

## Erratum to: Vagueness, tolerance and contextual logic

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### Erratum to: *Synthese* (2010) 174:5–46 DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9683-9

During the production of the article, the author overlooked some errors. Below you will find the corrected text.

Page 5, line 4-5 in the abstract should read:

One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-foot increment of a walking distance is a walking distance).

Page 6, line 6-8 should read:

A walking distance is still a walking distance if we increment it by one foot (but not by 5 miles); a child is still a child one hour later (but not 5 years later); and so on.

As of page 7 line 3 the words borderline vagueness should read:

borderline-vagueness

Page 8, line 1, first paragraph of Sect. 2: the line should read:

In ordinary usage, ‘vagueness’ is a broad term that covers an assortment of loosely connected linguistic phenomena: imprecision, fuzziness, ambiguity, obscurity, lack of specificity (hence the expression ‘vague generalities’), and their like.

Page 8, the last line of the first paragraph of Sect. 2 should read:

The indeterminateness, moreover, does not mean that the question is out of order (as would be a category mistake, like asking whether number 3 is happy); the question is appropriate, and unambiguous, but the semantics does not seem to decide it.

Page 16, line 7-4 from the bottom should read:

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Here, ‘derivation’ is defined in a standard way, using a standard system based on modus ponens and universal generalization; a wff is *used* in a derivation if it is either equal to, or is a component of a wff occurring in the derivation.

Page 17, the last line before Sect. 3.2 should read:

The proof of the Sorites contradiction fails, because it requires an unfeasible context and in unfeasible contexts a tolerant predicate loses its tolerance: it has some sharp cutoff. But unfeasible contexts do not arise in practice, as long as the predicate is not explicitly sharpened.

Page 21, line 14-15 should read:

We can add a formula that expresses the statement that  $C$  is feasible, as a conjunct to the antecedent of (TC\*); this will give us the scheme:  $C \text{ is feasible} \wedge NP(x, y) \rightarrow [C](P(x) \rightarrow P(y))$ .

Page 23, the first line of Sect. 3.3.1 should read:

The non-logical vocabulary includes also context-independent predicates and, possibly, function symbols.

Page 26, footnote 18. The last two lines should read:

**CSL**, i.e., the sentential fragment of **TCL**, is much more expressive than **CSL#** and its deductive system is an extension of classical logic, which **CSL#** is not.

Page 29, line 8-7 above Sect. 3.4.1 should read:

It can be done, using the fact that (1) is a  $\prod_1^0$  sentence.

Page 31, line 3-6 second paragraph of Sect. 3.5 should read:

Note that  $\alpha$  may refer to  $X$ , even when  $f(X)$  has no effect on  $\alpha$ 's truth-value; for example, the truth-value of a logical truth containing  $P$  is independent of the interpretation, but the sentence refers to some contexts;  $\forall u(P(u) \rightarrow (u))$  refers to all one-element contexts.

Page 32, line 1-3 should read:

Then a sentence  $\alpha$  refers to the context  $X$ , iff  $X$  is the set of values (in  $|\mathcal{M}|$ ) of some context,  $C \in \text{cont}(\alpha)$ , under some assignment of values to the variables occurring in  $C$ .

Page 34, line 5-7 of the second paragraph should read:

Moreover, one's hesitation may be due to semantic indeterminacy, therefore an expression of confidence can mean that this case is *not* one of semantic indeterminacy, i.e., is not a borderline case.

Page 35, line 6 of the third paragraph should read:

This corresponds to one reading of the inconsistent notation in Evans (1978). My notation, which differs from that of various authors, is motivated by the need for a convenient, natural dual for  $\Delta$ .

Page 37, line 7-5 should read:

If every world is accessible from every world, then, in each of these worlds,  $\Delta P$ ,  $BP$ , and  $\neg P$  have, respectively, the extensions  $\{0,1\}$ ,  $\{2,3\}$ , and  $\{4,\dots,8\}$ , and each is sharp (i.e., has an empty borderline).

Page 44, last two lines of the third paragraph should read:

The only discovery is the technique by which models that deliver certain effects can be constructed.