

## Expression-Style Exclusion

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Suppose William is a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant man and a political philosopher. When William *forcefully* argues that the distribution of wealth in the US should be more egalitarian, he is typically taken as *rationally* explaining a position. When so arguing, hearers typically take him as credible and as a knower partly because of a positive stereotype of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men as dispassionately rational and not emotional. William's forceful expression style does *not* cause hearers to take him as *either* less credible *or* as someone who is not in the business of giving knowledge. And, suppose that William's forceful expression style makes his argument better understood by his audience than other expression styles.

Suppose Simone is a black woman political philosopher. When Simone argues *without force* that the distribution of wealth in the US should be more egalitarian, hearers typically take her as rationally explaining a position just like William. But, if Simone were to *forcefully make the same argument*, then she likely would be taken as *irrational* because of a negative angry black-woman stereotype that black women are prone to emotionally-driven irrationality (Lewis & Neville, 2015).

If Simone were to forcefully make this argument, then this negative stereotype would cause her to be taken as either (a) less credible than she is (Fricker 2007) or (b) not in the business of making knowledge claims (Dotson 2011). Here, Simone's (i) argument or expression style likely would interact with (ii) a negative stereotype about black women to trigger or cause (iii) epistemic injustice where this epistemic injustice can at least result in either a hearer attributing a credibility deficit to Simone or a hearer not taking Simone as a knower simpliciter. If Simone's audience understands this

maldistribution of US wealth argument to a higher degree when she expresses it in a forceful style, then Simone, unlike William, cannot express her argument in an understanding-maximizing-expression style without suffering an epistemic penalty like testimonial quieting or testimonial injustice. And, suppose that Simone does *not* make this argument in a forceful expression style *because she knows* that she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty. Here, Simone is excluded from using an understanding-maximizing-expression style where this exclusion involves the likelihood that a hearer would take her as either less credible or not in the business of giving knowledge. So, this exclusion occurs without any clear perpetrator because no hearer actually takes Simone as less credible or as not a knower.

I label this epistemic injustice phenomenon, *expression-style exclusion*. A challenge I hope to meet in this paper is to render plausible that expression-style exclusion both (1) is a consequence of testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting and (2) shares features with agentially-caused-epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice and structurally-caused-epistemic injustice like hermeneutical injustice. I assume that if I plausibly suggest that (a) testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting at least partly cause expression-style exclusion and (b) that expression-style exclusion shares features with testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, then I will have met this challenge.

A second challenge I hope to meet in this paper is to render plausible that there is a relation between a speaker's expression style and an audience's degree of understanding where for a particular speaker's argument some expression styles allow for higher or lesser degrees of understanding in her audience. I assume that I have met this challenge if I plausibly suggest that a hearer's degree of understanding of an argument can depend on expression-style features like emotional tone, prosody and gesturing.

A third challenge I hope to meet in this paper is to suggest that identifying subtler kinds of epistemic injustice matters, because the abolishment of things like *de jure* racism in the US can make it appear as though identity-prejudice-driven injustices like testimonial injustice are declining, but as Charles Mills points out things like *de facto* racism are still rife (Mills 1999; Mills 2007). Testimonial injustice or quieting could be infrequent, say, in a particular university's philosophy department but expression-style exclusion could be much more frequent. So, some philosophers in this department might judge the department well in terms of epistemic injustice because testimonial injustice and quieting are infrequent even though it is not doing well in terms of expression-style exclusion.

A preliminary note is that I focus on a case of expression-style exclusion where a black woman suffers expression-style exclusion and not other non-dominant-identity-group members because (1) injustices that black women and Afro-Latinas experience are under-theorized in the epistemology literature and (2) a wealth of psychology literature, both qualitative and quantitative, shows that the angry-black-woman stereotype's effect on black women's and Afro-Latina's lives is pervasive and persistent (Ashley 2014; Lewis et al. 2013; Lewis and Neville 2015; Lewis et al. 2016; Ward 2016; Sparks 2015).

A last preliminary note is that I assume that when a speaker conveys an argument to her audience, she not only aims to have her audience know the argument, but she also aims to have her audience understand the argument. For example, when I teach my students an argument, I am pleased that they know it and can rehearse it, but I am more pleased when they *understand* it.

This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I explain what I take expression-style exclusion to be and its relation to the epistemic state of understanding. In the second section, I explain that expression-style exclusion is a consequence of agentially-caused-epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting, and I explain expression-style exclusion's primary and

secondary harms. In the third section, I suggest that expression-style exclusion shares some features with testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, but it does not share all of its features with both. In the fourth section, I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why what Charles Mills calls white ignorance is so ubiquitous.

## I

### 1.1: Expression-Style and Understanding

I now consider the relation between expression-style and understanding. Not all subjects express themselves in the same way. Some subjects speak quickly, slowly, loudly, quietly, deferentially, in an animated or gesturing manner and so on. If a subject says  $p$  quickly, loudly and in an animated gesturing manner, then by my lights these adverbs describe an expression style that this subject either consciously or unconsciously uses to express  $p$ . The basic idea of expression *style* here is that there are many ways to say  $p$ . For example, I can say  $p$  in a forceful way, an unanimated way, in a disinterested way or some other way where each one of these ways of saying  $p$  represents what I call an expression style.

The idea of expression style is similar to sociolinguists' John Gumperz and Jenny Cook-Gumperz' idea of a 'way of speaking' (Gumperz 1982, 13). By Gumperz' and Cook-Gumperz' lights, the basic idea of a way speaking is that speakers communicate at several "levels of generality" (Gumperz 1982, 13). Speakers communicate with audiences through the use of syntax and semantics. That is, a speaker communicates information through uttering certain words in a certain order where this signals certain information to her audience members. On the other hand, speakers also communicate information through things like prosody, pausing, emotional tone and gesturing. That is, a speaker not only communicates semantic content through using words in a certain order, but she also simultaneously communicates to her audience through things like gesturing or expressing speech

in an emotional tone. By Gumperz' and Cook-Gumperz' lights, speakers simultaneously (1) communicate semantic content through speech and (2) communicate about speech itself through things like prosody, pausing, emotional tone and gesturing (Gumperz 1982).

