

---

---

# THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME XCVII, NO. 3, MARCH 2000

---

---

## A PRESUPPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF REFERENCE FIXING\*

New theorists of reference have singled out the following Fregean contention as the core of their dispute with defenders of Fregean views on the semantics of singular terms. For the true Fregean, a correct semantic account cannot associate singular terms with only an extralinguistic individual, its referent; rather, such an account must also associate them with a property having the features necessary to count as a Fregean mode of presentation. At the very least, it should be a property known to competent speakers in a privileged way, and it must be reasonably taken as individuating.<sup>1</sup> In other words, the linguistic competence with singular terms of someone who has mastered a language cannot be captured by mentioning only his knowledge of the term's reference—unless this knowledge is understood as already involving some mode of presentation. Fregeans have defended further claims in addition to this central one. For instance, Jerrold Katz<sup>2</sup> assumes that a singular term and a definite description capturing its sense should be straightforwardly synonymous: everywhere substitutable *salva significatione*; he further assumes that Fregean senses are associated with types rather

\* Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Grup d'Epistemologia i Anàlisi's seminar, University of Barcelona, as well as at the University of Edinburgh and Oxford University. I would like to thank the audiences there for very useful discussions, and to Martin Davies, José Antonio Díez, Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí, Mike McKinsey, Richard Miller, Kevin Mulligan, Begoña Navarrete, Eleonora Orlando, Manuel Pérez, and Stephen Priest for their suggestions. Thanks also to Michael Maudsley for his grammatical revision. Financial support was provided by the research project PB96-1091-C03-03, funded by DGES, Spanish Department of Education, and by the Catalan Government's CIRIT (SGR97-396).

<sup>1</sup> Singular terms include indexicals and proper names but not definite descriptions; referential uses of the latter count also as singular terms, but they are in my view nonliteral.

<sup>2</sup> "Names without Bearers," *Philosophical Review*, CIII (1994): 1-39.

than tokens. Others add a form of internalism to the core Fregean view, as is the case when Michael Dummett<sup>3</sup> argues that “reference is not part of the meaning—it is not part of whatever is known by anyone who understands the expression” (*ibid.*, p. 123). To what extent Frege himself made these further claims is, of course, a matter of some controversy, but one with which I shall *not* be concerned here.

The present discussion is part of a larger project intended as a defense of the core Fregean claim against the objections raised by new theorists of reference, who have based their objections to Fregean views on two different semantic proposals: one for proper names—*Millianism*—and another for both indexicals and proper names—*direct reference*. Millianism manifestly contradicts the core Fregean claim, as can be seen from Saul Kripke’s<sup>4</sup> characterization: “According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak, *simply* a name. It *simply* refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying properties” (*ibid.*, pp. 239-40). Direct reference, on the other hand, is a claim about the possible-world truth conditions of sentences, including indexicals and proper names. It is essentially the thesis (still in Kripke’s<sup>5</sup> terms) that genuine referential expressions like proper names and indexicals are *de iure* rigid designators (*ibid.*, p. 21). On the assumption that the definite descriptions that might be contrived for the expression of senses have conventionally only attributive uses in which they are not *de iure* rigid, direct reference contradicts those forms of Fregeanism which take singular terms as straightforwardly synonymous with descriptions. As David Kaplan<sup>6</sup> has made clear, however, the thesis of direct reference does not contradict what I presented above as the core of the Fregean views. At least in the case of indexicals, the fact that an expression behaves *de iure* as a rigid designator appears to be compatible with its being semantically related not just to the individual to which it refers relative to every possible world, but also to descriptive material (Kaplan’s “character”).

<sup>3</sup> *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> “A Puzzle about Belief,” in Avishai Margalit, ed., *Meaning and Use* (Boston: Reidel, 1979), pp. 239-83.

<sup>5</sup> *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1980).

<sup>6</sup> “Demonstratives,” in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford, 1989), pp. 481-563, and “Afterthoughts,” in the same volume, pp. 565-614.

In more recent work, however, Kaplan<sup>7</sup> appears to be moving to join the most radical group among new theorists of reference. As emphasized at the outset, the subtle issue on which the debate turns is not whether a singular term is associated with descriptive material; the issue is rather whether the association is *semantic*, whether a semantic theory would be incomplete without acknowledging it. As Nathan Salmon<sup>8</sup> puts it: "Millianism does not entail that a proper name has no features that might be deemed, in a certain sense, intensional or connotive. Unquestionably, some names evoke descriptive concepts in the mind of a user. Some may even have particular concepts conventionally attached.... It does not follow that this connotive aspect of a name belongs to semantics, let alone that it affects the propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing the name" (*ibid.*, p. 311).

The following points are thus not under dispute: (i) there is some explanation for why a given singular term refers to a given individual; (ii) it has typically to do with properties of the referent, known (if only tacitly) by the speakers; and (iii) this explanation belongs in a theory of language, broadly considered. New theorists claim, however, that Fregeans confuse two importantly different types of linguistic explanations. Kaplan<sup>9</sup> classifies them as explanations answering, respectively, to *semantic* and *metasemantic* matters; Robert Stalnaker<sup>10</sup> makes a parallel distinction between explanations answering "descriptive questions" and those answering "foundational questions" (*ibid.*, p. 535). The first type of explanations are those which attempt to provide a compositional account of how the possible-worlds truth conditions of sentences (in context) are determined out of the contributions of their relevant parts and the way they are put together: "A descriptive semantic theory is a theory that says what the semantics for the language is without saying what it is about the practice of using that language that explains why that semantics is the right one. A descriptive-semantic theory assigns *semantic values* to the expressions of the language, and explains how the semantic values of the complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their parts" (*ibid.*). The second type of explanation answers questions "about what the facts are that give expressions their seman-

<sup>7</sup> In his unpublished Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, 1995, and in a series of lectures at the University of Barcelona the same year.

<sup>8</sup> "Nonexistence," *Noûs*, xxxii (1998): 277-319.

<sup>9</sup> In "Afterthoughts," pp. 573-76.

<sup>10</sup> "Reference and Necessity," in Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 534-54.

tic values, or more generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics" (*ibid.*). In his previous work, Kaplan<sup>11</sup> classified the rules by which the referents of indexicals are determined as part of semantics. In his more recent work, he seems to question even that by appealing to a distinction between *meanings* and *rules of use*; indexicals would be associated with rules of use, which fall short of constituting fully-fledged descriptive meanings.

It is of the utmost importance to be clear here about what does and does not count as semantic. I suggest that any meaning feature belonging to a type constitutive of the nature of languages (so that any attempt at characterizing a possible language having any chance of being the actual language of a population which overlooks that type of feature is thereby inadequate) counts as semantic. A more precise definition would invoke the theoretical apparatus that I deem necessary to say what is constitutive of languages, and would therefore be question begging; but let me use this relatively noncommittal suggestion to exclude two common ways of tracing the semantic/nonsemantic distinction. The expression of force by mood counts, I think, as semantic in the indicated sense; a theory that ignores the conventional expression of illocutionary force by moods would be "descriptively" inadequate in Stalnaker's sense. Hence, not only truth-conditional determinants strictly so-called are semantic, in the sense relevant here. Similarly, a theory that ignores the conventional role of context in the determination of many meaning features (for instance, in the precise determination of force by mood) would be descriptively inaccurate; thus, a feature involving contextual aspects does not count as nonsemantic, in the sense relevant here. *Being conventionally expressed* is a good manifestation of semanticity, in my sense. It only provides correct results, however, when applied under the guidance of the above suggestion. When Salmon presents himself (in the quotation above) as prepared to exclude from semantics even concepts conventionally attached to expressions, I think he has in mind cases like the link between 'Hesperus' and 'heavenly body seen at dusk'. I agree with him that this is a nonsemantic feature of the English expression 'Hesperus', even if one conventionally attached to it. What this shows is that only conventions by which expressions acquire their linguistically constitutive features count as really manifesting semanticity.

<sup>11</sup> "Afterthoughts," p. 575.

The ultimate goal of my larger project is to defend the moderate Fregeanism contained in the core thesis that a correct theoretical account of the semantics of singular terms must associate them with a property in addition to its signification.<sup>12</sup> It is not part of this view that the referent itself is not linguistically essential; on the contrary, I shall subscribe to a form of externalism, according to which the presence of a nonreferring singular term deprives an utterance of truth conditions, and singular terms with different referents have *eo ipso* different meanings. It is also not part of this view that sense and reference are ascribed to types; on the contrary, in the problematic cases, they are ascribed to contextualized expressions. Finally (and this is what sets the problem I want to discuss here), it is not part of this view that a singular term is straightforwardly synonymous with a description capturing its sense. The view is rather one according to which, in the phrase introduced by Kripke, descriptive senses *fix the referents* of the terms with which they are associated. Such a view still counts as Fregean in that it affirms the Fregean core.

I cannot rehearse in any detail the reasons in favor of that core, though I shall briefly mention some aspects of the positive argument which are relevant here. The most frequently invoked reason for the Fregean core is that our semantic intuitions suggest that senses of singular terms are needed to account for the truth conditions of identity statements, singular existentials, and statements involving indirect discourse. This, however, is just a manifestation of a deeper reason, namely, that a correct semantic characterization of the “semantic values” (as Stalnaker refers to them) of expressions occurring in fully literal utterances of the most ordinary sentences (that is, atomic sentences distinct from any of those just enumerated) requires us to mention senses. Richard G. Heck, Jr.,<sup>13</sup> expresses the main reason for this in a nice way. At least some utterances (in fact, a conceptually privileged subclass of them) aim, conventionally, at the transmission of knowledge, that is, justified belief. Now, for the communicated belief to be properly characterized as justified or not in those cases, it has to be individuated not just relative to the referents of the singular terms expressing it, but also to modes of presentation associated with them.<sup>14</sup> Let me illustrate this point by means of one example from Brian Loar,<sup>15</sup> which will also serve as a useful test later:

<sup>12</sup> Gödel proposed ‘signification’ as a better translation than ‘reference’ of the German ‘Bedeutung’. I shall use it as a variant, together with its cognates, ‘signify’, and the like.

<sup>13</sup> “The Sense of Communication,” *Mind*, civ (1995): 79-106.

<sup>14</sup> This is a focal point, of course, in writings such as those of P. F. Strawson, Dummett, and Gareth Evans.

<sup>15</sup> “The Semantics of Singular Terms,” *Philosophical Studies*, xxx (1976): 353-77.

Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in the latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says 'He is a stockbroker', intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now, as it happens, Jones has correctly identified Smith's referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith's utterance. It would seem that, as Frege held, some 'manner of presentation' of the referent is essential, even on referential uses, to what is being communicated (*ibid.*, p. 357).

