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Notes
In this respect, Hume goes a step beyond Berkeley, who ascribes a distinct temporal structure to each mind. I do not believe that Hume uses the term ‘moment’ to describe temporal structure in quite the way that Baxter does. But that does not affect the substantial correctness of Baxter’s interpretation.
Hume does not actually use his technical term ‘matter of fact’ in the section (Treatise 1.3.1) in which he classifies judgments about identity among those that “do not depend solely upon ideas.” But it is clear that this is the class of judgments that he later calls “matters of fact.”
Garrett (1997, Chap. 8).
References
Garrett, D. (1997). Cognition and commitment in Hume’s philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Garrett, D. (2004). ‘A small tincture of pyrrhonism’: Skepticism and naturalism in Hume’s science of man. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Pyrrhonian skepticism (pp. 68–98). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garrett, D. (2006). Hume’s conclusions in ‘Conclusion of this book’. In S. Traiger (Ed.), The Blackwell companion to Hume’s Treatise (pp. 151–175). London: Blackwell.
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Garrett, D. Difficult times for Humean identity?. Philos Stud 146, 435–443 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9429-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9429-z