But, expression style differs from the idea of a way of speaking because Gumperz' notion involves equal emphasis on grammar and lexicon along with things like prosody and pausing (Gumperz 1982). The idea of expression style, however, puts greater emphasis on things like gesturing, prosody, pausing and emotional tone.

A speaker's expression style can affect how well hearers understand  $p$  or how receptive hearers are to  $p$  (Abner et al. 2010). Contrast the following two professors. Professor Jimenez teaches an argument  $b$  in a certain animated and gesturing expression style which causes his class qua hearers to understand  $b$ . Professor Gonzalez teaches the same argument  $b$  in an unanimated and non-gesturing style which causes his class qua hearers to understand  $b$  to a lesser degree than Professor Jimenez. To put the point another way, I take it that two people can make the same argument, *word for word*, but one of them can cause her audience to *better understand* the argument where the difference in understanding is at least partly caused by expression style. So, expression style is not an unimportant feature of an epistemic subject's assertion that  $p$ , but rather it can affect how well her audience understands  $p$ .

Understanding that  $p$  differs from knowing that  $p$  (Kvanvig 2003). Take Simone's argument that the US wealth distribution should be more egalitarian. If I claim to *know* this argument, then I claim to know a conjunction of propositions that constitute the argument. But, if I claim to *understand* the argument that the US wealth distribution should be more egalitarian, then I claim to *grasp* how the argument's propositions relate to each other and to concepts and facts that the argument depends on

like the concept of egalitarianism and the US history of relations between wage workers, capitalists and free slave labor (Elgin 2009).

Take geometry. I can claim to know geometry if I have memorized certain geometrical axioms. But, understanding geometry seems to differ from knowing geometry. Someone is properly evaluated as understanding geometry if they can do things like “*reason* geometrically about new problems, *apply* geometrical insights in different areas [and] *assess* the limits of geometrical reasoning for the task at hand” (Elgin 2009, 323, my emphases).

Understanding differs from knowledge partly because understanding “admits of degrees” (Elgin 2009, 324). A freshman geometry student at the end of a semester of an introduction-to-geometry course likely understands geometry to some degree. But, a mathematics major likely understands geometry to a larger degree than this freshman. And, a professor of geometry likely understands geometry to larger degree than both the freshman and the mathematics major because the geometry professor’s grasp of how the relevant axioms cohere or hang together with one another is greater than both the freshman’s grasp and the major’s grasp.

### 1.2: Degrees of Understanding and Expression-Style Features

I now suggest that expression-style features like emotional tone, prosody and gesturing can make a difference to the degree of understanding that an audience has of a speaker’s argument. When someone conveys her argument through a speech act to her audience, she not only conveys information through the semantic-linguistic content of the utterances that constitute her speech act, but rather she also conveys information through non-linguistic features of the utterances that constitute her speech act qua argument (Abner 2015; Nygaard and Queen 2008). If (a) the information that a speech act bears can covary with its non-linguistic features and (b) more information can help

an audience understand an argument to a higher degree, then an audience's degree of understanding in an argument can depend on a speech act's non-linguistic features.

One non-linguistic feature of a speakers' utterances is *emotional tone*. So, Simone can utter 'centuries of free labor by blacks played a large causal role in the US' current distribution of wealth' in, say, either an angry or placid emotional tone. A recent study suggests that if the semantic content of an utterance connotes or is associated with an emotion like happiness, then a speaker's audience will both process the utterance more quickly and recall it more easily (Baddeley 2010; Nygaard and Queens 2008). So, if (a) Simone cannot convey her argument in an expression-style that involves an emotional tone of outrage or even anger because she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty and (b) these emotions are properly associated with her argument's semantic content, namely the inegalitarian-wealth distribution in the US, then (c) Simone's audience will likely process and commit her argument to memory less well and quickly. And, here I assume that processing ease can contribute to an audience's degree of understanding in an argument.

A second non-linguistic feature of speakers' utterances are co-occurring *gestures*. Gestures can play either interactive or representational roles in speaker-hearer communicative exchanges (Abner et al. 2015). Speakers can use *interactive* gestures to manage dialogue. For example, a speaker can signal through a gesture that someone may ask a question. Speakers use *representational* gestures to communicate information about the gesture's co-occurring utterance. Speakers can use representational gestures to communicate things like properties of actual objects or metaphorical properties (Kendon 1995). For example, Simone might gesture at levels that are above one another in a metaphorical way to communicate that the US distribution of wealth is inegalitarian because it is *hierarchical* along dimensions of race and class. Here, gestures can contribute to an audience's degree of understanding through either adding information to an utterance or partly constituting the information conveyed in a given utterance.

Gestures can also contribute to an audience's degree of understanding through aiding a speaker's facility in both producing speech and accessing information she has committed to memory which is relevant to better explaining an argument. In a meta-analysis of the cognitive science and psychology literature, Abner et. al suggest that "gestures have been shown to facilitate lexical access, [resolve] tip of the tongue states" and "reduce demand on working memory" (Abner et al. 2015). The basic idea here is that if (a) a speaker can more efficiently and clearly explain an argument through things like better word choice and (b) gestures help speakers recall helpful examples, then (c) gestures can contribute to whether a speaker's audience understands an argument to a higher degree. Or, in Simone's case, if Simone notices that her audience largely does not understand a premise in her argument, then gesturing may help her recall things like helpful examples, ideas or synonyms that will allow her audience to better understand this premise.

One might doubt that phenomenon such as more quickly recalling or more easily processing information can contribute to whether an audience has greater or deeper understanding of a speaker's argument. But, if (a) understanding involves that a subject grasps the relation between facts, (b) this grasping relation involves sensing how facts hang together or cohere, (c) that facts that constitute an argument are more easily processed and thus more quickly recalled increases the likelihood that a subject senses how an argument's constitutive facts hang together and cohere and (d) the degree of understanding that subject has in argument can depend on how many of these relations that she grasps, then (e) easier processing and quicker recall increase the likelihood that a subject has greater understanding of a speaker's argument. The basic idea here is that the more quickly someone can recall or process something, the more grasping relations they will instantiate such that they are more likely to understand the object of understanding to a higher degree. So, one need not doubt that phenomenon such as more quickly recalling or more easily processing information can contribute to subject's understanding of an argument.



