Abstract
This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.
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Notes
Whenever we use the terms “perception” or “experience” in this paper we mean visual perception. We leave it as an open empirical question whether the claims we make in this paper can also be extended to other sense-modalities, and if so how.
It should be noted that the sensorimotor theory as developed by Noë in his recent single-authored work has undergone some significant changes from its original formulation in Noë’s co-authored work with O’Regan. We will discuss some of these changes below (in §5).
There is no consensus on exactly how to draw the personal/subpersonal distinction. In the context of our discussion, personal level descriptions will be concerned with the contents of experience. Questions concerning the contents of experience are personal-level questions because contents of experience enter into normative, rational relations with an agent’s intentions and beliefs and desires. The contents of experience can act as reasons for a person to form an intention to act. Sub-personal level descriptions by contrast are concerned with causally explanatory functional and neural mechanisms upon which perceptual experiences supervene. Sub-personal descriptions are descriptions of vehicles that are bearers of contents. While we think that the distinction between sub-personal and personal levels of description needs to be respected, we also think there is an interesting story to be told about the relation between the processes that determine content at the personal-level and the sub-personal processes that carry content. Indeed, we will argue that one of the advantages that Hurley’s theory of active perception has over the sensorimotor theory is that the former but not the latter addresses this issue.
We are rejecting the distinction between sensorimotor coupling and cognition that we take to be implied by Noë and O’Regan’s account of the difference between sensitivity and awareness. We don’t mean to deny that there is a difference between sensitivity and awareness. Such a distinction is clearly required if we are to avoid admitting the missile guidance system into the realm of the conscious. We dispute however that Noë and O’Regan have offered a satisfactory conceptualisation of this distinction.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the AHRC (Grant Number AH/E511139/1) and forms a part of the CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) Project. The CONTACT project is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme. We both benefited enormously from discussing the ideas in this paper with Susan Hurley in the early days of the CONTACT project. Her loss continues to be felt but her ideas live on. We are also extremely grateful to Michael Madary and Andy Clark for many helpful criticisms and suggestions.
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Gangopadhyay, N., Kiverstein, J. Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action. Topoi 28, 63–73 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9047-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9047-y