The conventional goal of Smith's utterance is the transmission of knowledge. Now, although Jones has formed, on the basis of Smith's utterance, a belief that is plausibly characterized as having the same truth conditions as the belief that Smith represented himself as holding, the justification that Smith has for his belief might crucially depend on the manner in which he purports to present the referent of the indexical he uses: that is, Smith might well lack epistemic justification to believe that the man is a stockbroker, to the extent that he thinks of him as the man on the train. Therefore, in missing this aspect of Smith's utterance, justification might be lost; and as a result of that, the conventional point of the linguistic transaction has not been achieved. It thus appears that, even if we grant the views of new theorists of reference on the possible-world truth conditions of utterances like Smith's (as I think we should), a correct semantic account should avail itself of ways of characterizing what Stalnaker calls the *semantic values* of terms like 'he' in Smith's utterance which are richer than just mentioning their referents. For such a semantic account should correctly characterize what utterances like the one in the example conventionally aims to transmit. A semantic theory that avails itself of resources to characterize properly what has been lost in the Smith-Jones exchange is in a better position to achieve its goals (that is, to provide a correct characterization of the conventional semantic content of utterances) than one that merely assumes as independently given the "semantic value" correlated with Smith's token of 'he' (*ibid.*, p. 357).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> This argument assumes that there are *two* beliefs differing in their contents which Smith might be trying to get across with his utterance: one in which the man is presented under the visual aspects on the television screen, and another in which the man is presented under the property of being seen on the train every morning. This assumption could be rejected; but fewer people are prepared to take this line than to accept direct reference. Many writers who commit themselves to direct reference, however, argue that utterances of 'Smith believes that he is a stockbroker' could ascribe beliefs with different contents to Smith in different contexts, depending on whether the context of utterance for the belief ascription allows one or the other mode of presentation (the visual, or the memory based) to be associated with 'he' in the characterization of Smith's belief. For an illustration, see Mark Crimmins and John Perry, "The Prince and the Phone Booth," this JOURNAL, LXXXVI, 12 (December 1989): 685-711.

Of course, this does not amount to a full, positive argument for the core Fregean contention, but it allows me to set the stage for the discussion I intend to pursue. The core Fregean claim is that the relation between singular terms and their significations is mediated in semantically significant ways; we would miss semantically relevant facts if our semantic theory merely correlated terms with their significations. In other words, there are terms associated with the same significations which differ in semantically significant ways (as opposed to merely differing in *metasemantical*, or *foundational* ways). There is a straightforward way in which this core Fregean claim can be incorporated into a semantic theory: by counting any singular term as synonymous with a description capturing its sense. If the descriptions in question merely fix the referent without being synonymous with the singular term, however, we have additional work to do to make the semantic nature of senses undisputably a part of the account. Relatedly, the usual Fregean explanations of certain facts which Fregeans take as the clearest manifestations of the correctness of their core claim are put in jeopardy by limiting the relation to reference fixing (facts, namely, like the informativeness of identity statements and the differential truth-conditional import in some structures of singular terms with the same signification, on the one hand, and the truthfulness of negative existentials including singular terms without reference, on the other). Kripke has expressed the problem with his usual acuity: “Some of the attractiveness of the theory is lost if it isn’t supposed to give the meaning of the name: for some of the solutions of problems that I’ve just mentioned will not be right, or at least won’t clearly be right, if the description doesn’t give the meaning of the name.... So the analysis of singular existence statements mentioned above will have to be given up, unless it is established by some special argument independent of a general theory of the meaning of names; and the same applies to identity statements.”<sup>17</sup>

I attempt to confront these challenges here by offering an analysis of the senses of proper names and indexicals as essential ingredients of *presuppositions of acquaintance*. Because proper names introduce specific problems of their own, I shall focus mostly on indexicals, providing at the end just a brief indication of how the ideas are intended to apply to proper names.<sup>18</sup> I shall also suggest briefly at con-

<sup>17</sup> *Naming and Necessity*, p. 33.

<sup>18</sup> The suggestion will be fully developed in a companion piece entitled “The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.”

venient points how the analysis applies to referentially used descriptions, which I take to be expressions acting nonconventionally as singular terms. In section II, I defend the token-reflexive nature of the senses that I ascribe to most singular terms; this is needed to characterize properly the presuppositions I propose to associate with these terms. In section III, I discuss what Gareth Evans calls *Russell's principle*. The discussion here is intended to help distinguish presuppositions of acquaintance from those traditionally associated with definite descriptions. In section IV, I present the presuppositional account; and I explain in section V how it helps the Fregean to confront Kripke's challenge.

#### I. THE TOKEN-REFLEXIVE SENSES OF INDEXICALS

A relevant feature of the view I shall advance here is the contention that paradigmatic singular-referring expressions—proper names and indexicals—are not types or other abstract entities but the tokens instantiating them; they are *token-reflexive* expressions in that the referring tokens are a constitutive element in the individuation of their senses. By focusing on indexicals, I hope to avoid diversions provoked by difficulties specific to other singular terms, proper names, and referentially used descriptions; in their own particular way, however, most uses of those expressions are also token reflexive.

Here, I shall take an *utterance* to be an event or state (actual or possible) consisting in the instantiation of an expression type of a language (a sentence); if such an event meets certain conditions, it constitutes the *performance* of an act of meaning.<sup>19</sup> I shall be mostly concerned with acts of meaning performed by using (uttering or inscribing) a sentence type of a natural language in a literal way. The theoretical background presupposed is broadly Gricean in that I assume the concept of a literal act of meaning to be explicable on the basis of an account of *non-natural (speaker's) meaning* along the lines of H. P. Grice's, supplemented with an account of *convention* along the lines of David Lewis's.

Acts of meaning consist of a *force* and a *propositional content*, the latter specifying the act's truth conditions; the conventions constituting the language to which the uttered sentence belongs establish constraints on the force and propositional content of utterances that instantiate it. I touch upon an issue that sets what follows apart from

<sup>19</sup> Conditions such as this: the event is caused by a rational agent (instead of being, say, the occurrence of a grouping of ants accidentally conforming to the shape of a possible inscription of an English sentence), effected with *communicative* intentions, and so on.

Gottlob Frege's views on language.<sup>20</sup> Linguistic conventions alone do not always determine the truth conditions of fully literal utterances. This is consistent with truth conditions' being an essential component of meaning; for linguistic conventions only *constrain* the truth-conditional contribution, whose full determination is based partly on context. This is not exclusive of singular terms, which makes it a fact orthogonal to my discussion. Linguistic conventions establish, for example, that quantifiers quantify with respect to a certain domain, but the specific domain is usually fully given contextually; they determine that attributive adjectives and adverbs ('old', 'bad', and so on) qualify only relative to a given class, but the class is usually contextually indicated ('old among the bachelors', 'old among the freshmen', and so on).

Consider an utterance of an atomic sentence that includes an indexical or demonstrative expression, such as 'He is rich'. I shall assume that these expressions are, as Hans Reichenbach<sup>21</sup> claimed, *token reflexive*, or (as I shall alternatively say) *case reflexive*.<sup>22</sup> The semantic rules associated with case-reflexive expression types do not specify their contribution to the truth conditions of a sentence, but to the truth conditions of utterances in which they are instantiated. The semantic rule for the expression type 'I', for instance, could be like this: in any utterance *u* which includes an instance of an "ordinary" elementary sentence (that is, one not inside quotation marks or an indirect context) including the expression type 'I', that instance refers to the speaker of *u*. This presupposes that it is utterances, not sentences, that have truth conditions. Even if it is acceptable to speak of the truth conditions or propositional content of "eternal sentences," that way of speaking is inadequate when considering sentences including case-reflexive expressions. Henceforth, I shall use 'expression' to mean *case of an expression type*—unless I explicitly say otherwise. An expression is an utterance, or a part thereof; indexicals and demonstratives are "case-reflexive" expressions in that reference is ascribed to token expressions, and the referring cases themselves play a crucial role in the determination of their referents. The referent of a token of 'I' is determined as an entity related in a certain way to that very case: the token itself is in-

<sup>20</sup> On *ideal* languages, at least; he seems to have been aware that the idealization does not apply to naturally existing languages, as I shall indicate later.

<sup>21</sup> *Elements of Symbolic Logic* (New York: Free Press, 1947), §50.

<sup>22</sup> 'Token' connotes *enduring individual* more than 'case', or so I feel. This is why I prefer the latter: expressions should be event like, not thing like. For details, see my "Indexicals as Token-Reflexives," *Mind*, CVII (1998): 529-63.

volved, and thus “reflected” in the determination of its contribution to truth conditions.<sup>23</sup>

Although senses are provided by semantic rules associated with the types that particular cases instantiate, they—like referents—are primarily assigned to cases; the token itself to which a sense is ascribed is a constituent of that sense. This departs from some views on senses which consider them purely qualitative. So Kaplan is sharing a widespread assumption when he describes a Fregean sense as “a concept, something like a description in purely qualitative language,” the relation between senses and references being “in general, empirical: [the referent is] the individual who falls under the concept, that is, who, uniquely, has the qualities.”<sup>24</sup> In my view, however, this is not justified. The senses associated with linguistic expressions should have the following traits.<sup>25</sup> First, *predicative*: senses are property like, namely, the sort of thing which, if signified by expressions belonging to a first-order language, would be expressed by means of a predicate.<sup>26</sup> Second, *individuating*: in particular, the sense of a singular term is the sort of property that is reasonable for us to expect to fit one and only one entity. Third, *cognitively accessible* and *intersubjective*: they are the sort of property

<sup>23</sup> Notoriously, Kaplan in “Demonstratives,” §10, has rejected Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality. He offers several considerations in favor of taking propositional expressions to be what he calls *sentences-in-context*, instead of sentence cases; the main reason has to do with alleged difficulties in constructing a “logic of indexicality” if the Reichenbachian approach is adopted. I have argued elsewhere (see my “Indexicals as Token-Reflexives”) that this and related misgivings are ill-founded, and also that a proper account of demonstratives like ‘he’ or ‘that’ (as opposed to “pure indexicals” like ‘I’ or ‘now’) requires theories essentially along the lines of the token-reflexive approach. I refer the reader to this work for further details. My immediate source for this approach are the more recent papers in Perry, *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford, 1993).

<sup>24</sup> “Demonstratives,” p. 485.

<sup>25</sup> I use ‘concept’ intending to include ingredients of those contents which a tradition initiated by Evans counts as “nonconceptual,” like the contents of perceptual experiences or episodic memories; in my usage, ‘concept’ applies for instance to the “manners” contemplated by Christopher Peacocke—“Perceptual Content,” in Almog, Perry, and Wettstein, eds., pp. 297-329. This is just a terminological decision, which does not imply any position on the recent debate in which John McDowell has confronted that tradition. On most substantive matters my views are, in fact, closer to the Evans-Peacocke line.