### *1.3: Argument Content and Audience-Understanding Maximization*

If (a) an audience member more easily processes an argument when it is expressed in an emotional tone that is associated with it, (b) ease of processing increases the likelihood that a subject understands an argument to a greater degree, then (c) a speaker can maximize her audience member's understanding of her argument through expressing her argument in an emotional tone that is associated with her argument.

A study suggests that “emotional tone of voice influences the time course of [a subject's] lexical processing” (Nygaard and Queens 2008, 1025). In this study, if a speaker expressed words such as “beauty,” “cheer,” “glad,” and “sunny” in a happy emotional tone, then a participant hearer processed them more quickly than if the speaker had expressed them in an emotional tone that is not associated with these words such as a sad or neutral emotional tone (Nygaard and Queens 2008).

If (a) an argument is in part composed of words and (b) words can be expressed in emotional tones that are associated with them, then (c) arguments can be expressed in emotional tones that are associated with them. For example, Simone's argument is that the US' wealth distribution should be more egalitarian because it is so unjustly inegalitarian. This argument is seemingly associated with anger. So, if Simone expresses her argument in an emotional tone of anger, then she has expressed it in an emotional tone that it is associated with. If she were to express her argument in a neutral or happy emotional tone, then she would express this argument in an emotional tone that is not associated with her argument.

If (a) a speaker does not express her argument in a tone that is associated with it and (b) expressing it in this associated emotional tone increases the likelihood that her audience member understands it to greater degree, then (c) this speaker has failed to increase the likelihood that her audience member understands her argument to a greater degree.

#### *1.4: Expression Style and Understanding Maximization*

An expression style maximizes a speaker's audience's understanding of an argument relative to the argument's content. For example, an angry or impassioned expression style will maximize an audience's understanding of the argument that the US' wealth distribution should be more egalitarian because if a speaker expresses this argument in this angry or impassioned emotional tone, the audience will likely grasp more of relations between facts and concepts that the argument involves.

A speaker S maximizes her audience's understanding of an argument  $\alpha$  if she expresses  $\alpha$  in an emotional tone that is associated with the content of  $\alpha$ . So, whether an expression style is understanding maximizing at least partly depends on the associative relation between the content of the argument and the emotional tone of the speaker's expression style.

#### *1.5: Understanding and Persuasion*

One may object that expression style plays a role in an audience finding an argument persuasive rather than an audience understanding an argument to a greater degree. So, the objection goes, expression style is properly taken to maximize the degree to which a audience finds an argument persuasive rather than maximize the degree to which an audience understands an argument.

This objection fails even though it points to an interesting feature of understanding maximization. The objection fails because expression style can play a role in both (i) an audience finding an argument persuasive to greater degree and (ii) an audience understanding an argument to a greater degree. These two audience features often simultaneously obtain, but they are analytically distinct audience features. An audience can find an argument persuasive but not understand at argument. For example, many US presidential voters found Donald Trump's arguments persuasive, but, at least some, did not understand his arguments. Similarly, someone can understand Donald Trump's arguments, but not find them persuasive. Now, an expression style can contribute to whether

an audience finds an argument persuasive, but this contribution differs from an expression style's contribution to audience understanding.

This objection points to an interesting relation between persuasion and understanding. Persuasion, itself, can contribute to an audience's degree of understanding in an argument because if an audience finds a speaker's argument persuasive, then they may more carefully attend to the argument's features and details such that they understand the argument to a greater degree. But, persuasiveness' contribution to an audience's understanding requires that a speaker present an argument's features and details in a way that closer audience attention can result in a greater degree of audience understanding of an argument

## II

### 2.1: The Basic Idea of Expression-Style Exclusion

I now explain the basic of idea of expression-style exclusion. If expression style can affect to what degree an audience understands a speaker's argument, then dominant-identity-group-member speakers can engage in a wider range of expression styles than non-dominant-identity-group-member speakers without a similar loss of understanding in a speaker's audience or bad epistemic consequences.

Expression-style exclusion obtains if a non-dominant-identity-group-member speaker refrains from expressing an argument in an understanding-maximizing expression style because if she were to use this understanding-maximizing expression style, then she would likely suffer an epistemic penalty where an epistemic penalty involves suffering things like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting.

Expression-style exclusion is not an entirely agentially-caused-epistemic injustice like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting because no particular agent perpetrates it. No agent perpetrates expression-style exclusion because the *speaker herself refrains* from expressing her argument

in an understanding-maximizing expression style. She so refrains because *she knows* that given the ubiquity of identity prejudices like the angry-black-woman stereotype, her audience *would likely* commit, say testimonial injustice or quieting if she were to so express her claim.

On the other hand, expression-style exclusion is not purely structurally caused because individual audience members represent *potential* perpetrators of testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting where testimonial injustice and quieting are agentially caused phenomena. So, the likelihood of epistemic injustices that *individuals* can commit motivates Simone to refrain from using an understanding-maximizing-expression style to make her argument.

### 2.2: Paradigmatic Epistemic Injustice Kinds

I now briefly sketch a few paradigmatic epistemic injustice kinds because these are at least some of the epistemic penalties that Simone likely would pay if she were to express her argument in a style that likely would invoke or interact with the angry-black-woman stereotype. First, I sketch *testimonial injustice* where testimonial injustice obtains if historically oppressed group members are undermined as knowers when they attempt to convey knowledge through testimony due to identity prejudice (Fricker 2007). I, then, sketch Kristie Dotson's view of *testimonial quieting* where controlling images or identity prejudice partly cause believers with certain historically-oppressed identities to not be recognized as knowers at all.

