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Ismael on the Paradox of Predictability

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Abstract

In this discussion note we argue, contrary to the thrust of a recent article by Jenann Ismael, that resolving the paradox of predictability does not require denying the possibility of a natural oracle, and thus stands in no need of the response that she proposes.

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Notes

  1. Ismael cites Rummens and Cuypers (2010) as a significant influence here.

  2. It is worth noting that a version of the paradox can be stated without assuming determinism. Imagine an omniscient being who does not calculate, but simply receives information from the future, tells the counter-predictive device how it will act, and the device then acts contrary to the prediction. Everything we say below applies here too, yet the being is not predicting on the basis of deterministic laws.

  3. A more mundane example makes the same point, without assuming either an oracle or determinism. The following sentence exhibits the incoherence of (i) – (iii): “I correctly predict that you will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow and, as a result of hearing my prediction, you will choose not to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow.”.

  4. Our thanks to a referee for this journal.

References

  • Holton, R. (2013). From Determinism to Resignation; and How to Stop It. In A. Clark, J. Kiverstein, & T. Vierkant (Eds.), Decomposing the Will (pp. 87–100). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Ismael, J. (2019). Determinism, Counterpredictive Devices, and the Impossibility of Laplacean Intelligences. The Monist, 102, 478–498.

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  • Lewis, D., & Richardson, J. (1966). Scriven on Human Unpredictability. Philosophical Studies, 17, 69–74.

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  • Rummens, S., & Cuypers, S. (2010). Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability. Erkenntnis, 72(2), 233–249.

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  • Scriven, M. (1964). An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behaviour. In B. Benjamin, B. Wolman, & E. Nagel (Eds.), Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches. Basic Books.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia

    Brian Garrett

  2. Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, Malate, 0922, Manila, NCR, Philippines

    Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

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  1. Brian Garrett
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  2. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
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Correspondence to Jeremiah Joven Joaquin.

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Garrett, B., Joaquin, J.J. Ismael on the Paradox of Predictability. Philosophia 49, 2081–2084 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00381-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00381-z

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