<sup>26</sup> I assume that formalization is not arbitrary, but captures semantic features of the formalized expressions. A *logical category* is an abstract syntactic property of an expression, partly constituted by the way the expression behaves in some inference patterns. For instance, *being a propositional sign* is a logical category; to say that an expression has it is to say that is the sort of expression that, among other things, can be combined by means of the sign expressing conjunction with other expressions with that same property, so that the inference pattern usually called *conjunction elimination* is valid.

that ordinary speakers readily know, know to be associated with given expressions, expect other ordinary speakers to know them to be so associated, and so on: the sort of property whose association with an expression is *mutually known*. Although the genome of a given individual, or his fingerprints, are predicative and can be reasonably taken to fit just one entity, they are not senses of the sort of singular term I am considering: ordinary speakers do not possess concepts of them (let alone know them to be associated with indexicals and demonstratives), as part of the linguistic knowledge they have and expect their fellow speakers to share.

The linguistic senses that the Reichenbachian view ascribes to cases of indexicals have these features; they are not, however, “purely qualitative,” since a linguistic characterization expressing them would include a singular term referring to the case itself. This may seem to be objectionable on at least three counts, which I shall take up in turn in the following paragraphs.

The first objection questions a certain circularity in the proposal. It is arguable that any such linguistic characterization of a token-reflexive sense will make reference to the token by means of an indexical, if it attempts a faithful explication of the user’s tacit grasp of that sense. This should not worry us, however; the project is to account for the semantics of indexicals, not to show that signifying by means of them is ultimately achieved by nonindexical means. In all probability, signifying by means of indexical signs is a primitive phenomenon, not definitionally reducible to anything else. It would still be explanatory to show that reference to the sort of entities ordinary referred to by means of the indexical expressions we find in natural language (reference to Venus by means of ‘that heavenly body’, say) is achieved in part by means of an implicit form of reference, also indexical, to entities, such as cases of expressions, more readily available to language users.

A second objection points out that expression cases are still the sort of entity on which we could have different cognitive fixes. The worry is that the kind of senses I am considering, in being individuated by means of entities that can be presented to us under different guises, are still too coarse grained for the theoretical purposes to which senses are put: capturing the cognitive significance of utterances. This objection has a point; but it does not refute my proposal, because the point it has concerns the psychologically adequate individuation of the thoughts of language users, not the aspects of those thoughts which are linguistically conveyed. To characterize fully the mental state of someone who uses an indexical, so as to explain correctly and predict his behavior and behavioral dispositions, the token indexical is

indeed too coarse grained, as the objector points out.<sup>27</sup> To that end, I would also need to consider the speaker's cognitive perspective on the token, the appearance that the token presents to him.

Even granting the point does not by itself entail, however, that the token is not sufficient to individuate the linguistically relevant features of the case. In this broadly Gricean theoretical setting, which aspects of the fully-fledged thoughts of a speaker are to be associated with his utterances depends on the communicative intentions conventionally associated with those utterances, given the types they instantiate. Now, the core Fregean claim I advanced in the previous section is that the mere association of a singular term (an indexical in the present context) with its referent will not, in general, be sufficient to characterize the semantic content of an utterance; the term's cognitive significance is also required. The present suggestion is that, for purposes of individuating this semantic content, no more fine-grained characterization of the expression case is needed.

To drive the point home, consider how the token-reflexive approach handles Loar's example quoted in the preceding section. The example illustrates, first, a point to which I shall return in the next section, namely, that the modes of presentation associated with parts of utterances are not always given only by semantic rules: contextual information also contributes sometimes to their determination. Thus, Smith intends the visual information available on the screen to be part of the relevant mode of presentation, while Jones instead takes information from the previous conversation to be an intended piece of information. My present concern, however, is whether, in addition to the "purely qualitative" linguistic and extralinguistic aspects, something more fine grained than the token (namely, a cognitive perspective on it) is required to characterize the content of the speaker's communicative intentions. I think the answer should be negative.

Let us suppose that the token-reflexive rule conventionally associated with 'he' goes like this: the referent of a token *u* of 'he' is the male most salient when *u* is produced. Smith clearly (and unsuccessfully) intends Jones to identify the referent to whom he attributes a certain property on the basis, first, of several "purely qualitative" aspects: the information linguistically conveyed by the

<sup>27</sup> See the discussion of this point in Perry's "Individuals in Information and Intentional Content," essay 13 of *The Problem of the Indexical*. In my own view, a more fine-grained characterization would still be token reflexive, this time involving a token experience of the speaker.

use of 'he' that the referent is a salient male, together with the information about his current visible features available from the extralinguistic context; and second, on the basis of the token of 'he' he has produced, essential to fixing the relevant piece of visual information. To provide an accurate description of the situation, it seems enough to say that the speaker trusts his audience (i) to identify the particular token he has produced; (ii) to interpret it according to the token-reflexive rule associated with the type, as referring to a male who is contextually salient when the token is produced; and (iii) to find out some contextually available information (the facial features on the screen) which determines further the guiding determinable *most salient when the token u is produced*.

A third objection to considering tokens as individuating the purely linguistic determinants of senses comes down to the intuition that properly linguistic entities are repeatables—universals. But this is—as far as I can see—mere dogma. What else but a linguistic entity is a token utterance, successfully produced in agreement with extant conventions, and contributing by its very success to sustaining them? What else but specifically linguistic knowledge is required to produce it knowledgeably and to grasp it perceptually? The fact that linguistic entities are rule governed does not preclude that they involve particulars. This is so for expressions signifying in a rule-governed manner, as what C. S. Peirce called "indexes"; that is, relative to some of their "existential properties"—properties they have qua particular existents: their spatiotemporal location, their causes and effects, and so on.

The most persuasive objections to Fregean views proceed as follows. It is first pointed out that in many uses of singular-referring expressions, a singular reference is secured even if the purely qualitative information about the referent which speakers have hardly amounts to an individual concept (compare Kripke's "Feynman" example). Second, it is shown that, even when there is an individuating purely qualitative concept, we can imagine that the circumstances are such that the term's referent is not the one satisfying the concept (compare Kripke's "Gödel" example, or Hilary Putnam's<sup>28</sup> Twin Earth cases). A convincing elaboration of this is the following. Suppose that singular terms were conventionally attached to reasonably individuating, purely qualitative senses, like fingerprints or genomes for terms intending to refer to people. It is nonetheless

<sup>28</sup> "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in *Philosophical Papers*, Volume II (New York: Cambridge, 1975), pp. 215-71.

at least conceivable that fantastic duplications occur: somewhere in a planet spatiotemporally far away, someone has the same fingerprints, or genome, as the individual to whom we want to refer. Hence, if singular reference were mediated by purely qualitative senses, we should feel its success to be at the mercy of the nonoccurrence of such circumstances. But we do not feel any such threat, and not just because the envisaged possibilities are fanciful: we feel firmly that, ir-  
 respectively of qualitative duplicates, most of our uses of indexicals and proper names secure a determinate reference.

Considerations like this suggest that singular reference is not mediated by purely qualitative senses. This, however, is compatible not only with the thesis that singular reference is not mediated by senses at all, but also with the thesis that it is mediated by senses essentially involving particulars—like the token-reflexive senses contemplated in the Reichenbachian account of indexicals. Both in “On Sense and Reference” (particularly in the second footnote) and in the discussion of the “Dr. Lauben” example in “The Thought,” Frege<sup>29</sup> contends that senses are contextually ascribed only to singular terms; it is not the expression type, but it “together with the concrete circumstances” of use which express a sense.<sup>30</sup> The arguments for direct reference just rehearsed lose their persuasive potential when we think of expressions as tokens, allowing senses to be enriched with contextually gathered information, including perceived particulars like the tokens themselves.

#### II. A VARIATION ON RUSSELL'S PRINCIPLE

Loar's example makes it clear that in some cases, the purely linguistic sense associated with a given indexical is intended to be supplemented with information contextually associated only with the token (perceptually or otherwise). Pure knowledge of language allows speakers to associate with a token *u* of 'he' the individual concept *male most salient when u is produced*; however, fully grasping the communicative intentions of the speaker requires his audience to share with him more specific determinations of the determinable *salient*. Similarly, pronominal uses of demonstratives like 'this' or 'that' require obtaining from the extralinguistic context sortal information

<sup>29</sup> “On Sense and Reference,” in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, P. T. Geach and Max Black, eds. (New York: Oxford, 1967), pp. 56-78.

<sup>30</sup> This point has been emphasized by Tyler Burge in “Sinning against Frege,” *Philosophical Review*, LXXXVIII (1979): 398-432; and by Wolfgang Kühne in “Hybrid Proper Names,” *Mind*, CI (1992): 721-31. Frege indicates that such contextual dependence is only a feature of natural languages; in a more ideal language, senses would be conventionally correlated with expression types. This indeed suggests a penchant for the purely qualitative senses of traditional interpretations.

about the referent. None of this is incompatible with an enlightened Fregean picture. Now, some writers have advanced claims that are, in my view, speculative generalizations of the point just indicated. Although they are not incompatible with the view I am defending, I do not think these claims have been sufficiently substantiated; but there is something very important for present purposes we can learn from them.

Consider the following example by John Perry<sup>31</sup>: “Ellsworth goes to Hawaii and sends me a postcard. Unfortunately, it gets a bit wet before I receive it. The postmark, return address, and signature are all illegible. The message stays dry: ‘I am having a good time now’” (*ibid.*, p. 237). Perry claims that the addressee, by being a competent English speaker, can grasp a Russellian proposition with the utterance as the only singular ingredient: the proposition that would be asserted by “the producer of that token of ‘I’ was having a good time at the time he produced the utterance” (*ibid.*). He contends, however, that the addressee would not thereby grasp the Russellian proposition, with Ellsworth as a constituent, which is ordinarily expressed by an utterance like the one we are considering. The reason is that he does not know who the referent of that case of ‘I’ is; knowing of the referent that he is the producer of that case of ‘I’ is not sufficient for knowing who he is.

Elaborating what seems to be the same intuition, Frank Jackson<sup>32</sup> writes as follows: “Suppose I hear someone say ‘He has a beard’. I will understand what is being said without necessarily knowing the conditions under which what is said is true, because I may not know who is being spoken of. That is, I may not know which proposition is being expressed. ...if I don’t know whether it is Jackson, Jones, or someone else altogether, I don’t know which proposition is expressed in the sense of not knowing the conditions under which what is said is true” (*ibid.*, p. 73). In the same vein, Evans states a Russell’s principle requiring that, in order to refer properly with a singular term (indexical or proper name) or to understand one, one must know who or what the referent is. This, by itself, does not entail the contentions by Perry and Jackson, because the linguistic mode of presentation might be regarded sufficient for the required “knowing who or what”; but Evans’s applications of the principle sug-

<sup>31</sup> *The Problem of the Indexical and Other Essays.*

<sup>32</sup> *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (New York: Oxford, 1998).

gest that he interprets it in a way congenial to them.<sup>33</sup> These writers thus appear to be assuming the following as a constitutive general principle governing the genuine referential use of the expressions we have been considering:

*RP*: To grasp the singular proposition expressed by an utterance of 'I', 'he', and other indexicals, it is not sufficient to think of the intended referent on the basis of the purely linguistic mode of presentation given by linguistic knowledge alone—that he or she is the producer of the expression, and so on; for identificatory purposes, it is necessary to combine it with some other mode of presentation individuating by itself.