On Fricker's view, in testimonial exchange, hearers need to quickly discern whether a speaker is trustworthy regarding a particular topic where trustworthiness involves competence and sincerity. Hearers use stereotypes qua heuristics which can be either reliable or unreliable indicators of a speaker's trustworthiness. For example, the identity prejudice that Puerto Ricans are thieves is an unreliable stereotype which tracks Puerto Ricans in all domains of life such that they can be systematically taken as untrustworthy speakers (Fricker 2007; Stavans 2001).

For Fricker, a central-testimonial-injustice case obtains if (a) a hearer attributes a deflated credibility judgment to a speaker (b) because of a widely-held identity prejudice where (c) this identity prejudice pervasively and persistently tracks the speaker in all domains of life and (d) the identity prejudice is held due to an ethically bad or “ethically noxious” affective investment.

A testimonial injustice victim is partly epistemically wronged, or harmed, because she is undermined in her capacity as a knower. One bad epistemic consequence of this is that if a speaker asserts  $p$  and the speaker is undermined through a deflated credibility judgment, then the speaker will likely be less confident that she knows  $p$  or, at least, she will be less confident in her justification for  $p$ . The second bad epistemic consequence of this is that if a speaker is consistently taken as less credible, then the speaker is likely to lose confidence in her intellectual abilities more generally.

On Fricker’s view, testimonial injustice not only has bad epistemic consequences for individuals, but it also has bad epistemic consequences for groups or communities because testimonial injustice “blocks the flow of knowledge...evidence, doubts, critical ideas and other epistemic inputs conducive to knowledge” (Fricker 2016, 162). Testimonial injustice can impede or prevent oppressed group members from contributing certain true beliefs to their respective communities’ belief sets where these true beliefs could serve as counterevidence, undercutters, defeaters and so on. So, testimonial injustice’s epistemic badness not only consists in epistemic wrongs or harms for individual knowers, but it is also bad for epistemic *communities* more generally because individual believers in these communities miss out on truth conducive things like counterevidence, defeaters, doubts, evidence and so on.

I now sketch Dotson’s view of testimonial quieting which she labels as a kind of epistemic silencing. A speaker’s testimony is quieted if a hearer does not *recognize* her as a knower. A condition that is necessary for a speaker to successfully convey knowledge to a hearer is that the hearer regard the speaker as an agent who *can* know things. Dotson cites Patricia Hill Collin’s book *Black Feminist*

*Thought* which points out that black women are systematically regarded as “non-knowers” because of “controlling images” where black women “are perceived as mummies, matriarchs, welfare mothers and/or whores” such that they are taken as lacking the capacity to be epistemic agents (Dotson 2011, 242; Hill Collins 2000).

Dotson calls these controlling images, negative stereotypes. I understand Dotson’s notion of negative stereotypes and identity-prejudice to be so close that I will consider them functionally equivalent for the purposes of this paper. These negative stereotypes motivate, or at least, play a role in black women’s systematic testimonial quieting. This testimonial quieting differs from testimonial injustice because in testimonial-quieting cases speakers are not even judged credible at all. In testimonial injustice cases speakers are recognized as *less* credible than other speakers, and thereby these speakers are recognized as knowers, but in testimonial quieting cases speakers are *not* even recognized as *knowers simpliciter*.

### 2.3: Expression-Style Exclusion’s Causal Story

I now explain that expression-style exclusion’s causal story to make salient that expression-style exclusion is a consequence of testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting. Expression-style exclusion obtains when an epistemic subject is diminished in her capacity to maximize her audience’s understanding of her argument because of what likely would be interaction between her audience’s identity prejudice and the expression style that she qua epistemic subject would manifest. Suppose Simone and William express this same argument with the same forceful expression style. Here, only Simone is likely diminished in her capacity to maximize understanding in her argument because a widely-held negative-identity prejudice triggers her audience to take her as either less credible than she is (Fricker 2007) or not as a knower at all (Dotson 2011).

If Simone does express her argument in a forceful expression style, the identity prejudice that triggers her audience is that black women are angry and thus emotionally irrational. In the psychology

literature, this stereotype or identity prejudice is known as the “angry black woman” stereotype (Ashley 2014; Lewis & Neville 2015; Lewis et al. 2016; Lewis et al. 2012). According to Lewis and Neville, this stereotype causes black women’s audiences and interlocutors to behave in negative ways and say negative things in the *expectation* that black women will instantiate the stereotype (Lewis & Neville, 2015).

William can forcefully express this argument without his audience taking him as either less credible than he is or not taking him as a knower, because there is no widely-held negative stereotype or negative identity prejudice to work on hearers’ testimonial perception of him. If anything, William as a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant man will benefit from positive stereotypes or positive identity prejudices that will likely cause hearers to perceive him as rationally, even while forcefully, making his argument.

Recall that Simone is taken as *rational* when she makes her argument in an *unanimated* and *non-forceful* expression style but once she makes this claim in a forceful expression style she is taken to be either less credible than she is or as not a knower at all. William can go from an unanimated to a forceful expression style without suffering an epistemic penalty, but Simone cannot. Simone pays an epistemic penalty if she forcefully makes her argument.

Expression-style exclusion obtains in virtue of *certain* stereotypes or identity prejudices. Simone suffers expression-style exclusion partly because of a stereotype about *angry* black women. Simone is excluded from making her argument in understanding-maximizing expression-styles because if she were to use an understanding-maximizing expression style, then her expression behavior qua expression style likely would *interact with* the angry-black women identity prejudice such that she is taken as either less credible or not a knower.

Simone does not express her argument in an understanding-maximizing expression style because she has *knowledge* that involves (1) her identity qua black woman, (2) that her audience likely harbors the angry-black-woman-identity prejudice, (3) that her expression-style will likely invoke or trigger the angry-black woman identity prejudice that her audience harbors and (4) that her audience is largely composed of white men whose testimonial perception of her is likely affected in an epistemically bad way.

