Abstract
In this paper, we first review recent arguments about the direct perception of the intentions and emotions of others, emphasizing the role of embodied interaction. We then consider a possible objection to the direct perception hypothesis from social psychology, related to phenomena like ‘dehumanization’ and ‘implicit racial bias’, which manifest themselves on a basic bodily level. On the background of such data, one might object that social perception cannot be direct since it depends on and can in fact be interrupted by a set of cultural beliefs. We argue, however, that far from threatening the idea of direct perception, these findings clearly contradict the idea of hardwired theory of mind modules. More generally, we suggest that in order to further the understanding of social cognition we must take seriously insights about in-group and out-group distinctions and related phenomena, all of which are currently neglected in the mainstream social cognition literature.
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Notes
This idea is frequently expressed in the literature on social cognition. For example, Dretske, states it clearly: “We cannot see other minds. They are unobservable. You can see the smile (at least the upturned mouth) but not the thought ‘behind’ it. You can see the perspiration, the flushed face, the wrinkled forehead, the squint, the jerky motion of the arms … but you cannot see the fear, the embarrassment, the frustration, the desire …” (Dretske 1973, 36). Likewise, Wellman (1990, p. 107), defending this view writes: “Mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are private, internal and not observable in others.”
We thank one of the journal referees for pointing out the statements made by Carruthers and Lavelle.
One finds stronger claims about the role of perception in the simulationists. Thus, noting the idea "that in some circumstances some mental states of others can be the objects of direct perception," Heal remarks: "Nothing I have said is meant to rule out this idea; and exploration of its connections with simulationism might be of interest" (Heal 1995, p. 50). Robert Gordon (2008, 221), too, makes room for direct perception: "There should be no conflict between ST… and Gallagher's [view]… that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings of others' facial expressions, gestures and intentional actions". Within ST, however, there has been, so far as we know, no exploration of this issue which does not insist on the need for an extra step of simulation to supplement perception.
“Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so on. … Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face?” (Wittgenstein 1967 §229) And again: “In general I do not surmise fear in him—I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own.” (Wittgenstein 1980, § 170).
“Anger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them.” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 52–53).
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this formulation.
The study by Lindbloom (2007), for example, can help to address a concern raised by one of the journal’s referees. The experiments by Becchio and colleagues imposed an artificial constraint in asking subjects to identify one of three possible action intentions. The Lindbloom study, however, involved field research rather than lab experiment, and the ecological situation that she studied did not involve artificial limitations in terms of a limited range of possible answers. The subjects studied were interacting with each other on a complex task in a work setting.
This also goes to the issue of what precisely the nature of perception is. We address this below in Sect. 4.
John McDowell (2011) makes a similar point: “adapting Brian O’Shaughnessy’s dual aspect conception of the will, I propose that when one intentionally engages in bodily action, the action’s intentional character is an aspect of something that is also bodily through and through. The result stands in contrast with familiar philosophical pictures of the relation between mind and body” (p. 1). He proposes that “If rationality can be in bodily activity as opposed to behind it, we have a vivid contrast with a familiar picture according to which a person’s mind occupies a more or less mysterious inner realm, concealed from the view of others. If physical activity can be rationality in action, as opposed to a mere result of exercises of rationality, we have a vivid contrast with the tendency to distance a person’s body” (p. 17). For the notion of bodily rationality, see Gallagher 2013b and in press).
IT adopts an enactivist view of perception. See, e.g., De Jaegher et al. (2010). It is not the case, however, that all enactivists or all proponents of direct perception adopt IT, or that all proponents of direct perception are enactivists.
“If we stop thinking of behaviour as something that must be described in ‘thin’ terms, and recognize that it can also be described in ‘thick’ terms, then the illusion that the line between ‘the observable’ and ‘the unobservable’ is to be drawn along the line of thin descriptions will evaporate, and one will stop thinking that ‘the mental’ is unobservable, obscured from view by bodily movements and accessible only as a matter of inference” (Coulter and Sharrock 2009, 77).
We note that this kind of emotion pattern perception fails in autism and schizophrenia where subjects have a propensity to view the face as an array of unrelated details; they miss the pattern/gestalt and fail to recognize the emotion. “While most people perceive the face or body of another as a familiar whole imbued with life, subjectivity, and expression, schizophrenia patients will sometimes focus on individual parts or the purely material aspect of the person before them” (Sass and Pienkos 2013).
This is just a sketch of the pattern theory of emotion (see Newen et al. under review, for a more detailed account). Goldman and Sripada (2005) provide a simulationist account of face-based emotion recognition, emphasizing that non-perceptual processes might be necessary “to elaborate purely perceptual information.” This need not contradict the idea that we directly perceive emotions since the latter does not deny that ‘elaborating’ on perceptual information can involve cognitive (non-perceptual) processes. The issue considered here, in any case, is not one of elaboration.
In discussing the concept of direct perception, Gallagher (2008a) made use of the example of perceiving his red car. This has misled some critics (e.g., Bohl and Gangopadhyay 2013) into thinking that he was suggesting there is no difference between perceiving the sensory properties of things and perceiving the intentions or emotions of others, as if intentions and emotions were reducible to simple sensory properties like the redness of blushing. Perceiving my red car (not its sensory properties) and perceiving another person’s intentions or emotions may be similar insofar at both perceptions are direct and enactive, and in that sense “smart.” That there are important differences, both neurologically and phenomenologically, between object perception and person perception, even in regard to what ‘enactive’ means, has been explicated (even in Gallagher 2008a, but also in Gallagher 2005, 2008b; and Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), for example, in terms of the differences between instrumental and social affordances, between mere observation and engaged perception, and in terms of the dynamics of interaction. Bohl and Gangopadhyay are after a more detailed explanation of “the cognitive-perceptual mechanisms” of direct social perception and are clearly not satisfied with an embodied, dynamical approach that includes an enactive interpretation of the mirror system.
Evidence along this line can be found in what is sometimes considered induced autism as the result of extreme social deprivation in orphanages (see Hobson 2002).
Rorty (1989, xvi) suggests “the novel, the movie and TV program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principle vehicles of moral change and progress” (1989, xvi). We should add video games to this list. As research shows, prolonged play of such games induces changes in various cognitive functions, including hand-eye coordination, spatial visualization, visual anticipation, reaction time, and attention (Latham et al. 2013). Such changes involve brain plasticity; they are not induced because players change their theories or improve their inferences.
Scholl and Leslie (1999, 140) add that “It is certainly the case that these basic ToM abilities may eventually be recruited by higher cognitive processes for more complex tasks, and the resulting higher-order ToM activities may well interact (in a non-modular way) with other cognitive processes, and may not be uniform across individuals or cultures.” On this view, higher-order cognitive elaboration does not affect perceptual or basic ToM processes. On the enactive view proposed here, cultural practices, including communicative and narrative practices, go deeper and affect embodied perceptual processes and action possibilities. The material we draw on suggests that cultural factors can also lead to the loss or diminishment of the ability to understand others.
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Acknowledgments
S.G.’s research for this paper was supported in part by the Marie Curie Actions ITN project 264828, Towards an embodied science of intersubjectivity (TESIS), and by the Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier Research Fellowship.
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Gallagher, S., Varga, S. Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33, 185–199 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x