It is certainly the case that indexicals referring to material objects are usually produced under the assumption that the purely linguistic information about the referents associated with them will be supplemented with more information contextually available, typically perceptual and/or memory based, usually individuating by itself. Utterances and their parts are rather dull happenings, usually forgotten shortly after having occurred. Merely knowing the referent of an expression as its producer is cognitively of only transient help. Knowing also how he looks at the moment of the utterance, how he is called, the particular timbre of his voice, or the quality of his handwriting is of greater help. This will make it easier for the audience inferentially to link the content of the utterance with information that he may already have, or gather in the future, about the same individual; this is why speakers usually expect their audiences to obtain these more interesting pieces of information from the extralinguistic circumstances. In Perry's example, full communication has been hindered. Ellsworth took for granted that his audience would put together, as applying to one and the same individual, the information that such an individual is called 'Ellsworth', that he is someone interested enough in Perry to send him a postcard from Hawaii, and that he is the producer of the relevant case of 'I'. Because this presumption of Ellsworth's has proven wrong, we can conclude that his communicative intentions have not been grasped in their full extent by his audience.

<sup>33</sup> "There is a characteristic almost all [uses of referring expressions] share.... The characteristic is this: in order to understand an utterance containing a referring expression used in this way, the hearer must link up the utterance with some information in his possession"—Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (New York: Oxford, 1982), p. 305. The exceptions he seems to be contemplating are some informationally rarefied uses of 'here' and 'I', for which he is prepared to weaken Russell's Principle to, in effect, the merely potential link-up which our principle of reference (see below) embodies.

Yet it is one thing that Ellsworth's communicative intentions (or those of the speaker in Jackson's analogous example) have been partly thwarted, and another that nobody in a cognitive situation like that of Ellsworth's audience (that of someone who has not supplemented the purely linguistic information in the ways suggested) could grasp the relevant singular proposition. It is the latter that RP requires. Is there an argument in support of it? S. E. Boër and William Lycan<sup>34</sup> offer a persuasive account of *knowing who*, according to which this is essentially a matter of knowing "important predicates": it is a matter of knowing identifying properties of the object in question which are important for contextually salient purposes. Perry's claim that he does not know who sent the postcard is quite correct, according to this analysis; for he has not been able to grasp "predicates" which are important in the context and which the speaker intended him to grasp. But the contextual dependence of the requirements for knowing who, on which Boër and Lycan rightly insist, prevents us from deriving the general lesson that Evans, Jackson, and Perry extract. On the contrary, such context dependence gives us a reason to doubt the correctness of any such general claim as RP.

A competent English speaker who encounters an event consisting in the instantiation of an English sentence containing a case of 'I' will justifiably believe the event to have a unique producer; if the event is indeed an utterance, this justified belief will be true and constitute knowledge. This will give him sortal information specific enough to trace the entity in time and inform him of a property that the entity satisfies uniquely among all others. Moreover, the property (*being the producer of the utterance*) is readily usable by anyone cognitively like us to obtain further information about that same entity (*the producer's face looks like this*); and as we have seen, it is intended to be so used in some cases to obtain additional, uniquely identifying information more useful in ordinary contexts for the purpose of storing the information for further use. This is the grain of truth in Perry's and Evans's views. We can think of contexts, however, where a singular proposition has been intuitively expressed and grasped, although the only individuating information about the referent actually intended and grasped is the one provided by pure linguistic knowledge. Imagine a disguised politician giving privileged information to a journalist, and using at some point the first person in such a way that the linguistic information thus provided does not offer

<sup>34</sup> *Knowing Who* (Cambridge: MIT, 1986).

any individual concept of the speaker additional to the token-reflexive one ('I was in that meeting'). The journalist may not even be able to locate the man; perhaps he has given him a video recording or a letter. The journalist, it seems to me, has grasped a singular proposition about the politician; for we would confidently ascribe him *de re* intentions, surmises, and other attitudes about the politician. If we turn from indexicals referring to people to indexicals referring to times, places, animals, or objects, situations where the only plausibly individuating concept intended is the one furnished by the token indexical are much more frequent. I conclude that we should remain skeptical about RP.<sup>35</sup>

The grain of truth we have found in Perry's, Jackson's, and Evans's views is nonetheless interesting. Fregeans insist that reference to external entities like planets or other people is not just a matter of "being there," that is, of being causally connected with them. It is rather a genuinely cognitive achievement, involving essentially the possession of some knowledge or cognitive perspective on them. Fregeans emphasize that acknowledging this is required to account for those of our practices in the context of which representing and referring takes place; this is the point which Loar's example ultimately intends to convey. The grain of truth in Perry's, Jackson's, and Evans's views on genuine singular terms is a weaker constitutive principle on reference, which I shall present by means of a useful metaphor introduced by Grice<sup>36</sup>: "Let us say that *X* has a dossier for a definite description  $\delta$  if there is a set of definite descriptions which include  $\delta$ , all the members of which *X* supposes...to be satisfied by one and the same item" (*ibid.*, p. 141).

In using indexicals, we expect our audiences to use a description expressing the purely linguistic token-reflexive information associated with them to "open" and thus share with us a cognitive dossier for it (or to add to an already existing one, resulting from an ongoing conversation or more protracted exchanges) constituted by "im-

<sup>35</sup> Evans appears to have felt that his defense of Russell's principle was not very strong. He also perceived that the kind of considerations advanced in the text were going to be the ones used against his view. (See section 11.5, pp. 398-404, where the analogous case of proper names is discussed, and the other sections of the book referred there.) He claimed that the fact that we attribute *de re* attitudes to people in the epistemically meager circumstances of the journalist is not, in and of itself, sufficient to make the case. This is surely correct. A philosophically more fully satisfactory discussion would require an examination of the metaphysics and epistemology of what I shall be calling 'acquaintance' than I am in a position to provide.

<sup>36</sup> "Vacuous Names," in Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka, eds., *Words and Objections* (Boston: Reidel, 1969), pp. 118-45.

portant predicates" presumed collectively to individuate one and the same particular. As Grice puts it, "the speaker intends the audience to think (*via* the recognition that he is so intended) (a) that the speaker has a dossier for the definite description  $\delta$  which he has used, and (b) that the speaker has selected  $\delta$  from this dossier at least partly in the hope that the hearer has a dossier for  $\delta$  which 'overlaps' the speaker's dossier for  $\delta$  (that is, shares a substantial, or in some way specially favored, subset with the speaker's dossier)" (*ibid.*, pp. 141-42).

It is characteristic of this practice that it does not impose any a priori restriction, derived from our present knowledge or cognitive capabilities, on which "important predicates" may later get to be included in the dossier associated with a given indexical, so long as it is reasonable to think that they specify information coming from the very same particular individuated by the token-reflexive purely linguistic information. Take the above exchange between the politician and the journalist. The latter is given the alleged information that the producer of a certain token of 'I' was in the meeting. Now, the following possibility is part of our practice of conventionally using indexicals: that by linking up with *the producer of that token* any other mode of presentation *P* of an individual obtained later (that is, by adding *P* to the dossier), the journalist might come to confirm the information that the politician attended the meeting, or to reject it as a piece of misinformation. Moreover, there does not seem to be any restriction on the nature of *P* derived from what the journalist knew at the beginning, or was able to come to know, about how a person may be identified. *P* may involve uniquely individuating scientific information about who wrote a letter, regarding which we do not have at present a correct theoretical understanding. This is the reason why the best explication of our practices seems to be that the truth-conditional import of a token *u* of 'I' is the producer of *u*, that is, whoever *caused u*.<sup>37</sup>

The grain of truth in the intuitions of Evans, Jackson, and Perry thus appears to be a more modest principle, which I shall call the *principle of reference (PR)*; for I think that it signals a constitutive feature of genuine referential expressions.

<sup>37</sup> Similar considerations could be used to support Putnam's and Kripke's views on the reference of natural-kind terms, on the basis of our representational practices involving those terms and the larger context in which they operate. I take this to be the main point in chapter 5 of Richard W. Miller, *Moral Differences* (Princeton: University Press, 1992), where it is also applied to terms of moral appraisal. I have benefitted from the views presented there to formulate the suggestions advanced in the previous few paragraphs.

*PR*: utterances, including indexicals, express singular propositions in that: (i) an intended referent is presented relative to a purely linguistic token-reflexive mode of presentation given by linguistic knowledge alone, on the assumption that (ii) this linguistic mode of presentation will be contextually supplemented with other senses, or at least could be so supplemented with senses acquired later, so that (iii) this actual or potential supplementation is relevant to evaluating the correctness (truth or falsity, satisfaction or lack thereof, and so on) of the utterance.

By 'supplementation' nothing fancier is intended here than the logical operation of predicate conjunction ("adding to the dossier"). Suppose that the purely linguistic token-reflexive sense of singular term, as it occurs in utterance  $\sigma(\tau)$ , is *whoever/whatever is F*, and *G* expresses that "supplementation" mentioned in *PR*; then the truth-conditional import of  $\tau$  in  $\sigma(\tau)$  is to be determined as *whoever/whatever is F and G*.

### III. SENSES AS INGREDIENTS OF PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ACQUAINTANCE

According to Fregean views, propositional contents consist of two conceptually separable ingredients—which I shall call, respectively, a *state of affairs* and a *mode of presentation*. I shall now provide reasons for conceptualizing the modes of presentation contributed by indexicals as ingredients of presuppositions of the utterance, rather than as ingredients of the state of affairs.

Theorists of direct reference characterize the contribution of (an instance of) 'he' to the truth conditions *asserted* or *meant* by means of an utterance of 'He is rich' as an individual which is a component of a "singular Russellian proposition," represented as the pair <Victor Sin, richness>; it encapsulates the possible-world truth conditions of the utterance (which could also be represented, in a more coarse-grained way, simply as a set of the relevant possible worlds). My proposal agrees in part with this, for reasons implicit in the preceding considerations which I shall develop presently; according to it, any correct semantic account of such utterances should have a place for something like a Russellian proposition, the contribution to which of an indexical like 'he' should be abstracted away from the way that entity is presented. I prefer to call this entity by names other than 'Russellian proposition'; I shall instead use 'condition' and 'state of affairs' as stylistic variants. The reason is that there is an additional element semantically associated with an indexical, over and above its contribution to the signified state of affairs, the one I am about to conceptualize as constituting a presupposition. This presuppositional element contributes to the individuation of something much closer to what has been usually understood as a proposition: an object of

mental states such as belief; that which gets communicated in some successful speech acts. I take structured states of affairs and their constituents to belong to the realm of reference; they are the Fregean significations of utterances.<sup>38</sup> This is one more respect in which I do not follow Frege. There are good reasons for considering fallacious the standard argument<sup>39</sup> for Frege's own view that truth values are the referents of propositional expressions, of which Gödel, Alonzo Church, and W. V. Quine have offered more elaborated versions.