Fricker suggests that whether a speaker is taken as rationally making a point can depend on the identity of a speaker's audience (Fricker 2007). In Fricker's Talented Mr. Ripley case, she points out that Mr. Greenleaf takes Marge as irrational because she emotionally expresses her claim that the Mr. Ripley killed her fiancé, (Fricker 2007, 169). But, Fricker also points out that if Marge had made the claim, in the same emotional-expression style, to a woman hearer, then this woman hearer likely would have taken her as rationally making her claim (Fricker 2007, 169).

Similarly, if Simone's audience was a group of black women, Afro-Latinas or people of color, then she could have made her argument in an understanding-maximizing-expression style because the angry-black woman stereotype would likely not have affected their testimonial perception of her in an epistemically bad way. Or, even if the angry-black-woman stereotype did affect this audience, it would likely not affect their testimonial perception of her to the degree that it would affect, say, a white audience's perception of her. So, whether Simone is excluded from making her argument in an understanding-maximizing-expression style depends on her audience's identity.

#### 2.4: Expression-Style Exclusion's Primary Harm

The primary harm of expression-style exclusion is that a non-dominant-identity speaker cannot use expression styles that would likely allow her audience to better *understand* her argument. Simone is diminished in her capacity to *maximize her audience's understanding of her argument*. She is



diminished in this capacity relative to William, a dominant-group member who is not similarly diminished in this way, because he can use a wider range of expression styles. William can engender in his audience a greater degree of understanding in his argument because of his social location or identity. That is, William enjoys an epistemic good of understanding-maximization in virtue of his social location qua white man. On the other hand, Simone enjoys less of this epistemic good of understanding-maximization because of her social location qua black woman.

Recall that when Simone expresses her argument in unanimated and non-forceful expression style, her audience takes her as rationally making her argument. If her audience takes her as rationally making her argument, then they *likely know* her argument as result of her making it. That Simone's audience knows her argument because she makes it is consistent with her also suffering expression-style exclusion. *Expression-style exclusion is compatible with her audience knowing her argument* because her audience can know her argument but not understand it.

Knowing differs from understanding as an epistemic state that a believer can be in (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010, Zagzebski 2009). But, a speaker can have varying levels of success in explaining an argument to an audience. One kind of success is when an audience *knows* an argument *because of* how the speaker conveyed the argument. Another kind of success is when an audience *understands* an argument *because of* how the speaker conveys the argument. If (a) a speaker's success in explaining an argument can vary and (b) expression-style exclusion diminishes a speaker's capacity to engender understanding of an argument in her audience, then (c) expression-style exclusion is compatible with a speaker successfully engendering knowledge of her argument in her audience.

### 2.5: Secondary Harm of Expression-Style Exclusion

A secondary epistemic harm or consequence of expression-style exclusion is that a non-dominant-identity-group speaker's intellectual performance will likely suffer relative to dominant

group speakers because she must self-monitor which expressions-style she uses to make her argument. This non-dominant-identity-group speaker self-monitors her expression-style while making her argument because she does not want to use expression styles that invoke or trigger identity prejudices like the angry-black woman stereotype. If (a) a non-dominant-identity-group speaker self-monitors which expression-style she is using, and (b) dominant-identity-group speakers do not self-monitor, then (c) her cognitive load is greater than a dominant-identity-group speaker's cognitive load. And, (d) if an epistemic subject's cognitive load increases, then her intellectual performance may suffer. A subject's cognitive load is the set of tasks she attempts to simultaneously perform.

Suppose that Simone does not use an understanding-maximizing-expression style because she knows that she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty due to her audience's likely latent angry-black woman stereotype or identity-prejudice. She likely self-monitors the expression-style she uses to convey her argument because she knows that her audience's black-angry-woman-identity prejudice can easily be triggered. Lewis and Neville found that in a study of 265 black woman participants, roughly 90% affirmed the claim that "Someone accused me of being angry when I was speaking in a calm manner." (Lewis and Neville 2015, 295). This suggests audience members' latent angry-black-woman identity prejudice is easily triggered. So, Simone could easily trigger her audience's latent identity prejudice even though she is not expressing her argument in a way that is fairly characterized as angry or even forceful.

Now, I take a speaker's intellectual performance to involve things like successfully causing hearers to know arguments and understand arguments. Intellectual performance can involve (1) self-monitoring whether one is clearly conveying one's argument, (2) monitoring one's audience for either signs of comprehension like head nodding or signs of lack of comprehensions like quizzical looking facial expressions and, of course, (3) actually conveying the argument.

If a non-dominant-identity-group speaker has to worry about both clearly conveying an argument and self-monitoring to avoid expressing her argument in an expression style that she knows will likely make her seem less credible, then she will likely expend more cognitive effort to intellectually perform at the same level as a dominant-identity-group speaker. If a non-dominant-identity-group speaker expends more effort than a dominant-identity-group speaker to intellectually perform at the same level, then the non-dominant-identity-group-speaker's intellectual performance is more likely to suffer relative to a dominant-identity-group speaker. In other words, Simone's intellectual performance is more likely to suffer in comparison to William.

Findings in cognitive science, social psychology and linguistics suggest that if a speaker's cognitive load increases through the performance of multiple tasks, then a speaker will more often choose referring expressions that are economical because the speaker's working memory resources are limited (Daily et al. 2001; Hendriks et al. 2014; Hendriks 2016; Vogels et al. 2015). Working memory is a subject's "system or systems that are assumed to be necessary in order to keep things in mind while performing complex task such as reasoning, comprehension and learning" (Baddeley 2010, 137). Recall that a subject's cognitive load is the set of tasks or task she performs or attempts to perform at the same time. A recent study in cognitive psychology suggests that if a speaker's cognitive load is increased through providing her with a secondary task, then she will tend to choose economical pronoun referring phrases like 'she' rather than noun phrases like 'a saleswoman' (Vogels et al. 2015). Pronoun referring phrases are economical in comparison to more explicit noun phrases because it is easier to remember and recall pronoun phrases like 'she' rather than noun phrases 'a saleswoman.'

