other-than-academic negative biases, but it will not eliminate them, especially in the digital age, for which reason the auditing firm shall keep records, and upon a reapplication must select at random three other panelists from three *entirely different* peer institutions. I maintain that a within-area/within-approach but otherwise random selection is preferable to any form of bias and likely to be fairer, on average.

10. *Cost control.* Beyond the fact that these surprisingly simple, commonsensical, and practicable solutions are intentionally left somewhat sketchy—as every institution has different needs and more than a general outline will over-claim—any administrator reading this will no doubt say that I have simultaneously conjured up a solution to all the problems enumerated and provided a clear and unmistakable recipe for insolvency. This, of course, is not what I intend.

There are several ways of handling the costs of these proposals. First, lecturers and preceptors should be paid at what is presently the very top of the range for junior faculty (assistant professors, not instructors; senior lecturers, not lecturers), while, with the sole exception of specially endowed chairs, professors should be paid at what is presently the very bottom of the range for professors. No raises should be granted with the obvious exception of cost of living increases; exceptional performers may instead be rewarded by released time. Likewise, those who bring in research funding (which whether public or private has its own ethical problems relating to skewing research agendas, which are widely known and have been widely discussed and which does not need further discussion in this space) should likewise be rewarded with released time; perhaps in truly exceptional cases—those where the funding is sufficient for a new (that is, permanent) line—a raise may be justified, but under no circumstances should a promotion be based on funding.³⁸ Second, no conference registration fees, open-access fees, page charges,

³⁸ The implied salary reduction will also alleviate greatly the shortage of referees, and, far more importantly, the shortage of thoughtful, helpful, and responsible referees' reports by those writing them.

and the like should be paid by the institution. Third, sabbaticals should not occur more than once in seven years, true geniuses excepted. Fourth, travel budgets should be dramatically limited; one faculty member memorably told me that these were little more than university-paid vacations—although I have little doubt that this is often *not* true, integrity is far more important than even legitimate travel, and the exchange of ideas is possible without constant travel. This was not always true; it is true, today, more so, at least, than formerly. A fifth source of savings, which may well dwarf the others, follows almost immediately from the prior sections. As appointment has been vested solely in the faculty³⁹ and the one possible promotion outsourced, it follows that a substantial majority of those administrators with responsibilities for academic affairs, but by no means all, will be returned to the faculty, and their support staff will no longer have any duties. This will save scarce funds in three ways. First, academicians are generally not as highly paid as administrators; second, some lines will be occupied by former administrators; third, some staff will be reassigned or put into a pool for re-hiring when other staff positions become available. Indeed, this suggestion's tri-partite savings added to the savings from the preceding three suggestions may allow Professors to be paid at the middle of the present range, rather than at the very bottom.

11. *Why put this into print?*

Given that already at the start of this wide-ranging essay, I insisted on using the subjunctive, termed this a "hard sell," and myself said that there was "a lack of expectation of impact," the question naturally arises: Why then bother to put this into print.

What, in other words, am I hoping for? Well, the above words all refer to the academy writ large, but not to each and every competing college and university in the world, for

³⁹ It is hardly beyond belief that some faculties will deliberately appoint the weakest prospects who meet the criteria, normally a result of their own weakness and the resultant fear of being surpassed, yet another manifestation of professional jealousy; they will, naturally, end up attracting the weakest students, if any, and may find this behavior's end in the closure of their entire program, if not immediately, then after some time passes.

virtually no universal generalization with an extremely large domain of discourse is true. My hope is that one or two schools will hearken to this radical but simple advice and implement these ideas. If implemented properly, the pressures of competition may well force adoption in a wide range of institutions, so bit-by-bit a system now fairly close to completely ethically broken may be replaced by one which is far more equitable to all. Simultaneous deployment of these ideas is a necessity only *within* an institution not across institutions, although the recommendations in §8 cannot be made to really work unless and until widespread adoption.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ An apology is owed readers for the author's own cowardice in not putting this into print some time ago, when all this crystallized. The author, too, is a work-in-progress. Nevertheless, what has been said of indolence is also true of what was termed inner indolence, cowardice. It cannot really be objected to, if the author (referee, editor, etc.) will not be compensated, for this is, in turn, covetousness. The same apology is nonetheless owed readers for the large number of self-citations, due in large part to his piecemeal attempts to address these issues, when he understands full well that simultaneous deployment is required. *Mea culpa.*

References

American College Dictionary [ACD]. (New York: Random House, 1970).

Algozzine, Bob, and John Beattie, Marty Bray, Claudia Flowers, John Gretes, Lisa Howley, Ganesh Mohanty, Fred Spooner, "Student Evaluation of College Teaching: A Practice in Search of Principles," *College Teaching* 52.4(2004): 134-141.

Bailey, Jr., Herbert S., "[On] The Art of the Footnote," *The American Scholar* 53(1984): 287-288.

Cassuto, Leonard, "From Dissertation to Book," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 57.38(June 3, 2011): A37.

Foley, John P., ed., *The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia* (Brooklyn, New York; 1900).

Frost, Robert, "Mending Wall," *North of Boston* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2nd Ed., 1915), Pp. 11-13.

Fulda, Joseph S., "The Imperative to Publish," *Measure* 131(1995): 7.

Fulda, Joseph S., "In Defense of Charity and Philanthropy," *Business and Society Review* 104.2(1999): 179-189.

Fulda, Joseph S., "Student Evaluations of Teaching: Brought to You by Computer," *British Journal of Educational Technology* 31(2000): 81-82.

Fulda, Joseph S., "Peer Review: Three Suggestions in the Spirit of 'Mend It, Don't End It'," *Journal of Information Ethics* 16.2(2007): 6-9.

Fulda, Joseph S., "Perfectly Marked, Fair Tests with Unfair Marks," *The Mathematical Gazette* 93(2009): 256-260.

Fulda, Joseph S., "A Mockery of Due Process," *Journal of Information Ethics* 20.1(2011): 28-33.

Fulda, Joseph S., "Authorial Vanities," *Journal of Information Ethics* 20.2(2011): 9-11.

Fulda, Joseph S., "Authorial Vanities II," *Journal of Information Ethics* 21.1(2012): 7-8.

Gettier, Edmund L., "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis* 23.6(1963): 121-123.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

Kripke, Saul, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980 [1972]).

Molnar, Thomas, "Academic Freedom/Academic Excellence," *Measure* 131(1995): 1-3, 5.

Mumford, Stephen, "Combination Acts," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 2037(16 February 2012): 31.

O'Casey, Sean, *Inishfallen, Fare Thee Well* (New York: Macmillan, 1949).

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

Shatz, David, *Peer Review: A Critical Inquiry* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

Shaw, David, "Unethical Framework: Division, Dishonesty and Unfairness," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 2034(26 January 2012): 28.

Sieber, Michael, "On Three Levels of Complexity in Mathematical Modelling of Population Dynamics," Dissertation for Dr. rer. nat., Universität Osnabrück, August 2011.