According to the proposal I have been anticipating, the senses of singular terms constitute presuppositions associated with them. Intuitively, a *presupposition* is a proposition that is "taken for granted" when an assertoric utterance is made and not (primarily) asserted. Thus, an utterance of 'It was Victor who made *a* cake' presupposes the proposition *that someone made a cake*, but the condition asserted to obtain by the utterance is the same one that would have been asserted by simply uttering 'Victor made a cake'.<sup>40</sup> An utterance of 'Victor made a cake again today' presupposes that some other act of cake making by Victor has occurred, and asserts the same as 'Victor made a cake today, and that has happened before'. Antecedently to any detailed theoretical treatment, presuppositions are identified by two criteria. First, the presuppositions associated with utterances of a sentence are "inherited" when it occurs embedded in linguistic contexts in which what utterances of it assert is not inherited. Thus, if the previous sentences are negated (or are constituents of some conditionals, conjunctions, and other complex utterances), the resulting utterances still take the same for granted, but they do not assert the same condition any more: compare 'It was not Victor who made a cake', 'It might have been Victor who made a cake', and 'If it

<sup>38</sup> Given the conceptualization of senses as semantic presuppositions, the present view agrees further with new theorists of reference in that, according to it, it makes perfectly good sense to describe states of affairs as *what is asserted* or *meant* by utterances; the same cannot be said about what Frege took to be the references of sentence-like expressions.

<sup>39</sup> This well-known argument (called "the slingshot" by Jon Barwise and Perry) assumes that propositional expressions have reference, and also that their reference does not change either under replacement of logically equivalent parts or of coreferential singular terms. A crucial problem with the argument lies in its presumption that definite descriptions are singular terms, instead of being quantificational expressions. See my and Pérez's "Davidson, Correspondence Truth, and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument," *History and Philosophy of Logic*, XIX (1998): 63-81.

<sup>40</sup> Because the proposition that Victor made a cake entails that someone made a cake, in a sense the utterance also asserts what it presupposes—but not primarily.

was Victor who made a cake, we will have a great meal'. Second, in certain linguistic embeddings, presuppositions can be "cancelled" or suppressed; for instance, the utterance of 'It was Victor who made it' in 'If someone made a cake, it was Victor who made it' does not presuppose any longer that someone made a cake.<sup>41</sup>

Several theoretical accounts of this phenomenon have been suggested by Frege, P. F. Strawson, and others. The theory I rely upon here is the one provided by Stalnaker.<sup>42</sup> Presuppositions thus explicated are sometimes called *pragmatic presuppositions*. The qualifier 'pragmatic' may misleadingly suggest that presuppositions are in this account "pragmatic" in the sense in which conversational implicatures are, that is, that they are nonconventional meanings. Under that suggestion, there would be no point in appealing to presuppositions to defend the core Fregean view. Fortunately for my purposes, however, whether presuppositions in Stalnaker's account are or are not conventional in the required sense depends on the case.

Consider Grice's famous account of speaker meaning. The account makes it a "pragmatic" phenomenon on three counts. First, it characterizes speaker meaning as, constitutively, a form of rational behavior, locating it as a species of the genus *action*. Second, it does not take the recourse to conventional means to be constitutive of the phenomenon: some acts of speaker meaning can occur without the use of conventional means to perform them. Third, it does not presume the phenomenon to involve just truth conditions: there are, according to it, features of speaker meaning (illocutionary force, for instance) distinct from truth conditions. Not, of course, in that acts of speaker meaning might occur with force but without signified truth conditions; only in that two acts of speaker meaning might differ, even though the same truth conditions are involved in both. Stalnaker's account of presuppositions is "pragmatic" on the very same three counts. Of course, it is compatible with Grice's account that some acts of speaker meaning can be performed only conventionally; similarly, it is compatible with Stalnaker's account that some presuppositions involve conventional means.

<sup>41</sup> For a useful introduction to contemporary discussions of the phenomenon, see Scott Soames, "Presupposition," in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther, eds., *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, Volume IV: *Topics in the Philosophy of Language* (Boston: Reidel, 1989), pp. 553-616.

<sup>42</sup> "Presuppositions," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, II (1973): 447-57; "Pragmatic Presuppositions," in Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger, eds., *Semantics and Philosophy* (New York: University Press, 1974); "Assertion," in Peter Cole, ed., *Pragmatics: Syntax and Semantics* 9 (New York: Academic, 1978), pp. 315-32.

As already indicated, the pragmatics-semantics distinction is, for the goal of defending the Fregean core, the distinction between meaning features which are, and those which are not, individuating of natural languages. The presuppositions in which I am interested are *semantic* in this sense, even if, somehow confusingly, we take the phenomenon of presupposition to be explained by a *pragmatic* account. The semantics-pragmatics distinction assumed here cuts across other ways of tracing it. Some call 'pragmatic' any meaning phenomenon exhibiting context dependence; but I have already indicated that I take the association of a certain token expression with a token-including description that fixes its reference to be perfectly semantic in my sense. Some call 'pragmatic' any meaning feature of an expression that is not a truth-conditional import of it; I have already granted to new theorists of reference that the senses of indexicals (and proper names) are, in my view, pragmatic according to this usage.<sup>43</sup>

Stalnaker's account of presuppositions may be summarily presented in the following way. Acts of meaning take place with respect to a "conversational context" of propositions that speakers and their audience assume, believe that the others assume, believe that the others believe that they assume, and so on. We can say that an utterance *u* presupposes a proposition *p* if it is reasonable to infer from *u* that the speaker takes *p* to belong to the conversational context.<sup>44</sup> As indicated, the sketched account places the phenomenon in the context of the representational activities of rational beings; it avoids making a constitutive feature of presuppositions the use of conventional means, and it does not characterize them as constitutively affecting truth conditions. The account thus contrasts with the Strawsonian view that a presupposition of an utterance is a proposition the truth of which is required for the utterance to have a truth value, or to signify a state of affairs. But Stalnaker's account is compatible with the existence of conventional Strawsonian presuppositions. Among the presuppositions of an utterance, there may be both propositions believed as part of purely linguistic knowledge conventionally associated

<sup>43</sup> It is not just that the suggested way of tracing the pragmatics-semantics distinction is the proper one in this context; I think that it is a more accurate way than the other two of cutting at their natural junctures the phenomena in which students of natural languages are interested.

<sup>44</sup> An adequate explication should take into consideration what Lewis—"Score-keeping in a Language Game," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, VIII (1979): 339-59—calls *accommodation* (uttering a sentence normally carrying a given presupposition in a context where it does not belong to the conversational record, expecting the audience to modify the record by including that proposition) and related derivative phenomena.

with the sentence it instantiates, as well as many other pieces of non-linguistic information. Presupposition in the former class (to which our two previous examples belong) will be called *semantic*. Propositions stating the conventional semantic significance of the expressions are reasonably counted as such semantic presuppositions. The presuppositions I shall be discussing are of this general kind; more specifically, they are Strawsonian propositions stating the conventional truth-conditional import of some expressions.

Senses are not propositions but individuating properties, while according to this account it is propositions that are presupposed. I have been suggesting that senses are ingredients of presuppositions; now I shall characterize the presuppositions of which senses are ingredients. Consider, first, a case which is related, but which we ought to distinguish from the one in which I am interested: that of definite descriptions, in what I take to be their literal *attributive* use. I think we should adopt the Frege-Strawson line regarding them, according to which present utterances of both 'The present King of France is bald' and 'The present King of France is not bald' embody a false presupposition. With respect to contexts whose participants do not assume it (and are not prepared to accommodate it), such utterances fail to signify a state of affairs. A state of affairs is here assumed to "restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no":<sup>45</sup> with respect to every possible world in the relevant (in fact, presupposed) class, the state of affairs either obtains or does not obtain, *tertium non datur*. Needless to say, this does not mean that the utterance is absolutely meaningless. It has been put together by combining potentially meaningful expressions by means of meaningful ways of combination; we can easily think of contexts relative to which it would signify a state of affairs. Roughly put, in sum, utterances of sentences including a definite description *the*  $\Phi$  presuppose the proposition *that there is a unique*  $\Phi$ .

Let us assume now that  $\psi$  expresses a property appropriate to be the sense of an indexical  $\tau$ . Talk of senses as ingredients of presuppositions may have suggested that in the indexical case, the presupposition is also *that there is a unique*  $\psi$ . This is not the view, however, for it would entail that singular terms are synonymous with descriptions capturing their senses, literally (that is, attributively) used. It would then contradict the intuitions exhumed by new theorists of reference, which I share. What we have to do is to explain from a

<sup>45</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, trans. (New York: Humanities, 1961), section 4.023.

Fregean perspective why, as contended by new theorists of reference, the truth-conditional import of a singular term is a particular object. Descriptions provide a useful model, but we ought to consider instead descriptions used referentially. There is a disanalogy that we can put aside for our illustrative purposes: the descriptions associated with genuine singular terms behave referentially as a matter of linguistic convention, while in contrast referential uses of descriptions are nonliteral.

Let us consider a clear case of referential use of a definite description. Imagine that the speaker says 'The author of the *Tractatus* met with Russell in Holland after his release from Cassino', in a context where it is manifest to everybody that he uses the description as a stylistic alternative to the already much used 'Wittgenstein'. Here, the speaker uses 'the author of the *Tractatus*' as a singular term, and not as a description.<sup>46</sup> The principle PR advanced in the previous section captures, in the spirit of a Fregean outlook, what is constitutively involved in an expression's being used as a singular term. The speaker assumes in such a case that he shares with his audience not merely the belief that there is a unique author of the *Tractatus*. We can identify what he assumes by resorting again to the dossier metaphor introduced by Grice. He assumes that he and his audience share a cognitive dossier for the description *the author of the Tractatus*; that either additional uniquely individuating information contextually available will be straightforwardly linked up with *author of the Tractatus* in it, or that such an information can be added to it later; and, finally, that it is the full dossier, so completed, that is relevant to evaluate the correctness or otherwise of his utterance. All this adds up to the semantic point that it is the individual believed to be in fact determined by that dossier *itself* which individuates the asserted state of affairs. For it is the individual itself which, by being assumed to be a potential

<sup>46</sup> As I have suggested, this is in my view only a matter of speaker meaning and not a matter of the semantic meaning of the expression he uses. This is a notoriously controversial issue. The view that I hold—which, despite attributing a semantic descriptive content to genuine singular terms has it nonetheless that there is a semantic distinction between descriptions and singular terms—has been recently challenged by Stephen Schiffer, "Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (But Not the Ones You Expect)," *Mind*, CIV (1995): 107-31, and Anne Bezuidenhout, "Pragmatics, Semantic Underdetermination and the Referential/Attributive Distinction," *Mind*, CVI (1997): 375-409. Bezuidenhout argues that indexicals, like definite descriptions, have attributive uses as a semantic matter; Schiffer argues in contrast that descriptions, like indexicals, have referential uses as a semantic matter. I defend the asymmetry in a related piece, "The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals," in which I argue that Schiffer and Bezuidenhout both rely on semantically irrelevant psychological data.

source of individuating information to be included in the dossier, controls the evaluation of the utterance as true or otherwise.