Suppose that Simone performs two mental tasks. Her first task is to clearly explain her argument to her audience. Her second task is to self-monitor the expression style that she uses because she could, unbeknownst to her, use an expression style that would likely cause her to suffer an epistemic penalty. By the Vogels et al. (2015) study's lights, if Simone performs these two tasks, then

she is more likely to use pronoun referring phrases rather than more descriptive referring phrases. If she uses less explicit referring phrases rather more descriptive ones, then her intellectual performance could suffer because the sentences she uses to convey her argument contain less explicit content such that her audience likely understands her argument to lower degree. And, William likely does not self-monitor the expression style he uses to explain his argument and thus does not similarly suffer.

Here, someone might object that this study does not support the view that expression-style exclusion can cause subjects' intellectual performance to suffer. This objection fails because the study could have found that subjects under increased cognitive load do not increase their use of less explicit pronoun-referring phrases. And, if the study had found that subjects under increased cognitive load did not increase the use of economical referring phrases, like pronoun-referring phrases, then this would be evidence against the view that increased subject cognitive load can make intellectual performance suffer.

Barch and Berenbaum (1994) found that subjects who were interviewed while doing concurrent tasks showed decreased performance in answering interview questions when compared with a control group who did not do concurrent tasks while interviewed. Subjects who were interviewed while doing a concurrent task performed less well along dimensions of syntactic complexity, verbosity and filled pauses (Barch and Berenbaum 1994). Syntactic performance was judged in terms of independent and dependent clause use where independent clause use was a sign of good performance and dependent clause use was a sign of poorer performance. Verbosity was judged in terms of the number of words that subjects used. And, a subject who paused for shorter periods of time between sentences, when answering questions, was taken to perform better than subjects who paused for longer periods of time. By this study's lights, Simone, relative to Williams, likely would perform poorly along at least one of these dimensions if she self-monitors her expression style because she performs a second task, conveying her argument. If she performs poorly in terms of syntactic

complexity, verbosity and pausing, then her intellectual performance also likely suffers because a speaker whose explanation of an argument involves long pauses and dependent-clause use likely does not explain an argument as well as a speaker whose explanation lacks these things. So, if her intellectual performance suffers in these ways, then her audience may understand her argument to a lesser degree.

A basic idea that these studies, and others, trade on is that if (a) a speaker attempts to convey information through speech and (b) she simultaneously performs another task, then (c) she will likely convey this information to her hearer in a less efficient or clear way because (d) some of her working memory resources will be diverted from conveying information through speech to this other task (Daily et al. 2001; Hendriks et al. 2014; Hendriks 2016).

If (a) this basic idea is roughly correct, (b) non-dominant speakers actually do self-monitor their expression style and (c) self-monitoring takes up a non-trivial amount of working memory or cognitive capacity, then (d) non-dominant speakers' intellectual performance likely suffers because of expression-style exclusion.

### *2.6: The Double Bind of Expression Style Exclusion*

Simone may face a double bind because if she either (a) uses an understanding-maximizing-expression style or (b) refrains from using an understanding-maximizing expression style, then (c) she likely faces an obstacle to successfully conveying her argument to her audience. This seems bad enough. But, Janice Moulton suggests that it may even be worse because it can be quite easy for women to be taken as aggressive irrespective of what expression style they use to make their argument.

For Moulton, the adversary method involves the assumption that the best way to evaluate philosophical views is to subject them to the “strongest or most extreme opposition” where part of doing this involves attempting to refute views by entertaining counterexamples to a given view (Moulton 1996, 14). On Moulton’s view, philosophers are partly motivated to believe that the adversary method is the best way to do philosophy because of a mistaken view of the relation between aggression and competence or success.

Now, women are socialized to not engage in aggressive communication because of a widely-held false view that aggressive behavior is thought only natural for men but unnatural for women. This presents a dilemma for women. The first horn of the dilemma is that if a woman acts aggressively or even in a way that can hint at or invoke the idea of aggression, then she will be taken as acting unnaturally and thus she will be taken as acting unpleasantly. But, the second horn of the dilemma is that if she exhibits success-associated traits like competence and authority in a non-aggressive way, she will likely still be taken as exhibiting aggression because of success-associated traits’ association with aggression. Just by being competent, a woman can be taken as acting unnaturally and also be taken to be acting unpleasantly. So, the only option is to attempt to communicate or act competently without seeming competent which makes acting competent that much harder for women than men.

Now, if (a) Moulton is right that it is quite hard for women to make arguments without their audience taking them as aggressive, (b) the social psychology literature is correct that hearers are *highly prone* to take *black* women speakers as angry because of the angry-black-woman stereotype, then (c) black women and Afro-Latinas may not only be in a double bind where they suffer either expression-style exclusion’s primary or secondary harm. But, rather (d) a black woman or Afro-Latina speaker could suffer expression-style exclusion’s secondary harm while neither avoiding epistemic penalties like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting nor enjoying the epistemic good of using an understanding-maximizing-expression style.

Take Simone's case. If Simone refrains from using a forceful expression style because she knows that she would likely suffer, say, testimonial quieting because her audience likely harbors the angry-black woman stereotype, then she makes her argument while self-monitoring herself to ensure she does not use an expression style that could invoke the angry-black woman stereotype in her audience. Even if she makes her argument in a completely tranquil and calm manner, she still could very easily trigger this stereotype in her audience because the angry-black woman stereotype is so easily invoked (Lewis and Neville 2015). Here, Simone's identity as both a woman and black can make the likelihood that her audience's prejudice is triggered higher than, say, a white woman. If this likelihood is higher for Simone qua black woman, then Simone could be in the horrible position that she expends extra cognitive work to self-monitor her expression style, but she does not avoid the epistemic penalties she sought to avoid through refraining from using an understanding-maximizing-expression style.

### 2.7: An Intersectional Harm of Expression Style Exclusion

If (a) a non-dominant speaker knows she will likely suffer either expression-style exclusion's primary or secondary harm (b) a speaker who inhabits positions such as professor, lawyer, community member, manager is entitled to epistemic authority in the domain that is associated with these positions, then (c) a non-dominant speaker will likely not enjoy the epistemic authority from her audience that the positions entitles her to.

