Political Self-DeceptionSelf-deception, that is the distortion of reality against the available evidence and according to one's wishes, represents a distinctive component in the wide realm of political deception. It has received relatively little attention but is well worth examining for its explanatory and normative dimensions. In this book Anna Elisabetta Galeotti shows how self-deception can explain political occurrences where public deception intertwines with political failure - from bad decisions based on false beliefs, through the self-serving nature of those beliefs, to the deception of the public as a by-product of a leader's self-deception. Her discussion uses close analysis of three well-known case studies: John F. Kennedy and the Cuba Crisis, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and George W. Bush and the weapons of mass destruction. Her book will appeal to a range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and international relations. |
Contents
Investigating SelfDeception | 19 |
The Attribution of Responsibility to SelfDeceivers | 58 |
The SelfDeception of Political Leaders Officials | 79 |
Kennedy and Cuba | 115 |
Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | 150 |
Bush and the Weapons of Mass Destruction | 189 |
Conclusion | 234 |
| 247 | |
| 257 | |
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Common terms and phrases
according acknowledged action actually administration agent American analysis argued argument attack attitude avoid belief biases Bush causal circumstances clear cognitive Cold concerning condition consequences considered contrary conviction convinced costs crisis critical crucial Cuba Cuban deception decision definitely desire despite discussion doubts effect emotional evidence example explain fact failure false false belief favorable final given Gulf hand hence hold inaccuracy incident independent intelligence intentional interpretation invasion involvement Iraq issue justified Kennedy Kennedy’s later leaders lies lying matter McNamara military missiles mistakes moral motivated necessary negative officials operation political position possibility precisely present president Press problem produced rational reasons reported resolution responsibility result role Saddam seems self-deceptive simply specific story success taken thinking threat Tonkin true truth turn Vietnam wanted wish