There is thus a crucial difference between *describing* and *referring*, which the original appeal to presuppositions by Frege and Strawson did not capture. When we use the description *the  $\phi$*  literally, we presuppose the existence and uniqueness of a  $\phi$ ; but the truth-conditional contribution of the term involves the property  $\phi$  itself.<sup>47</sup> When we use a singular term associated with the description *the  $\phi$* , we take ourselves to be related (“acquainted”) with an individual by having a dossier for *the  $\phi$*  which as a matter of fact picks it out, and the truth-conditional contribution of the term is this individual itself. Much as I disagree with other points in it, I should forthrightly acknowledge that this was clearly seen in Keith Donnellan’s<sup>48</sup> classic discussion of these matters. He writes: “when a definite description is used referentially, not only is there in some sense a presupposition or implication that someone or something fits the description, as there is also in the attributive use, but there is a quite different presupposition; the speaker presupposes of some *particular* someone or something that he or it fits the description” (*ibid.*, p. 288).

PR captures, I submit, the essence of these “particular” presuppositions which Donnellan mentions here, to which I shall refer as *presuppositions of acquaintance*, to acknowledge a Russellian pedigree.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> On the assumption that the presupposition is satisfied, the truth-conditional contribution can be precisely given by using formal representations in which the descriptions are restricted quantifiers, having as their scopes the formulas to which they are immediately attached.

<sup>48</sup> “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” *Philosophical Review*, LXXV (1966): 281–304. My disagreements concern two points. The first is the already mentioned one that referential uses are a matter of speaker’s meaning. The second has to do with Donnellan’s emphasis that a referentially used description *the  $\phi$*  can correctly refer to someone or something which is not  $\phi$ . Like Donnellan (and Evans, pp. 316–20), I have been insisting that reference is a matter of speakers’ intentions. But, as Kripke made clear—“Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1977), pp. 255–76—we should distinguish two kinds of intentions. There is what we might describe as the speaker’s *ultimate intention*: say, bringing the man he (understandably, but wrongly) takes to be drinking martini into the discourse. There is also what we might describe as his *ancillary intention*: say, using, as a means for the preceding end, an expression of public language in the way in which it would be commonly understood in that context by his fellow speakers. I disagree on this with Stalnaker (*op. cit.*), who invokes a presuppositional account of the distinction between describing and referring (to which the one I am providing is indebted, I should acknowledge) to defend Donnellan’s view.

<sup>49</sup> I am passing over the most important metaphysical and epistemological issues regarding acquaintance. A full treatment should study under what conditions we are justified in taking for granted that we are sufficiently *en rapport* with a given entity for it to be a proper constituent of states of affairs we can legitimately represent.

If the description ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ is attributively used, it is taken for granted that the property *author of the Tractatus* identifies an individual; but that property itself individuates the asserted state of affairs. In order to make the point, let us assume, Stalnaker’s<sup>50</sup> explication of *assertion*, according to which to assert is to restrict the set of possible worlds constituting the shared background. In an attributive utterance of ‘The author of the *Tractatus* met with Russell in Holland after his release from Cassino’, the restriction is meant to leave only possible worlds in which someone or other—possibly different individuals in different worlds—uniquely authored the *Tractatus*, and this person met with Russell in Holland after his release from Cassino.<sup>51</sup> In a referential use, on the other hand, what the speaker means is to restrict the set to those possible worlds in which the individual *in fact* satisfying the assumed dossier met with Russell in Holland after his release from Cassino.

As suggested above, this is revealed in that it is being assumed that, in addition to the information already in the description, further, otherwise unspecified and unconstrained identifying information is available which is relevant to evaluate the truthfulness of the utterance. A “particular someone or something” is presupposed to be the truth-conditional import of the term by taking for granted that there is a particular that is a potential repository of individuating properties relevant to evaluate the truthfulness of the utterance, in addition to those used to pick it out. The descriptive material used is a convenient handle on this entity; but it is the entity itself which individuates the asserted state of affairs, under the presumption that the descriptive material puts us *en rapport* with it.

This is why—put in terms germane to a Fregean perspective—the proposition meant by the speaker in using the singular term  $\tau$  semantically associated with the individuating property  $D(\tau)$  is singular. We manifest our intention for the individual itself to be the semantic value of the term in the otherwise unconstrained variety of individuating properties that we are prepared to “add to” the dossier for *the*  $D(\tau)$ , that is, to take to be relevant to the evaluation of the speech act as true or false by linking them up with  $D(\tau)$ . A further consequence of this is that the intended state of affairs could have been signified by identifying the individual in many different ways; the speaker has

<sup>50</sup> “Assertion.”

<sup>51</sup> The point can, of course, be also made in the framework of a counterpart-theoretic treatment of identity across possible worlds; in this case, we would say instead “someone or other—perhaps even individuals who are not counterparts of each other...”

resort to the contextually most convenient one. As Donnellan also puts it, “the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job—calling attention to a person or thing—and in general any other device for doing the same job, another description or name, would do as well” (*op. cit.*, p. 285).

Of course, it might happen that someone utters in an entirely literal, attributive way ‘The shortest basketball player in the National Basketball Association is taller than me’, and the truthfulness of his utterance is confirmed afterward by linking up the property *being the shortest NBA basketball player* with other individuating properties discovered later. But this is not a linguistically constitutive aspect of those uses, as can be seen by reflecting upon the fact that there are many attributive uses for which such a thing is out of the question. A point made by Evans<sup>52</sup> on behalf of a partially Russellian treatment of literal uses of descriptions is relevant here, namely, that descriptions appear as a matter of course, in logical form, under the scope of other operators: temporal, modal, sentential, quantificational, and so on (*ibid.*, pp. 189-91). Now, consider ‘The mayor of this city has always been in the hands of speculators’, or ‘The first male Olympic winner of the one-hundred meter race in the twenty-first century might run it in less than nine seconds’, understood in such a way that the descriptions are under the scope, respectively, of the temporal and modal operator. At different points in time in the past, different persons might have held the office, the claim being that each one of them has been submissive to speculators; in different, sufficiently close possible worlds, different athletes are the first to win the one-hundred-meter Olympic race, the claim being that in a contextually close enough one, he runs in less than nine seconds. The descriptions here still carry presuppositions of existence and uniqueness, corresponding to their position in logical form: say, that for each assignment of a time to *t*, there has been one and only one mayor of this city at *t*, or that there is in a sufficiently close accessible possible world, one and only one first male Olympic winner of the one-hundred-meter race in the twenty-first century. These sen-

<sup>52</sup> “Reference and Contingency,” in his *Collected Papers* (New York: Oxford, 1985), pp. 178-213. The treatment is only partially Russellian in that it does not require the butchery of logical form imposed by the sort of formalization originally suggested by Russell. My own view favors formalizing descriptions as restricted quantifiers, as Stephen Neale proposes in his *Descriptions* (Cambridge: MIT, 1990). As Evans also noted, “recognition of the applicability of [the notion of presupposition], in cases of pure uses of definite descriptions, is...consistent with treating descriptions as quantifiers” (*op. cit.*, p. 307). (Neale, however, would reject the claim that descriptions carry presuppositions of existence and uniqueness.)

tences, however, are typically uttered without taking for granted any presupposition of acquaintance; that is, without any intimation by the utterer that he has opened cognitive dossiers for the descriptions, and expects his audience to have them, too. Rather, they are genuinely general claims, expressing general relations linking the distribution in space-time or in the logical space of the properties mentioned in the utterance.

Going back to the original case in which  $\psi$  expresses a property appropriate to be the sense of an indexical  $\tau$ , we are now finally in a position to identify the proposition that we take to be presupposed in this case. We can conveniently express it as the proposition *that there is a unique  $\psi$  to whom/which  $\tau$  refers*. The appeal to *reference* here does not make the account blatantly circular; it is merely intended to compress, relative to PR, a presupposition of acquaintance. When needed, the presupposed proposition is to be unpacked thus: that there is a unique  $\psi$  with whom/which the conversational participants are related by having a dossier for *the  $\psi$*  (contextually specified to include in addition properties such and such) individuating it.

This proposal agrees with the facts about presuppositions previously summarized. Consider an utterance of 'That car is running into a bus', and let  $\tau$  be the uttered token of 'that car'. The presupposition in that case, according to the proposal, is the proposition *that there is a car made salient by a demonstration of the speaker when he produced the instance  $\tau$  of 'that car' to which  $\tau$  refers*. It is indeed taken for granted in an utterance of 'That car is running into a bus', and would still be taken for granted in utterances of 'That car is not running into a bus', 'That car might be running into a bus', and so on.<sup>53</sup> The proposition

<sup>53</sup> It is sometimes said that it is not indexical expressions which refer, but speakers who do it; for we have to take into consideration speaker's acts of demonstration, or their intentions at least when no external acts are contextually required. But if it is the notion of *speaker's reference* introduced by Kripke (*op. cit.*) in contrast with that of *semantic reference* which is intended here, this is a mistake; and, if not, the point cuts no ice. The intentions (demonstrative or otherwise) which are relevant are those which were described in a previous footnote as *ancillary*, and Kripke describes as *general*, as opposed to the intentions which were described as *ultimate*, and by Kripke as *specific*. The speaker who (as in Kaplan's famous example) utters 'That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century' while pointing backward to a place on a wall previously occupied by a picture of Rudolf Carnap but, unbeknownst to him, now occupied by one of Spiro Agnew, has two sets of intentions which, against his reasonable assumptions, come apart. His ultimate intention is to refer to Carnap's picture. His ancillary intention is to refer to the picture made most salient by his gesture while producing the relevant token. The first determines the speaker's referent; the second, the semantic referent. We are interested only in the second, for we are only interested in theoretically characterizing the literal uses of words. This is what is intended here in attributing reference to (token) expressions.

thus passes the first intuitive test for presuppositions. It also passes the second: the candidate presupposition is suppressed, for instance, in utterances of 'If this is not virtual reality or a hallucination, that car is running into a bus', or 'I guess that this cannot be real, but, if it is, that car seems to be about to crash' (both said in the context of a suspected shared illusion). The cancelation of the presupposition involves that what is in other cases merely a constraint on the conversational record is here contributing to the asserted condition.<sup>54</sup>

For one final illustration, consider Loar's example presented in section 1. In that scenario, the proposition *that there is a unique male most salient when the token  $\tau$  of 'he' is produced, and  $\tau$  refers to him* is a semantic presupposition of Smith's utterance. By determining the determinable *most salient when  $\tau$  occurs with male on the television screen with such-and-such visual aspect* we obtain the proposition *that there is a unique male on the television screen with such-and-such visual aspect when the token  $\tau$  of 'he' is produced, and  $\tau$  refers to him*. This is instead a non-fully-conventional, pragmatic presupposition in that context,<sup>55</sup> for it involves nonlinguistic contextual information.