Take Simone. She is a professor of philosophy and suppose that in virtue of this position she is entitled to at least prima facie epistemic authority on the issue relative to non-philosophers. And, suppose that even though she has this position that should grant her epistemic authority on philosophical topics with at least non-philosophers, she still feels unease speaking on issues she knows

well because she knows that her epistemic authority will likely not defeat how her audience will perceive because of the mechanisms involved in expression-style exclusion.

So, even if a non-dominant speaker, like Simone, has managed to obtain a position in society that is secure and grants one prima facie epistemic authority, she will not enjoy the comfort of speaking from that position with ease on topics she knows well. Here, the structure of society makes it such that Simone, a black woman, cannot fully enjoy her station in life even though she may have worked for it twice as hard as her dominant group counterparts due to, say, systemic racism and sexism.

### III

In this section I suggest that expression-style exclusion shares features with testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. But, I suggest that expression-style exclusion does not share all of its features with both. That is, expression-style overlaps with testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.

#### 3.1: Expression-Style Exclusion as Agentially Caused

Hermeneutical injustice obtains if an epistemic subject cannot communicate an experience because of a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource due to hermeneutical marginalization (Fricker 2007). Hermeneutical marginalization obtains if non-dominant-identity group members cannot sufficiently contribute to their society's set of shared concepts because they cannot sufficiently access professions in society that can influence their society's set of shared concepts like journalism and law (Fricker 2007). In Fricker's central case, Carmita Wood cannot provide a succinct reason why she was fired from her job, on an unemployment insurance form, because the concept of sexual harassment did not yet exist in her society's social imagination.

Hermeneutical injustice, by Fricker's lights, is at least largely *structurally caused* because no agent can be blamed for, say, Carmita Wood's lack of the sexual harassment concept. Society is unjustly



structured such that this results in an epistemic gap in the social pool of concepts that Carmita Wood can use to succinctly describe her experience of what we can now succinctly call sexual harassment.

On the other hand, testimonial injustice is *agentially caused* because an agent, or hearer, perpetrates it through a deflated credibility judgment of a speaker. If someone takes me as less credible than I am because, I am Latinx, then I can blame this person. I can also point out that they are perpetrating testimonial injustice such that they could recognize that they are actually testimonially misperceiving me as not credible. By Fricker's lights, I cannot point to an individual who perpetrates hermeneutical injustice in the same way. If I can point to anything regarding hermeneutical injustice, I can point to the structure of society such that black and Latinx folks do not have equal opportunity in the US job market where this explains why certain gaps exist in the social imagination.

Expression-style exclusion is *partly caused by individual agents* or hearers because, say, Simone refrains from using an understanding-maximizing-expression style due to the likelihood that her *audience* will commit testimonial injustice. Simone knows that they likely harbor the angry-black woman stereotype that can easily be triggered such that they would take her as less credible than she is. So, here, individuals play a causal role because they represent the likelihood of an epistemic penalty for Simone if she were to use a forceful expression style. If the audience was composed of black women, then they would not represent an equal risk for Simone. *Individuals* who harbor the angry-black woman stereotype *can be blamed* because (1) they harbor this stereotype and (2) this stereotype would likely result in Simone being taken as less credible if she were to use a forceful expression style. If individuals can be blamed, then expression-style exclusion is in some measure non-trivially-agentially caused.

### 3.2: Expression-Style Exclusion as Structurally Caused

Expression-style exclusion is *partly structurally caused* because Simone's audience is composed of largely white men hearers. White men hearers largely constitute Simone's audience because non-whites and women have not had equal access to philosophy positions. A study by Mullainathan and Bertrand (2004) suggests that black candidates have a harder time in the job market than equally qualified white candidates because resumes with white-typical-sounding names received substantially more call backs than resumes with black-typical sounding names even though the resumes were otherwise identical. Non-whites have to deal with things like failing schools, less access to loans and capital, stop-and-frisk programs by police and lack of access to social capital or networks to a much larger degree than whites (Mills 1997). These factors partly constitute the structure of society such that white men will tend to compose the audience of a philosophy talk. And, white men qua audience members are more likely to epistemically penalize Simone through testimonial injustice or quieting. Here, a structural feature of society plays a non-trivial causal role in why Simone suffers expression-style exclusion.

Expression-style exclusion is also partly structurally caused because Simone's audience harbors the angry-black-woman stereotype due to hermeneutical marginalization. Black women currently and historically have not sufficiently influenced the collective hermeneutical resource such that the angry-black-woman stereotype is unfortunately pervasive throughout society. This lack of influence plays a role in why most white men harbor this stereotype. So, expression-style exclusion shares this structural cause with hermeneutical injustice, namely hermeneutical marginalization.

#### IV

In this section, I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why white ignorance obtains where white ignorance is a lack of true belief or false belief that obtains because of whites' dominant-group status (Mills 2007). According to a 2016 Gallup poll, 69% of US whites believe that

blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market (Jones and Saad 2016). Here, 69% of whites hold a false belief. And, I assume that a large number of these whites know things that either undercut or defeat this false belief, namely facts about the nature of slavery and the Jim Crow era in the southern US. I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why whites tend to not notice the tension between this false belief and defeating facts they know.

My argument in this section goes as follows. If (a) non-white folks are the most likely to understand oppression, (b) certain kinds of understanding may increase the likelihood that a believer has certain kinds of knowledge, (c) expression-style exclusion makes it less likely that non-dominant speakers successfully engender understanding in an audience, then (d) dominant audiences are less likely to have knowledge of oppression. A subject is in a white ignorant state if she either holds a false belief or lacks a true belief because of whites' dominant-group status (Mills 2007). In this section, I assume, rather than argue that (a) non-white folks or non-dominant groups are more likely to understand oppression than dominant-group subjects.