According to the present proposal, an utterance of 'He is a stockbroker' primarily asserts a condition identical with the Russellian proposition envisaged by theorists of direct reference. What Loar's argument shows is that a full, semantic characterization of what is linguistically going on in examples like his also requires us to associate a mode of presentation with the indexical. This mode of presentation is not part of the asserted content, but constitutes a partially semantic and partially contextual presupposition. Communication consists in many cases in the transmission of knowledge; and this involves not merely grasping the condition signified by the speaker, but grasping it *by sharing the relevant presuppositions*. Conceptualizing senses as presuppositions—semantic, or at least semantically constrained—thus provides a satisfactory gloss on the Fregean arguments rehearsed at the outset.

#### IV. HOW PRESUPPOSITIONS PROVIDE A FREGEAN ACCOUNT OF REFERENCE FIXING

Our initial concern was to provide a way to make the core Fregean claim compatible with our acceptance of the views of new theorists

<sup>54</sup> I am assuming that presuppositional material conventionally associated with a certain expression can be contributed by that expression in certain linguistic environments (or perhaps by other expressions constituting that environment) straightforwardly to the asserted state of affairs. This is controversial, but I cannot elaborate on it here. See Soames for objections to the sort of view I am holding, and for helpful discussion.

<sup>55</sup> An infelicitous one, because Smith's presumption that it is common knowledge fails.

of reference regarding the contribution of singular terms to truth conditions. If genuinely referential singular terms are not synonymous with descriptions expressing their senses, in what way do I still reserve a semantic role for those descriptions (as seems required by arguments like Loar's)? My reply has been to explain why it is that the truth-conditional import of an indexical is the object to which it refers via PR. This principle already embodies the requirement of a descriptive meaning for referential expressions, and makes clear the presuppositional role it plays.<sup>56</sup> The descriptions involved in presuppositions of acquaintance are, in most cases, partially obtained from the contexts in which linguistic exchanges take place, by reliance on nonlinguistic information, "knowledge of the world." Nevertheless, there is always a purely linguistic descriptive element, guiding or setting constraints on the obtaining of such contextual information. This is enough to contradict the claims of new theorists of reference and to account for our intuitions about examples like Loar's. A correct semantic theory cannot just correlate singular terms with referents at the "descriptive" or "semantic" level; it should additionally indicate how this correlation is linguistically guided by the conventional presuppositions carried by those terms.

This is how our proposal assigns a merely reference-fixing role to descriptions expressing the sense of a singular terms, without thereby forgoing the core Fregean claim. It has it that (and explains why) the propositional content of an utterance  $u_1$  of 'He is rich' is *not* the same as that of an utterance  $u_2$  of 'The most salient male in the context of  $u_1$  is rich'. Say that *what an utterance says* is the condition it signifies, and that *what an utterance shows* is the information it presupposes. Then the difference is that  $u_2$  *says* what  $u_1$  merely *shows*. The reason why the contention that the propositional content of  $u_1$  is the same as that of  $u_2$  would not be acceptable in this particular case is aptly articulated by Stephen Schiffer: "In any act of communication the speaker will expect numerous propositions to get conveyed to her audience, and many of these are such that the speaker would not have spoken as she did if she had thought that those propositions were either false or not going to be conveyed. But this does not show that those propositions are in any relevant sense *meant*. Meaning requires special audience-directed intentions, and we must not confusedly elevate psychological presuppositions of an act of meaning into further acts of meaning" (*op. cit.*, p. 125).

<sup>56</sup> PR thus articulates the "limited applicability of the Fregean notion of sense" mentioned by Evans (to whom the view I have advanced, as it should be clear by now, is very much indebted) in a relevant passage (*op. cit.*, pp. 315-16).

Schiffer's point also holds when the presuppositions are not merely, as he puts it, "psychological" (a characterization which would please defenders of direct reference), but genuinely *semantic*, as we are arguing they may well be in the cases discussed. The possible-world truth conditions characterizing the state of affairs asserted by an utterer of  $u_1$  are simply not those corresponding to  $u_2$ . Thus, a counterfactual circumstance where  $u_1$  occurs with Sergi as the most salient male (not Victor as in actual fact) would belong to the set determined by  $u_2$  if Sergi is rich; but whether or not it belongs to the set determined by  $u_1$  still depends on the wealth given Victor at the time. Analogously, it is only whether or not Victor is rich which is relevant to a circumstance belonging to the set of possible worlds constituting the state of affairs asserted by  $u_1$ ; it is irrelevant whether or not he is there the most salient male when  $u_1$  occurs. Notice that, as I have emphasized in the previous section, *most salient male when  $u_1$  occurs* is only used to pick out, together with the other properties in the dossier, whoever or whatever in fact satisfies it. It does not need to be an aspect of the background set of assumptions that this property is essential to that individual, and in fact it typically is not; that is, in some possible worlds compatible with the background assumptions, the property is satisfied by some individuals, and in some others by others.<sup>57</sup>

The presuppositional account acknowledges the rigidity of singular terms. Kripke says: "When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing in all possible worlds, I mean that, as used in *our* language, it stands for that thing, when *we* talk about counterfactual situations. I don't mean, of course, that there mightn't be counterfactual situations in which in the other possible world people actually spoke a different language."<sup>58</sup> The singular terms we have been contemplating are rigid in the sense Kripke puts forth. Only the entities fitting the associated senses in the actual world where the utterance takes place are relevant for determining the contribution of the expressions to the condition that *we* assert, also when we speak about other counterfactual circum-

<sup>57</sup> Kripke is reported to have said in the John Locke lectures on Reference and Existence: "One should not identify what people would have been able to say in hypothetical circumstances, if they had obtained, or what they would have said had the circumstances obtained, with what we can say of these circumstances, perhaps knowing that they do not obtain." (This reference might not accurately represent Kripke's views.) If the description *the  $\varphi$*  expresses the sense of the term *n*, then when we say that *n might not have been  $\varphi$*  we are describing a counterfactual circumstance that we know does not obtain.

<sup>58</sup> *Naming and Necessity*, p. 77. Genoveva Martí indicated to me the relevance of this characterization of *rigidity*.

stances. There are counterfactual circumstances where the same utterance expresses different conditions, but those aspects of these circumstances are irrelevant to the delimitation of the condition *we* assert. To put the point in terms germane to the presuppositional account, descriptive modes of presentation are presupposed, in the way previously explicated; and presuppositions are *inherited* in alethic modal contexts. The point belongs in a general theory of presuppositions and cannot be developed here; I have to confine myself to providing reasons specific to the cases in which I am interested (like the ones I have outlined) why the presuppositions involving the modes of presentation of singular terms are inherited in alethic modals. They are not ad hoc, however, but a particular instance of the general reasons accounting for the inheritance of presuppositions.<sup>59</sup> Singular terms working according to the account do not therefore give rise to the ambiguities common with definite descriptions that occur in subjunctive utterances. This is ultimately why the proposal precludes concluding that, if the description *the  $\varphi$*  makes explicit the sense of an expression *v*, *the  $\varphi$*  should be synonymous with *v* in that the former might substitute for the latter—we might say—*salva dicta* (that is, so that the asserted content is preserved), in every possible linguistic context.

The view we have put forward is *externalist* in that the propositional contents we have been envisaging (not just the signified conditions) can be said to be *object dependent* on two counts. First, an inhabitant of a *counterfactual* Twin Earth, using the same instances of the same expression types we do, and linking with them the same sense, might still be referring to different entities, and, therefore, signifying different conditions and expressing different propositions. Second, in any particular use of one of those expressions to which a competent speaker might fail to refer (and therefore to signify the sort of condition he purports to signify), even though he is epistemically as well justified in believing that he has indeed referred as he might be in situations where he does succeed in signifying a condition. Thus, an utterance of 'He is rich' fails to make the sort of act of meaning an utterance of this sentence ordinarily makes if the dossier for 'the most salient male when the case of "he" is produced' does not in fact individuate an

<sup>59</sup> For a partial but promising account of the reasons why presuppositions are inherited, see Soames, "How Presuppositions Are Inherited: A Solution to the Projection Problem," in Steven Davis, ed., *Pragmatics: A Reader* (New York: Oxford, 1991), pp. 428-70.

object.<sup>60</sup> This is one more difference between the act of meaning made by means of  $u_1$  and that made by means of  $u_2$ ; the former depends on an object, on which the other does not depend. (The latter is also object dependent: it depends on the existence of the utterance.) This is one more reason why such contents can be characterized in our framework as “singular propositions” and “singular truth conditions,” in the sense given to these terms by Kaplan.<sup>61</sup> The present proposal thus stands in contraposition to the Fregean internalism defended by John Searle<sup>62</sup> and to the view that Dummett (*op. cit.*) appears to be arguing for when he says in several places, that “references are not essential ingredients of meanings.”

If semantic theory ought to incorporate indexical senses at a semantic (descriptive) level and not just at a metasemantical (foundational) one, it is, first, because, as already argued, only in this way can it give a full account of the semantic properties of assertions, requests, and so on, but, second, because senses turn out to be semantic values in some cases: indirect discourse, identity statements, singular existentials. We have to show that the presuppositional account also makes this compatible with the “reference-fixing” character of the descriptive meanings of singular terms. That is, we need to see how the conceptualization of senses as presuppositions offers additional support for the main Fregean claim, while answering the qualms justly expressed by Kripke in the text quoted in the introductory section. A detailed explanation in each case would, of course, require much more discussion than I can provide here. I have said enough, however, to give the reader a clear indication of what I have in mind. Promising proposals already existing in the literature can be easily incorporated into the framework of the presuppositional account; I shall rely on them for the outline. The central idea is that the structures in question (singular existentials, identity statements,

<sup>60</sup> As before, the proposition that the speaker purports to utter by using a description “referentially” (as in ‘The author of the *Tractatus* met with Russell in Holland after his release from Cassino in the situation envisaged earlier) provides a model for the externalism at stake here. An analogous utterance of the same sentence type in different counterfactual situations, made under the same presuppositions about the identity of that constituent of the signified state of affairs, might nonetheless express a different state of affairs (for it is at least conceivable that someone other than Wittgenstein might have written the *Tractatus*). By the first criterion, we have thus externalism regarding the proposition meant by the speaker. We also have it by the second, for we might be mistaken in our belief that the dossier for ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ in fact individuates someone.

<sup>61</sup> “Demonstratives.”

<sup>62</sup> *Intentionality* (New York: Cambridge, 1983). I discuss this further in “The Nature of Externalism,” *Crítica*, xxviii (1996): 3-39, and “Fregean *versus* Kripkean Reference,” *Teorema*, xvii (1998): 21-44.

indirect discourse) are ones where what is otherwise presupposed can become part of the primarily asserted content, depending in some cases on contextual factors. The reasons are not ad hoc for the specific case of the presuppositions which I have claimed to be associated with singular terms, but instantiate general reasons why presupposed material becomes part of the asserted content in certain linguistic environments. Thus, characteristically Fregean accounts of the problematic statements are vindicated, given the presuppositional framework Kripke envisaged in that text quoted earlier: “by some special argument” independent of the theory of singular terms.

For identity statements and singular existentials, the idea is that they create environments inducing the cancellation of the presuppositions associated with singular terms, in such a way that descriptive material expressing their senses in context becomes part of the asserted state of affairs. We can follow Stalnaker’s<sup>63</sup> explanation for the identity case; his own account of the resulting states of affairs in terms of “diagonal propositions” is not far from the one resulting from the present proposal. If someone who asserts an instance of ‘that is that’ (in the context of a famous example by Perry, in which the first token of ‘that’, *that*<sub>1</sub>, is produced together with a demonstration pointing to the bow of a partially visible ship, and the second, *that*<sub>2</sub>, together with one pointing to the stern) is understood as taking for granted the relevant presuppositions of acquaintance, then given the conventional meaning of the identity predicate, he would be asserting a state of affairs including either all relevant possible worlds or none. Because neither of these is an interesting claim to make, he should be understood as making a different claim, and the contextually most easily available alternative claim is the one that results from canceling the presuppositions of acquaintance. The resulting claim is that the ship made salient by the demonstration accompanying *that*<sub>1</sub> (that is, the one with that visible bow) to

<sup>63</sup> In “Token-reflexivity and Indirect Discourse,” forthcoming in A. Kanamori, ed., *Analytic Philosophy and Logic*, Volume 6 of the *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*, I argue that the present account allows more precise predictions regarding the relevant diagonal propositions than can be obtained from the suggestions by Stalnaker, and other writers following him like David Chalmers and Jackson. It is precisely the Fregean element of the proposal (the fact that singular terms are semantically associated with a descriptive content), which Stalnaker would reject, which allows for the additional precision. The gain in precision becomes important when it comes to evaluating philosophical applications of the framework of diagonal propositions like that offered by Chalmers in *The Conscious Mind* (New York: Oxford, 1996) to defend an internalistic view of conscious experiences, which I find objectionable.

which *that*<sub>1</sub> refers is the ship made salient by the demonstration accompanying *that*<sub>2</sub> (that is, the one with that visible stern) to which *that*<sub>2</sub> refers. The assertion of this state of affairs only involves presuppositions of acquaintance regarding the linguistic tokens, and presuppositions of existence and uniqueness regarding the properties constituting the modes of presentation.

Let us briefly tackle singular existentials. Here, I would mostly follow the account by Evans (*op. cit.*, chapter 10), itself influenced by Kripke's unfortunately still unpublished John Locke lectures. Part of the account is the view that existence is a first-level property, true of every object in the contextually relevant domain. In the present framework, this accounts for the cancellation of the presuppositions of acquaintance associated with singular terms in singular existentials (both positive and negative), along the lines suggested above for identity statements. If the presupposition is in force, an attribution of existence is not informative, and a denial is contradictory. It is therefore reasonable to take the speaker to be making an alternative claim, and the one that suggests itself results again from taking the otherwise presupposed material as part of the asserted condition. Hence, if the speaker utters (say, in the context of a shared perceptual illusion, to use one of Evans's examples) 'That woman does not exist', he will be taken to assert that the contextually salient woman when the token *that woman* is produced (that is, the one responsible for the experiences giving rise to the shared illusion) and to whom *that woman* refers does not exist.

This is not yet what we want, because, of course, there is no such woman, still less a unique one; for something to be referred to, according to PR, it should be a repository of perhaps unexpected individuating properties independent of the ones used to pick it out, and in the envisaged case there is no woman with those features. I earlier committed myself to a Frege-Strawson line about definite descriptions: the point is that under this interpretation, the utterance still fails to assert something true or false. For similar reasons to the ones advanced for singular existentials, however, it is natural to assume that the existence and uniqueness presuppositions related to definite descriptions are also canceled in contexts like 'The actual king of France does not exist', the resulting claim being, of course, that there is no such unique king. Applying this point to the description 'the contextually salient woman when the token *that woman* is produced and to whom *that woman* refers' is the further step

needed to get an intuitively plausible content for singular negative existentials in the present framework.

Evans (*op. cit.*) criticizes “metalinguistic” accounts of the truth conditions of singular existentials such as those provided by some friends of direct reference, like Donnellan.<sup>64</sup> Following Kripke, Evans claims that a criterion of success for any purported analysis is that empty terms are explicated as somehow used and not merely mentioned. Contrary to first appearances, if we look closely at what he means by this ‘somehow used’ (*ibid.*, pp. 344, 365, 371), it can be seen that the present account is not objectionable on the basis of that criterion. The point, if I understand it correctly, is twofold. First, the use of singular terms in singular existentials involves a form of pretense, to engage properly in which one must understand those terms as parasitic on their normal use. Second, the relation with normal use extends to the supplementation of the descriptive material associated with the term provided by semantics with material contextually gathered, as in a normal case. In the example above, for example, a proper understanding of ‘that woman’ requires linking up in the same dossier the property *whoever is a most salient woman when that woman is produced referred by that token with whoever is responsible for such-and-such perceptual experiences* (those constituting the shared illusion). The preceding account agrees with Evans’s point, thus understood.

The proposal to cancel presuppositions is equivalent to the following. Let  $D(\tau)$  signify the sense of the term  $\tau$ , and ‘ $\Delta$ ’ the relation of determination between senses and their referents. Then, the content of an utterance of  $\tau$  *does not exist* can be formally represented as follows:  $\neg\exists x (\Delta D(\tau), x)$ . In the John Locke lectures, Kripke apparently proposed a quasi-intensional rendering of utterances of  $\tau$  *does not exist*, as (in my terminology) *there is no obtaining state of affairs that  $\tau$  exists*. This is to be understood relative to the stipulation that there can be no obtaining state of affairs that  $p$  not only because there is such a state of affairs (and it does not include the actual world), but also because there is no such state of affairs, period. The presuppositional account can then be seen as providing an alternative rendering of Kripke’s proposal. Evans and Salmon<sup>65</sup> criticize this proposal on the grounds that, given a directly referential account of  $\tau$ , this term cannot be understood as making a contribution to any claim, including the claim that there is no ob-

<sup>64</sup> In “Speaking of Nothing,” *Philosophical Review*, LXXXIII (1974): 3-32.

<sup>65</sup> Evans, pp. 349-51; Salmon, “Nonexistence,” *Noûs*, XXXII (1998): 277-319, pp. 296-98.

taining state of affairs that  $\tau$  exists. Such an objection is not applicable to the Fregean account provided here, which can help itself to the needed senses.<sup>66</sup>

Finally, let us consider failures of substitutivity of coreferring singular terms in belief reports and other indirect contexts (epistemic modals, for instance). The main idea here to account for the truth-conditional relevance of otherwise presupposed material comes from thinking of those contexts as involving a form of "quasi-quotation," in which some semantic properties of phrases in those contexts are used as a model of the semantic properties of the reported "speech." Rudolf Carnap, Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, and Donald Davidson have suggested versions of that idea. Paul Pietroski<sup>67</sup> has advanced a proposal along these lines (elaborating previous suggestions by James Higginbotham) which I particularly like and which is amenable to be adapted to the present framework. Given that presuppositions of acquaintance are semantically related to singular terms, it is to be expected that the peculiar form of quotation constituting indirect discourse exploits them. Just by way of example, consider a report of Smith's intentions (in Loar's example) made, in a given context, with 'Smith wanted to say that that man is a stockbroker'. The reporter may be using 'that man' to report the content of Smith's intended assertion in a more fine-grained way than merely by referring to a person. He may also be (at least in the framework of the present proposal) invoking the presupposition associated with 'that man' *in the context of his report*, aiming thus to refer to some aspects of the mode of presentation which Smith, in his turn, intended to presuppose as part of the propositional content of his assertion. The ascriber may convey, say, that it was an indexical mode of presentation, involving the visual aspect of the demonstrative's referent discernible also in the context of his report. If so,

<sup>66</sup> Of course, only to the extent that we can cash out the promissory note that the account will be extended to proper names, by providing token-reflexive, linguistically constrained modes of presentation for them. This is what I try to do in "The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names." The view I hold there is a form of the "metalinguistic" account, free, I believe, from the problems which other versions defended by writers like Kent Bach and Katz have. On my view, any token of the proper name *N* in one and the same discourse presents its referent under the presupposition that it is an entity, belonging to a kind contextually specified, called '*N*'. *Being called 'N'* is in its turn explained relative to a special class of speech acts, *acts of naming*. Kripke's initial baptisms are among those acts of naming, but they include much more commonplace speech acts. For instance, when we explain to someone that a certain street is *Nelson Street*, taking for its advantage of a sign with the inscription 'Nelson St.' properly placed, we are performing such an act of naming.

<sup>67</sup> "Fregean Innocence," *Mind and Language*, XI (1996): 338-70.

'that man' in the context of the report will not be substitutable *salva veritate* by other singular terms referring to the same person.

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke criticizes Fregean views under the assumption that, if the description *the  $\varphi$*  expressed the sense of the term *n*, the term must be replaceable *salva veritate* by the description in every linguistic context. Kripke is thus arguing against a sort of Fregean theory different from the one I have presented. I do not intend to suggest, by any means, that the Fregean Kripke discusses is a straw man. On the contrary, I think that (in opposition to the claims in this regard of philosophers such as Evans (*op. cit.*, chapter 1)), strands of it appear clearly in the work of Frege. In any case, they are certainly on the surface in the reconstruction of Frege's concept of *sense* by Church and Carnap. Moreover, at the root of such Fregeanism are deeply-seated internalist intuitions; as I have tried to show elsewhere,<sup>68</sup> Kripke has made a major contribution by submitting them to criticism.

Traditional Fregeanism has several elements, among which are the following. (1) Sentence-like expressions refer to extremely coarse-grained entities, namely, truth values. (2) Internalism: as Dummett puts it, "references are not essential ingredients of meanings." (3) Expressions achieve objective reference only in so far as they are semantically associated with senses. (4) Ordinary senses are referents of expressions in indirect contexts. I have put forth a framework that can be considered to be Fregean in that it honors the last two claims, though it is unorthodox in rejecting the first two. This does not depart decisively from the views of new theorists of reference, although we have seen that there are some differences; the theory of direct reference for indexicals as set up by Kaplan is not fundamentally incompatible with such a form of Fregeanism. What would be clearly at odds with those views is the extension of the present framework to proper names. This will have to wait for another occasion.

MANUEL GARCÍA-CARPINTERO

University of Barcelona

<sup>68</sup> In "Fregean *versus* Kripkean Reference."