#### 4.1: Understanding and Knowledge

I may more likely have certain kinds of knowledge if I understand certain things. A physician likely knows that a patient has a certain rare kind of allergy because she understands human physiology. That is, it seems unlikely that this physician would have come to know that her patient has this rare allergy unless she already *understood* human physiology. Similarly, an archaeologist of Mesoamerica knows that a particular Mayan symbol has a certain meaning because she understands the system of Mayan writing and how this symbol's use differed over the course of Mayan history. It seems unlikely that this archaeologist would have come to know this unless she already *understood* the Mayan system of writing and the history of this symbol's use.

Take Chad, a white man, who believes the falsehood that blacks have equal opportunity on the US job market. Suppose that Chad knows things like that slavery in the US was a horrible moral

wrong, that Jim Crow era laws kept blacks from enjoying basic rights that whites enjoyed and that the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1963 and 1964 were morally good things. But, Chad neither understands US slavery, the Jim-Crow era nor the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. If Chad understood, say, slavery in the US, then it seems less likely that he would believe the falsehood that blacks have equal opportunity in the US job market. Understanding of slavery involves grasping things like (1) that many blacks were forced to continue to work for free through unlawful imprisonment after reconstruction and (2) the incalculable wealth that whites amassed over centuries through free slave labor.

#### 4.3: Expression-Style Exclusion and Understanding of Oppression

Expression-style exclusion makes it less likely that non-dominant-identity-group members will successfully engender high degrees of understanding in their audiences about oppression. Expression-style exclusion can make this less likely because non-dominant-group members are the most likely to understand oppression, but they are also the most likely to have experienced oppression. Non-dominant believers who are most likely to know about, and understand, oppression are also the believers who are most likely to express arguments about oppression in expression styles that are impassioned. If Simone expresses an argument about oppression in an impassioned-expression style, then she is likely to suffer an epistemic penalty because her audience likely harbors the angry-black-woman stereotype. But, if she refrains from using an understanding-maximizing expression style, then she less likely engenders understanding in her audience. And, she will likely also worry about whether she expresses her argument in an expression style that could invoke this stereotype.

There is a relation between (a) understanding about oppression and (b) the believers who are most likely to have this understanding. This relation is (c) that the people *most likely* to understand oppression are also the same people who are the *least likely* to successfully convey this understanding. They are the least likely to convey this understanding because they bear a relation of having

experienced this oppression. If a group of people have largely experienced oppression, then they are more likely than others to convey this understanding in an impassioned or even angry expression style. If this group is likely to convey this understanding in impassioned or angry expression style, then they will either suffer the primary or second harm of expression-style exclusion. So, there is a certain kind of act that, say, Simone likely cannot perform because of expression-style exclusion. This is an act where *a non-dominant speaker engenders understanding of oppression in her dominant audience*.

Rebecca Kukla describes a similar act in her account of discursive injustice (Kukla 2014). By Kukla's lights, a speaker's identity can cause knowledge claims qua speech acts to have uptake as expressions of personally experienced emotion even though she is entitled to have her knowledge claim receive uptake as a knowledge claim. Kukla uses the following case to clarify this idea. Suppose a woman professor claims that her colleagues systematically devalue job talks by women-job candidates but her colleagues, men, take this claim as an expression of her sympathy for other women going through the rigors of the job market rather than a claim about how the world is apart from how she feels about it. Put simply, they take an *assertive* speech act as an *expressive* speech act *because of* this woman professor's identity qua woman. Here, this woman professor is *entitled* to perform an assertive speech act, but she *actually performs* an expressive speech act because her identity qua woman causes a "breakdown...of the path between performance and uptake" (Kukla 2014, 445). If a speaker's successful engenderment of understanding in her audience through conveying an argument is a speech act akin to assertive speech acts, then the act where *a non-dominant speaker engenders understanding of oppression in her dominant audience* can be understood as a kind of speech act. And, this speech act is performed when a non-dominant speaker successfully engenders understanding of oppression she experienced to her dominant audience. But, expression-style exclusion makes this particular speech act obtain less often.

#### 4.4: Expression-Style Exclusion and White Ignorance

Suppose Chad who is in a white ignorant state is at Simone's talk where she makes an argument that the US distribution of wealth should be more egalitarian. And, suppose that Simone was born in Haiti, then emigrated with her mother to the neighboring Dominican Republic to look for work as is often the case. And, she and her mother eventually move to New York from the Dominican Republic because they were discriminated against in the Dominican Republic and because there were few jobs available for her mother. Now, suppose that Simone also in part grew up in Jamaica Queens New York City, a community of color where opportunities are few and far between and schools underserve the community. So, Simone has personal experience with inegalitarian distributions of wealth. She has first-hand knowledge and understanding of inegalitarian distributions of wealth in the Caribbean and the US.

Simone can make her argument in at least two ways. She could make her argument in an impassioned-expression style. This is likely because of her personal relation to her argument's content. She could also attempt to make her argument in a dispassionate or non-forceful expression style. It will likely be difficult for her to successfully engender understanding using this non-forceful expression style because her audience's angry-black woman stereotype is so easily triggered. But, if she manages to use this non-forceful-expression style, her intellectual performance will likely suffer because she will likely self-monitor her expression style. Here, Simone is in a double bind.

This double bind likely results in depressing the odds that Simone successfully engenders a high degree of understanding, or any at all, in her audience. If Simone is less likely to engender understanding in her audience, then Chad is less likely to be disabused of white ignorance. Chad is less likely disabused of his white ignorance because understanding of say how inegalitarian distributions of wealth caused by slavery can make it more likely that someone knows that blacks have less opportunity in the US job market in comparison to whites. So, expression-style exclusion that Simone suffers can play a role in Chad remaining in a white ignorance state.

## Conclusion

I hope that I have made plausible the idea that expression-style is a consequence of testimonial injustice and quieting. I also hope that I have motivated the view that identifying more subtle kinds of epistemic injustice matters because an organization or society can score well in terms of epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting but simultaneously score poorly in terms of more subtle kinds of epistemic injustice like expression-style exclusion. I also hope that I have successfully argued that something like expression-style exclusion has contributed, and does contribute, to what Charles Mills calls white ignorance.

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